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Introduction
 In 2009, The New York Times ran the following headline: “Doctor 
Shortage Proves Obstacle to Obama Goals. Primary Care Lacking.” The story ran 
as the lead on page one. In Massachusetts, according to the Worcester Telegram 
and Gazette, new patients wait an average of 43 days to be seen by a primary care 
physician. To anyone in America old enough to remember the 1950s and ’60s the 
situation will seem familiar, as will the solutions being offered, namely, to expand 
existing medical school classes, open a dozen or more new schools, and produce 
more doctors - preferably doctors who will practice primary care.1
 Indeed, these solutions are identical to those proposed more than 50 years 
ago. This book tells the story of one such school, the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School, one of many founded between the 1950s and the early 1970s in 
response to a nationwide call for more doctors. Today, however, we have learned 
that producing more doctors is not the same as producing the kind of doctors 
most Americans need. 
 The idea for a state medical school in Massachusetts was broached in 1948, 
a response to the wave of veterans who could now consider it feasible to seek 
higher education. The Commonwealth did not begin to seriously consider the idea 
for another decade. At the time, medical education in the United States appeared 
to have reached a plateau. As soon as medical schools seemed to have achieved 
the technical and scientific rigor prophesied for them by Abraham Flexner’s 
famous 1910 report, many medical educators - and even some commentators 
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outside the profession - worried that the trend had gone too far.2  After decades of 
concerted effort to embody Flexnerian ideals - to eliminate substandard medical 
schools, to restrict the numbers of medical students admitted to the remaining 
schools, to educate medical students in the rigorous thought processes of the 
“scientific” method, to ally medical schools with first rate hospitals, to encourage 
medical faculty to become “full-time” professors (rather than clinicians for whom 
part-time teaching afforded a gratifying honorific), and finally, if implicitly, to 
encourage specialization and biomedical research - medical educators and the 
public were having second thoughts. Had medicine become too “scientific” and 
technical? Had physicians lost touch with the art of good practice? Why was it so 
hard to find a family doctor?3  
            Of all these pressing questions, two called for immediate resolution: whether 
to expand the pool of prospective physicians and if so, whether to modify their 
education to emphasize generalist clinical medicine. These were concerns 
throughout most of the United States. Unique to Massachusetts was the political 
subtext underlying the fight to establish a state medical school, an undercurrent 
produced by a pronounced shift from an establishment dominated by old-
line Brahmin Republicans such as Henry Cabot Lodge or Leverett Saltonstall, 
to the populism of Democratic politicians supported by organized labor, the 
Catholic Church, and in general, the non-elite. Such constituents were eager to 
bolster public education despite the increased taxes that would inevitably result. 
Sentiments ran high that the sons and daughters of plumbers and electricians 
should have the same opportunities as any other hard-working students.4 
          This book will examine Massachusetts’ responses to these challenges and 
how they shaped the culture and values of its only state-funded medical school, 
chartered in 1962. As we will learn in the ensuing pages, UMass Medical School 
was just one of an unusually large cohort of medical schools founded between 
1960 and 1978. But the politically complex circumstances of its founding and 
ongoing political challenges that lasted for decades created a distinct legacy. 
More fundamentally, the determination of UMass Med, embodied in its founding 
dean, Lamar Soutter, to resist the pressure to become a “community” medical 
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school - one that exclusively emphasizes primary care education at the expense 
of specialization and world class research - makes its history exemplary, if not 
unique.   
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School founding dean, Lamar Soutter, 
M.D., at the future site of the medical 
school, farmland previously owned by 
Worcester State Hospital. (Reprinted from 
“Achieving A Dream, A Commemorative,” 
Photo courtesy of  the  Office of University 
Relations, University of Massachusetts 
Medical School
          Part I of this book, Chapters 1-4, tells the story of those early political 
challenges and the importance of Dr. Soutter’s Boston Brahmin background and 
his wartime heroics at the Battle of the Bulge in arming him to fight for his notion 
of educational excellence. It also recounts the legislative epic of Worcester’s 
surprising choice as the location for the school, a fight which embroiled 
the University’s Board of Trustees with organized labor, state and national 
legislators, the Catholic Church, and, of course, the Massachusetts medical 
establishment. Legislative battles were a constant feature of the school’s pre-
history (and surely didn’t disappear after it opened in 1970). The groundbreaking 
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ceremony of 1969, more than 20 years after the first proposal to found a state 
medical school was made, occurred only after a concerted struggle by the Dean 
and Trustees to wring adequate construction funds from the Legislature, the 
governor, and the federal government. Part II will describe the school’s successful 
struggle to outgrow the confines of the state’s original vision—a “community” 
medical school—into an academic health science center that emphasizes both 
research and primary care education, and the growth of other major components, 
such as the Graduate School of Nursing, the Graduate School of Biomedical 
Sciences, and Commonwealth Medicine, as the school matured.
          A note on terminology: The University of Massachusetts Medical School  
became the University of Massachusetts Medical Center  from 1976 through 
1997 when it divested itself of University Hospital and reverted to its original 
designation as the University of Massachusetts Medical School.  This book has 
tried to honor these changes and refers to UMMS or UMMC depending on the 
years under discussion.
Aerial view of 
University of 
Massachusetts 
Medical School, 
circa 2012. (Photo 
courtesy of  the  
Office of University 
Relations, 
University of 
Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1  Robert Pear, “Doctor Shortage Proves Obstacle to Obama Goals. Primary Care 
Lacking,” New York Times (New England ed.), April 27, p. 1; Donna Boynton, 
“State Lags in Access to Primary Care,” Telegram and Gazette, May 9, 2011, p. 
1; A.G. Sulzberger, “New Path for Small-Town Doctors Starts in Kansas Small 
Town, New York Times, July 23, 2011, pp. 1, 3.
2  Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, “Higher Education and the 
Nation’s Health: Policies for Medical and Dental Education, Special Report,” 
October, 1970, pp. 1-11, in Series 6: Position Statements, Box 1, fol. 4, AAMC 
Archives, AAMC Reference Center, Washington, D.C. [hereafter, AAMC/DC]. 
Accessed at https://www.aamc.org/about/history/foundations/ on July 12, 
2011.
3  Also see the AAMC’s position statement on the need for more support for new 
medical schools, written largely by the deans of the newest of those institutions. 
“Draft: New and Developing Medical Schools, A Statement of Position,” Feb.  5, 
1970, typescript, pp. 1-10, ibid.
 
4  I owe the latter insights to conversations with H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., 
founding chair of Surgery at UMass Medical School, and with Nicholas Soutter, 
Esq., son of Dr. Lamar Soutter, founding dean of the medical school.
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Chapter 1
Does Massachusetts Really Need Another Medical School?
 Between 1943 and 1978, 48 medical schools opened in the United 
States and Puerto Rico, an increase of close to 60% over the number of schools 
already in existence. Thirty-eight schools were founded between 1960 and 
1978, including many that explicitly acknowledged a need for more primary 
care physicians as a major impetus for their founding. Largely, those were state 
schools. This chapter describes the context for founding so many medical schools 
and the specific - one might even say raucous - politics attending the birth of 
Massachusetts’ only state medical school in 1962.1
American Medical Education at a Crossroads: the 1950s and Sixties
 
 As leaders of the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and 
the American Medical Association (AMA) considered the future direction of 
medical education in the 1950s, they must have felt challenged by the strikingly 
mixed messages they received from both the government and the American 
public. Reflecting Cold War fears following the Sputnik satellite launch in 1957, 
reports issued from Washington called for intensified production of scientists, 
engineers, and physicians to meet a perceived scientific “manpower” gap. On the 
other hand, the numbers of general practitioners (GPs), available for the everyday 
medical needs of the public were rapidly declining. True, 10 new medical schools 
had been founded between 1943 and 1959, in part to accommodate returning 
soldiers in search of medical degrees on the GI bill.2  But they would not meet the 
need.  The American population’s rising birth rate and lengthening life span, not 
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to mention its changing disease profile in the era of antibiotics, led many in the 
medical establishment to heed calls from the U. S. Surgeon General, the Carnegie 
Foundation, and others to rethink their decades-old policy of keeping a tight 
rein on the physician supply.3 Underlying these conflicting demands was a much 
trickier problem: how to assure that a sufficient number of these new physicians 
actually became family doctors. Opening the profession to thousands more 
practitioners does not, by itself, improve access to medical care unless a higher 
proportion of those physicians choose to become “generalist” or “primary care” 
practitioners. 
 Efforts to find a workable balance between specialists and generalists 
extended back nearly half a century.4  Since the 1930s, when the “Final Report” 
of the Carnegie, Rockefeller, Milbank Memorial, and Russell Sage Foundation-
supported Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC) was published, one 
stream within organized medicine publicly advocated for more rationalized 
medical care delivery systems that integrated specialism and generalism into 
multi-specialty group practices offering comprehensive care. The CCMC Report’s 
sponsors were primarily interested in cost containment and increased access 
rather than in primary care per se. At any rate, neither the AMA nor medical 
educators paid much attention to the CCMC’s findings. The AMA feared, among 
other things, that GPs, who comprised the preponderance of their members, 
would lose out to specialists. Medical educators and hospital residency directors 
were too committed to the goal of medical specialization to consider making a 
place for what they saw as a dying breed - the GP.5  
 World War II dramatically accelerated the growth of specialization in 
biomedical research and medical practice, just as it had in most other fields 
of scholarship and the professions. Core specialties such as internal medicine, 
pediatrics and surgery, beneficiaries of new technologies, new techniques, 
and startlingly focused targets of research, all subdivided into subspecialties 
to adequately train young physicians for their newly enlarged, scientifically 
ambitious disciplines. As Rosemary Stevens observed more than 40 years ago, 
medical practice had begun to resemble “a federation of diverse disciplines.”6 
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Passage of the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 enabled 
hospitals to grant clinical departments more lines for residents.7 By calling for 
thousands more interns and residents, the Act translated into a call for more 
highly trained specialists. Dramatic improvements in medical technologies, 
whether chemotherapeutic agents such as antibiotics, corticosteroids, 
tranquilizers and antipsychotics, or surgical techniques such as open heart 
surgery, made the seemingly indisputable case for medical students to pursue 
highly specialized medical careers.8  Graduate medical education expanded 
both because of the desire of most medical graduates to become specialists and 
subspecialists, and because physician-researchers needed residents to carry a 
heavier load of the hospitals’ expanding clinical workload and medical student 
teaching. Such physicians, specialty-oriented and research-literate if not actual 
researchers themselves, were the antithesis of old-style general practitioners.
 This picture began to change during the 1950s. The Surgeon-General’s 
Report of 1959, titled “Physicians for a Growing America,” known as the “Bane 
Report” after one of its lead authors, announced the federal government’s 
serious attention to medical “manpower” issues. The Report called for a drastic 
expansion of the numbers of physicians produced each year, and especially a 
large increase in the number of medical schools. As one analysis concluded, “If 
the Surgeon General’s Consultant Group’s estimate of 10,500 M.D. graduates 
by 1975 were to be met...21 new 4-year schools would be needed by 1971 and 
an additional twelve more by 1976…a total of 33 new schools…” not counting 
the schools opened since 1943.9  More than a call for more doctors, the Report 
registered the public’s growing concern about the kind of medicine they would 
practice and, necessarily, the education that produced such practitioners.10  
According to surveys taken in the late 1950s, the medical workforce could be 
characterized as highly qualified, highly specialized, and scarce. The public’s 
belief that physicians were becoming a limited commodity –a belief shared by the 
authors of the Surgeon General’s Report, the AAMC, and even the professionally 
conservative AMA – was strengthened by the spread of prepaid health insurance 
like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, by fledgling HMOs, and by passage of Medicare and 
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Medicaid in July, 1965, which increased demand. Even the AMA was changing its 
views on the need for more physicians.11 
 Was the profession’s focus on specialization and technologically driven 
medicine overshadowing its delivery of humane, patient-centered medicine? Was 
the science of medicine replacing the art of medicine? Would typical medical 
graduates of the 1960s be prepared for or even willing to serve the nation’s 
growing need for “continuing, comprehensive,” primary care?12  How could 
medical education serve the ordinary needs of patients while also preparing 
young physicians for the most advanced medical science in the world? These 
questions rose to the top of the national health “manpower” agenda.
 In short, demand was increasing for accessible primary care. Historian 
John Burnham cites studies from the 1950s attacking the medical profession for 
greed and a lack of empathy, possibly in reaction to rising health care costs and 
the AMA’s ardent campaign against national health insurance during the Truman 
administration.13 By the late 1960s, only 20 percent of practicing physicians 
defined themselves as general practitioners, although residencies in pediatrics, 
surgery, and internal medicine were very full. The AMA’s placement service in 
1968 classified about one–third of its listings as general practice, but only eight 
percent of the physicians registered were general practitioners. Yet, according to 
physician and scholar John P. Geyman, “In 1966, among callers to the Chicago 
Medical Society’s Referral Service specifically requesting a field of practice, calls 
for general practitioners were about four times more frequent than for internists 
or gynecologists…”14 
 Medical schools, for their part, by fulfilling their Flexnerian mission, 
had become more divorced from the realities of everyday clinical practice than 
at any time since the 1920s. Responding to the new call for practitioners to 
relate to their patients’ real-world health problems, medical educators tried 
to improve “the educational process, largely from the standpoint of better and 
more effective learning, but also with regard to increased relevance of medical 
practice to social needs.” Education reformers called for increasing the role of 
the behavioral sciences in an expanded curriculum that stressed comprehensive 
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care of the “whole” patient. For example, the new field of family medicine was 
authorized to grant board certifications in 1969 and had campaigned for specialty 
status most intensively from the mid-1960s; the concept of the “biopsychosocial 
model” also emerged in the 1960s and ’70s, becoming a conceptual bulwark for 
both psychiatry and family practice.15 Among the most prominent proponent 
of modifying the goals of medical education to reconnect it more directly to 
the public’s needs and to incorporate more of what might be called “doctoring” 
was Ward Darley, Executive Director of the AAMC from 1959 to 1965. Others, 
too, began expressing concern over the dearth of small-group teaching and 
“active” learning rather than the still common reliance on large lectures and 
memorization during the first two years of medical school.16   
 By the time of the Surgeon General’s Report in 1959, in short, both the 
AAMC and the AMA were cognizant of a growing mismatch between the kinds of 
physicians entering the profession and those that the general population actually 
needed: primary care doctors. According to “The Future Need for Physicians,” a 
statement adopted at the 67th annual meeting of the AAMC in 1956, “In the ten-
year period [1945-46 to 1955-56] the number of medical schools has increased 
from 77 to 82, the number of entering freshmen from 6,060 to 7,686, and the 
number of graduates from 5,655 to 6,485…It is possible that some existing 
schools can, with new and larger facilities, accept additional students, but the 
need cannot be met completely in this manner. The larger contribution in the 
number of students will have to come, as it has in the past, by the establishment 
of new schools.”17 But Ward Darley of the AAMC came closer to the real problem, 
noting that, “The availability of physicians for general care has been threatened 
by the growth of specialism…The availability and adequacy of continuing, 
comprehensive health and medical care for individuals and their families is, 
I believe, one of the most important questions facing the future of American 
medicine.”18 
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The “New” Generation of Medical Schools
 In short, by the time Massachusetts officials took up the question of 
authorizing a state medical school, questions about the future of health-care 
access and reform of medical education informed legislative agendas across the 
United States. Yet, in a state where three private universities - Harvard, Boston 
University, and Tufts - already ran established medical schools, how could the 
state justify sponsoring its own? What needs should a state-supported medical 
school fulfill? Should it embrace the ideal of university affiliation? Should it strive 
to become an academic health science center, necessitating either affiliating 
with, or building, a major teaching hospital? Such questions boiled down to one 
overall decision: Should a new medical school in the 1960s and ’seventies become 
a “community-based” medical school emphasizing education for primary care 
in alliance with community hospitals and local medical practices, or become the 
now traditional academic health science center with an elite hospital and a strong 
referral base?  The choice would determine the long-range goals and even the 
cultural identity of members of this large cohort of new schools, including UMass 
Medical School.
 After the 1959 call for more medical “manpower” by the Bane Report, 
the AAMC received a veritable flood of inquiries from potential founders of 
new medical schools.19 In 1963 Public Law 88-129, the Health Professions 
Education Assistance Act, established matching Federal grants for construction 
and improvement of medical schools, as well as student loans for medicine, 
osteopathy, and dentistry. A Medical Library Assistance Act was passed in 
1965, providing construction and other funds for this essential unit of any 
medical school. Between 1959 and 1968, more than 8,000 additional students 
were enrolled, an increase of about 27% over pre-Bane Report levels.20 The 
founders of this new medical school cohort, as noted above, faced two divergent 
pathways depending on whether they envisioned their future as so-called 
“community-based medical schools” or as “academic health science centers” in 
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the Flexnerian tradition. In 1964 Ward Darley asked Dr. Lowell T. Coggeshall, 
Dean of the medical school of the University of Chicago, to chair a commission 
that would write a policy statement for the AAMC delineating the desirable 
features of modern medical education and the AAMC’s desired role in promoting 
it. Published in 1965, the “Coggeshall Report” became the definitive policy 
statement of the academic medical establishment for the next twenty years. The 
Report suggested that bridging the divide between “community” and “academic” 
medical schools would not be easy - and might not be possible at all.
 Coggeshall recognized the need for more physicians to better serve a 
nation in which both population and demand for health care were rising steeply. 
But he also made it clear that the “community-based” medical school would 
always be seen as a second-class citizen by what he termed the “great public 
and private medical schools.” In the context of his own career as a professor 
and then dean of an elite, private medical school, Coggeshall did not expect elite 
institutions to adapt readily to the current national need. He wrote, “Clearly the 
publicly supported medical schools have greater responsibility to orient their 
efforts toward meeting requirements of their sponsoring states...The primary 
emphasis of American medical education - especially since the Flexner Report 
- has been on establishing and sustaining quality of instruction and research…
The need of the future will be for the field of medical education to assume 
responsibility for meeting the quantitative as well as the qualitative needs of the 
nation and individual states and communities.” Implying that “quantity” might 
militate against “quality,” he warned against allowing a “re-emergence of schools 
of marginal quality.”21 His reservations were widely shared among leaders of 
established medical schools. The Massachusetts Medical Society formed its own 
committee to study the question of a state-supported school in Massachusetts. 
(Lamar Soutter was a member.) The committee prefaced its (tepid) support for a 
new school by saying, “The Society, however, can only favor the creation of a new 
medical school that is capable of graduating physicians of the same quality as 
those now provided by our three present medical schools.”22  
 Rather than creating such (supposedly) second-class schools, Coggeshall 
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called for new schools to be “integral parts of mature universities with well-
established graduate programs.” They should not be “hospital schools.” Thus, 
it would be imperative for new medical schools, like the best of the current 
institutions, to be closely allied with their parent universities. They must also 
be closely affiliated with a high-quality clinical setting, preferably with both 
inpatient and outpatient facilities. Medical students moreover, should experience 
the “multidisciplinary health care team” of the future, since specialization, 
Coggeshall believed, was clearly too entrenched to be dissolved. At the same 
time, such schools should take on the education of related health professions, 
emphasizing the skills necessary to be part of a “physician-led health care 
team.”23 
 New medical schools faced an ambivalent reception from the academic 
establishment if they tried to deviate from the now established “Flexnerian” 
model. The AAMC itself retreated from its brief focus on community-based 
medical education under Darley shortly after his retirement in 1965, the year 
when the influential Coggeshall Report was published. The organization instead 
renewed its earlier focus on federal funding for medical research and national 
health policy.24 The rise of federal funding for medical research in the post WWII 
decades produced a steep increase in the number of “full-time” faculty, that is, 
faculty funded entirely for their academic efforts with no independent clinical 
income, from close to 4000 in 1951 to about 19,500 in 1967. Many of these were 
strictly researchers. From the perspective of academic medicine, these trends 
were expected to continue.25 Even in 1961, early in the cycle of new medical 
school construction, a report issued by an expert AAMC/AMA committee on the 
planning of medical schools advised that, “Increasingly the teaching of medical 
students is carried on in close conjunction with graduate teaching programs 
in the basic and clinical sciences, with the training of hospital house staff, and 
with other educational activities of the medical school and its parent university.” 
This report suggested an ideal class size of 100 as well as an academic teaching 
hospital controlled, if not owned outright, by the school and large enough to hold 
500-700 inpatient beds and outpatient clinics catering to about 350 visits per 
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day. (It is worth noting, that even while advocating the close linkage between 
medical schools and universities, the report also acknowledged the emerging 
primacy of comprehensive care, reflecting “a growing concern with the problems 
of the patient as a person and as a family member, as distinct from the study of 
cases of a particular disease.”)26  
 Dr. William R. Willard, the dean of the University of Kentucky Medical 
School (established in 1956 and opened in 1960) and a nationally prominent 
educator, was one of the report’s authors. More consequentially, Willard was 
the author of one of the most important reports on medical education of the 
1960s, an AMA/AAMC collaborative effort titled Meeting the Challenge of Family 
Practice: The Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Education for Family Practice 
of the Council on Medical Education. In it he called for a new specialty, “Family 
Practice,” to take on the growing need for “continuous, comprehensive” care. 
Yet Willard was also adamant about the need for a first-rate medical school 
to be closely affiliated with a parent university for the sake of collaborative 
research and academic enrichment. UMass Medical School founding dean, 
Lamar Soutter, ardently agreed with this advice. As succeeding chapters will 
show, Soutter assumed the new school would be located on the UMass Amherst 
campus, something for which he argued strongly. Willard was the first expert 
invited by Soutter to advise the UMass Board of Trustees after Soutter had 
accepted the deanship at the Medical School. Willard told the Board that most of 
the existing research at his medical school was being done in cooperation with 
“allied university research units such as the engineering school, psychology and 
sociology departments, and the basic life sciences departments.”27  
 Many of the newer schools, however, could not afford to adopt the 
academic medical center model. For one, after 1968 the government’s predicted 
support for new medical school construction had become a hollow promise as 
the competing costs of the Viet Nam War siphoned off much of the available 
money and triggered rising inflation. The United States Public Health Service 
Surgeon-General, William B. Stewart, spoke to the AAMC Executive Council in 
1966, warning them of the downturn to come and added that research grants, too, 
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were becoming less likely to receive funding. He noted that each grant’s costs, 
like the costs of medical technology and hospital and school construction, all 
had “doubled in about two years.” The downturn in federal funding, it should be 
noted, coincided exactly with the years of UMMS’s efforts to raise construction 
funds and, literally, get off the ground.28 
 Therefore, some new medical schools faced financial barriers that 
precluded following the academic medical center model. By the late 1960s, as a 
faculty member from one of these schools wrote, “Issues of minority admissions, 
affirmative action, educational and financial supports for disadvantaged students, 
and medical care for the poor became preeminent in the consciousness of all of 
us.”  According to data compiled by the AAMC, schools that opened between 1970 
and 1980 allotted, on average, 65% of their first-year slots, to women applicants, 
significantly above the norm. Funding exigencies, however, discouraged any 
ambitions to become elite research centers –at least for awhile. For example, 
“many new schools found it necessary to use community hospitals…whether by 
choice or because of the essential unavailability of federal funds for university 
hospital construction after about 1970…” The new, community-based schools 
relied more on community physicians for teaching than established schools, and 
often had less authority over hospital policies than at university hospitals.29 In 
the words of Richard Egan, M.D., Secretary to the Council on Medical Education 
of the AMA, echoing Coggeshall, “There is understandably a concern about the 
creation of new schools that may, at least superficially, bear some resemblance to 
the prereformation [i.e. pre-Flexnerian] schools.”30  
 True, some of the new cohort, such as the University of California at San 
Diego Medical School, or Mt. Sinai, for example, became almost immediate 
successes as research enterprises - in large part due to their affiliation either 
with a research university or a venerable and well-endowed hospital. Many 
others, however, either took much longer to reach that status or made no plans 
to follow that path. The new schools of the 1960s and 1970s more often made 
their reputations not only via their more diverse student bodies, or by more 
readily integrating family medicine or general internal medicine into their 
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undergraduate and graduate programs, but also by affiliating with community 
hospitals and clinicians.31 Finally, new schools were associated with curriculum 
innovation to introduce medical students to actual patients in their first two 
years, and enhancing clinical science education with behavioral and social 
science. They thus early acquired the reputation of espousing, “a somewhat 
different set of values than did their established institutional peers.”32 As  noted 
by President John Z. Bowers of the Macy Foundation, which had begun funding 
curriculum innovation grants as early as 1954, “Primary care and family/
community medicine are… supplanting biomedical research and specialty 
training as the watchwords of medical education,” especially in schools of the 
newer cohort.33 
 When the University of Massachusetts and the state government began to 
seriously consider establishing a state medical school, therefore, the question of 
whether to create the school rapidly was supplanted by the question of what kind 
of school it should be. That, at least initially, seemed to depend on its location, 
whether a campus-based, non-urban site, or an urban location separated from 
the flagship campus at Amherst. It also reflected the pressures brought to bear 
by the deans of the established Boston medical schools. Most crucially, however, 
the question of whether to promote research and super-specialization over 
primary care, community service, and community hospital affiliations loomed 
large for years after Governor John Volpe signed the enabling legislation in 1962. 
For UMass Medical School, as for a few of the other members of its cohort (for 
example, UC-San Diego School of Medicine), that “choice” proved to be false, or 
at least unnecessary. Legislative pressures aside, in Massachusetts Dean Soutter 
adamantly refused to choose between primary care and specialization. In fact, he 
stipulated building a university hospital as one of his bedrock assumptions for the 
school. Ambitious plans for research, as will be detailed in Part II of this book, 
took longer to fulfill, but they were never off the table even during Dean Soutter’s 
earliest planning. Besides, as he would argue, even for careers in primary care, 
medical students must be well educated and that required their being exposed to 
specialty medicine.
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Politics, Medical Education and the Commonwealth
“The journey was fraught with repetitive challenges and 
dangers, and shipwreck seemed a constant threat.”34 
 Starting around 1948, elected officials in Massachusetts addressed 
themselves to the need for a state medical school. And for the next 30 years, the 
fate of the state’s medical school was bound up with larger concerns about the 
place of public higher education in a state that already boasted many excellent 
private colleges and universities ranging from elite schools like Harvard or 
Wellesley to those like Northeastern or Boston University that catered to a 
wider spectrum of students. The University of Massachusetts was incorporated 
in April 1863 as the Massachusetts Agricultural College under the Morrill Land 
Grant Act of 1862. In 1943, although the legislature renamed it Massachusetts 
State College, something of the “Aggie” school clung to its reputation. Finally 
in 1947 it was rechartered as the University of Massachusetts with the nominal 
mandate to provide a full liberal arts education for citizens of the Commonwealth 
on a par with other well-reputed state universities. Not until 1962, under the 
UMass system president, John Lederle, was the university able to wrest fiscal 
independence from the state legislature. Previously, UMass salaries were tied 
to the state salary schedule which, in Lederle’s words, was “impossible.”35 The 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) ranked UMass 82nd 
among American universities in average salaries in 1964, according to the 
university’s provost. A decade later, the state was ranked “last among the states 
in per capita investment in higher education. Furthermore, of all the states, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts invested the lowest proportion of its total 
public higher education budget in the training of health professionals.” As one 
observer summed it up, public higher education in Massachusetts was “a late-
bloomer.”36
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                John W. Lederle, President, University of Massachusetts (Photo 
                 courtesy of the Department of Special Collections and University Archives,
                 W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
  President Lederle, who remained in office from 1960 to 1970, was a crucial 
figure in the expansion of the university and the solidification of its fiscal and 
intellectual autonomy. During his tenure, UMass gained a new campus in Boston 
as well as the medical school in Worcester. According to one estimate, enrollment 
at UMass grew from 7,000 in 1960 to 26,600 across its three campuses by 
the early 1970s. Yet because of state subsidies, tuition in 1970 ($200.00 for 
undergraduates, $600.00 for medical students) remained sharply lower than 
what private, non-elite universities such as Boston University were charging. 
Beginning in the 1960s, private universities like BU began to feel the pinch of 
competition from the state higher education system, and they didn’t like it one 
bit. Between the early 1960s, when college costs - and tuition - began to rise 
steeply, and the 1970s, the percentage of in-state students at schools such as BU 
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and Northeastern fell almost by half, endangering their traditional “quasi-public” 
function of educating large numbers of middle-class Massachusetts students. 
By 1970, when John Silber became president of BU, his first public statements 
about higher education aimed a sharp protest at the Commonwealth’s support 
for expanded public education embodied in the new Boston and Worcester 
campuses, claiming that a solid private institution - like BU - could make space 
for state residents at a relatively low cost to the taxpayer simply through state 
tuition subsidies, thus avoiding the cost of building new campuses.37  
 This public-private tension shadowed the development of state-sponsored 
medical education in the Commonwealth through much of the 1970s. Silber, for 
example, was indignant at the proposed cost of building a new university hospital 
on the medical school campus when BU’s medical school could provide spaces for 
Massachusetts students in return for tuition subsidies and support for renovation 
of Boston City Hospital - a bargain, he claimed. In comparison, he projected a 
cost of more than $130 million for the new medical school and hospital. In words 
that still rankle among veteran faculty of UMass Medical School’s early years, 
Silber wrote, “The building of this school is a monument to the folly of forgetting 
that all universities are public, and of allowing anything but educational need to 
dictate expansion of the state sector.” In the early 1970s, Silber was fighting for 
the life of his financially-strapped university; his protests against the medical 
school were merely part of a larger campaign to draw more Massachusetts dollars 
to BU. His principal target was not the medical school, but the entire UMass 
system. But it nicely played into the hands of Boston’s private medical schools.38  
 In fact, resistance to a state medical school by the deans of the medical 
schools in Boston - Harvard, Tufts, and BU - weighed much more heavily in 
the political scales. Long before UMass began its expansion into Boston and 
Worcester, a state medical school attracted opposition strictly on its own terms 
- as a potential competitor for patients. Such opposition, particularly from the 
Dean of Harvard Medical School, posed a serious threat throughout the 1950s. 
As early as 1952, it was said to have blocked any effort to create a state-supported 
medical school, particularly since its proponents wanted to build it in Boston.   
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 Tensions between public and private medical education, in short, began in 
the late 1940s and persisted for nearly thirty years. (There are those who would 
say that opposition from “the privates” has never fully abated, but in the current 
era they would be mistaking intense rivalry for outright opposition.) During 
Democratic Governor Paul Dever’s term (1949-1953), the first of successive 
legislative commissions reported favorably on the idea in 1950, but only as a 
two-year, pre-clinical school. In 1952, another proposal from the Massachusetts 
Medical-Dental Commission favored a Boston site for a four-year school without 
absolutely ruling out a location in the western part of the state. That same year, 
Governor Dever proposed a state school be built adjacent to the new Lemuel 
Shattuck chronic disease hospital in Boston. Worcester, too, first made its 
case as a site for a medical school in 1952 when the Worcester District Medical 
Society, the superintendent of Worcester City Hospital, and several local college 
presidents banded together to stake a claim for the city. The costs estimated to 
build a new medical school that year were $35 million, with operating expenses of 
$1 million per year.39   
 Publicly, Boston’s medical establishment offered only oblique criticism. 
An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine argued that the need for 
doctors did not exist in the state; but if it did exist, the need was gravest in the 
western part of the state, especially for “general practitioners.” It concluded 
that any medical school in the Commonwealth must be “capable of producing 
graduates of the highest quality,” implying that limiting admissions to only 
Massachusetts applicants and emphasizing low-status general practice would be 
antithetical to such a lofty goal.40 Support for a state school seemed to cool in the 
next few years, and with a new Governor in the statehouse, Shattuck Hospital 
was run as a state-owned chronic disease unit.41 But the issue only had been put 
on the back burner; a succession of investigatory commissions kept it gently 
simmering until the Bane Report of 1959 brought it back to legislators’ attention. 
 As long as the Massachusetts Senate remained in Republican hands, 
powerful Republican constituencies such as the Boston medical establishment 
could block any action on behalf of a state school. Democrats, however, 
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had held a majority in the House since 1948 and did not let it die. The Bane 
Report happened to coincide with a democratic takeover of the Massachusetts 
Senate, giving that party control over both houses of the state legislature, a 
crucial development. As retired District Attorney (Worcester) John Conte, 
who previously held office in both the House and Senate, remembered, many 
Massachusetts citizens - those affiliated with organized labor, but many 
other middle and working class citizens - perceived medicine as a “controlled 
profession [that] didn’t give everyone equal opportunity.” In other words, they 
keenly felt a sense of undue and unfair exclusion. The admissions policies of 
Boston’s three private medical schools came to epitomize such exclusivity.42 At 
the time, many elite universities and those aspiring to be ranked among the elite, 
began to deliberately transform their admissions policies in favor of students 
outside their own state or region. In 1957, for example, Thomas J. Wojtkowski, 
Democratic state representative from Pittsfield in western Massachusetts and 
chair of the House Committee on Education, was quoted as saying that he has 
“many students who apparently are fully qualified to become doctors, but … are 
having a great deal of trouble getting into medical school [in Massachusetts].” 
Other legislators made the same claim. Under the GI Bill, many students from 
low- to moderate-income families could now aspire to a graduate or medical 
degree. But few places were open to them in Massachusetts - even if they could 
have afforded the tuition. One early leader of the UMass Med faculty described 
the atmosphere at the time as verging on “class warfare.”43 
 In response to such constituent pressure as well as to the perceived 
crisis in health “manpower,” the Massachusetts Medical-Dental Commission 
recommended in 1954 that the New England states create a New England Board 
of Higher Education (NEBHE). Since the state legislative Commission had 
not reached an agreement, a non-legislative Board seemed an excellent idea. 
When the U.S. Congress chartered the body in 1956, the NEBHE began to look 
closely at remedying the perceived shortage of medical school opportunities in 
New England.44 To no one’s surprise, New England was found wanting in the 
number of its young men and women who were admitted to medical school. 
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Forty of the 48 states currently supported public medical education “in some 
fashion,” according to the Board’s findings. In New England, however, only one 
state - Vermont - supported the medical education of its own residents.  In the 
words of a Board report of 1957, “Fewer New England students study medicine in 
proportion to its population than students from the country as a whole…Because 
we use more doctors than the national average…we must import them in sizable 
numbers from the rest of the country.” More persuasively, the Report continued, 
given the nation’s future demands for physicians, “Certainly many more young 
men and women will be competing for admission to medical schools. However, 
those schools supported by state and municipal funds will logically feel that their 
first responsibility is to students from their own area...” New Englanders would 
be left out.45 
 The NEBHE thus proposed that every New England state agree to spend 
$2,500 for each local medical student who enrolled in one of the region’s medical 
schools - public or private - beyond the number enrolled in 1956. For a moderate 
investment, the region might increase its medical graduates by the same number 
as if they had built a new school. Yet when the Board examined the results of its 
plan three years later, despite the fact that every state but Connecticut had agreed 
to participate, the figures revealed a sorry story. By 1959, the numbers had not 
increased. In fact, they had declined. As the Report detailed, “In 1959 there were 
117 fewer [New Englanders admitted to New England medical schools] than in 
1956 - a drop of 12.3% from 953 to 836.” Only the University of Vermont had kept 
its part of the bargain. Other New England schools, notably Harvard, Tufts, and 
Boston University, had actually reduced the number of students admitted from 
New England, recruiting instead from the increasing number of students applying 
from across the United States. Although, the Report admitted, “the region at 
present does enjoy a favorable physician-population ratio - 155.4 per 100,000 
for New England as compared with 118.4 for the United States,” it invoked the 
Surgeon General’s Report to emphasize that New England must do its share to 
help provide for the nation’s future needs: “Except for the state of Vermont, we 
are not contributing our fair share.” On October 18, 1959 the NEBHE adopted 
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three resolutions declaring that Massachusetts and Connecticut should establish 
medical and dental schools; that New England states without publicly supported 
medical and dental schools should create contractual arrangements with existing 
New England schools to admit more regionally-based students; and, that 
New England states without such schools establish financial aid for “qualified 
residents with limited financial resources” to attend those schools with which 
contractual arrangements had been established.46  
 The Commission’s findings generated a strong reaction. By February 1960, 
the AAMC had received preliminary inquiries into starting a medical school from 
the University of Massachusetts, the University of Connecticut, Brown University, 
and MIT. By October, it acknowledged what it termed “serious” inquiries from 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Brown. The outgoing Massachusetts governor, 
Foster Furcolo, a Democrat, publicly supported creating a state medical school.47 
Also in 1960 he proposed a bill to expand Shattuck Hospital’s ambulatory 
care department and construct a four-year, 100-student medical school and 
research building in Boston. Furcolo estimated the total costs at $17 million, 
of which fourteen million would come from the current surplus in the state 
budget, and $3 million from federal grants. Interestingly, Furcolo’s draft bill 
incorporated the same funding requests that would be made two years later: 
$100,000 for hiring a dean and other expenses associated with planning, and 
$14 million for remodeling Shattuck Hospital and constructing the education 
and research building. The bill also called for a reconstitution of the University of 
Massachusetts Board of Trustees to better manage a medical school and hospital; 
henceforth the Board should include, besides the governor, “the Commissioners 
of education, agriculture, public health, and mental health, the president of the 
university (ex officio), and not more than 15 additional members to be appointed 
by the governor for seven-year terms of whom one is to be drawn from a list 
provided by the Mass. Medical Society.”48  
 Handwritten, private notes by the newly arrived University of 
Massachusetts President, John Lederle taken during a meeting to discuss the 
matter convey the political complexities surrounding the question, still two years 
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away from actual passage of the enabling bill:
 
[Judge] Fox is afraid of 2-year med. sch.-
[State Representative John] Thompson wants issue - 
running for Gov.
Leadership by [UM] - 3 Boston Deans - want a study - 
# of 2 year schools [compared?] with 4-year schools
Movement from small areas to large areas
Any boy or girl who asked about 2-year school… 49
 Roughly translated, the notes tell the following story: By the end of 1960, 
political opinion in the Commonwealth had reached an unstated consensus. As 
former medical school Chancellor Roger Bulger wrote in 1978, the legislature 
was the most powerful of the branches of state government in Massachusetts and 
after 1958, as noted earlier, both houses held a Democratic majority. The House, 
in combination with organized labor, had “consistently” led the battle for a state 
medical school.50 But by 1960, a majority of both houses in the Massachusetts 
legislature favored creating a state medical school. So did organized labor, 
which was a powerful lobby on Beacon Hill, especially after the union of the 
AFL and CIO and the creation of a state Labor Council in 1962. The question 
wasn’t whether to build the school, but what kind of institution it should be. That 
question hovered over Lederle’s notes. First, Judge J. John Fox, a probate judge 
said to be a friend of three different Democratic governors (Dever, Furcolo, and 
Peabody), was an influential Boston politician sought after for his ability to bring 
politicians together with organized labor. He was also a member of the UMass 
Board of Trustees. Judge Fox, “A tall, lean man with craggy features [who] was 
said to possess one of the shrewdest political minds in the Commonwealth,” is 
credited with securing a campus for the University of Massachusetts in Boston. 
His obituary noted that he also “was generally considered the father of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School…which was established by the 
Legislature after tremendous behind-the-scenes battling with medical officers 
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in Boston.”51 Fox was adamant that the school be first rate and was convinced 
it must be a four-year school. Representative John Thompson from the western 
Massachusetts town of Ludlow and the Speaker of the House, wanted to run for 
governor as one who had brought the people a state medical school. Thompson 
was willing to start with a two-year school, but Fox knew that the day of the two-
year medical school was over. (The AAMC went on record as opposed to such 
schools in 1961 at the same time as they began strongly encouraging new schools 
to become an integral part of a parent university.)52 
 Another issue embedded in this cryptic fragment was to prove much more 
troublesome, namely, whether to locate the school in an urban or rural part of the 
state. In early 1961, when Lederle’s notes were written, the school’s supporters 
already were touting locations in Boston, Worcester, Springfield, or a two-year 
school on the UMass campus in Amherst. Organized labor was quite open about 
its strong preference for an urban location for the school, preferably Boston. 
Hugh Thompson (no relation to Speaker John Thompson), who was at the time 
President of the Massachusetts Labor Council of the AFL-CIO and a member 
of the UMass Board of Trustees, made his views known plainly. Judge Fox, too, 
responsive to the wishes of organized labor, insisted the school be located in 
the heart of the Boston medical center. Labor would play an important role in 
winning approval for the school, in the selection of its location in Worcester, 
Judge J. John Fox (Photo courtesy of the James P. Loughlin 
Papers, University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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and in assuring that it obtained its own teaching hospital. At this stage of the 
proceedings, however, Boston was Labor’s first choice, but bitter factions were 
forming around the question of location. According to Speaker Thompson, 
Ever since the idea of a state-supported medical school 
was first advanced for legislative consideration by the 
late Governor Paul A. Dever, the Democratic Party 
in Massachusetts has strongly supported all efforts 
to establish a state medical school...At the present 
time, supporters of a four year state medical school 
are hopelessly divided as to the location of such an 
institution, and many informed observers believe that 
a divide and conquer strategy has been deliberately 
contrived by opponents of the plan in an effort to defeat 
all such efforts.
 Thompson went on to say that although he favored a four-year school, 
it seemed unlikely that anything but a two-year school had any possibility of 
passage into law. For that reason he decided to support a proposal for a two-
year school on the campus at UMass Amherst strongly favored by Mary Fonseca, 
Democrat of Fall River and Chair of the House Education Committee. The deans 
of the three Boston medical schools, too, had submitted a request to the Governor 
to authorize a formal study of the need for a state medical school, claiming to 
support a new school if it were shown to be necessary and if it were a top-quality 
school rather than one limited to accepting only in-state students. An editorial 
written by Lamar Soutter in the Boston Medical Quarterly, a journal published 
by Boston University School of Medicine and Massachusetts Memorial Hospitals, 
argued for a two-year school located on the Amherst campus, with either the 
existing Boston schools or the existing hospitals of Springfield and Westfield 
absorbing the students for their third and fourth years’ clinical work until a 
500-bed hospital could be built on the UMass Amherst campus. Few noticed at 
the time, however, that Representative Thomas Farrell, Democrat of Worcester 
and soon-to-be Chair of the House Finance Committee, spoke for Worcester, 
pointedly saying, “There seems to be an iron curtain down against spending 
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money anywhere west of Framingham.”53  
 In 1962, the Massachusetts Medical Society issued its own report on the 
advisability of founding a state medical school. The Society acknowledged the 
need for more doctors, but declared itself “considerably more enthusiastic about 
supporting the establishment of a two-year school than a four-year school.” 
The assumption underlying this conclusion was that the medical students from 
such a school would be accepted for their last two clinical years into the existing 
Boston schools - which would receive a state subsidy to make up the difference 
in tuition. The prospect of a financial windfall from the state was enticing. 
An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, a journal published by 
the Society, once again warned against limiting admissions to Massachusetts 
residents for fear of diluting the quality of its graduates. Instead of building such 
a school, it recommended that the three existing medical colleges be given tuition 
subventions similar to those already going to the University of Vermont. Boston 
University’s president Harold Case hoped to increase BU’s own medical school 
enrollment from 288 to 500 students, some presumably from Massachusetts, 
with money for tuition subventions and expansion of BU’s facilities to be 
underwritten by the state.54  
Politics, Medical Education, and the University of Massachusetts
 In the midst of these trial balloons, the University of Massachusetts had 
yet to formulate its own policy and preferences. In the UMass President’s office, 
for example, where John W. Lederle had just begun his 10-year term of office, 
little was known about  running a medical school. The Board of Trustees had 
explored the issue a decade earlier, but with no definitive conclusions.55 In May, 
1960, four months before Lederle took office, the University Provost convened a 
fact-finding committee of faculty and administrators to investigate the question. 
The Committee was headed by the dean of the UMass School of Nursing, Mary 
A. Maher. Maher was not a neutral party, of course, in that the School of Nursing 
would greatly have benefited from having a medical school and teaching hospital 
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on campus. As it was, nursing students routinely were bussed into Springfield 
for their hospital training, an unnecessary expense of time and money in 
Maher’s - and Lederle’s - view. But the committee did a highly professional job 
in a very brief period of time, consulting both published documents and the 
personal opinion of medical experts in New England and nationally. Among 
those they consulted were medical school deans from Vermont, Albany, and from 
Kentucky--Dean William Willard. Lamar Soutter, dean of Boston University 
Medical Center, was also among the report’s expert consultants. Although these 
consultants included Dr. Alfred Frechette, Commissioner of Public Health for 
the Commonwealth and a determined proponent of a Boston site for the school, 
the committee’s report strongly reflected the pro-campus bias of most members. 
In this it also reflected the bias of their consulting deans. All of the latter stood 
behind the sentiment of Dean Willard that, “the high level of Medical Education 
in the United States exists in part because of the close affiliation of the medical 
school and university; and because of its control by university administration.’ 
It ‘greatly’ facilitates faculty recruitment…” They concluded, “The ideal location 
for a medical school is on the campus of the sponsoring university, even if the 
location is not in a large city. School and hospital should be physically connected, 
because of the increasing importance of clinical instruction throughout the four 
years.” These educational ideals, it must be noted, accorded fully and deliberately 
with the Boston medical school deans’ determined opposition to having another 
four-year school share their already strained clinical resources, much less run a 
hospital that would compete for their patients. The UMass report commented, 
“…the deans of all three Boston medical schools...are perfectly willing to actively 
support a new medical school in Massachusetts if it is located outside of the 
Boston area and if it is to be developed according to high educational standards.” 
The report rejected the idea of a two-year school and, adding an observation 
of its own, pointedly noted that, “The staffing of a medical school requires a 
degree of freedom from control which does not currently exist in the state of 
Massachusetts.”  In only a few months, the committee sifted through and reached 
a consensus on most of the critical concerns that would be faced by the incoming 
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president, the Board of Trustees, and the legislature: the desired type, stature, 
location, and fiscal structure of the future school.56    
 The Maher study represented academic opinion, while the founding of 
a state medical school, certainly in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, was 
fundamentally a political, not an academic, decision. Lederle made this discovery 
even before he arrived on campus in September from the University of Michigan. 
At the time, Lederle knew next to nothing about running a medical school. As he 
recalled in 1975, “I felt we sooner or later…ought to have a medical school.” But 
not in Amherst, “because like everyone else my impression was that Amherst was 
a small country town and my impression, not knowing about medical education 
particularly… was that medical schools ought to be located in large centers of 
population. That a great deal of their clientele consists of people that are whisked 
there after auto accidents by ambulance with sirens screaming, etc.” In August, 
a month before his move to Amherst, he took a phone call at his Michigan office 
from former governor Furcolo, who invited him to a meeting in a hotel near 
Lederle’s summer home. When Lederle arrived, he discovered that Judge John 
Fox was traveling with the governor. As Lederle learned, “Judge Fox from the 
very beginning had been interested in a medical school for Massachusetts. Judge 
Fox is very much interested in opportunity for people to get medical education…
So he, from the beginning, had the concept of pushing for a medical school.” 
Even before Lederle had moved to Massachusetts, he was introduced to a major 
lobbyist for a medical school and a future member of his Board of Trustees. As it 
happened, Fox was devoted to the idea of a medical school in Boston that could 
make use of Shattuck Hospital, commonly seen as the “white elephant” of Dr. 
Frechette’s Department of Public Health. Traveling to Michigan to meet UMass’s 
incoming President, Fox made sure his hopes, which were also shared by many 
in organized labor, were crystal clear. Thus began the medical education of 
President John Lederle.57 
 Once he settled in, President Lederle quickly began to learn more. After 
informal discussions with pertinent members of the newly augmented Board 
of Trustees, and perusal of the Maher report, Lederle still did not feel he was 
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sufficiently in command of the details to lobby effectively for a medical school. 
At a meeting of the Trustees, he requested that they go on record in favor of 
establishing a medical school “immediately.” Significantly, although the Board 
did go on record favoring a state medical school under the aegis of UMass, but 
specified that it be located “in the greater Boston area,” a harbinger of future 
wrangling.58 
 Also at Lederle’s request, UMass Amherst Provost Gilbert Woodside called 
for a second study to supplement the Maher report with concrete details about 
budgeting and timetables for the entire process. As Woodside wrote in July, 1961, 
“Frankly, we have no idea how much money should be budgeted for this.” But, 
the “medical center” they had in mind included “a medical school, an associated 
hospital, a dental school, a school of nursing, a school of public health, and 
possibly a school of pharmacy.” When the Provost wrote, however, that “Whether 
any or all of these should be established would be the work of the initial planning 
group,” he gave ample evidence that the President’s office at UMass Amherst still 
had no notion of how little discretion the Legislature would eventually afford 
them in what Lederle clearly viewed as an academic matter. The report made 
several more assumptions that indicated the need for a steep learning curve in 
the realities of state politics; for one, it assumed that “the research activities of 
the [medical center] staff will be supported initially by state funds.”59 
 In fact, even before Lederle’s office weighed in with its own investigation, 
the Democratic-controlled Massachusetts legislature authorized a “Recess 
Commission on the Establishment of a State-Supported Medical School” on May 
31, 1961. Worcester is usually seen as the surprise winner in a four-way race 
to host the school. Yet, the results of a little-known straw vote by the members 
of the 1961 Recess Commission suggest that this may not have been true. The 
Commission was chaired by Senator Maurice Donahue, a Democrat from western 
Massachusetts, a graduate of The College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, with 
ties to organized labor. Donahue was also the majority leader in the Senate, 
and its future president. Among his committee’s 15 members, only three had 
any direct connection to Worcester: the presidents of Assumption College and 
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Clark University and Representative Vite Pigaga, a Democratic member of 
the House for Worcester since 1958. Pigaga firmly supported a state medical 
school and openly supported Worcester as the best site for it. He seemed greatly 
outnumbered…at first.
 Donahue sought advice from leaders of the AAMC and traveled to 
their headquarters in Evanston, Illinois to consult with them. Primarily he 
took the political pulse of Massachusetts’ citizens by holding a series of 10 
meetings covering most of the state. From the outset, Donahue and most of the 
Commission were convinced that the school should be a four-year institution 
and be built in a major urban center. They also clearly hoped to link it to an 
existing hospital, both to reduce the cost and the time of construction. Thus, 
the Commission closely inspected potential locations in Boston, Worcester, 
and Springfield. All three cities owned municipal hospitals that were viewed as, 
in Vite Pigaga’s words, “white elephants” they hoped to “unload” to the state. 
Donahue had consulted with the Executive Director of the AAMC, Ward Darley , 
and so presumably knew that medical educators strongly opposed building a new 
school apart from a university campus. Nevertheless, in his public testimony, he 
listed Boston, Springfield, and Worcester - in that order - as sites with hospital 
facilities that would be “adequate” for a medical school. Cannily, by estimating 
the costs of building only a school, not a teaching hospital, the cost was estimated 
at about $10 million, a low estimate even on its own terms.60
 According to both Donahue and Pigaga, the three Boston medical schools 
and the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers’ Associations all opposed the 
idea. The Massachusetts Medical Society, as we have seen, tried to hedge its 
bets. Labor unions were strongly in favor, and didn’t hesitate to say so from 
the beginning. In Worcester, supporters at first were cautious. But, by the fall 
of 1961, when word got out that the Commission would recommend a four-
year state medical school to be affiliated with the University of Massachusetts, 
Worcester came out strongly in favor of locating the school there. The UMass 
Board of Trustees, through the testimony of Owen Kiernan, State Education  
Commissioner, made it known in December 1961, that it still favored a four-year 
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school in the “Boston area,” with only the two Springfield-area Trustees openly 
dissenting.61 
 In the end, the Donahue Report recommended that the state establish 
a four-year school, that it be given fiscal independence as a guarantee of 
educational excellence, that the commissioners of public health and mental 
health be made University Trustees, and that an appropriation be made for a 
dean and an architect. But it also recommended that the site decision be left 
in the hands of the University Trustees and the future medical school dean. 
What neither the public hearings nor the Report disclosed is that Donahue 
privately took a straw poll of the Commission members’ preferences. As Vite 
Pigaga recalled, Worcester won - by one vote. Only then did Donahue realize 
how contentious the location question could become, with many members of the 
legislature likely to lobby for their own districts. In order to pass the enabling 
legislation for the school, the Commission’s close vote for Worcester was 
withheld from the record. Pigaga recalled that Donahue abruptly adjourned the 
meeting - ”banged the gavel” - immediately following the informal poll without 
ever recording it officially. The Report - minus a recommendation for a site - was 
given unanimous approval by the Commission. It was accepted by the Senate 
on January 31, 1962 and sent on for consideration as a bill by the House. But, as 
Maurice Donahue acknowledged in recalling the events that followed, “Our work 
State Senator Maurice A. Donahue 
(Photo courtesy of the Department of Special 
Collections and University Archives, W.E.B. 
Du Bois Library, University of  Massachusetts 
Amherst)
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was just beginning.”62
At the legislative hearings of March 1962, just prior to passage of the 
bill authorizing a state medical school, supporting testimony was offered by 
representatives of organized labor, by the Worcester Area Chamber of Commerce 
(also representing the City Council and City Manager Francis McGrath), the 
Worcester City Hospital Board of Trustees, and the Worcester District Medical 
Society. House Speaker Thompson supported the Report, citing the state’s low 
ratio of “GPs” to population. Finally, President Lederle reinforced the University’s 
support by expressing appreciation for the bill’s provision for fiscal autonomy for 
the school. He told the legislature he was glad to see that the Report, “recognizes 
the importance of proper fiscal self-management as a prerequisite for operating a 
good medical school.” Representative Mary Fonseca, chair of the House Finance 
Committee, supported the Report, too, except for its endorsement of fiscal 
autonomy for the school, something she vehemently opposed. In the Senate, the 
chair of the Ways and Means Committee, a Worcester Democrat, recommended 
against it. Donahue, as Majority Leader, brought it to the floor for a full vote and 
won, 19 to 17. In the House, the bill had no easier passage, but with labor support 
 Senator Vite Pigaga, Democrat, Worcester, c. 1965 
(Photo courtesy of  the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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and the efforts of Speaker Thompson, representing western Massachusetts, it 
passed. On July 27, 1962 the legislature enacted a bill to authorize a four-year 
state medical school as part of the University of Massachusetts.63  
When a bill is passed by a Democratic House and Senate, of course, there is 
no guarantee that it will be signed into law by a Republican governor especially 
when, as in the case of John Volpe, his own fiscal conservatism was reinforced by 
the arguments of political allies among the Boston medical establishment. 
 As John Lederle commented in 1975, it was only by “a thin thread,” 
woven by the adept lobbying of Judge Fox, Senate majority leader Donahue, 
and organized labor with its ally, the Catholic diocese of Boston, that the bill 
was signed. Lederle recalled that he made a trip into Boston to see the Governor 
about the bill on a Monday. “And,” he told his interviewer, “it looked as though 
the Dean of the Harvard Medical School had slept with [the Governor] over the 
weekend because the Governor, instead of listening [to me], immediately started 
blaring out, ‘Any qualified student can get into medical school.’” Lederle brought 
out his facts and figures, information originally collected by the New England 
Board of Higher Education and incorporated into the UMass study of 1960, 
detailing “the number of kids, how qualified they were, who couldn’t get into 
medical school.” Lederle told him, “Your information is just poppycock…He now 
listened to me instead of popping out the arguments that he was getting from the 
private medical schools.” But Lederle knew he could not be sure of Volpe’s vote. 
“I left the office and...I went immediately over to [Maurice] Donahue’s office…he 
was Majority Floor Leader and I said…You guys will have to take it from here.”
  Lederle left no doubt as to whom he meant by “You guys.” He went 
on to say that, “In the afternoon, we knew that Labor was going in. Fox had 
that all arranged with the head of the AFL-CIO organization. They went in 
and then Judge Fox told me that he was going to have Cardinal Cushing use 
whatever influence he could…And about seven or eight o’clock that night, the 
Governor signed the bill…It was by a thin thread that that one got signed.” 
Trustee Hugh Thompson, who led the six-man Labor delegation that followed 
President Lederle, remembered that even after an hour’s discussion with Volpe, 
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the Governor was still not fully persuaded. The final effort came a little later, 
presumably from the Cardinal and Judge Fox. 
 And so President Lederle added another chapter to his education in 
Massachusetts politics. By then he knew for sure that, “Labor and the Church 
influence was greater [than mine].”64 This was the easy part. The fight over 
choosing the school’s location lasted another three years.
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Chapter 2
Lamar Soutter
“We would not have a medical school in the Commonwealth today but for 
Bimi Soutter…” 
On December 20, 1963, the Board of Trustees of the University 
unanimously appointed Lamar Soutter, M.D. to be the founding Dean of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School. He was to begin work on February 
24, 1964, initially working from offices in the South College Building on the 
UMass Amherst Campus.1 No one could have known then what tenacity, 
optimism, and grit Soutter would need over the next ten years to take a mere 
concept and turn it into a glass, stone, and concrete reality. Yet President 
Lederle’s due diligence before choosing his dean was thorough. Even before 
he and Soutter began their long partnership to bring the medical school to life, 
Lederle learned enough about him to suspect that he’d hired a man with the 
toughness and ingenuity to succeed. In 1970, on his last day in office before 
retiring from the Presidency of the University, Lederle wrote a letter to Soutter, 
revealing his thoughts after many battles, many victories, and almost as many 
defeats. He told him, “I do not think that there is another man in the country 
who could have overcome all the obstacles you have faced and they still go on!” 
Five years later - soon after Lamar Soutter left the University - Lederle reiterated 
his claim: “Bimi [Lamar] Soutter is a hell of a guy. We would not have a medical 
school in the Commonwealth today but for Bimi Soutter….What a guy!”2 
 “Bimi” Soutter, by all accounts, was a man raised to seek challenges 
and confront obstacles - not excluding those that are endemic to politics in 
Massachusetts. Even his nickname, “Bimi,” which he seems to have liked, hints 
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at a man who was not likely to back down from a fight. According to his son, 
Nicholas Soutter, the name was bestowed by his classmates at the St. Paul’s 
School sometime after the class had read a Rudyard Kipling story titled “Bertran 
and Bimi.” Bimi was an orangutan. After capturing Bimi as a baby somewhere 
in the “Malay Archipelago,” the French naturalist, Bertran, raised him as a full 
member of his household. But after Bertran married, he began to ignore his 
former protégé, who nursed a murderously jealous grudge. When Bertran left 
the house one day, Bimi killed his new wife and ran off. But Bertran laid in wait 
to have his revenge. In the end, although Bertran succeeded in killing Bimi, 
the ape managed to kill his attacker before dying of his own wounds. Clearly, 
his classmates at St. Paul’s thought that “Bimi” Soutter was not someone to 
underestimate.3 
 Dr. Lamar Soutter grew up in Boston, the son of a family of distinguished 
physicians and surgeons. His father, Dr. Robert B. Soutter (1870-1933), 
graduated from Harvard College in 1894 and Harvard Medical School in 
1899. After graduation Soutter’s father became a House Officer (intern) at 
Boston Children’s Hospital followed by a two-year stint as the Surgical House 
Officer and then House Surgeon at Boston City Hospital. The bulk of his 
career combined a busy private practice of orthopedic surgery with teaching at 
Harvard Medical School and scholarly publishing, including nineteen articles, 
one book, and several book chapters on the subject of orthopedics. He married 
Helen E. Whiteside, one of the descendents of the prominent Shattuck family 
of Massachusetts, in 1904. Buried in the Harvard Class Secretary’s files, lest 
we impute more conventionalism to Robert Soutter than might be warranted, 
are the following details: He “favored” the Democratic party, he did not belong 
to any church (although he “preferred” the Presbyterian or Episcopalian 
denominations), he did not “regularly” attend morning prayers, he included the 
Hasty-Pudding among his college clubs, and he contributed “a few jokes” to the 
Lampoon. In his graduation file of 1894, Robert Soutter noted both that he was 
headed to medical school and that he regretted not having taken more classes 
in philosophy and history. But by the time his son Lamar was born, on March 
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9, 1909, the third of five children, his father was immersed in the demands of 
a respectable - and respected - surgical practice. In summers, the entire family 
would head off to Barnstable to sail, swim, fish, and canoe. Lamar was proficient 
in all these pursuits by the time he was ten years old.4  
  From grades nine through twelve (from 1922 to 1927), Lamar Soutter 
attended St. Paul’s School in Concord, New Hampshire, an Episcopal boarding 
school for boys. The prep school was established in 1856 at the summer home 
of Boston physician George Cheyne Shattuck, Jr., a maternal relative. St. Paul’s 
declared itself as striving “to nurture a love for learning and a commitment to 
engage as servant leaders [and to] service to a greater good.” Its value system of 
Christian stewardship was fully concordant with the self-proclaimed missions 
of the 19th century Episcopal elite, at least in the Northeast. While Lamar 
Soutter attended St. Paul’s he acquired (besides his nickname) a liberal arts 
education and a strong taste for naturalism. He joined the Missionary Society, 
which promoted service to the needy, but he also acted the lead in at least one 
school play --to enthusiastic reviews. A photo from the St. Paul’s archives also 
shows him in the back row of the school football team.5 But, according to his 
son, Soutter was not at all athletic in the typical sense of team sports. Rather, 
he was an avid outdoorsman. The school occupied many hundreds of woodland 
acres with ponds and streams running through the grounds. Fishing, hunting, 
camping, and sailing were lifelong passions, compelling outlets for Lamar 
Soutter’s intense need for excitement and achievement. Soutter and another boy 
brought their canoes to St. Paul’s every year. One year they attempted a long 
canoe trip complete with portage through local lakes and streams, but set out 
so late in the day that their return, long after dark, barely forestalled a full-scale 
search party. Because of their presumed inexperience, the boys’ main punishment 
was, in Soutter’s words, receiving “considerable unwanted advice.”6  
 Lamar Soutter’s wife, Mary Bigelow Soutter, and his son agreed completely 
that Lamar Soutter was “absolutely part of the elite…a Brahmin,” but that he 
was also extremely competitive, wanted to excel, and needed the stimulation 
of overcoming a crisis. “Taking risks and accepting responsibility” might well 
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have been his personal credo -- traits equally well suited to performing surgery 
or founding a medical school. As  H. Brownell (Brownie) Wheeler, M.D., one of 
Soutter’s closest colleagues at the Medical School and the founding chair of the 
Department of Surgery, wrote, “He was willing to take risks. And he had dogged 
determination, persistence and faith when he took a job on.”7 
 After graduating from St. Paul’s in 1927, Soutter attended Harvard College, 
graduating in 1931. Although he described himself as a “premedical student,” his 
memoir of those years focuses on his ambitions as a budding naturalist, scheming 
for adventure in the wilds of the Yukon and Alaska. He was forced to defer those 
plans until his third year of medical school, but directly upon graduating from 
Harvard College in 1931 (the summer before he began medical school), Soutter 
signed on as an ordinary seaman for the maiden voyage of the “Atlantis,” Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institution’s first oceangoing research vessel. (Fifteen years 
later, the founder of Woods Hole, Henry B. Bigelow, would become Soutter’s 
father-in law.) They sailed from Copenhagen, where the ship had been built to 
its captain’s specifications, to Plymouth, England and back to Boston, but the 
voyage was hardly smooth sailing. En route from Plymouth they encountered 
mechanical troubles, paralyzing bouts of seasickness, and at least one serious 
accident when the captain crushed his foot. Twenty-five years later, in his senior 
class “Anniversary Report,” Dr. Soutter recalled, “As graduation approached, 
the thought of going to medical school became increasingly abhorrent,” and 
he withdrew his application from Harvard. But by the end of the medically 
challenging forty-day voyage, he had changed his mind and went on to Harvard 
Medical School anyway, pleasing his father considerably.8 
 The two preclinical years of medical school were “dull and rather 
dreadful,” according Dr. Soutter’s memoir from 1956, but the clinical years 
proved completely fascinating. Summers offered a highly desired respite. In 
the summer of his third year of medical school, he and a classmate, Graham 
Webster, outfitted themselves for a more than 1,500 mile trek by land and 
canoe down the Mackenzie River and on into the Yukon River via the Rat River, 
which runs through the northernmost pass in the Rocky Mountains. The idea 
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for what turned out to be a long and dangerous canoe venture from Alberta 
via the Mackenzie and on to Fort Yukon in Alaska was planted when a favorite 
zoology professor in college mentioned the lamentable dearth of subarctic and 
arctic birds in the collections of the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology. 
Adventure could be balanced with sober zoological work. Much of their route 
took them through completely uninhabited territories with the exception of a few 
trapper camps. They drove from Massachusetts to Edmonton, Alberta, where 
they purchased a sturdy canoe and supplies. Then by train and boat, they traveled 
to the Mackenzie, where their adventures really began.  At one point, on the Rat 
River, their canoe overturned in the icy rapids. Soutter nearly drowned; soon 
after, Webster, who was exhausted after this ordeal, cut a deep gash in his leg 
while trying to chop wood. Later, along their way to Fort Yukon they encountered 
isolated trappers, Indians, and occasionally the police. But, they finally reached 
their destination, sold their canoe, and eventually made it back for the last year of 
medical school.9 
   
     Captain Bob Bartlett, far left, Lamar Soutter, center, and unidentified others, Greenland  
    (Photo courtesy of  Elizabeth B. Soutter)
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The pattern was repeated the following summer when Soutter, a freshly 
minted physician, signed on to be ship’s doctor and scientific officer on the Effie 
M. Morrissey, owned and captained by Bob Bartlett, a veteran of Admiral Robert 
Peary’s voyage to the North Pole. The mission was sponsored by the Smithsonian 
and the Field Museum of Chicago. Its objective was a trawl up to Greenland in 
search of marine specimens. Their travels yielded everything from narwhals to 
sea urchins, with the bonus of an orphaned baby seal (which they named Peeuk, 
the “Eskimo word for ‘good,’” according to Soutter). Peeuk quickly became the 
ship’s mascot and pet, as evidenced by the urgent messages relayed to a seal 
expert at the Bronx Zoo for instructions on what to feed him: salt cod mash. Dr. 
Soutter was charged with collecting species of plankton. He used a sufficiently 
expert technique that the Smithsonian published a notice of his discovery of 
a new species. Judging by the logs Soutter kept, Captain Bartlett later wrote, 
“One can see that our medical officer and chief collector was a very busy man.” 
A typical excerpt read, “‘Sun high; arose at 2:45 a.m.’” But zoology was mostly a 
diversion as he prepared himself to plunge into the work of medicine and surgery. 
In the midst of the voyage’s challenges and adventures, however, Soutter made 
careful note of the medical condition of the indigenous peoples along the coast 
of Greenland and their high rates of tuberculosis and syphilis (brought by the 
Europeans and Scandinavians, he observed) with which they contended in the 
years before penicillin. Soutter later used his earnings to fund a European tour of 
hospitals and clinics--not excluding beer halls, as he made sure to specify.10  
 At the end of the summer, Soutter began an internship and surgical 
residency at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons in New 
York, apparently a combined program in which his residency took place first at 
Presbyterian Hospital from 1936 to 1938 and then for another year at Bellevue. 
The Department was chaired by Dr. Allen Whipple and included several notable 
surgeons including Hugh Auchincloss, Sr., a renowned hand and breast surgeon, 
and Fordyce B. St. John, who would become head of Mobile Hospital No. 2 
in France during World War II. Interestingly, while Soutter was at Physicians 
and Surgeons, the faculty also included one of the earliest women to become 
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a successful orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Barbara Stimson. Dr. Virginia Apgar, the 
anesthesiologist who created the Apgar Test which has been utilized following the 
births of literally millions of children, was also there. Still, the residency seemed 
fairly tame to Soutter (especially after his Arctic adventures), but that would 
change. On May 6, 1937, the German-built, hydrogen-powered Hindenburg, the 
largest zeppelin ever launched, caught fire while approaching its landing site 
at the Naval Air Station near Lakehurst, New Jersey. One-third of the nearly 
100 persons on board died, and many were severely burned. As part of an elite 
surgical department in nearby New York City, Soutter participated in the care 
of many of the 62 survivors, including Captain Max Pruss. When Pruss was well 
enough to travel home to Frankfurt, Dr. Soutter was asked to accompany him. 
While he was there, he also managed to tour the zeppelin factories in southern 
Germany, occasioning rumors – never substantiated –among some of his family 
that he had actually been spying on the German military. When his work in 
Germany was complete in 1937, Soutter considered  returning to Boston for the 
remainder of his training. Whipple wrote a recommendation letter which said, 
“Soutter has been one of the best men we have had in a long time - thoroughly 
capable, reliable, industrious, and absolutely trustworthy. Furthermore, he has 
a very rare sense of humor which has been a joy…I am sure you will find him a 
delightful, as well as a very able resident…”11 
 Soutter instead continued in New York for another year, 1939-1940, as 
a surgical resident at Bellevue, where he was said to have done “outstandingly 
good work,” while also working at the Free Hospital for Women in Brookline, a 
suburb of Boston. During his last year in New York City, Soutter married Norah 
Goldsmith. According to their son, Nicholas (Nick) Soutter, they met while she 
was a volunteer at the front desk of Bellevue Hospital. They  married after a 
brief courtship, and soon afterwards they moved to Boston, where he continued 
his training - now in thoracic surgery - at Massachusetts General Hospital until 
1941.12
 For the next two years, Soutter was part of the staff at Massachusetts 
General Hospital both as a junior member of the surgical team, and as the 
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organizer and director of MGH’s Blood Bank, the first in New England. It was 
begun in May, 1942. But getting the unit started was not uncomplicated. The 
superiority of frozen, stored blood over fresh blood was still in dispute. Moreover, 
the hospital had little money to fund the large refrigeration units and staff 
needed to run a Blood Bank, much less the funds to pay donors at a time when 
the idea of free donations had not yet taken hold. The hospital agreed to fund the 
initial effort, however, because of wartime fears of potential mass casualties and 
recognition that blood banks were already in use by the English, the Russians, 
and in the U.S., in Chicago and New York City. MGH committed to revamping 
a former Emergency Ward in the basement of one of its buildings, and hired 
a nurse, a technician, and a “part-time maid.” Dr. Soutter, one of the Blood 
Bank’s main advocates, was put in charge. But, Soutter wrote, “in the beginning 
everything went wrong.” Using whole blood at first, they found that it clotted 
before it could be used; additionally, it could not be filtered through the kinds of 
filter then available; and, antigenic reaction rates were at a high of 12%. However, 
within three months, new filtering techniques using stainless steel, micromesh 
filters and new techniques to minimize clotting reduced serious reaction rates to 
2%.13 
 Soutter’s new goal was to introduce the use of frozen blood plasma that 
could be stored in large enough quantities to serve in civilian emergencies on 
a broad scale, as well as for individual burn surgeries. But, no additional funds 
were forthcoming from the MGH administration and Soutter was forced to 
raise money from private sources. With the necessary funds raised, the group 
purchased refrigerators and other equipment. Intending to stockpile frozen 
plasma in case of a large-scale emergency, the Blood Bank’s stores began to grow, 
bottle by bottle. They could now also perform more sophisticated blood-typing 
and pre-typing of patients. Soutter’s insistence on reliable blood banking proved 
its worth many times over when, on November 28, 1942, a popular and packed 
Boston nightclub, the Cocoanut Grove, caught fire. Of the reported 450 dead or 
injured, 114 were rushed to Mass General for treatment where they were offered 
the blood products newly collected by the Blood Bank. 
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         Top: Lamar Soutter, M.D., first director of Massachusetts General Hospital blood bank  
         Bottom: Refrigerators storing plasma (Photos courtesy of the Massachusetts General Hospital 
          Archives and Special Collections)
Soutter continued as the part time Director of the Blood Bank (while also 
pursuing his career as a surgeon) from 1942 to 1952, with a leave from 1943-1946 
for war duty. But, as a history of Mass General, by its former director (and Lamar 
Soutter’s boss), Nathaniel Faxon, makes clear, it was at the Blood Bank that the 
outlines of Soutter’s career as an innovative - and strong-willed - administrator 
began to take shape. Faxon recalls that he and Soutter had a running debate over 
whether or not the finances of the Blood Bank – an independent department 
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at the Hospital – were running in the red or in the black. Soutter insisted that 
they were always in the black - as long as no one counted all the “free service” 
it provided to large numbers of MGH patients. Faxon, of course, saw the 
department’s budget as running “bright red” because, “Dr. Soutter never paid 
much attention to budgets.” In another instance, Soutter refused to carry out his 
Chief of Surgery’s direct order to unfreeze all his bottles of plasma in anticipation 
of the arrival of a large group of casualties, patients who never materialized. 
Since plasma cannot be re-frozen, Soutter’s decision to wait until the need was 
demonstrated proved prescient when, only a month later the Cocoanut Grove 
disaster struck. (In the meantime, he was not popular with his bosses.) By 1952 
when Soutter left MGH to become an Associate Professor of Surgery at Boston 
University Medical Center, the Bank had given out an average of one transfusion 
per hour, or 10,000 gallons of blood products. In addition, the Blood Bank 
became a foundation for Soutter’s long ties to the Red Cross. By 1952, 30% of the 
blood distributed at the MGH Blood Bank came not from direct donations but 
from the Red Cross.14  
 Within a year of establishing the Blood Bank, Soutter enlisted for duty in 
World War II as a member of the Army’s Fourth Auxiliary Surgical Unit attached 
to General Patton’s Third Army. At the time, he was stationed at Metz, France. 
“There is something that toughens you in war,” Soutter told a reporter many 
years later. His storied flight into the besieged town of Bastogne in Belgium 
during the Battle of the Bulge in the winter of 1944-45, measures the distance 
between youthful adventuring in the Yukon and being responsible for the lives 
of hundreds of soldiers.15 The main lines of the story of the Battle of the Bulge 
are clear and brutal: it represented the last major German assault against Allied 
lines of defense in Western Europe and it cost thousands of lives on both sides. 
Beginning mid-December, 1944, and lasting about a month, German Panzer 
divisions fought to control the Ardennes region in southern Belgium, drive a 
wedge through Eisenhower’s troops, and gain an outlet onto the North Sea via 
the port of Antwerp. The German advance took the Allies by surprise. Bypassing 
and encircling American troops in the city of Bastogne on the 20th and 21st of 
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December, 1944, they created a “bulge” in Allied lines and trapped the 101st 
Airborne Division under General Anthony C. (“Nuts!”) McCauliffe. Bad weather 
prevented Allied air strikes or supply drops until the 23rd, but by December 26th, 
almost 450 C-47 carriers had been flown over to drop supplies while 11 or more 
gliders carried in a handful of surgeons, medical corpsmen, and hospital supplies. 
The first ground troops of General Patton’s Third Army also made contact with 
Bastogne on the 26th, and German forces retreated over the next two weeks into 
the middle of January, 1945. During the month-long campaign in the Ardennes 
and, especially around Bastogne, more than two thousand soldiers and civilians 
died, including some of the Army’s medical corps.16 
 
      Clockwise from top left: 1. Lamar Soutter driving an English Ford in Normandy. 
       2. Soutter boarding the glider for Bastogne. 3. The Bastogne team after receiving their
       Silver Stars. Soutter is second from left. 4. Soutter helps to transport patients. 5. Soutter 
       (left) performing surgery in the field hospital. (Photos courtesy of the H. Brownell Wheeler, 
        M.D. Papers, the University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
       University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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 Lamar Soutter, at this point a surgeon whose Surgical Auxiliary unit 
was attached to Patton’s army in Metz, was among those asked to volunteer to 
fly in to relieve the one surgeon still functioning in Bastogne. The call came on 
Christmas Eve, 1944. “’This was something we felt we absolutely had to do,’” 
Soutter told a reporter years later. Getting into Bastogne was a challenge. On 
December 26th, with minimal air cover due to poor visibility, Soutter and the 
other medical personnel boarded a glider towed by a plane. They all expected to 
parachute behind enemy lines into Bastogne. In fact, only the medical supplies 
were parachuted in; the men were expected to stay inside the glider after it 
was unhitched from its towline and land with it in an undoubtedly hair-raising 
descent under enemy fire. As if that were not enough, according to Soutter’s 
son and granddaughter he was profoundly afraid of heights. A photograph of 
Major Soutter at the glider’s entryway reveals the man’s utterly appropriate 
sense of fear before the mission. According to Soutter family lore, he reluctantly 
abandoned his brandy flask before takeoff to minimize any extra weight. 
Although the glider did sustain some shelling, it landed intact behind a knoll 
that provided some protection as the medical unit scrambled –with supplies –
into the woods where American soldiers had signaled their presence. In a letter 
to Norah, his first wife, several days after the landing, Soutter’s sangfroid and 
deadpan humor were on display; he wrote her that the glider’s emergency exit 
was marked with the following question: “Is this trip absolutely necessary?” 
The landing was successful and they began operating within two hours of their 
touch down. The wounded, many close to death, were sheltered in a warehouse. 
Soutter told a reporter in 1985, “We did what we could do, and, of course, we 
lost many.” At the time, he bluntly told his commanding general that unless 
they could evacuate the wounded to a better supplied field hospital, they would 
lose most of them. According to his son, that first night in Bastogne, German 
dive bombers targeted their position. “Dad said afterward that the sound of the 
wounded screaming as they listened to the incoming bombs was the worst thing 
he ever heard...” Nevertheless, he operated on 56 cases in the first 24 hours 
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without a break, at least once while being shelled, and continued operating until 
a relief force arrived on December 28th with trucks to transport the wounded 
back from the front lines. Only then did Soutter return to one of his own unit’s 
platoons –this time traveling by truck. He was awarded a Silver Star and three 
Battle Stars.17
   After he rejoined his field hospital, he met up with a young corporal, 
James K. Sunshine, a surgical technician who later became a newspaper editor 
and writer in Rhode Island. The two men became friends, and Sunshine’s 
recollections of Soutter during the war provide a vivid portrait of his leadership 
style. Sunshine, who had completed just one year at Oberlin College before he 
was drafted, described Soutter 50 years after the campaign of the Ardennes. His 
description, even though recalled after the passage of half a century, deserves 
quoting at length: 
 Neufchateau, Belgium, January 9:  Major Lamar 
Soutter, age about 35, with sandy curly hair, horn 
rimmed eyeglasses, and a patient voice resonant with 
the authority conferred by 300 years of Harvard.  The 
voice is never raised, and the lowliest of enlisted men 
is patiently addressed by name followed by please and 
thank you. At home in Boston he is a well connected 
young chest surgeon. Here on the edge of the Siegfried 
Line, he is that rarity among commissioned officers, the 
idol of his enlisted men. Of all our surgeons, he is the 
best. 
 Soutter is just out of Bastogne, having 
volunteered to be dropped by glider into the surrounded 
town where more than a thousand casualties lay in a 
warehouse under the care of a single surgeon.  Blood 
and plasma were gone. Third Army asked for volunteers. 
Soutter and eight other surgeons and technicians 
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responded and were loaded with fresh blood and drugs 
into a glider towed by a C-47 and cut loose to drift to a 
snowy field at the edge of town.  Soutter said later that 
the first day in the warehouse they did 56 operations.
 By the 28th, the 4th Armored Division had 
broken the siege. The major and his team were given 
Silver Stars and assigned to us. We have become friends, 
and spend considerable time together mixing grapefruit 
juice and the contents of a 5-gallon can of medical 
alcohol that somehow made its way from the medical 
dump at Bastogne to the major’s tent concealed in an old 
barracks bag.18 
 Soutter’s capacities for leadership and determination, less obvious before 
the war, became steadily more apparent in the years after his return to civilian 
life. To his son, this was largely attributable to the surgeon’s experiences in the 
Army. Nick Soutter remembers when his father admitted that before the war, he 
was “a party animal.” Lamar Soutter liked “to party, to dance and to be frivolous…
But in the Army, he discovered many talented dedicated people who were below 
him [in rank] but who could get things done intelligently…The playboy in him 
was drained out of him and he was convinced that there was serious inequality in 
America.” Nick Soutter makes a direct connection between these realizations and 
his father’s postwar career, particularly his steady gravitation toward reform of 
medical education. Lamar Soutter was “absolutely part of the elite.” Yet his son 
is convinced that after his return to civilian life, “everything, [or] most, of what 
he did was to make it possible for [people with intellectual ability but limited 
financial resources] to have the opportunity to get a good education…all the way 
through to graduate school…to be part of the educated elite…no holds barred.”19 
 Soutter’s first marriage, like many others, did not survive the war, 
and in 1946 he remarried, to Mary Cleveland Bigelow Soutter (1909-2007), 
daughter of the founder of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, a second 
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cousin, and someone he had known since they were young children. Mary 
Soutter remembered finding herself –around the age of four - behind the family 
grandfather clock with her slightly older cousin Lamar during a family gathering, 
exploring the old clock’s workings. Mary Bigelow grew up in Concord, attending 
Concord Academy to which she rode her horse, Flash, most days. She graduated 
from Radcliffe with a major in art history. Like her husband, she loved to sail but, 
as her son-in-law confessed during her memorial service, Lamar was more fun 
to sail with than Mary because he didn’t care as much about the proper knots, 
sheeting, and so forth. Mary Soutter also was known as an avid conservationist. 
Her bequest in 1993 of “many acres of land along the Concord River” to the 
town of Concord for preservation was recalled with gratitude. She was a lifelong 
pacifist, yet she served stateside in the United States Navy during World War 
II. The first faculty recruits to UMass Medical School recall Mary Soutter with 
appreciation and respect. Indeed, she was a partner with her husband in those 
early recruitment efforts, welcoming potential candidates to their large (and 
by some accounts, quite conservatively heated) house in Dedham for dinner, 
afterwards presumably discussing whether their dinner guests seemed “suitable” 
for the new school. She participated in many of the school’s early activities. At her 
memorial service, her son-in-law disclosed that Lamar always referred to his wife 
as “the management.”20 
 The couple adopted two daughters, Elizabeth and Sarah, and raised Dr. 
Soutter’s son, Nicholas, from his first marriage. Nick Soutter remembers his 
father as “marvelous company. He listened to me and took my ideas seriously.” 
He also attended Nick’s local baseball games –even though he was outraged 
when Nick was “beaned” by one of the opposing team’s pitchers (behavior of a 
kind that would not have been tolerated at St. Paul’s, he made clear). He enjoyed 
working around the house, sailing, camping, growing orchids in the basement, 
and making exotic buffet-style dinners, for example, Indian curry. He always 
did the shopping and cooking for those dinners, kept the menus a secret and 
the kitchen doors firmly closed during their preparation. According to his wife, 
they were always a success. His younger daughter, Sarah Soutter, recalled her 
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father as “a tremendous amount of fun, one of those grownups who wasn’t 
entirely grown up.” He would “organize fun stuff…say, mushroom hunting...and 
invent prizes for the ugliest or biggest…everyone got a prize.” At Christmas he 
would “organize trades [with local friends of the family] of completely unwanted 
Christmas presents –large and bizarre items.” They would all sneak out at night 
to deliver them. One Christmas eve, they deposited an enormous stuffed sailfish. 
On another, a gaudily painted bath tub. Early in his career Soutter purchased a 
rugged and pristine island in New Hampshire for a getaway, Squam Lake (the 
locale chosen for the film “On Golden Pond”), which boasted a “ramshackle” 
cottage with neither running water nor electricity. Vacations on the island weren’t 
for the faint of heart. Eventually the Soutters deeded the island to the state of 
New Hampshire as a “forever wild” sanctuary.21   
                                  Lamar and Mary Soutter in front of their Dedham, MA home. 
                                  (Photo courtesy of Elizabeth B. Soutter)
 The hub of Soutter’s surgical career between 1942 and 1952 (excluding 
his years in the military) was Massachusetts General Hospital. Back in Boston 
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in 1945, Soutter resumed direction of the MGH Blood Bank and nurtured a busy 
career specializing in thoracic surgery. He became an Instructor in Surgery at 
Harvard, began a long association with the Veteran’s Administration hospitals 
when he became an Attending Surgeon at the West Roxbury VA Hospital, and 
carried on a busy practice with operating privileges in many of the hospitals 
around Boston. During these years his writing and research mainly focused on 
surgical management of tumors and the techniques and technology of blood 
typing and transfusions, an outgrowth of his work for the Blood Bank. He also 
began what would become a long association with the American Red Cross. 
But Soutter was restless at MGH. Mrs. Soutter told me he decided to leave 
MGH and the Blood Bank not only to do more surgical work, but to “move up” 
as an academic administrator. Thus, in 1952 he was recruited to join Boston 
University Medical Center as Associate Professor of Surgery. Once there, he  
took an immediate interest in medical education in all its facets; within three 
years he was named Associate Dean. In this capacity, he organized a study of the 
financial resources required by medical students of limited financial means at 
BU to subsist at a level that would be “compatible with good scholarship.” The 
faculty and administration were concerned about the number of able students 
who, because they needed to work while also trying to complete medical school, 
were suffering academically; some flunked out, while others with excellent 
undergraduate records became a “fixture in the lower part of the class.” As his 
study group discovered by surveying the students, many did not even have 
enough money to buy all the textbooks they needed and likely subsisted on 
inadequate diets. (The report noted students’ reliance on outdated bakery goods 
and sales of canned food from “little known producers.”) Boston University’s 
admissions policy was need-blind, but its capacity to provide financial aid was 
quite limited. Thus, many students worked at night and on weekends during the 
term. Many wives of students also worked, but usually only until they became 
pregnant, as was typical of the era. Soutter’s concerns for these worthy, but 
financially needy, students, seems entirely consistent with the meritocratic 
values imbued in him by his war experiences. His concern for talented but less 
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privileged students presaged Soutter’s long-term fascination with overall reform 
of medical education.22 
 The most significant reform effected by Soutter while at BU, a six-year 
combined liberal arts-medical degree, was not his idea, but seems to have 
appealed to him because it, too, addressed the problem of the talented, but 
financially needy, student. It also may have appealed to his elitism. The BU 
six-year curriculum, an idea suggested initially by the Rockefeller Foundation 
and funded by the Commonwealth Fund, became one of the nation’s first such 
accelerated programs and combined a Bachelor of Arts degree with a medical 
degree.23 Particularly appealing to Soutter, besides its potential to reduce the 
costs of a medical education by 25 percent, was that students gained the security 
to pursue coursework for its educational value, not for its ability to “impress 
an admissions committee, and to obtain a good score in the…Medical College 
Admission Test [MCAT].” He did not advocate minimizing the sciences in 
relation to the humanities in the six-year program; rather, he hoped students 
would take more advanced or specialized biological coursework or classes in 
the social sciences that might better equip them to practice socially responsible 
medicine. “We wanted not only to improve the student’s background in [the 
social sciences] as they affect medicine, but also to develop his interest in being 
a responsible member of society and understanding the place of medicine in the 
social system.” Students, in addition to their basic science courses, would take 
history, history of science, literature, and statistics. Boston University School of 
Medicine in the late 1950s was far less developed than it became during the 1970s 
and beyond. Its class size and quality were rather modest at the time Soutter was 
there, according to University President Emeritus and former Medical School 
dean, Dr. Aram Chobanian. According to Dr. Chobanian, another purpose of the 
accelerated program was to bring in a more “elite group of students.” Someone 
qualified for such an accelerated and intensive curriculum would necessarily 
be among the most talented students in the country; Soutter and BU president 
Harold Case both had hopes of elevating the reputation of the school through 
this high profile experiment. Crucially, to carry out such a program would 
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require close cooperation between the faculties in the medical and the liberal arts 
campuses. And most important for student morale, Soutter hoped the University 
would build a housing unit dedicated to the program that would incorporate 
meeting rooms, athletic facilities, a library, and residences for “male, female, and 
married students, interns, residents, and some faculty members.” The concept 
was based on the model of the Harvard College residential houses.24 
  A word about language and social diversity might be in order at this 
point:  Lamar Soutter used the male pronoun almost exclusively throughout 
his professional writing, both because it was considered standard, i.e. good, 
English usage at the time and because his imagination generally did not run to 
envisioning women as medical students. When describing the plight of married 
medical students at BU whose spouses must work, for example, he always 
imagined those spouses as wives. Whether he referred to medical students or 
faculty, he generally called them “men.”25 But BU’s medical college was, in part, 
the descendent of the New England Female Medical College; its early history 
also included a stint as a homeopathic school. Both traditions inclined to a 
somewhat more liberal policy toward women physicians. Soutter’s upbringing 
and experience did not make him a feminist; but neither did it predispose him to 
conscious gender discrimination. The problem of discrimination against women 
in the medical profession, something that triggered a full-scale, highly divisive 
debate within and without the profession by the end of the ‘60s, no more than 
racial discrimination against African Americans, whether men or women, did 
not seem to have captured Soutter’s imagination in the way that the problem of 
economic disparities did. For example, in order to fit in all the necessary credits 
for a six-year combined degree, Advanced Placement high school credits would 
substitute for elementary biology and chemistry, saving students quite a lot of 
credit hours and allowing for more interesting course work. Thus, for a student to 
succeed in the program, he or she must have come from an excellent, Advanced 
Placement-offering high school, a condition that would not have eliminated low-
income students necessarily, but could have hindered students from segregated 
high schools that lacked the resources to offer accelerated courses. Nevertheless, 
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as his plans for the six-year curriculum at BU indicate, Soutter was probably 
more open to experimentation in medical education than most of his peers.26 
 Over the course of his stay at BU, Soutter continued to actively think, 
write, and experiment with reforms in medical education and practice. He was 
intrigued by the efforts of a dozen or more medical schools in the 1950s and 
’60s to create a better environment for learning. Too many, he believed, were 
little better than high schools with their regimented, passive learning styles that 
emphasized lectures and lockstep progression for students with widely differing 
learning styles, educational backgrounds, and intellectual interests. When 
Western Reserve’s dean published an interim report in 1962 on his medical 
school’s curricular reforms, Soutter was quick to write an editorial accompanying 
the article, lauding the school’s achievements while acknowledging the new 
curriculum’s inapplicability in many other settings. He wrote another editorial 
commenting on the decline of general practice as specialism “relegated the 
generalist into a less and less effective position” in the profession. He urged 
that organized medicine try to “preserve and strengthen an important part of 
practice…to improve our service to the public,” by creating multispecialty group 
practices in which the role of the generalist is preserved by the presence of a full 
complement of specialists to back them up.27    
 The question of a future shortage of physicians preoccupied Soutter as 
much as the six-year curriculum. In his mind the two topics were linked; he 
frequently cited the new program as BU’s share of the solution to the problem 
of increasing the future supply of physicians since it was intended to expand 
the graduating class by 28 medical students per year. Between 1958 and 1963, 
Soutter wrote more than a dozen articles or editorials on the state of medical 
education, its demography, curriculum, and finances. Interestingly, the year 
before publication of the Bane Report, Soutter wrote an editorial that took issue 
with the assumption that the potential shortage should be addressed by existing 
medical schools through sizable expansion of their classes. In 1958 he wrote in 
“Quantity and Quality in Medical Education,” that BU’s expansion by more than a 
modest number was viewed with “trepidation” because “quantity seriously affects 
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quality.” The actual number of students per class was not his concern; rather, 
he emphasized the “student-faculty relationship” and its role in stimulating 
students’ active learning. From his vantage as Associate Dean of the medical 
school Soutter declared, “We categorically condemn any educational policy which 
holds the number of students as a primary objective and sacrifices quality to get 
it.”28 
 Over the course of the next few years, Soutter seems to have struggled 
to find a solution he liked for the problem of physician undersupply. A year 
after writing that article, the same year as the Bane Report’s call for a rapid 
enlargement of the medical workforce, Soutter was named the Acting Dean of the 
BU Medical Center. He urged that existing medical schools be the ones to expand, 
but with federal support for medical education to allow more students from 
outside the most affluent walks of life to become doctors. This was a position 
strongly favored by BU’s president, Harold Case. Yet, Soutter’s overriding 
concern was to both preserve the high quality of medical education while 
increasing access to a medical degree by a broader segment of college graduates. 
He worried that medicine was “going to become more and more restricted to the 
upper income groups.” Serendipitously, during the following year he acted as 
consultant to a faculty study conducted at UMass Amherst, known as the  Maher 
Report, on the feasibility of building a state medical school, presumably on 
campus. His own preconceptions and prejudices favored the need for meritocracy 
and for scientific excellence. The study conducted by deans and faculty at the 
UMass campus in Amherst seems to have shown him a possible pathway for 
expanded opportunities for medical education in Massachusetts. It also gave 
him some helpful exposure to some of the same people who would choose him to 
become the new medical school’s first dean.29  
 Thus, when the question of a new, state-supported medical school began 
to look like a genuine possibility for the Commonwealth, Soutter cautiously 
supported the idea in an editorial published in March 1961 in the Boston Medical 
Quarterly, BU Medical Center’s journal. (Significantly, it was published only 
a few months before he resigned as dean at BU.) He believed that the current 
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doctor-patient ratio did not justify such an expenditure of state funds. In fact, 
Massachusetts ranked second nationally with a ratio of 180 physicians per 
100,000 residents. (Only New York State was ahead of it.)  But future needs 
were another story. Even if Massachusetts continued to enjoy a favorable 
doctor-patient ratio, it would not continue to hold its position of leadership as 
a center for medical education if it did not keep up with future trends. A limited 
response to the call for expanded numbers of students, such as BU’s planned 
expansion by 28 students would not, he now believed, be sufficient to address 
the state’s anticipated need for 100 additional medical graduates per year. 
Characteristically, Soutter tried to balance fiscal prudence with educational 
excellence. He recommended that a two-year school be established on the 
campus of the University of Massachusetts where a focus on the biological 
sciences was already established. Then after the medical school was running 
smoothly, it might expand into a four-year school with a new, 500-bed hospital 
to benefit citizens of the western part of the state in which students could carry 
out their last two, clinical years. Somewhat blithely he suggested that recruitment 
to such a “pleasant” town as Amherst would not be difficult. Perhaps it wasn’t 
coincidental that his recommendations did not clash with those of the UMass 
Amherst’s faculty report.30 
 During the academic year 1960-1961, despite Lamar Soutter’s growing 
prominence among national leaders in medical education as well as in 
Massachusetts, his position at Boston University appears to have become 
untenable.31 Appointed Dean in April, 1960, he resigned his deanship a little 
more than a year later. Indeed, almost eighteen months later, when UMass 
president John Lederle was vetting Soutter for the position of dean, the only 
negative comments he heard came from Boston University’s President Case 
who declared Soutter to be “difficult” to work with.  What happened? Although 
the details are unknown, it is commonly held, according to Dr. Chobanian, 
BU’s President Emeritus, that, BU’s presidents before the 1970s simply didn’t 
understand the potential of the medical school to enhance the reputation of the 
university. Thus, in Soutter’s era, the medical school did not receive the financial 
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or other support it would have needed to grow and thrive. Dr. Soutter’s son was 
even blunter. He recalled receiving the impression from his father that President 
Case thought the school was a lost cause: it ran a deficit and its reputation was 
completely overshadowed by its neighbors, Harvard and Tufts. The six-year 
program so dear to Lamar Soutter could only fulfill its promise if the University 
followed through with a major investment in new facilities and faculty, something 
that was not on the President’s long-term agenda. It may also have rankled 
that the Department of Medicine was more favored than Surgery or medical 
education.32 But Soutter may have felt he could get neither the money nor the 
autonomy that he felt was due to any medical school head.  Several years later, 
in a meeting with the UMass Board of Trustees to plan a Board subcommittee to 
work with him as Dean, Soutter ruefully recalled his experience at one (unnamed) 
school where the dean was “told how to run [the] school in detail.” The clear 
implication was that he wouldn’t be willing to repeat that experience.33 
 After resigning as Dean, Soutter returned to teaching and the practice of 
surgery at the BU hospitals as well as at others in the region. By the end of the 
year he had become Area Chief of Surgery for the New England and New York 
region of the Veteran’s Administration. About that time, as we have already 
seen, the Legislature was finally coming to terms with the Commonwealth’s need 
for a state medical school. One can imagine that Dr. Soutter paid attention to 
those developments. When, at the beginning 1963 the Board of Trustees formed 
a search committee for the medical school’s first dean, Soutter was among the 
small group short-listed out of a larger complement of 25 candidates. UMass 
President Lederle was looking for someone youthful, with administrative 
experience, a leading scientist who could “deal with [the] legislature,” and - this 
was underlined - with a “public attitude.” The Trustees had a more pragmatic 
goal. As Joseph Healey, chair of the Board’s medical school committee, told 
the Boston Globe, “We want a person of such distinguished and established 
reputation that he will be immediately accepted by the medical profession, 
the other medical schools, and the people of Massachusetts as an exceptional 
choice.”34 
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                       Lamar Soutter, circa 1965 (Photo courtesy Elizabeth B. Soutter)
 Soutter must have seemed well suited to the position. He had some years 
of administrative experience as a dean, he was well-respected as a surgeon and 
surgical researcher, and best of all, he had long been initiated into the Boston 
medical elite. Those connections were even more important because the Board of 
Trustees recently was augmented to include members who, as executive branch 
appointees, were well connected to Boston politics: the State Commissioners of 
Education, Mental Health, and Public Health. The screening committee of five 
included the latter two as well as two other Boston-based Trustees with strong 
political ties, Judge J. John Fox and Joseph Healey, chair of the subcommittee 
and a former state tax commissioner. President Lederle rounded out the group, 
the only one without close ties to the Boston political establishment. Soutter, as 
his son commented, was a genuine Boston Brahmin who believed in education: 
“he walked the walk and talked the talk of a well-to-do Boston Brahmin. Until 
you started talking about equality of opportunity.” As noted earlier, only BU’s 
Harold Case, with whom Soutter had tangled, expressed a negative view, telling 
Lederle that Soutter was “highly opinionated,” “not ready to take criticism,” 
and “unbending.” To UMass president John Lederle, that was a good sign. It 
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told him that Soutter would be tough, and toughness was going to be a basic 
requirement for anyone trying to wrest sufficient funding from the Massachusetts 
legislature to launch a first-rate medical school. Lederle remembered saying 
to the search committee, “Look, this is going to be a rugged job.” After one 
promising candidate, a dean of another medical school, withdrew from the search 
and another, a former dean, was judged to be too old for the rigorous battles to 
come, Lederle was sure they’d found the right man in Lamar Soutter.35 Thus, a 
little more than two years after resigning as Dean at BU, Dr. Soutter was named 
founding dean of the state’s only public medical school. In John Lederle’s words, 
“Bimi signed on. Then the problems began.”36   
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Chapter 3
“Everything but the air rights over a cemetery" 
Location, Location, Location…
  Once Lamar Soutter was appointed dean of the medical school, the 
Trustees turned their attention to a more contentious question: where to put 
the new school. As one of President Lederle’s top aides learned at an AAMC 
conference on new medical schools, the question of location would dwarf in 
importance and difficulty any other single issue in creating a new school. To 
give some idea of the intense interest in the Board’s decision, let it suffice to say 
that by the end of their deliberations in August of 1965, 95 different locations, 
according to one estimate, were offered up for consideration, ranging from rural 
Holyoke in the western part of the state to the heart of downtown Boston. Not 
a week went by that Dean Soutter didn’t receive an offer for some prime land 
out in the country, complete with barns and pasturage. According to Soutter, 
he was offered “everything but the air rights over a cemetery.”1 In fact, only four 
sites were seriously considered: Boston, Worcester, Springfield, and the UMass 
Amherst campus. Millions of dollars in short-term investment and long-term 
development would hinge on this decision, as all local stake-holders in each of 
the communities competing for the school knew well. But for those making the 
decision - the Board of Trustees - more was at stake than economic development. 
The choice of a site for the school - seen by one faction of Trustees as a choice 
between a university-based campus and a free-standing campus, while the rest 
of the Board saw it as a choice between rural and urban locales - turned on 
competing visions of the essentials of a first-rate medical education.
 Three years stretched from the bill’s passage in July 1962 to the Trustees’ 
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decision in the summer of 1965 to locate the school in Worcester. In the process, 
the name of Abraham Flexner carried little recognition and less weight with most 
members of the Board, the Legislature, or the governor. In short, when it came 
time to decide the school’s location, the ideas of professional educators held little 
sway. As President Lederle and Dean Soutter slowly realized, when government 
funding is at stake, “location” is always a matter of politics.
Anywhere but Boston
 The deans and senior faculty of the existing Boston medical schools 
played an important, if indirect, role in the choice of sites. Although by 1962 
they had learned not to oppose a state medical school outright, they continued to 
adamantly oppose building it anywhere near their own hospitals and schools--
“anywhere but Boston.”2 As the report prepared by Dean Mary Maher and other 
faculty from UMass Amherst concluded in a study commissioned by President 
Lederle in 1960, “Existing medical school deans of New England are not opposed 
to the establishment of a new medical school in Massachusetts providing (a) 
it is not located in Boston, and (b) it will be of high, not merely ‘acceptable’, 
quality.” When a precursor to the legislation of 1962, House Bill 3333 of 1960 
called for the school to be co-located with Lemuel Shattuck Hospital in Boston, 
which would have been retrofitted as an academic teaching hospital, the Boston 
schools were not at all pleased. Another perennial suggestion was the shared use 
of Boston City Hospital by all the Boston schools. It soon became clear that either 
arrangement would run afoul of the Boston medical school deans who viewed 
Boston’s hospitals and supply of patients as their exclusive domain. A report by 
Boston’s mayor, who was presumably under pressure from Harvard, BU, and 
Tufts, “welcomed” the UMass Board to consider a Boston location at Shattuck 
and/or Boston City Hospitals but added that, “formal provision should be made 
which would give the other medical schools a voice in the operation of the 
medical complex.” This was the proverbial poison pill, a provision which could 
never be accepted by UMass if the school were to survive and flourish.3  
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 The leadership of the Boston schools simply did not think they could 
handle the competition, not for research grants or faculty, but for patients, the 
so-called “clinical material” on which medical education largely depended.4 Dr. 
Francis Moore, a renowned Harvard surgeon, chief of surgery at Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital, and one of the most powerful members of Boston’s medical 
elite, began lobbying to keep the school out of Boston as soon as the Governor 
placed his signature on the bill to establish UMass Medical School. He made sure 
to attend a party given by Calvin Plimpton, a physician who would soon become 
the dean of Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons but who was at the time 
president of Amherst College and a member of the UMass Board of Trustees. 
Plimpton had invited John Lederle to the gathering, and Moore viewed it as an 
opportunity to take the President’s measure while also lobbying for a two-year 
medical school as a “promising beginning.” Crucially, it should be located on the 
UMass Amherst campus. Presumably, the students would complete their last 
two, clinical years at various hospitals around the state. At the same time, Moore 
was also lobbying in Boston for a bill to give scholarship funds to medical and 
nursing students attending the existing schools as a way to siphon funding and 
prospective students away from a state school - or so Lederle and the UMass 
Board were convinced. Moore wrote cozily to Plimpton that he hoped Lederle 
“can be suitably protected from the onslaughts of the legislature.”5  
 Trustee Hugh Thompson described a less genteel approach. According 
to minutes of a special meeting of the Board held after its vote for Worcester, 
he reminded his fellow Trustees that they had, “visited the Legislature many 
times in order to get the Medical School bill passed. He noted that deans of the 
three existing medical schools in the Commonwealth ‘followed right after them, 
“buttonholing” the legislators and saying, “don’t do it!”…Then we found that the 
only place you couldn’t have the medical school was near these three medical 
schools - get it out in the sticks somewhere and don’t bother us!’” Governor 
Volpe, meanwhile, was thought to be strongly influenced by the Boston medical 
establishment. Although he never came out and said so, and in fact he avoided 
being present at the Board meetings where the issue was decided, Volpe too 
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wanted the school to be anywhere but Boston, preferably far away in Amherst.6 
Strange Bedfellows: Staking a Claim for Worcester 
 Support for Worcester as the location of the medical school was slow to 
surface. Early on, in the proceedings of State Senator Maurice Donahue’s Recess 
Commission of 1961 (described in Chapter 1), Worcester’s leading newspaper 
chided the city’s leadership for its apathy. But if the city’s support was not overly 
prompt, its lobbying –when it finally emerged toward the end of 1961 –was both 
forceful and persistent. Two groups usually at odds, business and labor, joined 
forces in support of the City. That base of support, in turn, assured that the 15 or 
so state legislators from central Massachusetts were strongly united behind the 
proposal. As John Conte, a Democratic state senator from Worcester from 1962 
to 1976, understood, the city of Worcester benefited uniquely from the forceful 
lobbying of the central Massachusetts delegation; in this battle, Worcester had 
the strongest legislative support of any Massachusetts city. That would count for 
a lot because most commentators outside the political process had little to say, 
none of it flattering, about Worcester’s chances.
 In retrospect, Worcester seems like the logical compromise between the 
geographic extremes of Boston and Amherst. Lamar Soutter described the City in 
a 1967 federal grant application this way:
Worcester is an industrial city of 180,000 [in] 
population. The number of people living within the city 
has declined from 210,000 in 1950…but the area around 
the city has gained … by some 3.7%… Within an hour’s 
driving distance (at 35 miles per hour) of our site live 
a total of 1,841,000 people excluding those living in 
Boston. . . The industry in the city is highly diversified, 
manufacturing mainly durable goods. Several companies 
have factories which are quite large. Approximately 
45% of the labor force works in manufacturing 
establishments…Worcester, economically, is about at 
the State median, with an average annual family income 
of $5,804 for the year 1960.
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He went on to note that Worcester was, “well governed by a city-manager system 
and has twice been named an All-American City” with a “very good” public school 
system, many colleges, and the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology.” 
He wrote that the hospitals were quite good, with 61 percent of physicians in 
private practice. He might also have mentioned the presence of an art museum 
notable for the wealth of its holdings in a city of its size.7 
 This was not, unfortunately, the picture most citizens of the 
Commonwealth called to mind when they thought of this aging, predominantly 
working-class city. Prevailing opinion held that Worcester had little chance 
against either Amherst or Boston. Not even the presence of several high quality 
colleges--Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), Clark University, and the 
College of the Holy Cross, or the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology 
(an internationally known research center responsible for developing the recently 
introduced birth control pill, later renamed the Worcester Foundation for 
Biomedical Research), held much sway with educators (or journalists) on either 
end of the state.
  Worcester , however, wasn’t listening to the nay-sayers. Although 
Worcester’s business community cautiously refrained from lobbying the Donahue 
Commission during its statewide hearings in 1961, when word leaked that the 
Commission would soon issue a report that would recommend both creation of 
a medical school and the best site to place it, the Worcester Area Chamber of 
Commerce  (WCC) preemptively issued a statement declaring the advantages 
of Worcester. On December 9, 1961, the WCC’s president told reporters that “In 
the best interests of Massachusetts people…we have had no alternative but to 
put before the commission the superior facilities available in Worcester…” He 
added, “This is not a selfish power grab on Worcester’s part.”8 Soon after the bill 
authorizing the establishment of the new medical school was signed into law, the 
WCC’s president organized a Medical School Executive Committee, chaired by 
retired industrialist Lewis Wald, to lobby for Worcester under the umbrella of the 
Chamber of Commerce. Soon a total of 65 members of the business, industrial, 
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educational, medical, and political communities had been enlisted. Consisting of 
leaders of industry, banking, insurance, communications, small business, labor 
unions, Worcester city government, the Worcester District Medical Society, 
hospitals, Worcester’s major research and teaching institutions, and the local 
Bishop, the committee made sure its local senators and representatives in the 
legislature understood the economic importance of securing the medical school 
for the city. They prepared a 48-page, 8” x 11” glossy booklet with impressive 
photographs and text to promote Worcester’s many attractive features. They 
boasted of its central location in the state,  its evolution as a “hub of New 
England’s expanding highway network,” the presence of many good hospitals 
and physicians, “the large supply of all types of patients so essential to the proper 
functioning of the Medical School,” and the city’s highly favorable “community 
attitude” toward the school. As Norman Sharfman, a prominent businessman of 
the period, President of the WCC in 1964, and author of the previous quotations 
recalled, “We estimated the creation of about 4,000 jobs.”9
 
           
            Norman Sharfman (Photo courtesy of the Office of 
            University Relations, University of Massachusetts 
            Medical School)
 Wald’s promotional efforts won praise from nearly everyone, and the 
combined efforts of business, industry, politicians, and the medical profession 
were described as “’an unequalled monument to cooperation in Worcester” 
by the City Manager, Francis McGrath. Moreover, the leadership of the WCC 
demonstrated a greater understanding of the political realities of the fight 
than most other observers. Six months before the final vote, the Chamber’s 
new president, John Adam, Jr., told the City Council that Worcester was one 
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of the two top contenders, the other, of course, being Amherst. Astutely he 
concluded that despite Dean Soutter’s preference for the campus location, the site 
committee could not be counted on to agree with him - otherwise the decision 
would have already been made. He concluded that Worcester had an excellent 
chance.10  
                 Major General John J. Maginnis 
(Photo courtesy of the Department of 
Special Collections and University Archives, 
W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst)
 A pivotal figure on the WCC’s Medical School committee, Major General 
John J. Maginnis, was a much-honored veteran of World War II. The General 
was appointed to the UMass Board of Trustees only in 1965, a Volpe appointment 
made with the hope that Maginnis would favor UMass Amherst, his alma 
mater, in the battle for the medical school. Maginnis had graduated from the 
Massachusetts Agricultural College - later UMass Amherst - in 1920, having 
interrupted his classes for two years to enlist during WWI.  In WWII, he attained 
the rank of Major General and played a leading role in the Allied governance of 
postwar Berlin.11 General Maginnis later taught economics at UMass Amherst 
for a few years. He served on the UMass Board of Trustees from 1965 to 1972, 
and at the time of the vote to locate the medical school, he was President of 
the UMass Amherst Alumni Association. Maginnis, however, was playing his 
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cards close to the vest. Right up to the weeks before the vote, no one - whether 
Senator Donahue or Dean Soutter or President Lederle - knew for sure which 
way the General was leaning. According to one account, for example, Donahue 
was concerned enough about the General’s pivotal vote that he called on a 
Worcester contact, the son of a favorite professor from Holy Cross who was 
now general counsel of the Paul Revere Insurance Company, one of the largest 
firms in Worcester, to find some way to impress on Maginnis the importance of 
his vote to Worcester’s future. In the end, Maginnis did vote for his home town 
after Frank Harrington, Sr., co-founder of the Paul Revere Insurance Company, 
personally remonstrated with him.12 Maginnis himself later said that he couldn’t 
see the school located anywhere but in an urban setting. And after he had made 
a few discreet calls to the anti-Amherst members of the Board, he “felt sure that 
Worcester would survive at least two ballots.” A vote for Worcester would not be 
a wasted vote.13 
Headline appearing in the Worcester Telegram, June 11, 1965 (Courtesy of 
the Vite Pigaga Papers, The University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
Organized Labor 
 Massachusetts labor leaders clearly foresaw the potential for jobs in a 
medical school, especially if it were to be built near Labor’s preexisting power 
bases in the more populous, eastern half of the state. Second, they were strongly 
convinced that a medical school needed a deep and varied population base such 
as could be found only in larger cities. From early in the campaign to establish the 
school, as we saw in Chapter 1, representatives of organized labor representing 
Boston and, eventually, Worcester, visibly lobbied for the law’s passage. One of 
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them, Hugh Thompson, was a member of the UMass Board. Another, a politically 
minded judge with close ties to Labor, Judge J. John Fox, also sat on the Board 
until 1965 and, as noted in Chapter 1, was an influential figure in its deliberations 
even after his term had ended. Before being named to the Bench, Fox had been 
Secretary to Governor Paul Dever. He was a passionate supporter of public 
higher education and had helped keep the question of a medical school alive even 
after Dever left office. As former State Senator John Conte observed, Fox was a 
“valuable resource” to any cause he supported. He “knew everyone - high and 
low.” In President Lederle’s words, he was “a fixer.”14  
 Thus some of the strongest backers for an urban medical school site were 
drawn from supporters of organized labor. They were passionate about their 
desire to create a school where the working man’s (or woman’s) child could get a 
medical education. Hugh Thompson, for example, involved himself in support for 
a public medical school ever since he was assigned to the New England region by 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Thompson was an early organizer 
for the United Auto Workers, establishing its first affiliate in 1933. From 1937 to 
1953, he was the CIO Regional Director for Western New York State working out 
of Buffalo, and the CIO’s statewide Secretary-Treasurer. But in 1953, he was sent 
to Boston as the New England Regional Director and represented the CIO when 
it merged with the American Federation of Labor, becoming the AFL-CIO’s New 
England Regional Director from 1955 to 1967.   
 From this vantage, he was a natural choice to represent organized labor on 
the UMass Board of Trustees starting in 1961, where he was a comfortable ally of 
Judge Fox. Even before that he had been appointed to the New England Board of 
Higher Education and was part of the group that negotiated an agreement with 
the University of Vermont to admit 70 Massachusetts medical students at the 
in-state tuition rate. (Massachusetts Governor Foster Furcolo, a Democrat who 
wanted his state to have its own medical school, clinched the deal by agreeing 
to a state contribution of $2,500 per year per student.) Thompson consistently 
advocated for a medical school in the Boston area both because of the jobs it 
would provide and because, as someone who had spent his entire career in 
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urban settings, he held fast to the notion that only cities could provide the varied 
“clinical material” that future physicians would need to prepare for medical 
practice. As he told the Board at a special meeting to choose the school’s 
location, it “should be where groups of patients are diversified (age-wise, variety 
of ailments, etc.).”15 For Thompson, therefore, an urban location, preferably in 
Boston, held the highest priority.
       
   Hugh Thompson, far right (Photo courtesy of the Department of Special Collections and  University   
   Archives, W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
            Many other significant labor leaders played an important role even though 
they were not on the Board of Trustees. Probably the most tenacious of these, and 
someone who always had Worcester in mind as the site for the medical school, 
was a Worcester native named James P. (Jimmie) Loughlin. From 1962, when 
he was elected the Secretary-Treasurer of the Massachusetts State Labor Council 
of the AFL-CIO, Loughlin was educated, as friends, family, and detractors alike 
acknowledge, in the rough-and-tumble world of Worcester’s blue-collar Irish 
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neighborhoods. His language could be, and often was, “colorful.” 
James P. Loughlin (Photo courtesy of the  James P. Loughlin 
Family papers, The University of  Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter  Library, University  of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
              As one former state senator from Worcester told me, Jimmie Loughlin 
would “say anything to anyone.” During the late 1950s and 1960s, many large 
employers such as Wyman Gordon and US Steel were leaving the Worcester 
area. As a lifelong labor leader, born in Worcester’s south-side Irish section at a 
time when “No Irish may Apply” was a meaningful threat, Loughlin was a tough, 
determined labor leader who fought for his central Massachusetts home town 
even after he moved to Framingham and worked on Beacon Hill as one of the 
Commonwealth’s most powerful labor leaders. Loughlin was a strong supporter 
of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and of Hubert Humphrey and Ted Kennedy. 
His daughter Pat recalled the family’s being invited to the inauguration of both 
JFK and LBJ. She told me that Senator Kennedy (“Teddy”) was in and out of her 
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father’s office all the time. Local and, especially, state politicians visited their 
house often. In Loughlin’s mind, there was never any question that the school 
should be located in Worcester, not only to replace all the jobs being lost but as 
a testimony to the solid claims of Worcester itself, the second largest city in New 
England. As Secretary-Treasurer of the strongest union organization in the region 
as well as a member of its influential Committee on Political Education (COPE), 
one of organized labor’s more effective entities to support favored candidates, 
Loughlin was in a position to make his point. In the back-room dealings behind 
the choice of Worcester, Loughlin was never “the player,” his son explained, but 
he was “a player.”
 Unlike Hugh Thompson, and perhaps contributing to some coolness 
between them, Loughlin got his start in union work with the AFL, not the CIO. 
Born in Worcester on October 28, 1910, Loughlin attended Worcester schools. 
He left St. Peter’s High School in 1926 to work as a carpet weaver’s apprentice 
at the Whittall Mills to help support his family. He left Whittall Mills when 
he realized he could double his wages by working for the Works Progress 
Administration (more commonly known as the WPA) as a tree surgeon. Loughlin 
was introduced to organized labor when, after taking a job with Brockert Brewery 
in 1934, the brewery was unionized. He was elected vice-president of the local 
AFL Brewery Workers Union in 1937.  Following World War II (Loughlin 
enlisted in the Navy in 1942), he became a bartender at the Coronado Hotel in 
Worcester.  This secured his ties to the local bartender’s union and in 1948 he 
was elected Secretary-Treasurer and Business Agent for the union.  He served 
as President and Executive Board Member of the Massachusetts State Council 
of the Hotel, Restaurant and Bartenders Union and was the first Vice President 
of the Worcester Central Labor Union. In February 1962, seven years after the 
merger of the AFL and the CIO, Loughlin was elected Secretary-Treasurer of the 
Massachusetts Labor Council of the AFL-CIO, a full-time position located on 
Boston’s Beacon Hill, until his retirement in 1979. Loughlin moved his family 
to Framingham, a town located about halfway between Worcester and Boston, 
after he began representing union members from the entire state. By all accounts, 
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Loughlin never lost his sense of loyalty to Worcester.
 His career propelled him toward statewide office just as the new school’s 
location was being considered. And, like Conte, Loughlin was committed to his 
hometown. During the late 1950s and 1960s, as mentioned earlier, many large 
employers were leaving the Worcester area. Loughlin and other labor leaders 
looked to a new state campus not only for construction jobs, but for the long-term 
benefits it could bring. His daughter remembers his telling some of the school’s 
first leaders, “Some day you could be the largest employer in Worcester!” And 
after all, as he and Worcester’s other supporters all felt, Amherst already had the 
University’s main campus, while Boston had just been “given” a branch campus 
of the University. Now it was Worcester’s turn. If Hugh Thompson turned to 
Worcester as a second-best alternative to Boston, Jimmie Loughlin never saw 
Worcester as a compromise. Worcester was always his first choice. And as an 
influential member of COPE, with control of the campaign workers and funds 
to assist likeminded political candidates, Loughlin was prepared to work closely 
with Maurice Donahue and the central Massachusetts legislative delegation 
to insure that Worcester was not overlooked. After the choice finally did go 
to Worcester, Trustee and labor leader Hugh Thompson was straightforward 
about where he got the idea for Worcester as the next-best choice to Boston. 
He “credited [Loughlin] with being ‘the first one to hit me’ about locating the 
school in Worcester. ‘When he did (shortly after the legislation establishing 
the school was passed), I didn’t know anything about Worcester,’” Thompson 
confessed.16 Other Labor leaders also played a crucial role on behalf of the city. 
Dan Murray, then head of the local steelworkers union (and the grandfather of 
Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Tim Murray), was the state representative 
to the International Council of the AFL-CIO. He was acutely aware that heavy 
industry was in decline in his district and is remembered as a strong supporter 
for Worcester. 
 Ultimately, however, Labor’s influence on the decision depended on 
its close ties to the leadership of the General Court, as Massachusetts’ state 
legislature is known; especially its close working relationship to Senate Majority 
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Leader turned Senate President, Maurice Donahue. Indeed it is difficult to 
overstate the importance of legislative clout in bringing a medical school, first, to 
Massachusetts and, second, to Worcester.
 
Politics, As Usual
 As noted in Chapter I, Massachusetts had long been known - unfavorably - 
for its niggardly support for public higher education. Coinciding with post-World 
War II pressure to accommodate returning veterans on the GI Bill, control of 
the lower house in the state legislature changed hands in 1948, with Democrats 
holding a majority for the first time in decades. Even the governorship changed 
hands with the election of the Democrat, Paul Dever. While this may have 
helped the University of Massachusetts in its transition from a state college to 
a university, it was not enough to overturn the state’s ingrained reluctance to 
spend large sums on public education. Nor did it neutralize the opposition of the 
Boston medical deans. Governor Dever favored a state medical school, but “His 
recommendations were killed by the Republican controlled Senate at the request 
of Dean Berry of the Harvard Medical School,” according to Maurice Donahue.17 
But, the Commonwealth’s elections of 1958 gave the state senate a Democratic 
majority for the first time in memory and made both houses of the legislature 
Democratic for the first time in half a century. Many legislators felt sure that the 
time had finally come to win a medical school for the state. One such legislator, 
Vite Pigaga of Worcester, was first elected to the House in 1958, became a 
member of the Education Committee, and in 1961 was appointed to the Recess 
Commission on the medical school. The election of Boston’s favorite son, John F. 
Kennedy, in 1960 signaled a new turn in national politics in keeping with trends 
in Massachusetts. The decade of the ’60s in Massachusetts became the era of the 
reform spirit of JFK and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. Nationally 
prominent Democratic politicians such as House Speaker John McCormack, 
Representative Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, and in Worcester, Representative Harold 
Donahue, thus could maintain close ties with their colleagues and backers at 
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home and keep their initiatives alive in Washington.18  
 One of several active members of the Worcester delegation to the 
statehouse during and after the fight to locate the medical school, Democratic 
State Senator John J. Conte was first elected in 1962, remaining in the Senate 
until Governor Michael Dukakis appointed him District Attorney for central 
Massachusetts in 1976. (He retired from that office in 2006.) Like Maurice 
Donahue, Conte was a graduate of The College of the Holy Cross and like Vite 
Pigaga, had been a history teacher before going into politics. (He strongly believes 
that the presence of more than a dozen Holy Cross graduates in the legislature 
helped neutralize doubts about Worcester’s suitability to host a medical school.) 
Conte vividly recalled the feeling he and his colleagues carried with them into 
government: “promise, expectation, and turmoil.” During the sixties,  despite the 
turmoil caused by the growing divide over the Viet Nam War and school bussing, 
the legislature moved ahead with the creation of a community college system, a 
state college system, and, as noted in Chapter 1, the consolidation and expansion 
of the state university system. Conte remembers feeling that many of the political 
newcomers of the 1960s were men and women who were inspired by JFK’s 
“attitude, his reach.” They “wanted to do things,” and they did.19 
 Conte is one of many who readily asserts that of all the figures who helped 
bring the school to Worcester, no one was more important than Senator Maurice 
Donahue (1918-1999). Donahue was a passionate supporter of public education 
who entered politics after graduation from the College of the Holy Cross in 
Worcester and some years as a high school history teacher. He was first elected 
to the Massachusetts Senate in 1950 and became the Senate Majority Leader in 
1958, three years before being assigned the chairmanship of the Senate Recess 
Commission on the medical school. He was elected Senate President in 1964 
and held that position until 1970 when he ran unsuccessfully for governor and 
then resigned to become a professor of Political Science at UMass Amherst in 
1971.20 Despite representing Holyoke, a town in western Massachusetts, Donahue 
was committed to finding an urban location. Leaders of the AAMC might try to 
promote the scientific benefits of a close association with university research 
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departments, but the prevailing opinion of those without graduate degrees held 
that to be well-trained, doctors needed a large and varied supply of “interesting” 
patients, the sort that only cities, they felt sure, could provide. Finally, 
Massachusetts had, as we have seen, no liking for large public expenditures on 
higher education. The earliest hopes for the medical school combined egalitarian 
idealism with Puritanical frugality. In short, an urban site would provide plentiful 
patients as well as a preexisting hospital that might be cheaply retrofitted to 
accommodate medical student teaching. 
 Donahue testified that a four-year school of “high quality” could be 
established at reasonable cost by locating the school in any one of the three 
major cities where hospital facilities already existed: Boston, Springfield, and 
Worcester. At the time of this testimony, March 1962, he projected the cost of 
such a school at ten million dollars. Since Donahue had consulted personally 
with the AAMC’s executive director, Ward Darley, and surely knew how 
strongly medical educators believed in the merits of integrating medical schools 
with universities, the desire to save money must have been his paramount 
consideration in winning approval from the legislature and Governor John Volpe. 
Former Senator Conte believes that the need to build a wholly new, teaching 
hospital was purposely unmentioned in the first years of the medical school 
deliberations because of the fear that the much larger price tag would frighten off 
many legislators. Reading Lamar Soutter’s earliest descriptions of his anticipated 
medical school, however, no one should have doubted that he (and Lederle) 
intended to build a new hospital  from the beginning. But, whatever Maurice 
Donahue felt about building a teaching hospital, there was never any doubt that 
he favored an urban site for the medical campus. Fellow Senator John Conte, like 
other Worcester-area senators, such as Vite Pigaga of the Recess Commission, 
backed him up. It was Worcester’s turn.21 
 If the President of the Senate was squarely on the side of an urban site, in 
the House, Speaker John Thompson, Democrat of Ludlow in the western part 
of the state and known as the “Iron Duke” for his tight control over the House, 
was determined to win the school for Amherst.22  But Thompson was extremely 
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ill by the time the location came to a vote. He was succeeded as Speaker by 
Representative John Davoren, a central Massachusetts partisan who made no 
secret of his determination. Maurice Donahue, like Judge Fox, was closely allied 
with Labor’s electioneering manpower and money, but Davoren held the keys to 
the state’s budget. The influence of the legislature was not lost on several new 
members of the Board of Trustees, namely,  the Commissioners of Public Health 
and Mental Health--both of whom could be expected to vote with an eye toward 
the concerns of the legislature by whom their departmental budgets would 
ultimately be scrutinized.23  
 Senator Conte readily acknowledged that Maurice Donahue and members 
of both houses lobbied members of the Board. As he elaborated, “a lobbying 
process can be interpreted in many, many ways.  But basically, we’ll put it at the 
high end.  And that merely is explaining to the members of the Board why 
                       Handwritten note from Representative Thomas Farrell, Massachusetts 
                       House Ways and Means Committee, to President John Lederle, 1964 
                       (Courtesy of the Department of Special Collections and University Archives, 
                          W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
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Worcester would be the better site. . . . And quite honestly,” he told me, “I had 
no compunction about talking to anybody, whether they wanted to hear me or 
not, quite honestly.  I mean, that’s part of the political process, and I don’t shirk 
from it.” But most influential was the lobbying of the Senate President, Maurice 
Donahue. And, in Conte’s opinion, no one on the Board would have been exempt 
from that process, not even a Bishop. On several occasions, the entire Worcester 
delegation made their concerns known to the Board, as for example, in a letter 
telling Trustee Joseph Healey, chair of the Board’s Medical School committee, in 
November, 1964, that “There are many, no doubt, who eagerly await your all-
important decision, but please be assured that their anxiety can in no manner 
be compared with that of our people in the city of Worcester - the Heart of the 
Commonwealth.” Representative Thomas Farrell of Worcester, a member of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, made sure to send a copy to each member 
of the Board. He appended a handwritten note saying, “This is our way of saying 
that ‘us guys would rather fight than switch’ our position on the site for the Mass. 
Medical School.” In closing he added, “Continued success always.”24  
 And so, as the Board of Trustees carried out their deliberations over a 
period of nearly two years, they were hardly operating in a political vacuum. No 
matter how many educational consultants the Dean and President brought before 
them, the financial clout of the Legislature, shadowed by the political influence 
of organized labor, could never be discounted. And neither Labor nor the state’s 
leading politicians was happy about locating the medical school in Amherst on 
the University campus. It was no secret that Dr. Soutter and President Lederle 
both favored a University site. Almost half the Trustees were willing to follow 
their lead. And so, for a year and a half the Board was deadlocked, leaving 
the legislature increasingly frustrated.  Eventually, the administration of the 
University of Massachusetts did realize the importance of their dealings with 
the legislature. Leo Redfern, Provost, told an interviewer years later that the 
choice for Worcester from a legislative point of view, “was about as good a choice 
as any; I’m not talking about the logistics or the academics of it; but politically 
it suddenly gave [the Trustees] a bloc of Worcester delegation votes in the 
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Legislature.”25   
 How the deadlock was broken is the subject of the rest of this chapter.
Joseph P. Healey, Chair, University of 
Massachusetts Board of Trustees (Photo 
courtesy of the Department of Special  
Collections and University Archives, W.E.B. 
DuBois Library, University of Massachusetts 
Amherst)
“You can’t learn to play the piano, unless you have a piano.” 26
 The cost of a medical education and its accessibility to the sons and 
daughters of working-class citizens were not the clinching concerns behind 
Labor’s and many Legislators’ opposition to the Amherst campus. Rather, they 
genuinely were wedded to the belief that the best medical education could only be 
had in an urban setting. Thus, one must ask what factors in favor of an urban site 
weighed in the balance with a majority of Board members.
 Initially the matter was left in the hands of an Ad Hoc Committee for the 
Medical School, consisting of Joseph Healey, chair, President Lederle, Judge 
Fox, and Commissioners Alfred L. Frechette (Public Health) and Harry Solomon 
(Mental Health), with Lamar Soutter in attendance. But, after about six months, 
it was clear that the committee could not reach unanimity. Soutter and Lederle 
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began to advocate openly for an Amherst site, Fox, Frechette and Solomon 
wanted Boston, while Healey, tending to the urban side, nevertheless maintained 
that he was “personally still listening.”27 Signs of the committee’s deep divisions 
surfaced early. For example, Judge Fox left a Board of Trustees meeting in the 
middle of a presentation on the merits of university-campus locations for medical 
schools by William Willard, a national expert on medical education and Dean at 
the University of Kentucky Medical School. Willard had been invited by Lamar 
Soutter. Fox would prove adamant in support of an urban site, and he was part 
of a Board majority, albeit a very close one, that held fast. At bottom, the various 
commissioners, Judge Fox, labor leader Hugh Thompson, and other Boston-area 
Trustees could not imagine a medical school in a rural location like Amherst; 
neither could Senator Donahue who thought that, “they had no sick people there 
and the ‘notch’ was a dangerous road in snowy weather.” On the other hand, if 
the urban-location faction could have had their first choice, the vote would have 
gone to Boston. Judge Fox told the Board, “it will take decades to build a great 
medical center, but it will be built by the people of Massachusetts and should 
go where growth is greatest and patient clinical material is greatest - which is in 
Boston.” Besides, he cautioned, “When will we take our first student if we try to 
push [an] Amherst site through the legislature…” Joseph Healey, one of the most 
influential members of the Board, told President Lederle early on that the school 
would “never be in Amherst.” As Lederle remembered it, Healey told him flatly, 
“‘You don’t have the votes.’”28  
 At this point, Soutter (with discreet support from Lederle) began digging 
in his heels and lobbying hard for his dream of a university-based medical school. 
In the spring of 1964 the Board requested that he formally set out his reasons for 
advocating a campus site. His report to the Board, presented in May, stressed 
the importance of collaborative basic and social science research, the advantages 
of the existing School of Nursing at UMass Amherst, the advantages of building 
upon a preexisting library, other potential opportunities for centralized 
administrative costs, the desirability of locating away from the existing medical 
schools in Boston, and the likely lower cost of constructing the school on campus. 
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Finally he stressed how much harder it would be to receive full accreditation at 
a location distant from the main campus, citing the near unanimous opinion 
of deans from top schools such as Johns Hopkins, the University of Chicago, 
Columbia, and Cornell, as well as the strong recommendation of the principal 
members of the Liaison Committee on Accreditation of Medical Schools, Drs. 
Walter Wiggins and Ward Darley. He wrote, underlining his words for emphasis, 
“The most important considerations in the location of a School are academic 
ones.” His recommendation clearly reflected his deepest hopes for the kind of 
university campus-based medical school he believed to be the best model for 
academic excellence. He pulled no punches about the advantages for recruitment 
of good faculty, and the economies of administrative and other costs at a campus 
site: “If we want a good medical school at the earliest possible time, there can be 
no doubt about where to put it.”29 
 A closed session of the Board, called by Joseph Healey for December 1964 
so that everyone could take a “’pot shot’” at the location question after the Ad 
Hoc Committee found itself unable to reach consensus, displayed all the differing 
perspectives. Dr. Soutter began, as requested by the Board, with an extended 
statement of why the school “should go where there is a center of graduate and 
undergraduate education.” His arguments echoed those of the major figures in 
medical education of the 1960s, as described in Chapter 1, but also attempted to 
address fiscal concerns. First, he emphasized how helpful the University presence 
would be in recruiting good faculty, stressing the value of cross pollination with 
[UMass] Amherst research programs.” He also stressed the need for a 400-bed 
teaching hospital, informing the Board that of all medical schools constructed 
since 1950, only two had not built hospitals. Thus, not only did the campus afford 
a likelihood of much cheaper construction costs than in a city, but it offered the 
expansive acreage that the teaching hospital would require. Neither in Boston 
nor in Worcester would so much land be available - regardless of the cost. A 
campus location would eliminate costly duplication of systems, such as library 
facilities. Finally, “In Boston, all available medical talent [is] taken up already by 
the three existing schools.” With regard to the availability of patient referrals, the 
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so-called “clinical material” of concern to the Boston contingent, Soutter believed 
that the referral patterns would be no different in Amherst than anywhere else. 
Most important, he told the Board that, we “need to be additive in our function…
In Boston we would be a ‘trade school,’ not a professional school. We must work 
hard to have a first class school wherever we go, so [we] might as well start off 
with as few handicaps as possible.” With that, he told the Board, he hoped “we 
go to Amherst.”30 And these were not idle hopes. Soutter had even scouted for a 
suitable site and, according to persistent rumors which - decades later - his son 
still credited, he had put a down payment on a house somewhere nearby. It’s not 
clear which weighed heaviest on the new dean - Amherst’s small-town ambience 
and lovely setting in the Connecticut River Valley (known as the Pioneer Valley), 
the prospect of a brand-new hospital (something potentially unavailable in 
any of the cities under consideration), or the sheer relief of starting fresh and 
far from the competitive shadow cast by the Boston medical establishment, a 
consideration both his son and wife, Mary, emphasized.
 At this point, Joseph Healey re-took the floor. His only recorded comment 
was, “Personally, I’m still listening.” Knowing where the votes were likely to go, 
he remained publicly noncommittal. He wisely sat back and allowed the “pot 
shots” to begin. President Lederle, who was squarely behind his Dean in the 
matter, knew an Amherst location would give an unimagined boost to the main 
campus, bringing personnel, money, and prestige. He had been persuaded early 
on by his own faculty that collaborative work with a medical faculty would be 
a boon to both the natural and social sciences; the School of Nursing, too, was 
fully behind the idea. In the past year and a half, he had been “educated.” He 
quickly stepped forward to support Dr. Soutter. Besides claiming that patients 
could as easily be brought into Amherst for referrals as they could to Boston or 
Springfield (no one on the Board except for Dr. Edmund Croce, president of the 
Worcester District Medical Society, was considering Worcester at this point), 
Lederle added that they would attract “better basic science people in Amherst.” 
He found the economic argument for Amherst compelling: construction costs 
would probably be lower, and operating expenses would “certainly be less in 
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Amherst. Consider computer[s]…a large one [will] be available in Amherst.” 
Also, Western Massachusetts had by far the greater need for an influx in medical 
facilities. Finally, he pointed to the “interesting experiments” currently underway 
in combined bachelors and doctoral programs in medicine such as, although he 
did not mention it, the six-year program started by Soutter at BU. Such programs 
were only feasible on the Amherst campus.31 
 Others on the Board were unconvinced. Dr. Solomon, Commissioner of 
Mental Health, began the counter charge in favor of Boston diplomatically: “[We 
are all] proud of [our] Dean,” he began. “On [the] assumption that Amherst is 
the best choice, the rationale developed is fine.” But he “doubted some of the 
assumptions as stated…” For one, the “problems in Massachusetts are different,” 
from those in Florida or Kentucky (the exemplars offered by Drs. Willard and 
Soutter). The preclinical, basic science faculty slots, he believed, would be few in 
number and not hard to fill. But, “Physicians are not anxious to go to Amherst.” 
Asking what we want in a “good” medical school, he pointed to Columbia, Johns 
Hopkins, and Cornell - schools with excellent parent universities but, more to 
his purpose, located in large urban centers. A “good school,” he continued, “is 
that which has physical facilities to give good training, erudition of [its] staff, 
competence of students, etc. Such a facility could be anywhere.” But if he had to 
choose between a site on a university campus or in a sizable city, he would choose 
the urban site. He objected, in other words, to Soutter’s one-sided presentation. 
Soutter had presented the negatives of the urban sites, but not the positives. For 
example, he made no mention of the possibility of the large tract of land available 
at Worcester State Hospital, land that already belonged to the state and therefore 
would cost them nothing.32  
 Commissioner Frechette, too, felt unsatisfied with Soutter’s presentation. 
As an advocate for public health, he was attuned to the needs of outpatients 
more than inpatients. He could not imagine that Amherst, still a relatively 
small community, could supply enough patients either for the physicians or for 
educational purposes for the students. He anticipated that the need for outpatient 
care in Boston, on the other hand, would soon be “very severe.” Since, presciently, 
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he wanted the curriculum to emphasize “routine ambulatory cases rather than 
the usual accident case involving special treatment,” Boston was his clear 
preference. Bishop Christopher J. Weldon of Springfield remained undecided 
at this meeting, but as someone with a constituency that was decidedly urban, 
he soon became a crucial “swing vote.” In the meantime, Ad Hoc Committee 
chair Joseph Healey reported to the Board that they were “not in full agreement 
concerning the designation of a site.”33 
Bishop Christopher J. Weldon of Springfield (Photo courtesy 
of the Department of Special Collections and University Archives, 
W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
 
Given the strong division of opinion even among members of the Ad 
Hoc committee, Healey realized that the full Board would never simply rubber 
stamp their decisions. Moreover, the Ad Hoc committee was unlikely to vote 
unanimously for any site. Also, in the background, Healey likely was aware that 
the Boston medical school deans were becoming seriously concerned about the 
new competition that seemed to be on their horizon. Healey therefore decided 
to end separate deliberations by his committee and bring the proceedings back 
to the full Board. Not long after, Governor Volpe - always sensitive to the needs 
of his powerful supporters – made two changes to the UMass Board. The terms 
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of Judge Fox and Professor Victoria Schuck, of Smith College, both strong 
supporters of the Boston option, were due to expire. Volpe chose two Board 
members as their successors who were reputed to be supporters of Amherst as 
the medical school site. Volpe was correct about one of those new members, 
Caroline C. (Mrs. George) Rowland but, as discussed earlier, not about retired 
General John J. Maginnis, of Worcester. Despite Maginnis’ strong ties to UMass 
Amherst, in the end local pressure from the Worcester business community 
brought him around.34  
 Given the Board’s inability to make up its mind and the urban-site 
faction’s discomfort with Lamar Soutter’s advocacy for a campus location, Joseph 
Healey acted like a good politician - he called for a new study. In January 1965, 
he told the Board that the Ad Hoc Committee, “needed further consultant service 
to present the case for an urban location, and that a medical expert would not be 
involved.” Instead, they would hire a management consultant firm such as Arthur 
D. Little or Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc. (BAH) to “present affirmatively as 
a protagonist, the case for an urban location.” He expected the report to take 
approximately one month. He probably hoped to get the advice the urban site 
advocates wanted - and needed - to avoid charges of mere political expediency. 
Although the Ad Hoc committee wasn’t dissolved until March, it became, in 
effect, little more than a screening committee for the consultant’s report that 
would be brought before the full Board.35 
 Healey had hoped to wrap up the decision by the end of March. As it 
turned out, the Board did not even come together for a vote until June 11, 1965. 
The choice of a consultant was itself ensnared in politics, because Booz, Allen, 
and Hamilton, Inc., resisted the request to only consider urban sites. Several 
weeks after meeting with the Board, BAH presented its list of “Objectives and 
Criteria” for a medical school. They were based on interviews with AAMC 
officials, deans, and department chairs of medical schools with whom they had 
worked in the recent past, major reports such as the Coggeshall Report and 
the Donahue Report, and the state’s authorization bill of 1962. Criteria for the 
UMass medical school, they concluded, must satisfy the general objectives of 
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the Commonwealth and of the University of Massachusetts as well as the basic 
criteria of achieving excellence in education, patient care and research. Further, 
the school must be located where administrative services could be provided 
easily, where faculty and staff could be attracted and retained, where the “number 
and variety of patients required” to achieve the medical school’s curricular 
objectives could be acquired, where there would be enough room to develop 
necessary facilities, where all this could be achieved at manageable cost, and 
where the school could maintain good relationships with local, state, and national 
civic and professional bodies.36 In short, BAH’s first draft report demonstrated 
the same biases as Lamar Soutter’s report - its criteria gave great weight to factors 
that only a university campus site could satisfy.37 
 The consultants then polled all the Board members about how to weigh 
each criterion. Not surprisingly, resistance coalesced around the very points 
at issue from the beginning. Bishop Weldon once again emphasized that the 
school’s prime duty was to teach. Thus, it must be placed in a setting central 
to a varied and large population. He told the Board, “In order to learn to play 
a piano, you must have a piano.”38 The Commissioner of Public Health, Alfred 
Frechette, insisted that the curriculum must allow students to learn about the 
health needs of large population groups; hence, the school should be located in an 
urban setting. Hugh Thompson, Labor’s voice on the board, feared that heavily 
weighting a criterion focused on interdisciplinary research tilted the report 
toward Amherst. He also questioned the consultants pointedly about the state’s 
need for what he termed “General Practice.” He didn’t see enough to indicate that 
this was a priority. His objection elicited one of the more interesting dialogues 
of the meeting because it presaged a major point of contention between Dean 
Soutter and the Legislature in later years. Here is an excerpt from unofficial 
minutes:
Thompson - “Are you going to emphasize General 
Practice here - or what?”
Wilsey [from BAH] - “Yes - How can we provide the best 
family care and make this field attractive to students. 
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The term G.P. too often has connotation of minimum 
preparation.”
Soutter - “We should make 2 efforts:
1. Expose students to family practice
2.  “Influence med prof as best we can to see to it 
that climate for Family Practice is improved in the 
communities. In some towns, for example, the general 
practitioner cannot admit his patients to the hosp. We 
should do our best to improve this situation. [GPs] “may 
be called 4 year “undifferentiated physicians” 20 years 
hence.”
Frechette - “Would be a mistake to commit ourselves 
now to G.P. term as such.”39  
 Unofficial minutes of Board meetings during the spring of 1965 suggest 
that tempers were beginning to fray; the Board members sound edgy, almost 
curt. Senator John Conte of Worcester had begun proposing legislation to 
require that the Board make its decision by April 15. Although Senators Conte 
and Donahue agreed to keep a “lid on” the bill, the press soon learned of it and 
began to put pressure on the Board to make a decision.40 Moreover, as President 
Lederle admitted at the Board meeting of March 31, “Much of my other difficulty 
[legislating] UMass bills flows from our failure to come to a decision on [the] 
med school.” Trustee Healey reminded them of the need to come together and 
make a decision soon. “We are under the guns as never before . . . the Press, the 
Governor, and the Legislature [are] now after us,” he reminded them. In fact, 
some on the Board were beginning to think that Lamar Soutter, as much as they 
respected him, had contributed to their troubles by his “one-sided approach,” 
leaving them feeling “inept” and lacking the “full picture.” How could they make 
a rational decision? Worse, Bimi Soutter’s many public statements in favor of 
Amherst were creating a misleading impression in the papers. At one closed-door 
meeting during this period, a meeting to which Soutter was not invited, Weldon 
complained about leaks to the Springfield newspapers that were causing him, the 
Bishop of Springfield, great embarrassment. It was the Bishop who came right 
out and said they must, somehow, “Shut Bimi up.”41 
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 In the end, a revised ranking system did little to alter the ratings of the 
five possible locations, including in order of the report’s preference, Amherst, 
Springfield, suburban Boston, Worcester, and Boston. It did rank the need for an 
ample and diverse patient population much higher than previously. The criteria 
were listed as follows:
1. Potential for meeting broad medical school objectives
2. Capabilities for providing comprehensive 
instructional programs
3. Feasibility of attracting and retaining faculty and 
employed staff  
4. Capability of attracting the desired number of patients 
5. Capability of attracting the desired variety of patients 
6. Feasibility of providing required facilities 
7. Feasibility of obtaining ample land 
8. Feasibility of constructing facilities of appropriate 
size, layout, design and justification.
To the consternation of the urban-site faction, Booz, Allen, Hamilton’s final 
report unequivocally favored locating the school on the Amherst campus. It 
concluded that,
 
An outstanding medical school that would best serve 
the requirements of the Commonwealth in the decades 
and century ahead could be planned and developed to 
its fullest potential most effectively and rapidly if located 
on the campus of the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst…
For the short term, the report allowed that Springfield’s hospitals could be 
utilized for the clinically-based third and fourth years of medical education until 
a university hospital was constructed. Unsurprisingly, Boston was declared the 
worst choice, but Worcester came in next to last:
 
Developing a medical school in Worcester would, 
in spite of the many advantages and resources of 
the community, be the fourth best choice among 
those available. Since there is no present or planned 
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University of Massachusetts campus in Worcester, 
the medical school could not work with the other 
components of the university to their mutual benefit as 
effectively as would be true on campuses in Amherst or 
in suburban Boston. 
On a rating system with five rankings, Worcester was rated in the highest 
category only twice, in its capability to attract the number and the desired variety 
of patients. When the Report was leaked to the Boston Herald, it ran a prominent 
story declaring that, “UMass Medical School Expected to be in Amherst.”42  
  At this point, members of the Legislature weighed in using the only 
weapon at their disposal - the threat to withhold funding. Speaker of the House 
John F. X. Davoren, a Democrat representing the Worcester suburb of Milford 
whose words carried the full weight of his influence over state funding, told a 
“social gathering” of fellow legislators and  businessmen from the Worcester 
region that he would “do what he can to block location of the state medical 
school in Amherst.” Considering that the Booz, Allen, Hamilton report’s revised 
criteria for choosing a location stated that it should be the one where, “the 
medical school can best attract and retain the resources the school will need 
to meet requirements for health care and prepare young men and women to 
become practicing physicians,” placing this criterion nearly at the top of the 
list, any Trustee with ties to the Legislature would have taken Davoren’s thinly 
veiled threat with utmost seriousness. As Worcester’s Chamber of Commerce 
later acknowledged, without the central Massachusetts legislative delegation’s 
undivided support - backed up by the power of Senate President Donahue, no 
amount of business or union lobbying would have made a difference. And as 
if this were not enough pressure, someone leaked to the press the results of an 
informal poll by Hugh Thompson of legislators’ preferences for the new school’s 
location: Out of a total of 137 responses, only 22 chose Amherst. As unscientific 
as the survey surely was, it clearly showed that Amherst was not running strongly 
with the folks on Beacon Hill.43 
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The Vote and its Aftermath
 When the Trustees finally met on June 11, 1965, they knew that the 
vote would not be unanimous. But, they lay down a set of ground rules for an 
orderly, if secret, ballot. First, they decided to vote on five different choices, 
Amherst, Worcester, Springfield, suburban Boston (in deference to the new 
UMass campus soon to be built somewhere near the city), and Boston itself. The 
site with the fewest votes in each round would be eliminated. They also agreed 
that the vote would be secret and that the entire Board would support it solidly. 
From the perspective of outsiders who had learned about the BAH report but 
not the nuances of many Board members’ political alliances, Worcester looked 
to be the least likely site to be chosen. Those who credited the power of Boston’s 
established medical schools, on the other hand, would have thought Boston the 
least likely location for another medical school. 
 In the end, the balloting ran to five rounds. And in the first round of the 
five, Worcester showed what one reporter called “surprising” strength, winning 
7 votes to Amherst’s 9. Springfield received 3, the Boston suburbs 2, and Boston 
1. (Governor Volpe did not attend the vote.) Once Worcester’s potential showed 
itself, Boston’s supporters gave the city their votes. By the second round, 
Worcester outpolled Amherst, 10 to 9, with Springfield’s 3 supporters apparently 
holding the balance of power. It took three more ballots for Worcester to edge 
out Amherst 12-10, with Bishop Weldon having cast his lot with Worcester by 
Round 3. In Round 4 the two cities were tied, 11 to 11, but in the last ballot, one 
voter changed his or her mind and switched to Worcester. General Maginnis 
later claimed to have won over that unnamed voter by stoking his irritation 
over some slight by the University. And Trustee Robert Gordon from Lincoln, 
Massachusetts, who was thought to be a pro-Boston voter, did say later that he 
was glad he had switched his vote. President Lederle later told his interviewer 
that, “Two past presidents of the alumni association voted against their alma 
mater as to the site. One was Bob Gordon, the other was Maginnis. Now Maginnis 
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I can understand as long as Worcester was in the running. He cast the votes for 
his home town, although he had told me he would go for Amherst.” Gordon, on 
the other hand, was expected by most observers to vote for Boston. We will never 
know who supplied the last-round Worcester vote by switching from Amherst. 
Bishop Weldon, although he is often credited with the change, publically 
stated his support for an urban choice throughout the months of deliberation. 
He switched to Worcester after Round 2.44 Gordon, however, must have been 
undecided between the one remaining urban choice, and his alma mater. His 
vote for Worcester clearly surprised President Lederle and would fit with General 
Maginnis’s claim to have “turned” the final vote for Worcester from Amherst. 
 We can be fairly sure, however, that for most of the Board, their votes 
hinged on their preference for a university or an urban site. Dr. Edmund Croce, 
Trustee and physician from Worcester, later said, “‘It’s a matter of educational 
philosophy…On-campus schools are strong in turning out excellent research 
scientists and staff members for medical schools, but this does not solve the 
problems of those who are needed to actually go out into practice.’” As one 
reporter wrote, “The city boys beat the country boys in five ballots of tight 
voting…A block of university trustees who had favored the Boston area right 
up to the moment of decision swung over to Worcester when it became obvious 
Boston couldn’t win . . . Most bitterly disappointed was Dr. Lamar Soutter, dean 
of the new school, who left Amherst, without comment, for his home in Dedham, 
immediately after the vote.” A decade later, when Soutter stepped down from 
his post at the medical school, President Lederle wrote him that there had been 
many times when he was sure Bimi would resign. This surely must have been 
one of them. Lederle recalled talking to Soutter soon after the vote. “Bimi...was 
very upset about the decision as was I, and [I said] to him, ‘Bimi, I hope you 
won’t quit. Because we’re going to build a great medical school in Worcester 
and we’re going to build a university around a medical school.” Yet, Soutter was 
not unprepared for this outcome. His son recalled that during the battle over 
the decision, his father would come home and say, in effect, “It might just be 
Worcester - these Worcester people are very determined.” Moreover, one week 
   111
after the vote, Soutter was ready to negotiate about a site in Worcester, with a 
clear preference for land transferred from Worcester State Hospital’s capacious 
grounds. Trustee Harry Solomon, Commissioner of Mental Health had made the 
suggestion even before the site vote in June, and by June 18, Soutter was fully 
engaged in making the medical school a reality - even in Worcester.45 
 Headlines suggest how little prepared, unlike Soutter or Lederle, were 
UMass Amherst supporters for the decision. “Worcester Chosen Site of State 
Medical School in Surprise Board Vote,” and “Bulletin! It’s Worcester for Medical 
School,” and, from the Boston Herald: “Medical School Fiasco,” convey the mood 
from around the state. The Herald’s reporters complained at length that “the 
University of Massachusetts is a public institution. Its Trustees are appointed 
by the governor and thus are subjected to political pressures…If the Legislature 
was so adamant on an urban site, it should have said so from the start…” But 
they did not stop there. In a series of jabs at the winning city, Worcester, they 
contended that, according to Booz, Allen, Hamilton, “it will be far more difficult 
to attract a first-rate professional and medical faculty to Worcester than either to 
Boston or Amherst…Worcester is neither fish nor fowl. It has neither the cultural 
attractions of Boston nor the university association of Amherst. Its public-school 
system and those of surrounding communities are not of the caliber needed to 
entice highly qualified professionals with school-age children.” A writer for the 
UMass Amherst campus paper minced no words:
Anyone of a stature suitable to be a professor of 
medicine or any student of a calibre suitable to attend 
a first-rate medical school would without hesitation 
prefer to do his work in the garden setting of Amherst 
with its higher saturation of sophistication, intelligence 
and the amenities of life than in or about the city of 
Worcester. Undoubtedly the drabbest, dullest, most 
mediocrity-impregnated communities in the country 
are its medium-sized cities. Even though Worcester is 
well above average in this category it cannot escape that 
curse.
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One letter from a resident of the western Massachusetts village of Turners Falls 
to Frank Boyden, UMass Board President and headmaster of Deerfield Academy, 
summed up the general impression that, “…now it is too late and we are all stuck 
with your pork barrel Worcester solution.” Boyden received so many complaints 
that he began sending pre-printed postcards in reply.46 
 Some of the bitterest responses were sent by faculty at the main campus. 
One poignant letter, from the Assistant Dean of Men, wrote to the Trustees that,
 
As an administrator and teacher employed by the 
University of Massachusetts I consider my main mission 
to be that of developing in students the capability of 
making decisions based upon sound research, objectivity 
and integrity. Further, I feel my task is to infuse in 
them the sacred commitment to stand openly by their 
decisions so reached…How now in the shadow of your 
Medical School decision can I face my students? In the 
future, how can I expect them to hold their trust in me 
when I act as an agent of this university?
  An astonishing 150 faculty members attended a special meeting of the 
UMass Amherst faculty senate to plan a counterattack. Accusations spread of 
improper political influences over some of the Board’s members, especially the 
five State Commissioners. In one newspaper cartoon, members of the Board 
are shown sitting around a table headed by the Chair who is saying, “Very well, 
Gentlemen - we’ll have an open, show-of-hands vote.” The illustration shows all 
the trustees wearing Ku Klux Klan-style hoods and gowns.47  
   113
“We’ll have an open show-of-hands…” (Reprinted with permission of the Department 
of Special Collections and University Archives, W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst)
 On July 28, Trustee Fred Emerson of Agawam, a town near Springfield in 
western Massachusetts and a Springfield supporter, called for reconsideration 
of the decision and a second round of voting. The Board agreed to hear petitions 
from a select set of speakers at a special meeting, and then to vote on whether 
to hold a recount. The show-down was set for August 4. Representatives of 
the Faculty Senate and the Council of Academic Deans at UMass Amherst, 
of the City of Worcester, and of the state AFL-CIO were permitted to make 
presentations to the Board. Dean I. Moyer Hunsberger, for example, accused the 
Board of improperly holding a secret vote, and predicted that placing the school 
in Worcester would lead to a 10-year delay in winning the resources necessary 
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to achieve a high-quality institution. (His prediction came uncannily close to the 
truth.) The Deans’ petition went even further: “We believe that this decision, if 
allowed to stand, will go down in the history of the University as the beginning 
of the death of the institution…” Board members Hugh Thompson and Robert 
Gordon hotly defended the decision itself and the integrity of the decision-
making process, with Thompson insisting, “’I want it made clear that I am not 
controlled politically…I have never been politically controlled and I don’t think 
the majority of the board was.’” A delegation from Worcester representing the 
major corporate, educational, research, cultural, medical, and political sectors 
of the city made sure to testify in person to what they had already elaborated 
in their lobbying materials, namely, that Worcester was far from the gritty and 
downtrodden city being depicted by supporters of Amherst. In fact, its close 
association between business and academic leaders made it an exceptionally 
fruitful environment for research. The 
director of the Worcester Art Museum 
informed the meeting that, “As the 
second city in the Commonwealth, 
[Worcester] long ago determined to 
be independent of Boston. [The city 
contains the] oldest music festival in 
the U.S., [the] Worcester Light Opera, 
the Players Club, the Antiquarian 
Society, the Craft Center, the Worcester 
Science Museum; nearby is Sturbridge 
Village. [The Worcester Art Museum 
was] called by Time one of best in 
America…” But the most powerful 
statement was made by Dr. Hudson      
Hoagland, Executive Director of the 
Worcester Foundation for Experimental 
Biology, who “cited his own experiences in recruiting scientists from throughout 
   Hudson Hoagland, 1968 (Photo courtesy of  
  the University of Massachusetts Medical School  
  Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
 Massachusetts Medical School)
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the world,” thus refuting the suggestion that Worcester was an “’intellectual 
desert,’” that made faculty recruiting an uphill battle.48 
 The Citizens’ Committee on the Medical School Site in Amherst brought in 
outside medical education experts who reiterated what Deans Soutter, Willard, 
and others had told the Board from the beginning. The unofficial minutes reveal a 
frustrated and disbelieving Provost of Cornell Medical College asking:
 
Has Board been misled by the 19th Century concept that 
Med Ed is just lecturing and apprenticeship[?] Even 
in old days, great European Universities were in small 
towns.
Great opportunity here to develop a great State U. 
Hospital in Mass. Should be a model. Another function 
of a good hospital should be training investigators…A 
computer center…is an absolute essential. Most medical 
schools today are permitting students in second and 
third year to do some research…A fallacy is that a 
medical school cannot be good unless it has a lot of 
trauma cases…
After the strenuous rehearsal of their year of deliberations, the Board set the open 
vote on reconsidering their earlier site selection for August 4. The outcome was 
unchanged: 12-10 in favor of Worcester.49 
 Against the general outcry from western Massachusetts, Worcester was 
defended by an Amherst native, now a resident of Worcester and the wife of one 
of the city’s leading citizens. Martha Allis Cowan (Mrs. Fairman Cowan) wrote to 
the Amherst Record, “I have been astonished at the violent opposition to having 
the medical school in Worcester….Having moved to this city from a Boston 
suburb ten years ago, with a somewhat provincial approach, I can understand 
this ignorance…” After describing the research and teaching that could be found 
at the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology and Worcester’s five 
hospitals, she went on to directly address the numerous direct and indirect 
imputations of the city’s general unattractiveness to the families of upper middle 
class professionals:
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Are [these critics] familiar with the teaching and 
research being done at Clark University, Worcester 
Tech, Holy Cross, Assumption College, and Worcester 
State College or with the lectures, courses and concerts 
open to the general public at these institutions?  Have 
they ever visited the Worcester Art Museum or the Craft 
Center, or the new public library, or the Antiquarian 
Society? Do they come to the century-old Worcester 
Music Festival in October? …We have lived in the city 
for ten years, and our three boys have all attended public 
schools in Worcester…
In truth, the widespread criticism of Worcester as, in effect, a gritty, uncouth, 
working-class town that was unsuited to such an elite operation as a medical 
school was a criticism that has taken decades to soften, if not wholly erase. 
Despite its many institutions of learning and culture, its Westside neighborhoods 
of leafy hills and prosperous houses, Worcester was (and is) demographically a 
predominantly blue collar city. And that, in the end, was one reason it won such 
loyal support from many politicians and labor leaders who quickly abandoned 
Boston for Worcester when it was clear that Boston was not a viable choice.50 
 Amherst’s supporters were not reconciled to the decision. Dr. Paul 
Dudley White, a Boston-based, “nationally known heart specialist,” had been 
vocal in support of a campus location for the school for months. Now that the 
Trustees had voted conclusively for Worcester –clearly the wrong choice, in 
his view –he enlisted as honorary co-chairman of the Citizens’ Committee on 
the Medical School Site in Amherst, a group campaigning for reconsideration 
of Worcester as the choice. From August through the fall of 1965, this group, 
apparently representing the Massachusetts Medical Society, the Boston medical 
establishment, and deeply unreconciled legislators from western Massachusetts 
such as Representatives David Bartley from Holyoke and Anthony Scibelli from 
Springfield and the Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, campaigned 
against Worcester. The Committee produced a series of “Bulletins” updating all 
interested parties in the travesty of rational decision-making represented by the 
Board’s vote. “Bulletin #10,” for example, informed Commonwealth citizens that, 
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“The medical school and its hospital in Worcester will be, at best, a local service 
operation of no distinction.” Just as bad, the separation of the medical and 
main campuses would “cripple” the development of the main campus and cost 
taxpayers millions more dollars.51 
 President Lederle and the Board, however, had moved immediately 
after the first vote to consider sites in Worcester. Dean Soutter began meeting 
with City Manager McGrath, Trustee Solomon, and the Director of Worcester 
State Hospital. In the end, he was quite pleased with the State Hospital site; his 
attitude toward Worcester changed completely once he knew the school would 
not be locked into the old and geographically limited site at City Hospital, as 
presumed by the original Donahue Report. In contrast, the State Hospital site, 
formerly a large farm, sat attractively on a slope overlooking Lake Quinsigamond 
and conveniently abutted Route 9, then the most direct east-west route between 
Worcester and Boston. Route 290, a highway being built at the time to connect 
the Turnpike, south of Worcester to the northeast corner of the state, would 
have an exit close to the new campus, adding to its centrality and accessibility 
for central and northeastern New England. With approval from the Dean 
and encouragement from the City Manager and local legislators, the Trustees 
proposed that the governor ask the Legislature for funding as soon as possible to 
buy several small parcels needed to square off the Worcester State Hospital site 
and to pay for architects’ fees to begin the planning process.52  
 Francis J. McGrath (Photo courtesy  of the  Office of 
University Relations, University of  Massachusetts Medical 
School)
   118
At this point, further delaying tactics ensued. On November 9, Dr. 
Paul Dudley White and Edward Weeks, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, 
became the first two signatories of a lawsuit brought by the Massachusetts 
Taxpayers’ Committee for Quality Medical Education, a suit charging that the 
trustees violated their responsibilities by approving plans for a second-rate 
school. The suit asked for an injunction against further development of the 
Worcester site, a move designed to forestall the legislature from approving 
budget requests for the school from Governor Volpe. White gave his reasons 
in a private letter to state senator Conte. They included his genuine belief in 
the benefits of a campus-based medical school for both the medical and the 
liberal arts campuses, but they went further. White apparently believed that 
a medical school in Worcester was the Trojan horse for developing an entire 
state university campus in Worcester as well. He believed the expense and 
delays involved in such a complex project would doom the medical school 
to an unnecessarily protracted launch. About a week later, Representative 
Scibelli, made it known that funds would not be appropriated for the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School in Worcester until “more serious 
study and consideration” was given to the site.” In response, Dan Murray 
wrote in a Worcester labor union newsletter of Labor’s outrage at any attempt 
to stop the school: “A ridiculous and shameless attempt is being made to 
nullify [the] decision of the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts in 
choosing Worcester as the site of the…medical school.” He firmly reminded 
his readers of why organized labor was so determined to establish the school. 
“The Massachusetts Labor Council, AFL-CIO, and for once all its affiliates,” 
he continued, “made it their business, because…there is an acute shortage 
of [doctors] … Secondly, the cost of a Medical education in the established 
schools is beyond the reach of the son or daughter of the average working 
man…and the public, the needy, and sick were denied utilization of great 
talent. Organized Labor is rightfully proud of its part in bringing about 
enactment of this legislation.”53  
 In fact the Governor proposed his budget amendments just over a 
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week after the lawsuit, requesting $1.75 million bond issue for planning 
and authorization for the transfer of land from Worcester State Hospital to 
the University of Massachusetts. And the legislature came to the rescue. On 
December 10, the Senate, with strong urging from Vite Pigaga and John Conte 
of Worcester and likely behind-the-scenes support from Maurice Donahue, 
passed an amendment to the pending state budget bill that added two words, 
“in Worcester,” to the budget line of $100,000 for employment of a dean, other 
personnel, and some supplies. As reported all over the state, such wording 
appeared to “guarantee” that the school would be built in Worcester, regardless 
of the outcome of the Taxpayers’ Committee case. Finally, in January 1966, 
Governor Volpe signed into law two more bills to allow the start of tangible work 
on the school. One approved the $1.75 million bond issue to pay for site studies 
and architectural planning on the Worcester State Hospital lands; the second 
authorized transfer to the University of 133 acres of state-owned land  
at Worcester State Hospital, lands overlooking Lake Quinsigimond that for 
more than a century had been used as agricultural lands for WSH. The bills were 
passed on the very last day of the 1965 legislative session, only hours before the 
Governor Volpe signs legislation for Worcester location, 1965 (Photo courtesy of  the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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entire battle would have been forfeited for another year. Even then, legislators 
from western Massachusetts tried to filibuster, but the vote in the House 
exceeded - just barely - the two-thirds majority needed for a bond issue. The 
process of winning financial approval from the legislature now seemed to have 
passed a crucial hurdle. As we shall see, Soutter immediately presented the Board 
with concrete plans for construction and hiring. Once more, unpleasant surprises 
awaited him on Beacon Hill.54  
University of  Massachusetts President John Lederle and Dr. Lamar Soutter  (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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Center, Worcester, 1982, pamphlet, n.p., Office of Public Affairs Collection, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Worcester, Massachusetts 
[hereafter, PA/UM/W].
2  These words are a direct quotation from Paul Loughlin, son of James P. 
(Jimmie) Loughlin, one of the state’s powerful labor leaders and a big booster 
for Worcester. Personal communication with Mr. Paul Loughlin by Ellen More, 
March 4, 2010. For more on James Loughlin see below. 
3  “I am speaking today in strong support of House Bill 1796 for the 
establishment of a two-year medical course at the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst…” typescript fragment, n.d., Box 43, fol. 533, John W. Lederle Papers, 
Archives and Special Collections, UMass Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts 
[hereafter, Lederle, UM/A]; “University of Massachusetts Medical School 
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School, Worcester, 1962-, R-Si,” fol. “Report, UMass Medical School, 1964,” RG 
55-2, “Other Campuses - Medical School, Worcester, 1962 - ,” UM/A [hereafter, 
Other Campuses, UM/A]. 
4  Looking back many years later, Sen. Maurice Donahue thought they were 
also worried about the availability of cadavers. Lamar Soutter, too, mentioned 
the need for cadavers during his interview (see n. 35, Chapter 2 above). On 
Donahue’s recollections, I have relied on handwritten notes taken by retired 
state senator Ed Burke during a lecture given by Donahue on Feb. 18, 1988 in 
Burke’s health policy class at Regis College. My deep appreciation to Sen.. Burke 
for making them available. The Boston medical schools’ need for more hospital 
beds also was a problem. At the time of the vote on a location for UMass Medical 
School an article appeared in the Boston Globe in which their deans actually 
denied that they were engaged in a “power grab” for control over Boston City 
Hospital to assure that it was not deeded over to the state’s new medical school. 
“Denial by School Heads Seen on City Hospital ‘Power Grab,’” Boston Globe, 
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Chapter 4
A “Sort of Schizophrenia”:
What Makes a Medical School “First-Class?”
  Once the medical school site was chosen, it didn’t take long for Dean 
Soutter to bring his vision for the school straight to the public.1 Eventually, he 
learned to communicate directly with Beacon Hill and Washington. The dean 
was determined that the legislature feel the pressure of public expectations. 
But he was not prepared for legislative second-guessing. The public supported 
the creation of additional opportunities for young people in Massachusetts to 
become physicians and it surely supported their staying in state after they began 
to practice. But, it took Soutter months to realize, few of his fellow citizens - and 
certainly few Massachusetts politicians - supported paying for young doctors to 
become academic researchers or specialists. Academic physicians like Lamar 
Soutter and early recruits to the faculty such as surgeon H. Brownell (“Brownie”) 
Wheeler, considered designing a medical school to produce nothing but primary 
care doctors as tantamount to declaring one’s school second-rate from the outset. 
Even as Soutter proudly and without disingenuousness insisted that medical 
education at UMass would teach students to understand the needs of their 
communities, he refused to create a so-called “community” medical school that 
did not offer the full spectrum of medical training. The dean didn’t mince words 
about it either. As Dr. Wheeler, his principal confidant among his colleagues, put 
it, “Dr. Soutter kept saying that if you did things in a second-class way, within 
- to use an inelegant expression -  spitting distance of Boston, that it would be 
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an embarrassment and a failure, that the only way an academic health center 
in Worcester could succeed in competition with Boston was to be as good as 
Boston.”2 
 A long interview with a reporter for the Worcester Sunday Telegram gave 
Dr. Soutter the chance to start a dialogue with the public. He described at great 
length his background in Massachusetts, his war experiences, and his philosophy 
of medical education. Soutter described himself as a reluctant medical student 
until his first contact with patients during his third year at Harvard Medical 
School. “‘Most of the science courses in the first two years I didn’t like at all. I 
didn’t find them interesting or even terribly relevant,’” he told the reporter. As 
a result, the goals of the school represented much more than abstract ideals for 
Soutter. He held very definite ideas about medical education. It must, “‘train 
very good practitioners. I think that if you’re starting [a medical school] from 
scratch you can say alright, let’s get this science of medicine very firmly rooted 
in the students’ minds  - but then let’s take them back to the bedside and make 
them much better practitioners and much more interested in taking care of 
human beings even though they are making full use of laboratory procedures 
and scientific advances.’” He carefully articulated the social obligations of the 
physician as a core element in the new curriculum. In words that echo emerging 
trends in medical education nationwide and pioneered to some extent at (Case) 
Western Reserve Medical School, Soutter insisted that, “‘The doctor we train 
must also see himself in relationship to the rest of society - to other agencies for 
health and welfare - and fulfill his obligations to society on a very broad basis.’” 
In other interviews from the same period Soutter also emphasized the study 
of community medicine to educate medical students about the health needs of 
vulnerable populations and communities, problems of “environmental health and 
the relation of non-medical problems to sickness.”3 
 Soutter was sincere in these hopes, but they tell only part of the story, a 
part designed to reassure legislators at a time when funding for the new school 
still was not firmly committed. All the major decisions about land acquisition in 
Worcester, campus design, and personnel hinged on the type of school UMass 
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Med would be. A so-called “community” medical school dedicated largely to 
turning out primary care doctors, as we have seen in Chapter 1, would not require 
its own teaching hospital. Nor would it demand major resources to incubate a 
serious, high-powered research enterprise at the level of an “academic” medical 
center. Rather, it would emphasize the production of practitioners, especially 
in primary care, and would utilize the better local hospitals and specialists for 
community-based clinical education. This vision, while compatible with the goals 
of the school’s political and labor allies, was diametrically opposed to Lamar 
Soutter’s intentions. True, a Worcester campus could not follow the model 
advocated by leading medical educators  - given its geographic separation from 
the main campus, it could not become a closely integrated component of the 
university. Nevertheless, a “community” medical school stood for something less 
than first-rate in Soutter’s mind, and he would have no part of it. As Nick Soutter 
vividly recalled, “If you wanted to get [my father’s] hackles up, just suggest 
that this medical school was going to be anything less than the other major 
medical schools in the country.” To get an idea of his intent, one need only read 
his description of the role of the University hospital: “The hospital needs to be 
connected to the medical science building so that patients are readily accessible 
to students and faculty…Administratively it is completely under the control of 
the university. The variety of patients within it depends on its location, ideally it 
should be sufficiently remote from other general hospitals not to compete with 
them, but instead acts as a referral center for the more difficult and complicated 
problems.” This description from 1964, admittedly part of Soutter’s campaign for 
an Amherst location, underscored the idea that UMass Medical School must have 
its own hospital, one built for the most advanced techniques and technologies 
available. For more routine work - Soutter used family medicine, obstetrics, and 
psychiatry as examples - medical students and patients could always go to the 
“good, small” or specialized hospitals in the community.4  
 Unfortunately, now that a new medical school had been approved by the 
state, the Legislature was faced with the need to pay for it. As they slowly realized 
the intended scope of plans, including a teaching hospital and extensive research 
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facilities, and the potential costs, they began to balk. The hurdles to winning 
legislative approval for the school and its location in Worcester were at least 
equaled in difficulty by the battle to win funding for its construction; opposition 
to building a teaching hospital almost scuttled the school itself. The very 
legislators, like Maurice Donahue, who ardently supported the school were also 
those most opposed to the imposition of, in their view, a regressive state sales tax 
to pay for it. It didn’t help that the bills for many other “Great Society” initiatives, 
such as the expansion of community and state college systems, were coming due 
at the same time as medical school construction costs. But Soutter was not apt 
to back down; he told an interviewer, “’There seems to be a sort of schizophrenia 
here. Everybody demands that the medical school be the best, and then they 
refuse to give me the tools to make it the best possible. And this is where I get 
unreasonable!’”5  
 Soutter began preparing the Board for obstacles they would have to 
surmount months before Worcester was chosen as the site. The first involved 
winning preliminary accreditation. He explained, “Obtaining preliminary 
accreditation is one of the most serious problems we face” because it was 
a prerequisite for any application for federal construction matching funds 
under Public Law 88-129. Until the United States Commissioner of Education 
received notice from the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (the LCME 
comprised leaders from both the AMA and the AAMC) that they had awarded 
UMass Med such preliminary accreditation, no letter of “reasonable assurance” 
of accreditation would be granted. (The full accreditation would not occur until 
the first class graduated.) Winning such assurance would require a site visit from 
LCME representatives to determine whether the chosen site was appropriate, 
whether the surrounding community was supportive, and whether the overall 
educational plan, including faculty recruitment, was sound and likely to succeed. 
The LCME, especially, would need to be convinced that the state was sufficiently 
committed to the project to put up the necessary share of the costs.6 
 The LCME’s expectations were no mystery. In 1961, the U.S. Public Health 
Service (PHS) published an influential medical school planning document, 
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“Medical School Facilities: Planning Considerations,” which was written 
in collaboration with the of leaders of both the AMA and AAMC, several of 
whom were among those who conducted UMass Medical school’s preliminary 
accreditation site visit in 1966. The report noted, among other essentials, that 
the optimal class size would be 100 students with a faculty-to-student ratio of 
100:135. It also declared an adequate medical library to be “essential.” In the near 
future, it predicted, the typical collection will contain 100,000 books and 1000 
periodicals. The report also noted the direct correlation between the size of the 
medical library budget and a medical school’s research budget, since researchers 
require more library resources, including staff. With regard to clinical education, 
it mentioned, approvingly, that some schools had begun to bring clinical teaching 
into the curriculum in the first two years. In addition, “The development of 
comprehensive care clinics for teaching of the clinical sciences reflects a growing 
concern with the problems of the patient as a person and as a family member, 
as distinct from the study of cases of a particular disease…In some schools, they 
are conducted in separate clinics especially equipped to provide family health 
services.”7 
 Soutter was well versed in these standards, using federal requirements to 
win support during battles with the Legislature over funding and fiscal autonomy. 
Thus, three days before the Board of Trustees chose the Worcester State Hospital 
site, Soutter and Lederle orchestrated the presentation of a series of next steps 
in a planning memorandum to the Board’s Buildings and Grounds committee. 
First on the list was the need to lift the salary ceiling for Massachusetts state 
employees in the case of medical school faculty and top administrators. As 
Soutter informed the committee, typical first-rate faculty and administrators, 
especially department chairs, earned between $25,000 and $35,000 per year, 
whereas the state salary ceiling topped out at $21,300. Lederle strongly agreed 
that they must try to work this request through the Legislature. Without even a 
building to show prospective faculty, how could they possibly draw in recruits 
with such sub-standard salaries? Soutter also requested hiring up to 16 “core” 
faculty and staff to aid with planning and recruitment. Third, they must quickly 
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hire architects with experience in designing medical schools and teaching 
hospitals. The full Board readily consented, but it took another year for the 
Legislature to agree.8 
 Soutter’s list of personnel to be hired as soon as possible included a 
professional hospital director to start work immediately and be part of the 
planning team, and three clinical faculty to be hired part time as planning 
consultants until the buildings opened; they would then become professors and 
department chairs of Medicine, Surgery, and Pathology. Soutter also requested 
three full-time preclinical chairs to work at the University itself until the school 
facilities were ready. These would become heads of Anatomy, Physiology, and 
Biochemistry. The Library, too, was a centerpiece of his planning and a Medical 
Librarian was among those he hoped to recruit immediately. The USPHS 
planning guide for medical schools emphasized the recent growth of master’s, 
doctoral and postdoctoral programs attached to medical schools in what were 
then called the “basic medical sciences” (between 1956 and 1960, 77 medical 
schools sponsored such programs and the number of students enrolled jumped 
by 50%). Soutter, however, did not integrate a graduate school into the plans 
for the medical school and hospital. It would come, but not for another decade. 
At this early stage, his ideas about doctoral research were governed by different 
assumptions. For one, he assumed that the School of Public Health at UMass 
Amherst would come under the Medical School’s administrative control; second, 
that the biological science departments at the Amherst campus would also be 
closely involved in the programs of medical students who wanted to become 
researchers.9  
Scandalous Designs
 The biggest challenge faced by President Lederle and Dean Soutter proved 
to be designing, constructing, and - especially - paying for the buildings. Lamar 
Soutter’s plans were nothing if not ambitious. They incorporated Lederle’s 
informal promise that a university campus later would be built around the 
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medical school, a compensatory (if unrealistic) vision sure to raise Bimi’s spirits. 
Soutter thus called for a three-stage process: “During the first we would construct 
the medical science building, the University teaching hospital, and housing. 
The second would be that in which such appendages as other schools in the 
health sciences, hospitals and clinics might be built, and the third, would be at 
some distant time in which a variety of other elements might be added to form 
a graduate and undergraduate educational center for medicine, biology, and 
related sciences.” Besides envisioning Worcester as the site of a University health 
sciences campus, Soutter also gave consideration to the way that design of the 
medical school itself could enhance the education of students. He told a reporter 
that he would like, “the hospital and medical school to be part of one building 
with the library in the center so that the main focus of the institution is on 
learning.’” He admitted the idea, according to the reporter, was “new to this part 
of the country…By putting library, lecture halls, and auditoriums in the center, 
accessible to students, faculty, and the hospital, the student can be introduced at 
the very earliest stage to patients,” Soutter believed. He hoped to build in a way 
that made future expansion cost effective and as minimally disruptive as possible. 
Thus, the university teaching hospital would be built for 440 beds but have 
the flexibility for expansion to a 1000-bed capacity. Ideally, too, a “motel-like 
facility” would be included for patients traveling long distances to the hospital 
for diagnostic testing. The medical school would be designed for an initial class 
size of 100, but with the capacity to expand to 150 students per class. The Dean 
also envisioned student housing as part of the first stage of construction, with 
dormitories to house 250 students of whom, “30 might be female.” Finally, he 
hoped to see apartments for 300 married students, residents, and postdoctoral 
fellows. Unfortunately, by the time these plans were distilled into a grant 
application, ambition collided with a new federal budgetary landscape marred by 
war spending and rapid inflation.10  
 The initial planning moved deceptively fast. Dean Soutter had a list of 
preferred architects to show the Board within a week of the vote to choose the 
Worcester location, a list based on the advice of the Dean of Architecture at 
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MIT. Soon after the Worcester State Hospital site was identified, the Trustees 
agreed informally that the school be designed as an integrated campus complex 
of buildings including the 400-bed teaching hospital,” despite knowing that the 
actual letter of the law empowered them to create only a “school.” The Board also 
voted to choose Ellerbe Architects of St. Paul, Minnesota and their associates, 
Architects Collaborative of Cambridge, to design the structure. Since this was 
a state building project, the President’s office communicated its decision to the 
Commissioner of Administration and Finance for appointment, along with a 
second choice, Campbell, Aldrich and Nulty of Boston. They all hoped the design 
phase could begin promptly, but these hopes soon were dashed in what became 
a serious scandal for the Volpe administration - the Governor, it was alleged, 
ignored the Board’s choices in favor of a firm apparently willing to work with a 
local partner who, again allegedly, was favored because of his contributions to 
Governor Volpe’s political campaigns.11 
 A letter from one of the trustees sums up the reaction of the Board, 
the President, and Dean Soutter: “As Chairman of the Buildings and Grounds 
Committee of the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts, I am 
shocked to learn that another firm, not on the list submitted to you, is being 
considered for appointment as architect of the medical school without an agreed 
consultation with the Trustees.”12 In choosing their top two candidates for 
designing the school, Soutter and the Trustees had been advised by the Dean of 
the School of Architecture at MIT as well as faculty and deans of other medical 
schools. As Soutter told a special committee of the Legislature after the matter 
had become a serious problem for the Governor, they all advised him to choose 
a firm with experience building medical institutions but especially a firm that 
had successfully shepherded clients through the application process for federal 
matching funds. Second, they strongly advised choosing someone who was based 
nearby. These were the criteria used to choose the combination of Ellerbe, who 
had extensive experience, and Architects Collaborative, a local partner with 
experience working with Ellerbe. On October 13, 1965 President Lederle sent a 
letter to John J. McCarthy, state Commissioner of Administration and Finance, 
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listing the recommendations, their two alternate choices, and two other firms 
who were interviewed but not recommended. He also gave a detailed account 
of the criteria and how each firm ranked according to those criteria. Two weeks 
later, at a lunch with Lederle, the Governor, Commissioner McCarthy, his Deputy 
Commissioner Walter O’Connell, several Trustees, and the University Treasurer, 
Soutter discussed these choices and the criteria used in making them. The 
Governor then told McCarthy, “‘Go ahead and appoint them.’” The appointments 
were never made. By the beginning of January 1966, Lederle and Soutter heard 
from Ellerbe that things had taken an unexpected turn. In a meeting with 
McCarthy and O’Connell, the Ellerbe architects were asked to replace Architects 
Collaborative of Cambridge with a Boston firm, Ritchie Associates, or, it was 
implied, they would lose the entire contract. When Ellerbe declined to do so, the 
Commissioner instead chose the Trustees’ second choice, Campbell, Aldrich and 
Nulty (who had done work at UMass Amherst) to work with Ritchie Associates 
on the medical school design. Ritchie Associates alone was awarded the contract 
to design the hospital. Ellerbe was appointed merely as a “consultant,” but was 
paid a suspiciously large sum of $500,000. Lederle and Soutter were furious, and 
word quickly spread.13 
 None of this sat well with the legislature, especially those members 
who had opposed the school in the first place. Unhappily for the Governor, an 
investigation turned up $1,500 in contributions by Donald Ritchie to Governor 
Volpe’s 1962 and 1964 gubernatorial campaigns. Even worse, another state 
official, Horace Chase, Director of the Bureau of Building Construction (BBC), 
testified that the governor’s brother, head of the family construction company, 
had been informally advising the governor on state construction appointments. 
Peter Volpe was highly enthusiastic about the Ritchie firm and said so - at 
a meeting with Commissioner McCarthy and Horace Chase. And so Dean 
Soutter found himself being grilled under oath by a special Senate committee to 
investigate the choice (and cost) of the architects. In his account of the lunch with 
Governor Volpe, the Dean did not pull any punches. Commissioner McCarthy 
had told the committee two weeks earlier - also under oath, “‘At no time did the 
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governor indicate in any way during the lunch hour that he would tell me whom 
to select.’” Lamar Soutter’s account clearly diverged from McCarthy’s. When both 
UMass Treasurer Kenneth Johnson and President Lederle confirmed the dean’s 
story, pressure began to build on Commissioner McCarthy and rumors began to 
circulate that he would soon resign.14  
 While such skirmishes surely helped Bimi Soutter in the eyes of the state’s 
Democratic politicians - who never shirked their responsibility to discomfit a 
Republican administration, they did nothing to ease the trials of working with 
Horace Chase and the BBC. Soutter had hoped for fairly rapid progress in the 
construction of the campus once the legislature approved the site and agreed to 
preliminary financing. He even hoped to cut six months off the planning phase 
after consulting with the Ellerbe architects. He had told the Board in the fall of 
1965 that if the architects were appointed and funds appropriated by December, 
the school and hospital could be completed by April 1970 and students admitted 
by the fall of that year. In January 1966, he still held out hope of making this 
goal, telling a reporter, “If we are to get the school fast and well, we need 
experience.” But, interference in the choice of architects was only the first episode 
in a seemingly endless period of political meddling, whether by Republicans, 
Democrats, or a combination of both. Chase, whose office was uncomfortably 
interdependent with political appointees such as the Commissioner of 
Administration and Finance, was caught in the cross-fire and had no easy time of 
it either. Nor did he work comfortably with Dr. Soutter. The result was a seriously 
muddled planning process and significant delays in the start of construction. 
Ultimately, these delays and the dire effects of rapidly rising inflation took a 
toll. Two years lost in the choice of site and architects for the school cost the 
state dearly in escalating construction costs. It almost, as we will see, cost it the 
teaching hospital, so vital to the dean’s hopes for academic excellence.15  
“Progress and Problems”
 The promised lifting of the state salary ceiling for senior medical school 
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faculty and administrators did not go smoothly. Soutter expected to begin 
faculty recruiting early in 1966, assuming that legislation exempting senior 
medical school personnel from the salary ceiling would be passed quickly. He 
needed a Medical Librarian to help organize purchases of books (he hoped to 
purchase around 40,000 volumes to start) and journals and - with some urgency 
- he needed an experienced hospital administrator to help plan the teaching 
hospital. However, Massachusetts House Bill H324, which would allow the 
University of Massachusetts to lift the salary ceiling for senior administrators 
and department chairs - the first step toward lifting the ceiling on all academic 
positions - languished in the House of Representatives for many months, 
impeding Soutter’s recruitment efforts. Worse, it threatened the new school’s 
ability to win preliminary accreditation. As President Lederle wrote to Speaker 
of the House, Rep. John Davoren, “the Accreditation Team made a big point 
of House 324. They pointed out how absurd it would be to think that we could 
build a good Medical School with a salary ceiling on the staff.” He couldn’t resist 
commenting that, “You can well imagine that the present controversy over the 
architects preceded by the controversy over the site for the Medical School has 
done nothing to promote the idea that Massachusetts is prepared to support a 
first-rate Medical School. Everything we do seems to become quickly involved 
with ‘politics’ and controversy.” The bill was finally brought out of committee, 
passed by the House and Senate and signed into law in September 1966. In 
its final form the Trustees were empowered to designate the salary for senior 
administrators and department chairs at both the University and the medical 
school, but not exceeding one percent of the total faculty and administration of 
the institution. Not until 1968 was the ceiling lifted for all medical school faculty.  
In the meantime, while Lamar Soutter tried to recruit chairs for the new school, 
he found that “prospective heads of departments are hesitant about coming to 
us because they are fearful that they will be unable to obtain a good staff to work 
with them.” Based on a 1966 survey of U. S. medical schools, he concluded that 
UMass Med would be unable to compete for high-quality faculty with 93 percent 
of the other schools, at least not on the basis of salary. He could understand a 
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prospective professor’s reluctance: “Most prospective faculty members interpret 
a ceiling on salaries as a deliberate effort of the government to restrict and 
control their activities.” This was not an unreasonable fear. The supplementary 
budget, passed during the same week as the salary ceiling bill, nearly left out 
an appropriation for hiring faculty because the House Ways and Means Chair, 
Anthony Scibelli, Democrat of Springfield, thought that without an actual 
building, medical school professors would just “’stand around doing nothing.’”16 
 Despite the Dean’s misgivings, the Medical School, after a site visit in 
May, did receive its preliminary accreditation in the fall of 1966.17 A month after 
the visit, the Dean submitted a report to the Board summing up where they 
stood. Part I was titled “Progress and Problems,” and the latter far outweighed 
the former. For one, the school’s budget was cut almost by two-thirds in fiscal 
year 1966, leaving just enough to hire a hospital director on a consulting basis, 
a plant engineer, and an administrative assistant to assist with planning.18 
Besides an urgent need for working capital from the state, Soutter was most 
concerned to complete the planning for the physical plant and submit a proposal 
for federal funding before November 1, 1966. For this, he needed the architects 
to supply “preliminary plans” to accompany the application. The application, he 
hoped, would be approved in March 1967, and without delays due to changes in 
congressional appropriations, they could begin construction in June, 1968. He 
still planned to open the school in the fall of 1970 in its new building.19 
 Although the Dean consistently mentioned the school’s future need for 
expansion to include schools of dentistry and nursing, by 1966 he was realistic 
enough to agree that the school should be designed with no overt mention of the 
other schools; in fact, he now favored requesting funds from HEW for the school 
and library alone, submitting an application for the hospital only at the next 
round of funding. Ellerbe Architects, in their role as consultants, began work in 
April. By mid June they had already produced three separate “space programs,” 
or a translation of the needs of the school into actual square feet of space [and] 
about 15 diagrams to show possible internal arrangements of the various parts 
of the buildings.” Soutter transmitted the last of the space programs and the 
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diagrams to Campbell, Aldrich and Nulty, the firm overseeing the architectural 
work.20 
 At this point, however, nothing seemed to go right. It is unclear from 
existing records what or who was really to blame - the Dean’s overly ambitious 
hopes for the new school; the Ellerbe Architects’ unwise encouragement for 
a plan with spacious research quarters for faculty; the Board’s acquiescence; 
or, simply the botched execution of the building plans by the state-appointed 
architects in concert with the state’s Bureau of Building Construction. Soutter’s 
overly optimistic space planning, encouraged by advice from Ellerbe, is suggested 
by an early discussion at a Board meeting in June 1966. Soutter wanted to 
get their go-ahead to expand the space allocations for faculty research using a 
“faculty-research space formula” suggested by Ellerbe of 720 square feet per 
faculty. Trustee Owen Kiernan, Commissioner of Education and a supporter 
of the Worcester site asked for an explanation of the figures. Soutter admitted 
that the “NIH Guide Book gives less space than we provided for; but the basic 
recommendation is increasing. Ellerbe came up with 720 [square feet] based 
on work they are doing in other schools. We have preliminary support [and] 
commitment from NIH people who will have to pass on approval for [Federal] 
fund support. But when we get going full blast we’ll have to add to it.”21 Dr. 
Wheeler, soon to become founding Chair of Surgery, explained that the guidelines 
they worked with seemed quite inadequate to the goal of building a first-rate 
school. For example, Dr. Wheeler explained that the “total surgical faculty was 
not supposed to exceed 21 for a school of 100 students per class. And if you break 
that down into all the various [surgical] specialties, you end up with two of this 
or even one of that, and it becomes very difficult to provide coverage in [the case 
of] absence or illness…” Luckily, they “discovered that the government, in its 
infinite wisdom, had decided that …every faculty member was allowed to have 
a lab.” Naturally, he and Dr. Soutter decided they should designate a lab for all 
21 surgical faculty members knowing that some of those would, in fact, be used 
as offices for additional surgeons.22 Although the Board routinely questioned 
Dr. Soutter closely, they simply were in no position to challenge his technical 
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judgment. The Dean was building for the future. As John Stockwell, the Dean’s 
choice to become hospital director, told the Board, the “criteria supplied to the 
architects included the necessity to provide for expansion and flexibility to adapt 
to the needs of the future.” Unhappily, by this time, the federal government was 
unwilling to fund such ambitions, and from the start, reviewers for the proposal 
sent up numerous red flags.23 
 The legacy of troubles over the choice of architects also bequeathed 
months of poor communication, delays, and unhelpful working relationships 
among Soutter, the architects, and the Bureau of Building and Construction 
bureaucracy. For example, a letter from Dr. Soutter to Nelson Aldrich, lead 
architect on the medical school, library, and power plant, described a “dress 
rehearsal” presentation to HEW in Washington that was “far from satisfactory.” 
They had already been informed that they must reduce the size and scope of their 
plans - and, in particular, reduce the size of the library from 50,000 to 35,000 
square feet and from four floors to three - but the plan presented to Soutter on 
the eve of the trip showed a library of 40,000 square feet on four floors. Nor had 
his team received final estimates of the new cost projections. As a result, they 
had to insert figures into the plans at the last minute, resulting in a proposal 
that looked “sloppy,” and a team that appeared unprepared. Indeed the NIH 
deferred acting on the application until after a second site visit to Worcester to 
determine the level of local support for the school as well as the kinds of research 
prospective faculty intended to undertake due to what seemed like outsized 
projections for lab space. Soutter was sufficiently worried that he arranged for 
community leaders in Worcester as well as state senator John Conte to attend a 
lunch at the State Mutual Life Assurance Company.24  
 Despite these signs of misgiving from NIH, the Dean and President were 
shocked when they received word in November 1967 that their request for $17, 
424,871 had been rejected. One strike against the proposal, it was conjectured, 
was the apparently lukewarm support given the school by the Massachusetts 
legislature. The fact that in May 1967, state funds had been committed for 
medical school construction, but only “contingent upon the prior approval by 
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the proper federal authorities and assurance by such authorities that the federal 
allocation will be not less than twenty-two million five hundred thousand 
dollars,” that is, approximately half the expected cost, did not indicate strong 
local support for the school to the authorities in Washington.25  
 Officials from HEW told UMass that they deemed the proposed design 
“unnecessarily generous” and duplicative in its allocations for educational space. 
The design for the library appeared “inefficient and inflexible,” as well as too 
large. Also viewed as a gratuitous expense was a provision for dual cafeterias; 
instead, only one should be created, serving both the hospital and the school. 
Most serious, the clinical sciences wing was not connected directly to the hospital 
to maximize efficiency for faculty. (They had designed it in the form of a “T” with 
a central wing for labs and lecture halls, the two horizontal wings for clinical and 
basic sciences.)26 Federal officials objected to the long separation that would be 
created between faculty labs and the hospital, which would only connect at the 
base of the education stem of the building. The HEW urged them to resubmit an 
application as soon as possible, however, and, if possible, in conjunction with 
their application for hospital construction funds. Then - another blow: their 
$7, 361, 832 million proposal for the research wing of the building was also 
rejected because “the planned amount of research space [was considered to be] 
excessive.” The reviewers suggested, mystifyingly, that the university prepare “a 
new proposal which reflects more realistically the research space requirements 
for the first few years of the school’s operation. The research space should be 
keyed closely to firm faculty staffing projections and should request the amount 
needed to recruit this faculty.” Soutter told the press that, while some of the 
reasons for the applications’ rejection were reasonable, some were due to the 
current “austerity” in federal spending due to the escalating costs of the Viet Nam 
War.27 Had the application been submitted a year earlier, he had been told, it 
would have “gone right through.” In a post-mortem meeting with federal officials 
and the meeting’s organizer, Senator Edward Kennedy, Lederle and Soutter 
also learned that the chances of funding in the coming year might be even worse 
because only $82 million was available for medical school construction overall, 
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and because some existing schools were in trouble and might receive higher 
priority. Yet, Kennedy told reporters that the meeting had cleared up many of the 
misconceptions clouding discussion of the application. In his view, the school’s 
chances had become much stronger.28  
 In the winter of 1968, in a gesture of resignation over the extra years 
construction was likely to take, the University purchased a small building for 
$550,000 on the edge of the medical school property -- a former warehouse for 
wholesale cigars, cigarettes, tobacco and confectionaries. 
Owned originally by the H. E. Shaw Company and still known today as the “Shaw 
Building,” the building would be renovated to include classrooms, teaching 
  
labs, minimal office space, and a library – all in time for the first small class of 
16 students to begin their studies in the fall of 1970. The new medical sciences 
building, meanwhile, would now open no earlier than 1972.29
 Dean Soutter was determined to complete the suggested revisions and 
submit the new proposals by the next deadline, March 1, 1968. Despite Horace 
Chase’s indignation at the “drastic” changes required, the new application 
followed the reviewers’ suggestions, eliminating an entire wing that would have 
contained additional lecture and conference space. Under the revised design, 
the school would look something like the top half of an “H” with one wing 
making up the basic science and medical education departments, the other, the 
Shaw Building, 1968.  Sign in window reads 
“University of Massachusetts Medical School 
Office Will open here February 1968” (Photo 
courtesy of the Department of Special Collections 
and University Archives, W.E.B. Du Bois Library, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst)
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clinical sciences. The design called for as much correlation as possible between 
clinical and biological departments, for example placing anatomy and surgery 
on the same floor. The crossbar would contain units such as student labs and 
administrative offices. The hospital would be designed to elongate the clinical 
sciences wing, with the clinical science departments linking to the relevant 
patient-care floors.30 
 
          
The revised proposals for the medical education, library, and research 
components of the school were approved in the spring of 1968. University 
officials, however, soon learned that success might be more apparent than real. 
Architectural drawing of Medical School and teaching hospital, 1968
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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The head of NIH informed U. S. Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (at 
the time, the senior legislator from Massachusetts), that due to budget cuts and 
a backlog of 100 million dollars’ worth of medical school funding, Massachusetts 
might not receive the money for at least another two years. At that point, 
Massachusetts deployed all of its political muscle - not only Speaker McCormack, 
but Senators Edward Kennedy, Edward M. Brooke, and Representatives Harold 
Donahue and Silvio Conte all made sure Secretary Wilbur Cohen, head of HEW, 
knew of their concern. Senator Kennedy, in particular, “indicated his strong 
interest in this matter.” On Beacon Hill politicians sympathetic to the school such 
as Maurice Donahue and John Conte also contacted their friends in Washington. 
In addition, the Democrats’ strong allies, organized labor, strongly supported 
medical education in the election platform proposals they presented to both 
political parties prior to the presidential election in 1968. Finally, both President 
Lederle and Dean Soutter stayed in constant touch with the Washington 
congressional delegation. Despite Dean Soutter’s fear that the war in Viet Nam 
 Speaker John McCormack, U.S. House of Representatives (Photo courtesy of the National 
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.)
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had drained most of the available funds from the federal budget, with a close 
Presidential race in the offing, a faithfully Democratic state like Massachusetts 
saw its pleas rewarded by a Democratic administration. The first installment of 
$13.8 million, intended for the medical education building and the library, was 
awarded in early September 1968. Representative McCormack sent President 
Lederle a telegram with the good news. Lederle’s office sent thank-you notes to 
the entire Massachusetts congressional delegation, as well as to state leaders 
such as Maurice Donahue and chairs of both the House and Senate Ways and 
Means committees, testaments to the extremity of the need and the depth of the 
gratitude.31 
 Unfortunately, money for the research wing of the medical school building 
was deferred indefinitely when Congress cut the budget for the Health Research 
Facilities branch of HEW. Because of the need for any first rate medical school 
to include research facilities for faculty, Lederle and Soutter urged the Trustees 
to allow them to move ahead with bids for the construction, and received 
reassurances from HEW that going forward with state money on the assumption 
of retroactive payment from federal funding would not jeopardize their chances 
of receiving it. They did not finally receive the money until the winter of 1969.32 
“A Long, Hard Look”
 The hospital, always a core component of Lamar Soutter’s vision of 
excellence, was yet to be funded. UMass officials submitted the application for 
federal hospital construction funds on June 14, 1968; a site visit was conducted 
two weeks later. The University hoped to receive $13 million of the expected 
total cost of $38.8 million from the Health Manpower Administration; they 
sought an additional $450,000 through the Hill-Harris hospital construction 
act. In December, President Lederle’s office learned that the hospital grant 
proposal had received approval from an advisory council, the first rung of the 
ladder, albeit with an approximately 30 percent reduction in requested funds, 
down to about $16 million dollars. Unfortunately, this potentially good news 
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from Washington was offset by three larger developments: the ascendance of 
a Republican administration in Washington; a resultant change in personnel 
in the Massachusetts governor’s office; and rising inflation related to the war 
in Viet Nam leading to startling increases in construction costs. Soon after 
Richard Nixon’s election to the Presidency in 1968, he nominated Massachusetts 
Governor John Volpe to be Secretary of Transportation. When the moderate 
Republican Lieutenant Governor Francis W. Sargent moved into the Governor’s 
office in 1969, he learned that the costs to build the medical school complex had 
risen dramatically - from a projected $70 million to $124 million. Sargent was 
quick to express his - entirely understandable - alarm.33 On top of that, with the 
inauguration of President Nixon, the political and fiscal landscape in Washington 
changed completely. Dr. Wheeler vividly remembered the situation:
The funds were actually appropriated under the Johnson 
Administration.  Unfortunately, President Nixon was elected, 
and did not fare well in the election in Massachusetts.  And he 
reaped his vengeance.  The Boston Naval Shipyard was closed, 
and NASA’s Electronic and Research Center in Cambridge 
was closed.  A lot of other federal projects that brought 
money into Massachusetts went down the drain.  And the 
funds appropriated for the university hospital by the Johnson 
Administration were never - were basically impounded by the 
Nixon Administration, so obviously no money was coming 
from the federal government to help build the hospital.  With 
that being the case, the Legislature wondered whether they 
could afford to build the hospital…It was a sort of touch and go 
battle...34 
 The Worcester papers closely followed the battle, not only for the hospital, 
but for the school itself. They were quick to report the changing tides of political 
feeling for the project. The first sign of trouble arose when Donald Dwight, 
Sargent’s Commissioner for Administration and Finance, mentioned the need 
to appraise the entire project’s “economic feasibility.” Dwight’s perspective is 
captured in a study completed several years later for the Kennedy School of 
Government. It notes that the original authorization “recommended a ‘medical 
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science building’ with a cost of $10 million.” However, even before a site had 
been selected, “Soutter began expanding the existing construction plans. By 1968 
[the school] had grown into a medical complex with a price tag of $80 million.” 
Faced with a potential fiscal shortfall partly due to the state’s newly increased 
responsibility to cover Medicare costs, Governor Sargent immediately announced 
the need to consider raising taxes and to take a “long, hard look” at building a 
state medical school and hospital.35 
 Journalists soon began referring to the school’s “long, battle-scarred 
history” and wondering –in print -  whether it was doomed. At these signs of 
apparent vulnerability, the deans of the three medical schools in Boston (of 
whom Tufts and BU were experiencing their own budget crises and rumors of 
imminent closure), as well as the medical deans at the University of Vermont 
and Dartmouth promptly let it be known, first, that no first-rate school could be 
built without a teaching hospital. Second, given the prohibitive costs of doing 
so, the state would be better off granting subsidies to existing schools to accept 
Massachusetts students. Finally, if their own schools were to survive, they must 
Massachusetts Governor Francis W. Sargent 
(Photo courtesy of the Department of Special 
Collections and University Archives, W.E.B. Du Bois 
Library, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
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“receive additional money,” presumably from the state. Lamar Soutter met 
this return to the debates of 1962 with outright dismissiveness, noting that the 
state constitution actually forbade public funds going to private educational 
institutions. Although the Governor acknowledged that BU and Tufts were in 
some financial difficulty, their backhanded bid for state subsidies won little or 
no support. The Governor assured Worcester that the school - if built - would be 
built nowhere else but Worcester. However, through Commissioner Dwight, he 
also commissioned a study of the matter by Professor Leon S. White, a professor 
in the School of Management at MIT, so that Sargent could make a “careful, 
speedy, but not hasty” decision.36  
 In the meantime, however, all work on designing the buildings was 
officially halted when the project ran out of money. Not only that, the Governor’s 
budget for the coming fiscal year, the year the medical school was expected to be 
“tooled up to open” as Soutter put it, allotted only $530,000 to hire faculty and 
buy equipment and furniture for the Shaw building so the school could open on 
schedule in 1970. Soutter told reporters the governor’s administration “really slit 
our throats,” adding that for the past five years the school had been “miserably 
financed…We’ve been crippled by this.”37 Such frankness to the press might seem 
a risky ploy for a dean without funding for an un-built medical school.  President 
Lederle saw it differently:
[At] first I didn’t think Bimi was cutting it with the Legislative 
leadership, and we needed their support in order to get large 
sums of money that…would be required …And then things 
began to fall into shape. The Governor had a succession of 
Commissioners of Administration who were taking negative 
views. Practically asking the question: ‘Should there be a 
Medical School?’…even though the Legislature had voted 
it. This really stirred up Legislative hackles and Judge Fox’s 
hackles…
Well, Bimi, under these circumstances - and I encouraged him 
in this although some presidents would not have - would blast 
off about critics taking a long, hard look and a dirty look and 
stuff like this. Some of his phraseology was just terrific and it 
was headline-getting. . . The Democratic legislative leadership, 
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which didn’t like to spend the money, found that Bimi was 
becoming better in attacking Republican administration 
footdragging than they were themselves. Bimi became 
rehabilitated.
 Brownie Wheeler, whose career will be discussed in Chapter 6, recalled 
how, “Lamar Soutter lobbied long and hard up and down the offices and 
corridors of Beacon Hill, and knocking on every door, and soliciting support 
from every legislator who was available.” Again, President Lederle: “They [the 
state legislators] now began to rally around Bimi and be his friend and give him 
support. I won’t say they ever loved him, or that Bimi ever felt happy walking 
around the halls of the State House; but he was my kind of dean.”38 
 Once again, Worcester’s local supporters mobilized, “reorganizing” the 
medical school committee of the Chamber of Commerce to lobby the Governor. 
At a Chamber meeting, for example, where the Governor was the featured 
speaker, most of Worcester’s municipal, state, and national politicians appeared 
as did major labor leaders such as James Loughlin. Local union leaders lobbied 
hard, writing directly to Governor Sargent. Salvatore Camelio, Hugh Thompson’s 
successor as President of the Massachusetts State Labor Council, AFL-CIO, 
“disclosed that the Council by unanimous consent ‘wishes to reaffirm its strong 
support for the … Medical School…’” The Governor was clearly feeling the heat 
over the matter - he admitted that he had even heard from Cardinal Cushing, 
“a supporter of the state medical school,” on the subject. Again, a Democratic 
legislature came to the school’s rescue. In a startlingly bold maneuver by 
Representative Joseph Early (supported by the House Democratic leadership 
including Representative David Bartley, Speaker of the House), a bill was 
successfully introduced from the floor of the House, bypassing all committees, 
to increase financial support for the school to cover the increased costs of 
construction. This would allow the architects to continue work (they had been 
working without pay since December). At the same time, the bill lowered the 
amount of federal funding required by the state before its own monies could be 
allocated, in light of the lesser amounts actually forthcoming from Washington 
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compared with the state’s original expectations in 1968. 
  
State Senator David M. Bartley 
(Photo courtesy of the Department 
of Special Collections and University 
Archives, W.E.B. Du Bois Library, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst)
 
 The legislation was widely seen as a red flag signaling the legislature’s 
anger over the governor’s implied threat to halt work on the school. When the 
bill came up before the State Senate, it passed overwhelmingly. Even more 
important, with heavy lobbying by Worcester state senators Dan Foley and John 
Conte and the firm support of Senate President Maurice Donahue, the Senate 
turned back an attempt to eliminate mention of the teaching hospital from the 
bill, thereby insuring that the entire medical center concept could go forward. 
Even many Republican legislators voted for it. Sargent, who was a distant relative 
of Dr. Soutter, had already heard privately from influential supporters of the 
dean about the need for a teaching hospital to insure that the school was “first 
class,” and these personal contacts likely helped persuade him. When even the 
Republican floor leader in the Senate publicly testified for the school, saying of 
Soutter that he had come to “know and admire this man,” Sargent must have 
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seen little advantage in opposing the bill. Delays would only increase its ultimate 
cost. Finally, Worcester-based Representative Joseph Early assured that the 
governor’s $250,000 cut from the school’s budget allotment would be reinstated 
and that the additional $436,000 necessary for equipment and books would also 
be available in 1970. Even the students at UMass Amherst, among the bitterest 
opponents of Worcester back in 1965, weighed in with a resolution by the Student 
Senate to support the school against the governor.39 
State Representative Joseph D. Early (Photo
courtesy of the Collection of the U.S. House  of  
Representatives, Photography Collection)
 
            Construction of the school was assured. Yet Sargent and others were 
unconvinced that the next phase of the project - building a teaching hospital 
- could be justified. In light of Worcester’s many existing hospitals, weren’t 
enough beds already available? Some Democrats agreed. In a statement 
that predicted his outlook six years later when he took office as governor, 
Representative Michael S. Dukakis, Democrat from Brookline, testified 
that he thought Worcester had been chosen for the school on account of its 
preexisting hospital beds. He accused University trustees of trying to “out-
Harvard Harvard” by trying to create a research and specialty-oriented 
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institution at Worcester rather than emphasizing primary care, as lawmakers 
had always expected. The Governor, ever-cautious, allowed the MIT study of 
the need for a teaching hospital to continue, with a due date of June. He also 
let it be known that he might still block the bidding for construction contracts 
in June because of the state’s financial shortfall. Senator Kennedy, too, 
publicly questioned the drastically elevated cost projections.40
                                    Senator Edward M. Kennedy, (D)-Massachusetts
                                    (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Senate Historical Office)
 When the White  study finally appeared, it represented everything the 
medical school’s supporters had feared - seemingly a hatchet job. White, working 
closely with Commissioner Donald Dwight, no fan of the Worcester project, did 
not advocate a particular course of action, but merely laid out the possibilities. 
The most original of these - the “community medical school” concept - would 
have called for creation of a basic sciences building on the UMass Amherst 
campus for the first two years of medical school and then the adaptation of 
existing hospitals into teaching sites for primary care medicine. Faculty - apart 
from the basic sciences - would consist of part-time teachers drawn from the 
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ranks of local physicians. White believed that this would hold down costs but 
also provide the greatest number of physicians - implicitly, primary care doctors 
- for Massachusetts. Most important, this approach obviated the need to build a 
teaching hospital.41 
 The report was truly Dr. Soutter’s worst nightmare - proposing a school 
explicitly limited to generalist medicine and with no apparent commitment 
to innovation or excellence. Coming at the very time that proponents of the 
“family physician” concept were still struggling to win recognition for the new 
specialty as a worthy successor to the old-fashioned “g.p,” it is not difficult to 
understand Dr. Soutter’s chagrin. Once again, the Dean did not hold back his 
scorn. He told reporters that the White Report showed the Governor taking not 
a “long, hard look” at the question, but a “dirty look and an unfair report.” He 
was furious that his own figures had not been taken into account resulting in, 
he charged, a deliberate under-estimate of the numbers of graduates the school 
would produce for Massachusetts. Moreover, by the time community hospitals 
in Worcester, Springfield, and other cities would be renovated according to such 
a plan, the costs would be at least as much as to build a single teaching hospital 
in Worcester. More damning, the apparent motive for the report seemed to be 
a desire to scrap the costly state school entirely and give some state funds to 
BU and Tufts, an unconstitutional use of state money. Many legislators were 
convinced that, in the words of state senator John Conte, “the governor has fallen 
to pressure from Harvard, Boston University, and Tufts Medical Schools.” A 
typical headline ran with the words, “Soutter Says School Report Part of Plot.” 
(The dean of Tufts Medical School felt it necessary to “categorically” deny any 
attempt to “block” the opening of the state medical school, while the dean of 
Dartmouth Medical College offered UMass his support.)42 
 All the public bickering took a toll. Two of Dr. Soutter’s early senior staff 
appointees, a hospital director and the chair of the biochemistry department, 
announced their imminent departure even before the school was opened. 
They had been on the state payroll for about a year and a half. The departing 
department chair told a reporter that the school was “in limbo,” and that others 
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were likely to quit too. He was sure the state would never build the school. The 
last straw for him was the Governor’s decision to bring in a panel of outside 
medical experts to review the White Report. He was sure the school would be 
ceaselessly delayed. Another more serious threat emerged when the leading 
hospital in the region, Memorial Hospital in Worcester, ordered a study of 
future needs for hospital beds in the region and the potential impact of a new 
academic teaching hospital on the hospital market. In earlier discussions with the 
Central Massachusetts Regional Hospital Planning Council in 1967, Dean Soutter 
emphasized the medical school’s dependence on local hospitals to give students 
a “community-oriented education.” Soutter had also publicly pledged to keep 
the new UMass Hospital true to its mission of tertiary care, that is, cases that are 
referred by other hospitals; the one exception, of course, would be emergencies 
brought directly to its doors, which it would be obligated to accept. In private, 
none of the early clinical leaders at the school were fooled by this, given that a 
teaching hospital needs enough patients to supply its many medical students, 
residents, and faculty. Now it appeared that a major local player in Central 
Massachusetts health care doubted the dean’s pledge, and was willing to say so 
publicly. Further, a recent study by the Central Massachusetts Regional Hospital 
Planning Council showed “no evidence” of need for additional beds in the county. 
On the other hand, a new study by the Department of Public Health in Worcester 
did show an increased need for beds. The picture was unclear. Regional health 
planning was a new phenomenon, one which has, even today, never been fully 
integrated into the economics of health care in the U.S. At a time of increasing 
inflation and budget tightening, this could have been the moment when the idea 
took hold in Massachusetts, dooming the plan for a brand new teaching hospital. 
That was the context for Professor White’s strictly theoretical study. If the 
planning, funding, and political commitment to a first-rate state medical school 
had not already taken hold, the school might not have gotten its hospital. The 
dean, however, quickly renewed his public assurance that University Hospital 
would primarily accept referrals. “What we will do is get the patients Worcester-
area doctors are now referring to Boston hospitals - especially the elderly ones.” 
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That left only the Governor as a “roadblock.” When even the Governor’s out-of-
state experts acknowledged that going forward was the best plan of action, the 
Governor had no choice but to agree.43 
 On July 2, 1969, Governor Sargent announced to the UMass Board of 
Trustees that he would drop his objections to building a state medical school 
and teaching hospital - an outcome greeted by Dean Soutter as “an absolutely 
thumping victory.” Within days, local newspaper coverage portrayed the dean as 
“relaxed and ebullient.” The medical school now was portrayed as an economic 
“transfusion” for the region: The anticipated hiring of 2,000 faculty and staff for 
the school and hospital, many of them from Worcester itself, and the purchase of 
fuel and supplies from local companies would obviously give the city’s economy a 
boost. Worcester began to prepare itself for the “face-lifting” the new institution 
would bring to its eastern gateway by fixing access roads. Soutter felt confident 
that his now-resumed faculty recruiting (halted when the school briefly ran out of 
money), a tight but viable budget, and the scheduled start of renovations for the 
Shaw building in November, would allow the definite opening of the first medical 
school class in September 1970. It would consist of 16 students.44 
 The groundbreaking did not occur until October 23, 1969. For the 
ceremony, held on a brisk day in late October, the President’s office along with 
the Dean made sure to invite the full range of city, state, and organized labor 
dignitaries with any claim to having helped bring the school to Worcester. The 
officers and Board of Directors of the Worcester Chamber of Commerce, many of 
whom were directors of the city’s major manufacturing, business, and corporate 
enterprises, received invitations as did the members of the Chamber’s Medical 
School Executive Committee (who included the City Manager, the head of the 
Worcester Labor Council, and Richard C. Steele, the publisher of the city’s 
newspapers), and the city’s political, religious, medical, and educational leaders. 
All of these men (and a handful of women) had actively lobbied for their city. 
From the governor to local state representatives for central Massachusetts, 
dozens of politicians were invited. Members of the University’s Board also 
attended. Photographs show first-term Governor Francis Sargent, state Senate 
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President Maurice Donahue, Speaker of the House David M. Bartley,  Worcester 
mayor John M. Shea, Worcester city manager Francis McGrath, James P. 
Loughlin, Secretary-Treasurer of the Massachusetts State Labor Council, and 
Joseph P. Healey, Chair, UMass Board of Trustees, brandishing broad smiles and 
ceremonially engraved shovels with President Lederle and Dean Soutter. At last, 
the medical school seemed to be moving off the drawing board and out into the 
fields of Worcester. It would not be ready for another three years, but at least the 
bulldozers could be expected soon.45  
  
 
Groundbreaking, October 23, 1969, (l-r) University of Massachusetts 
President John W. Lederle, Worcester City Manager Francis McGrath, Senate 
President Maurice Donohue, House Speaker David M. Bartley, Governor 
Francis Sargent, Worcester Mayor John M. Shea, Massachusetts Labor 
Council Secretary/Treasurer James Loughlin, President of UMass Board of 
Trustees Joseph P. Healey, Dean Lamar Soutter (Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
    163
NOTES
CHAPTER FOUR
1  “Medical School Planning Sought: Soutter Requests a Start,” [Worcester 
Telegram], Jan. 5, 1966, n. p., in Public Affairs Newsclipping Collection, UM/W 
[hereafter, PA, UM/W].
2  Transcript, Oral History interview with H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., Part 1, 
interview by Ellen More, Aug. 21, 2006, South Portland, Maine, p. 24, in Oral 
History Collection, UM/W [hereafter, Oral Histories, UM/W].
3  Martha Mason, “Dr. Lamar Soutter: The Chest Surgeon Turned Dean 
Whose Job It Is To Put The Medical School On Its Feet,” Worcester Sunday 
Telegram, June 26, 1966, pp. 3-7, in PA, UM/W; Howard F. Angione, “Med 
Courses to Stress ‘Totality’,” Worcester Sunday Telegram, Oct. 17, 1965, Box 
“Other Campuses: Medical School, Worcester, Newsclippings, 1951-1965,” fol. 
“Medical School Newsclippings, 1965 (2 of 5),” RG 55-2, “Other Campuses,” 
UM/A [hereafter, Other Campuses, UM/A]. Western Reserve [now, Case 
Western Reserve] Medical School began revising its curriculum as early as 
1950, and became a model for many others. Cf. Lester J. Evans, M.D., Executive 
Associate, Commonwealth Fund to Dr. T. Ham Hale, Aug. 7, 1950, Records of the 
Committee on Medical Education, School of Medicine, Record # 24FM1, Box 1, 
fol. 2, Case Western Reserve Archives, Cleveland, Ohio.  
4  Oral History telephone interview with Nicholas Soutter, Esq., by Ellen More, 
July 3, 2008; [Lamar Soutter], “A Modern Medical School,” typescript, n.d., in 
Box 43, fol. 533, “Medical School, 1960;” Lamar Soutter, “Memo to Board of 
Trustees,” Dec. 21, 1964, Box, 46, fol. 562, “Medical School Location, Oct.-Dec., 
1964,” both in Lederle Papers, UM/A.
5  Martha Mason, “Dr. Lamar Soutter,” p. 7.
6  Soutter did emphasize the need for close integration into the larger university 
as a way in assure preliminary accreditation, but this part of his argument, as 
we have seen, fell on deaf ears. Lamar (Bimi) Soutter to John W. Lederle, July 
20, 1964, cover letter and “Accreditation and Site,” typescript, Box, 46, fol. 561, 
“Medical School Location, Jan.-Sept., 1964,”  Lederle, UM/A.
7  “Medical School Facilities: Planning Considerations,” PHS Publication No. 
874 (Washington, DC: Public Health Service, 1961), pp. 2, 4, 13, Box 46, fol. 567, 
    164
Lederle, UM/A. The 56-page document was prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee 
on Medical School Architecture of the AAMC and the Council on Medical 
Education and Hospitals of the AMA, with the USPHS. Dean William Willard was 
one of the study’s authors.
8  President Lederle’s long-term objective was to use the medical school to 
“spearhead” the same changes for the rest of the University. “Medical School 
Planning Sought;” University of Massachusetts President’s Office, “Plans for the 
Development of the Medical School and Recruitment of Faculty,” Sept. 7, 1965, 
Box “Minutes of Meetings of Full Board and Committee, 1965 (Jan.-Sept.),” fol. 
“Trustees, Minutes, Agenda, etc. (Committees) (Sept.) 1965,” Trustees, UM/A. 
The problem was no less serious for the other faculty where mid-range salaries 
even for lower paying medical specialties like Pediatrics and Psychiatry stood 
somewhere between $1,500 and $3,000 above the state ceiling. See “University 
of Massachusetts Medical School: [Average Salaries] at U.S. Medical Schools,” 
typescript, Box 1, John Conte Collection, UM/W [hereafter, Conte, UM/W].
9  University of Massachusetts President’s Office, “Plans for the Development of 
the Medical School and Recruitment of Faculty,” ibid; “Medical School Facilities: 
Planning Considerations,” p. 16, Box 46, fol. 567, Lederle; “Application for Joint 
Construction Grant, July 24, 1967,” p. 18b, Box “Other Campuses, Medical 
School, Worcester, 1962-, A-D,” fol. “Application for Joint Construction Grant 
1967 and Site Visits,” Other Campuses, both at UM/A.
10  Lamar Soutter, MD, Dean, “Architectural Needs of the School of Medicine,” 
Aug. 31, 1965, Box 44, fol. 542, “Medical School Architecture, 1965-June ‘66,” 
Lederle, UM/A; Mason, “Dr. Lamar Soutter,” p. 7.
11  “[Unofficial, handwritten] Minutes,  Board of Trustees Buildings and Grounds 
Committee,” June 18, 1965, fol. “Trustees, Minutes, Agenda, etc., 1965 (June);” 
“Minutes, Board of Trustees Meeting,” Sept. 10, 1965, fol., “Trustees, Minutes, 
Agenda, etc. (Full Board), 1965 (Sept.),” both in Box “Minutes of Meetings of 
Full Board and Committee, 1965 (June-Sept.);” “Informal Meeting of Board of 
Trustees, Dec. 11, 1965,” pp. 2-9, Box “Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meetings of 
Full Board and Trustees, 1965 (Oct.-Dec.) and 1966 (Jan.-Mar.),” fol. “Trustees 
(Full Board), Minutes, Agenda, etc. (Dec.) 1965,” all in Trustees, UM/A. 
12  John W. Haigis to Commissioner McCarthy [Western Union Telegram], Nov. 
11, 1966, Box 44, fol. 545, Lederle, UM/A.
    165
13   University of Massachusetts Medical School, “Teaching Hospital Application 
for a Joint Construction Grant,” June 14, 1968, p. 2a,  Box 45, fol. 559a, Lederle, 
UM/A.
14  John W. Lederle to John J. McCarthy, Oct. 13, 1965, Box 44, fol. 545; “Dean’s 
Testimony: Governor Said ‘Appoint Them’,” Boston Globe, May 6, 1966; S. J. 
Micciche, “UMass Pair Support Dean’s Story: 2 Agree Volpe O.K.’d Choice,” 
Boston Globe, May 6, 1966; Timothy Leland, “UMass Architect Dispute Widens,” 
[Boston Herald?], April 15, 1966; Thomas C. Gallagher, “M’Carthy May Resign, 
Blasts ‘Interference,’” Boston Herald, April 15, 1966, all in Box 44, fol. 544, 
Lederle, UM/A.
15  “Minutes, Board of Trustees Meeting,” Nov. 9, 1965, p. 5, Box, “Board of 
Trustees, Minutes of Meetings of Full Board and Trustees, 1965 (Oct.-Dec.) and 
1966 (Jan.-Mar.),” fol. “Trustees (Full Board), Minutes, Agenda, etc. (Nov.) 
1965,” Trustees, UM/A. Cf. photocopied fragment, Jan. 26, 1966, Box 44, fol. 545, 
Lederle, UM/A, presumably notes taken by Dr. Lederle’s secretary: “Mr. Chase 
called…He got your message…He is going to contact Dean Soutter and he is going 
to talk with ELLERBE if he is willing to talk with him without Dean Soutter.” Cf. 
“Medical School Planning Sought: Soutter Requests a Start,” Jan. 5, 1966, n. 1 
above.
16  The efforts of Worcester-area state senators Vite Pigaga, John Conte and 
James Kelly, Jr. restored the money in the Senate. “Minutes, Board of Trustees,” 
Nov. 9, 1965, Box “Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meetings of Full Board and 
Trustees, 1965 (Oct.-Dec.) and 1966 (Jan.-Mar.),” fol. “Trustees (Full Board), 
Minutes, Agenda, etc. (Nov.) 1965,” Other Campuses, UM/A; John W. Lederle 
to Hon. John F. X. Davoren, June 1, 1966; “An Act authorizing the Trustees 
of the University of Massachusetts to establish salaries of certain officers and 
members of the professional staff of the University, Approved Sept. 4, 1966,” 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves, Chap. 659; Lamar Soutter, 
“Reasons for Requesting the Removal of the Ceiling on Salaries for the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School at This Time,” May 18, 1967; Lamar Soutter to 
Dean Leo Redfern, Feb. 13, 1967; Sen. William D. Weeks to Fred Emerson, May 
10, 1967,  all in Box 46, fol. 568, Lederle, UM/A. Cf. Brian S. McNiff, “Legislators 
Open Nonstop Session,” Worcester Gazette, Sept. 2, 1966, PA, UM/W.
17  On Sept. 23 the AMA Council on Medical Education, and, on Oct. 24, 1966, 
the AAMC Executive Council voted to grant provisional accreditation to UMass 
Medical School. Lamar Soutter to John W. Lederle, May 13, 1966; Walter S. 
    166
Wiggins, MD, Secretary, Council on Medical Education, AMA and Robert C. 
Berson to Mr. George Howe, Commissioner of Education, Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, Nov. 9, 1966, both in Box 43, fol. 537, Lederle, UM/A.
18  John Stockwell, Hospital Director, was hired full time in Feb. 1967, and 
continued at UMass for more than a decade. Lamar Soutter to Provost Oswald 
Tippo, Oct. 26, 1967; Lamar Soutter to Provost Oswald Tippo, Nov. 7, 1967; 
Lamar Soutter to Provost Oswald Tippo, Jan. 16, 1968, all in Box 46, fol. 568; 
“Chronology of Medical School Appropriations, May 11, 1966,” Box 44, fol. 544, 
all in Lederle, UM/A. The one line item for the medical school in the legislature’s 
initial appropriations bill allocated $200,000 to purchase books and journals for 
the Medical School Library. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves, 
1967, Chap. 682, Section 2, Item No. 8068-61. 
19  Lamar Soutter, “Report to the Trustees from the School of Medicine,” June 
1966, pp. 1-12, Box  “Other Campuses, Medical School, Worcester, 1962-, R-Si,” 
fol. “Report to the Trustees from the School of Medicine, June 1966,” Other 
Campuses, UM/A. “Medical School Planning Sought: Soutter Requests a Start,” 
Jan. 5, 1966, n. 1 above.
20  Soutter, “Report to the Trustees from the School of Medicine,” June 1966, 
p. 3, ibid. The Board briefly worried over their authorization to build a hospital 
at all, given that the enabling legislation called for a “medical school,” not a 
“medical center.” Cf. “Informal Meeting of Board of Trustees, Dec. 11 [1965],” 
Box “Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meetings of Full Board and Trustees, 1965 
(Oct.-Dec.) and 1966 (Jan.-Mar.),” fol. “Trustees (Full Board), Minutes, Agenda, 
etc. (Dec.) 1965.”  But the legal niceties were not, in the end, as problematic as 
the sheer cost of building the hospital. See below. “Minutes of Joint Meeting of 
the Committee on Buildings and Grounds and the Committee on Faculty and 
Educational Policy,” April 21, 1966, Box “Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meetings, 
Full Board and Committees, 1966 (April-Aug.),” fol. “Trustees (Committees), 
Minutes, Agenda, etc., April - 1966,” both in Trustees, UM/A.
21  The architect even suggested designing the garage to be “wrapped around 
the hospital and for an auditorium to be located on the roof of the garage.” The 
garage might cost 2 million dollars, but “the consultants think it’s a good idea.” 
See “[Handwritten] Minutes of closed meeting of members of Board of Trustees,” 
June 30, 1966, Box, “Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meetings, Full Board and 
Committees, 1966 (April-Aug.), “fol. “Trustees (Full Board), Minutes, Agenda, 
etc., June - 1966;” “Minutes of Buildings and Grounds Committee, Sept. 8, 1966, 
    167
“ Box “Board of Trustees, Minutes of Meetings, Full Board and Committees, 1966 
(Sept.-Dec.),” fol. “Trustees (Committees), Minutes, Agenda, etc., Sept. - 1966,” 
Trustees, UM/A.
22  Transcript, Oral History Interview with H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., Part 1, 
pp. 14-15, in Oral Histories, UM/W.
23  “Minutes, Board of Trustees Meeting, Nov., 1967,” Box “Board of Trustees 
Minutes of Meetings of Full Board and Committees,” Aug. [sic: July]-Dec., fol. 
“Trustees (Full Board), Minutes, Agenda, etc., Nov., 1967,” Trustees, UM/A; Mary 
Ann Magiera, “UMass Board OK’s Med School Drawings,” Worcester Telegram, 
Aug. 15, 1967, PA, UM/W.
24  Henry T. Cram to Kenneth W. Johnson, May 29, 1967; Lamar Soutter to 
John J. Conte, July 7, 1967, both in Box 1, Conte, UM/W. Cf.  Katherine Schaef, 
“Federal Officials Very Impressed With Support for Medical School,” Worcester 
Telegram, Aug. 18, 1967; “Poor Application Blamed for Medical School Lag,” 
Worcester Telegram and Gazette, Aug. 19, 1967, PA, UM/W.
25  Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves, 1967, Chapter 276, 
Sections 2-9, Item 8067-98, pp. 153-154, in Box 1, Conte, UM/W.  The act was 
approved May 22, 1967. 
26  “Minutes, Board of Trustees,” Aug. 14, 1967, Box, “Board of Trustees Minutes 
of Meetings of Full Board and Committees,” Aug. [sic: July]-Dec. 1967, fol. 
“Trustees (Full Board), Minutes, Agenda, etc., Aug., 1967,” Trustees, UM/A.
27  Federal officials, perhaps touchy about the growing strength of the anti-war 
movement, quickly rebutted Soutter’s charge. Cf. “Federal Official Asserts War 
No Factor in Med School Cuts,” Worcester Telegram, Nov. 22, 1967, Box 1, Conte, 
UM/W.
28  Lamar Soutter to Nelson W. Aldrich, Feb. 3, 1967; Frank W. McKee 
to Kenneth Johnson, Nov. 15, 1967; “A Statement by the University of 
Massachusetts in Reply to the Letter from Dr. Frank W. McKee, HEW, Nov. 
17, 1967;” David Tilson to Kenneth Johnson, Dec. 12, 1967; Lamar Soutter to 
Frank W. McKee, Dec. 21, 1967; Horace M. Chase to John Lederle and Kenneth 
Johnson, Dec. 22, 1967; John W. Lederle to Charles E. Shepard, April 11, 1968; 
all in Box 44, fol. 543, Lederle, UM/A. Florence Niles, “Medical School Delay 
Predicted Long, Costly,” Worcester Gazette, Nov. 18, 1967; Mary Anne Magiera, 
    168
“U.S. Rejects 16-Million Bid For Medical School Funds,” Worcester Telegram, 
Nov. 18, 1967; Katherine A. Schaef, “Med School Impasse Puzzle,” Worcester 
Telegram, Dec. 3, 1967; Theodore Mael, “City Med School to Get Low Priority,” 
Worcester Telegram, Dec. 15, 1967; Matthew V. Storin, “2-Year Wait Seen Likely 
for Med Building Funds,” Worcester Telegram, Dec. 16, 1967,  all in PA/UM/W. 
And, Carl D. Douglass, Ph. D. to Dr. Lamar Soutter, June 22, 1967; Frank W. 
McKee to Hon. Harold D. Donahue, Dec. 13, 1967;  Frank W. McKee to Hon. 
Harold Donahue, Dec. 6, 1967; “Notes on Meeting of Nov. 29, 1967 regarding 
Planning Library,” n.d ; “Notes on Meeting Dec. 9, 1967 regarding Research 
Application,” all in Box 1, Conte, UM/W.
29  Worcester City Directory, 1948, p. 1047, lists the company at an earlier 
location on Mechanic Street in downtown Worcester. By 1968, when the State 
bought the building for the medical school, the Shaw Company was out of 
business. Faculty and students from the first class claim that the smell of tobacco 
was still noticeable in 1970. “Medical School’s Opening Definite,” Worcester 
Telegram, Dec. 19, 1967, Newsclippings, UM/W. “Minutes, Board of Trustees 
Meeting, Jan., 1968, Box, “Board of Trustees Minutes of Meetings of Full Board 
and Committees, Jan. - March, 1968,” fol. “Trustees (Full Board), Minutes, 
Agenda, etc., Jan. 1968,” Trustees, UM/A.
30  My great thanks to Dr. H. Brownell (Brownie) Wheeler for clarifying the 
designers’ intentions. H. B. Wheeler to Ellen More, personal communication 
(email), April 6, 7, 2011.  Cf. Leo Redfern to President Lederle, Trustee Plimpton, 
Dean Soutter et al., “Memo,” n.d., Box 45, fol. 556, Lederle, UM/A; “Med School 
Unit Gets First OK,” Worcester Gazette, Sept. 30, 1968, PA, UM/W.
31  John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House, to Dean Lamar Soutter, July 
26, 1968; “The AFL-CIO Platform Proposals, presented to the Republican and 
Democratic National Conventions, 1968” (pamphlet); John W. McCormack to 
Wilbur J. Cohen, Aug. 26, 1968; Lamar Soutter to Maurice Donahue, Aug. 28, 
1968; John W. McCormack to John W. Lederle (telegram), Sept. 5, 1968; Frank 
W. McKee to Kenneth Johnson, Sept. 6, 1968; all in Box 45, fol. 557, Lederle, 
UM/A. Thank you letters to the following are also included in this file: Senate 
President Maurice Donahue, James Burke (Chair, Senate Committee on Ways 
and Means), House Speaker Quinn, Representatives Robert Cawley, Anthony 
Scibelli (Chair, House Ways and Means Committee), and Paul Murphy (Vice 
Chair, House Ways and Means). 
32  “$13 Million Granted for Medical School,” Worcester Telegram, June 27, 
    169
1968; “Medical School Gets $4.9 Million,” Worcester Gazette, July 2, 1968; 
“Back Funds Sought for Medical School,” Worcester Telegram, Sept. 13, 1968, 
PA, UM/W. Lamar Soutter to the Hon. Maurice A. Donahue, Aug. 28, 1968; 
David Tillson to John McCormack, Feb. 7, 1969, both in Box 45, fol. 557, Lederle, 
UM/A; “Worcester Area Chamber of Commerce Officers and Board of Directors,” 
“Medical School Executive Committee,” “Medical School General Committee,” 
all in Box “Medical School, Worcester, 1962, E-N (except Newsclippings),” fol. 
“Groundbreaking,” Other Campuses, UM/A.
 
33  Soutter to Donahue, Aug. 28, 1968, ibid; Matthew V. Storin, “Hospital Funds 
Given Approval,” Worcester Telegram, Dec. 6, 1968; Howard S. Knowles, “Med 
School Costs: New Estimates Jump $54 Million,” Worcester Gazette, Dec. 26, 
1968, PA, UM/W.
34  Transcript, Oral History Interview with H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., part 1, p. 
25, Oral Histories, UM/W.
35  Kennedy School of Government, “The Massachusetts Medical School,” 1975, 
typescript, 110 pp., quotations, pp. 3, 5  in PA, UM/W.  This case was prepared 
under the supervision of Professor Graham Allison. Cf. S. J. Micciche, “Governor 
Asks 14% Surcharge, End to U.S. Deduction; 
Message Tells ‘Plain Truth’…The State is in Trouble,” Boston Globe, Jan. 23, 
1969, cited in “Kennedy School,” p. 5.
36  Carl M. Cobb, “N.E. Medical Deans Say UMass School Needless,” Boston 
Globe, Feb. 5, 1969; idem., “Cash Crisis Hits 2 Med Schools,” Boston Globe, Feb. 
17, 1969; “Dartmouth Dean Advocates 4-Year Mass. Medical School,” Worcester 
Sunday Telegram, Feb. 16, 1969, in Box 1, all in Conte, UM/W. Howard S. 
Knowles, “Medical School Costs,” Worcester Gazette, Dec. 26, 1968; “UMass Med 
School - A Case History,” Worcester Gazette, Jan. 23, 1969; Mary Anne Magiera, 
“City is Assured of Med School,” Worcester Telegram, Feb. 6, 1969; “Action 
Expected Soon on Med School Funds: Architects’ Pay Problem,” Worcester 
Gazette, Jan. 14, 1969; Theodor Mael, “Soutter Predicts City Will Get Med 
School,” Worcester Gazette, April 23, 1969, all in PA, UM/W.
37  “Action Expected Soon,” Worcester Gazette, Jan. 14, 1969; Florence R. Niles, 
“Sargent ‘Slit Our Throats’,” Worcester Gazette, Feb. 13, 1969; Brian S. McNiff, 
“Sargent Assures City on Med School ‘Site’,” Worcester Gazette, Feb. 5, 1969; 
“Medical School Loan Hike Backed,” Worcester Gazette, March 7, 1969, all in PA, 
    170
UM/W.
38  [Robert McCartney] Oral History Interview with John W. Lederle, 1975, 
typescript fragment, p. 68, John Stockwell Papers, UM/W. Original in Box 1, 
fol. 14, “Oral History Program Interview Transcripts,” UM/A; Transcript, Oral 
History Interview with H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., Part 2, p. 3, interviewed by 
Ellen More, Oct. 23, 2006, Worcester, Massachusetts, Oral Histories, UM/W.
39  Massachusetts State Labor Council, AFL-CIO, “For Immediate Release,” 
March 20, 1969, Box 43, fol. 540, Lederle, UM/A. Also see, McNiff, “Sargent 
Assures City,” Feb. 5, 1969; “C. of C. to Press Sargent for Medical School, 
Worcester Telegram, Feb. 22, 1969; Lamar Soutter, “The Case for the Medical 
School,” Worcester Telegram, March 4, 1969; Howard S. Knowles, “House 
Boosts Outlay for Medical School,” Worcester Gazette, March 7, 1969; Howard 
S. Knowles, “Medical School Future Appears Brighter,” Worcester Gazette, 
March 26, 1969; “Move Beaten to Cut Out Hospital Plan,” Worcester Telegram, 
March 26, 1969; Albert B. Southwick, “Why the Medical School Costs So 
Much,” Worcester Telegram, March 31, 1969; “Sargent Signs Bill,” Worcester 
Gazette, April 8, 1969; Rep. C. Vincent Shea, “Letter to the Editor,” The Evening 
Gazette, May 28, 1969, all in PA, UM/W. Frank V. Saulenas and Malcolm Foss 
to Governor Francis W. Sargent, Feb. 20, 1969; “Action Taken by the University 
of Massachusetts Student Senate - March 12, 1969 - Passed Unanimously,” 
typescript, Box 1, Conte, UM/W. On Soutter’s relationship to Gov. Sargent, see 
Transcript, Oral History Interview with H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., Part 2, pp. 2, 
3, in Oral Histories, UM/W.
40  Roger J. Bulger, “The Medical Center: University of Massachusetts,” pp. 125-
146, in New Medical Schools at Home and Abroad: Report of a Macy Foundation 
Conference, John Z. Bowers and Elizabeth F. Purcell, ed. (New York: Josiah 
Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1978), quotation, p. 129.
41  Howard S. Knowles, “Legislative Leaders Assail Med School Restudy Plan,” 
Worcester Telegram, June 10, 1969; Howard S. Knowles, “Lesson for Governor 
Sargent in Medical School Fiasco,” Worcester Telegram, July 6, 1969. Also 
see “Sargent Signs Bill,” ibid.; “MIT Expert Conducts Medical School Study,” 
Worcester Telegram, April 18, 1969; Theodore Mael, “Soutter Predicts,” 
Worcester Gazette, April 23, 1969; “Kennedy is Disturbed by Med School Cost,” 
Worcester Gazette, May 17, 1969, all in PA, UM/W.
42  Family Medicine did not become a board-certified specialty until 1969. 
    171
Cf. Ellen More, Heather-Lyn Haley, and Robert Vander Hart, “The People’s 
Medicine Comes to Massachusetts,” accessed at https://web.archive.org/
web/20150810135847/http://library.umassmed.edu/omha/fmch/index.cfm 
on March 22, 2011, esp. “A Specialty for Generalists.” Cf. Knowles, “Legislative 
Leaders Assail,” ibid.;  Knowles, “Plan Would Scrap Big Med School,” The 
Evening Gazette, June 10, 1969; Howard S. Knowles, “Sargent Appoints Med 
School Panel,” Worcester Gazette, June 13, 1969; Theodore Mael, “Sargent 
Chided on Med School,” Worcester Gazette, n.d.;  “Soutter Says School Report 
Part of Plot,” Worcester Gazette, June 14, 1969; “Tufts Dean Denies Med School 
Block,” Worcester Gazette, June 18, 1969, all in PA, UM/W.
43  “Med School Relations to Hospitals Discussed,” Worcester Telegram, Oct. 20, 
1967, Box 1, Conte, UM/W. Also see, David T. Turcotte, “2 Key Aides Quit Posts 
On Staff Here,” Worcester Telegram, June 19, 1969; Theodore Mael, “Study Will 
Analyze Effect of Med School Hospital in Area,” Worcester Gazette, June 24, 
1969; “Medical School Clarification,” Worcester Telegram, June 27, 1969; Mary 
Anne Magiera, “Med School: A Transfusion Carrying Gold to City’s Economic 
Heart,” Worcester Sunday Telegram, July 6, 1969, in PA, UM/W.
44  Howard S. Knowles, “Sargent Rules Med School to Be Built in City,” 
Worcester Telegram, July 2, 1969; “‘Thumping Victory,’ Says Dean Soutter,” 
Worcester Gazette, July 2, 1969; Magiera, “Med School: A Transfusion, July 6, 
1969; Mary Anne Magiera, “Med School Work to Start on Sept. 3,” Worcester 
Telegram, Aug. 12, 1969; Harry T. Whitin, “Med School Work Begins Next Week,” 
Worcester Telegram, Sept. 27, 1969; “Med School Pact Awarded for $529,367,” 
Worcester Telegram, Jan. 22, 1970, all in PA, UM/W.
45  “University of Massachusetts Medical School Groundbreaking” photograph 
and caption, in Box “Medical School, Worcester, 1962, E-N (except 
Newsclippings),” fol. “Groundbreaking,” Other Campuses, UM/A; Albert B. 
Southwick, 100: The Telegram Story, 1884-1984 (Worcester, MA: Worcester 
Telegram and Gazette, 1984), p. 17.
172
 
Chapter 5 
University Hospital: 1976 - 1998 
 For Lamar Soutter and H. Brownell (Brownie) Wheeler, two veteran 
surgeons and the unquestioned founders of UMass Medical School, teaching 
hospitals represented the keystone of the arch of medical education, the apex 
of the development of modern medicine. During the entire twentieth century, 
hospitals had been the physician’s workshop, the medical student’s clinical 
classroom.1 This chapter will describe how the University Hospital was won and 
how, 22 years later, it was lost; the struggle to build it, and the indisputable 
reasons for giving it up.
Background
 The legislation that established the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School in 1962, described in Part 1 of this book, made no mention of a hospital. 
Many legislators who voted for the bill assumed that an existing municipal 
hospital in Boston, Worcester, or Springfield would serve the school’s purpose 
well enough. But the early leaders of UMass Medical School – particularly Dean 
Soutter and his principal confidant, the surgeon Brownie Wheeler – never 
doubted that the medical school would include a new teaching hospital, which 
indeed opened in 1976. There were solid reasons for their insistence on building 
a teaching hospital, both financial and educational. The 1960s, the years during 
which UMMS was legislated, coincided with the construction of dozens of 
medical schools, most of which also built – or affiliated with – academic teaching 
hospitals.  By 1980, approximately two-thirds of all state medical schools were 
associated with academic teaching hospitals. Particularly after Worcester was 
chosen as the school’s location in 1965, the Trustees, too, came to believe an 
academic hospital would be necessary to effectively compete with the teaching 
hospitals in nearby Boston.  
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Just as important, however, the advent of Medicare in 1965 provided 
general hospitals with an unprecedented infusion of money for services that 
many patients previously were unable to afford. As historian Rosemary Stevens 
has written, hospitals built or expanded to meet this new patient demand 
could even recoup the capital expense of borrowing through increased – but 
reimbursable – charges to patients.2 As late as 1971, a study of projected cost 
recovery from the UMass teaching hospital estimated that 90% of construction 
costs would be “recovered on cost-reimbursement contracts” with such payers as 
Medicare, Medicaid, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield.3  The ’60s and early ’70s were, 
in short, a period of bullish growth for hospitals. And, especially given Soutter’s 
and Wheeler’s own Harvard training in cardiothoracic and vascular surgery, 
respectively, the medical school’s leadership firmly believed in the educational 
need for a tertiary care hospital through which UMass students could be exposed 
to high-quality medical care in every specialty.4 
By the 1980s, as we will see, the financial landscape for academic 
teaching hospitals had become far more barren. For one thing, the steep rise in 
American health care spending fueled by Medicaid, Medicare, and higher labor 
and technology costs, had begun to attract unfavorable attention. Already in 
1974, the Stanford economist Victor Fuchs called for a five-year moratorium 
on hospital construction and expansion. Historian Kenneth Ludmerer writes, 
“Concern about health-care costs had been growing for many years, but in the 
1980s cost consciousness finally began to dominate the health care debate.”5 The 
growing presence from the 1980s of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
and federal and state measures to control rising medical costs portended the 
challenges teaching hospitals would face. In Massachusetts, the University 
Trustees began expressing dismay over the hospital’s deficits as early as 1991, 
a mere 15 years after its opening. When the University President and Trustees 
finally privatized University Hospital in 1997-1998, they were convinced this was 
a rational response to the threat of financial liability the hospital represented to 
its parent body, the University of Massachusetts. University Hospital’s history 
thus mirrors the fate of many teaching hospitals across the U.S. 
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This chapter will examine the rising and falling arc of University Hospital’s 
association with the Medical School, including the budget battles that dogged its 
construction, and in consequence, forced the resignation of Dean Lamar Soutter; 
the faculty’s reaffirmation of a commitment to primary care education as the 
justification for the hospital; the hospital’s years of growth and rising importance 
to central Massachusetts; and finally, the period from the late 1980s when cost 
pressures overtook revenue growth and the threat of massive fiscal overruns 
convinced the University’s Trustees to divest the hospital. 
Construction Budget Battles: 1967-1972
 As Chapter 4 suggested, Massachusetts legislators never expected to 
fund the full cost of the hospital. Medical school officials submitted an initial 
– unsuccessful – request for federal funding for the hospital in 1967. It called 
for a 400-bed facility that could be expanded to accommodate 800 with a 
limestone exterior and a wrap-around covered garage; federal officials had no 
trouble turning it back on the grounds that it was simply too big. The final, 
successful plan called for a more compact, economical structure, with a separate, 
covered garage “under consideration” but not integral to the building. The 
façade now was to be granite, not limestone.6 Even so, by the time the $16.5 
million UMass proposal for federal funding was approved in 1969, the Nixon 
administration had impounded further spending authorized by the Health 
Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1963. UMass was too late. Its proposal 
may have been approved, but the funding had evaporated.7 Despite lobbying 
by the UMass system president Robert C. Wood, by Dean Soutter, and by the 
Massachusetts congressional delegation, a teaching hospital – especially for 
the state of Massachusetts – stood at the bottom of the Nixon administration’s 
list of priorities.8 Besides, construction costs were much higher by 1970. To get 
some idea of the gap between initial expectations and the ultimate outlay for the 
hospital, compare the estimated cost in 1964 of using Worcester City Hospital, 
$20,360,300 with the estimate of $95,000,000 for construction and financing 
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costs of a new 400-bed building in 1971. With funds from Washington no longer 
an option and Republican Governor Francis Sargent dismayed by the hospital’s 
ballooning construction costs, only the Legislature could secure the necessary 
funding.9 
 The state, however, was facing its most daunting financial crisis of the 
post-World War II era. As the bills came due on the many new state initiatives of 
the Kennedy-Johnson years in Massachusetts – a new community college system 
and an expanded state college system are just two examples – the need to control 
the state budget and minimize tax increases loomed much larger to Governor 
Sargent than the obligation to bail out a new teaching hospital. Although the 
legislature approved spending $53 million for the hospital in 1971, the Governor 
delayed signing it for another five months.10 In an effort to at least reduce the 
state’s rising health care costs, the Sargent administration signed a new bill in 
November 1971 that required the Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
(DPH) to approve any hospital construction costing more than $100,000. Such 
measures were not unique to Massachusetts. In 1966, the federal Comprehensive 
Health Planning Act (PL 89-749) established the Certificate of Need process, but 
it included no strong enforcement mechanism. Between 1966 and 1972, the year 
Massachusetts’ Certificate of Need program went into effect, a total of 19 states 
had established the process. In central Massachusetts, the new requirement 
spurred the creation of the Comprehensive Health Planning Council of Central 
Massachusetts, or CHPCCM. The Commission, a “quasi-public nonprofit 
corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth and supported in 
equal measure by federal and private funds,” was chaired by Robert D. Cope, a 
local attorney.11
University Hospital, having been established by state law, was not subject 
to the Certificate of Need requirement. Nevertheless, the new mandate did 
complicate matters for UMass. In 1972, Worcester was rife with excess hospital 
beds in the eyes of the state DPH. Seven community hospitals currently operated 
in or around the city: Memorial, St. Vincent, City, Hahnemann, Fairlawn, 
Doctors’, and Holden Hospitals – not counting Burbank Hospital in Fitchburg or 
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Worcester State Hospital, a psychiatric facility. With the possible exception of the 
latter, their leaders all were mindful of the potential threat posed by the soon-to-
be-built medical center hospital. The rationale for University Hospital rested on 
the lack of a tertiary care facility in Central Massachusetts. Yet as soon as plans 
for the hospital became public, the leading community hospitals in Worcester 
announced expansion plans for various tertiary care units of their own. Memorial 
Hospital, for example, announced a $13 million construction project for, among 
other things, a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Similarly, City Hospital 
proposed a burn unit and trauma center, and at St. Vincent, plans for centers for 
radiation oncology, chemotherapy, open-heart surgery, and a new maternity wing 
quickly materialized. Burbank Hospital in Fitchburg also requested permission to 
expand. From the perspective of the DPH, the threat of redundancy and serious 
overbedding in Worcester seemed both realistic and intolerable.12  
State officials made it clear that, “Since we apparently have no control 
over the UMass hospital, all new [hospital] projects in the Worcester area will 
have to be measured against the impending reality of the teaching hospital...
We will not permit existing institutions to modernize, expand or change services 
if that need would be met by the UMass hospital.” The new Certificate of Need 
requirement thus threatened to drive a wedge between UMass and the leaders of 
Worcester’s other large hospitals at a time when Dean Soutter was negotiating 
with them to allow UMass medical students and, eventually, residents, onto their 
wards for clinical rotations. Soutter was politically astute enough to understand 
that he would gain much more in the long run if he supported Worcester’s other 
hospitals’ claims. After all, even a tertiary care hospital with an eye on patient 
referrals from across the state would need referrals from local physicians. It 
would also need numerous local physician volunteers for clinical teaching at 
the school. Soutter told reporters that the potential rejection of other hospitals’ 
expansion plans was “capricious and arbitrary.” He stressed that the new hospital 
would not compete with local hospitals. “Think of it as a referral hospital,” he 
reiterated.13 
Yet the overbedding concern persisted even after Soutter assured 
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local hospital officials that only 20-30% of UMass patients would come from 
Central Massachusetts. The CHPCCM managed to broker a deal signed by 
UMass President Robert Wood and Robert Cope in 1972. In order to minimize 
competition between the teaching hospital and local community hospitals, the 
agreement required that any new UMass “facility, service or program of medical 
care” be reviewed by the Council. Further, UMass agreed to limit its maternity 
and pediatrics inpatients, the two specialties shown to have low utilization rates 
in the region. Memorial, St. Vincent, and Burbank hospitals agreed to reduce 
their proposed expansion. With such concessions from all parties, on March 2, 
1972, Governor Sargent approved the proposals for the three local hospitals as 
well as University Hospital.14 With that, hospital construction began in earnest. 
Soutter hoped to see the building open by the end of 1974. As had happened 
repeatedly over the past decade, such optimism proved unwarranted. 
 
Dean Soutter vs. President Wood
 At this juncture, internal divisions began to complicate an already complex 
process. Dean Soutter and UMass President Wood could not seem to work 
together. After a long and excellent working relationship with John Lederle, 
the UMass president who had hired him in 1963 and had seen him through the 
grueling process of opening the school in 1970 (see Chapters 1-4), Bimi Soutter 
was disappointed in Bob Wood, Lederle’s successor in 1970. Wood, a political 
scientist by training, had been the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
in the Johnson administration; he was much more a politician than either 
Lederle or Soutter. Soutter, plainly put, did not trust him to stand firm in the 
face of political pressure. Signs of Soutter’s irritation and distrust are evident in 
their correspondence within a year of Wood’s arrival. Wood was interested in 
magnifying the role of the UMass system president’s office. He quickly added 
administrative positions to his budget and asserted more control over the 
budgets of the Amherst, Boston, and Worcester campuses. His impact was all 
the more irksome in that it coincided with the end of a major growth spurt for 
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the University of Massachusetts and, as noted above, a drastic tightening of the 
Legislature’s purse. An early letter from Soutter to President Wood suggests that 
the Dean did not suffer the new president gladly:
Dear Bob: 
It has come to my attention that your office is continuing to drain 
off our funds at the rate of about $1,000 per week. I would like to 
request that further withdrawal of our funds be stopped and that 
we be reimbursed back to the $50,000 which we agreed to last 
summer. If later in the summer your office needs more money, we 
would be glad to consider this in the light of what is still available to 
us.15
                
Their relationship did not improve. Wood seems to have begun a good-faith 
effort in the fall of 1971 to objectively examine a long-held dream of Soutter’s 
to expand the campus into a full University site. He asked the dean to “convene 
a planning group” for this purpose, including representatives from the other 
UMass campuses as well as the Worcester Consortium colleges. The committee 
began work in late 1971.16 But by that time, budgetary pressures from Beacon 
Hill, described above, as well as a State Board of Higher Education heeding 
the Sargent Administration’s call to reduce the costs of higher education in 
Massachusetts, trimmed the sails of such initiatives.17 The obstacles impeding 
the completion of University Hospital probably added to growing impatience and 
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tension between Wood and Soutter. Soutter had little confidence that President 
Wood would fight for the kind of hospital he believed in. Wood, for his part, 
saw the Dean as an obstructionist, someone unwilling to compromise.18 When 
the Worcester campus planning committee asked Wood whether he intended to 
name a Chancellor to the Worcester campus to create uniformity among the three 
campuses – something which would cause them to slow down their planning 
until that individual could participate – he began making plans to insert an 
appointee of his own as the medical school Chancellor, someone who, like the 
UMass Boston and Amherst Chancellors, would report directly to him and the 
Trustees. Wood wanted to find someone with more appetite for politics than 
Soutter. And, by the fall of 1972 when the committee’s report was complete, he 
sorely needed a campus leader who could convince the state legislature of the 
School’s commitment to primary care. 
In the background, a tug of war was being waged between the Worcester 
campus leadership and the legislature over the relative place of primary care 
education among the school’s priorities, a question closely tied in the minds of 
many state politicians to the matter of funding for a tertiary care hospital. This 
further complicated the situation for both Soutter and Wood. Wood saw Soutter 
as an obstacle to smoother dealings with the legislature. At a Medical School 
faculty meeting held in September 1973, President Wood laid out his concerns. 
He also announced that Board chair Joseph Healey, Soutter, and he had met to 
discuss the issue of “succession.” He reported Dr. Soutter’s preference to target 
the “full operation of the hospital,” or June 1976, as his approximate date for 
retirement.19 
Wood’s initial choice for the next UMass Med Chancellor, Professor 
Adam Yarmolinsky, had been one of Sargent Shriver’s original deputies at the 
Peace Corps and had held numerous other positions in the administrations 
of Presidents Johnson and Carter. Prior to his most recent appointment as 
Ralph Waldo Emerson Professor assigned to Wood’s office, Yarmolinsky had 
been a professor at Harvard Law School and member of the John F. Kennedy 
Institute of Politics. His background must have promised political finesse, 
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organizational skill, and attunement to current demands for broader health care 
access, seemingly the ideal candidate to act as liaison between the Legislature 
and the President.20 In October, Wood appointed Yarmolinsky to coordinate the 
“intensive planning efforts” he anticipated during the coming year to develop the 
Worcester campus. As Wood informed his Board, “This planning will proceed in 
cooperation with the Board of Higher Education which has asked that Professor 
Yarmolinsky of the University coordinate the planning in view of his expertise 
and present work in the health manpower field.” Despite the effort to normalize 
Yarmolinsky’s involvement with the Worcester campus or, indeed, to shift 
responsibility for it to the Board of Higher Education, Wood’s larger intentions 
seem to have been clear to Soutter and other medical school leaders, namely, to 
ease Lamar Soutter out of the medical school’s leadership.
These maneuverings were intensely resented. To Soutter’s direct objection, 
Wood smoothly replied that Professor Yarmolinsky would work “in collaboration 
with the Medical School and the other campuses in his staff assignment… I hope 
you won’t consider Professor Yarmolinsky an outsider for long, and I think you’ll 
find that his qualifications surpass any other possible candidate.”21 
At this point, behind the scenes, a quiet rebellion began against what the 
Worcester campus – especially the department chairs – saw as an attempt to 
railroad Lamar Soutter out of office. A sense of their esprit de corps and loyalty 
to Dr. Soutter can be glimpsed in faculty reminiscences. Even after 40 years, R. 
William (Bill) Butcher, then chair of Biochemistry, remembered, “…right from the 
beginning, Lamar Soutter was, and remains, one of my great heroes.  He was a 
magnificent man…” Brownie Wheeler was more concise: Soutter “was a Brahmin 
but not a stuffed shirt.”22 Many of the early faculty and students felt exactly the 
same. In response to Wood, the chairs signed a letter of unwavering support 
for the dean and forced a meeting with the University President. As a result, 
President Wood asked that Dr. Wheeler, a figure trusted by everyone on the 
Worcester campus, act as an intermediary between Soutter and Wood. 23 Months 
passed before a compromise was reached and an outside Visiting Committee 
was formed. When it did convene, Yarmolinsky, who was to have overseen the 
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Committee’s workings, was no longer part of the process. In the interim, Wood 
and Soutter came to an agreement that made Lamar Soutter the first Chancellor/
Dean of the Medical School, allowed for the Visiting Committee’s formation, and 
set a definite date for the Dean’s retirement of June 1975. Soutter’s acceptance 
of the title of Chancellor in February 1974 did not settle matters for the hospital, 
but it did establish a workable agreement between the Medical School and the 
President’s office.24 
The growing fiscal crisis in state government forced the University to 
reduce its budget request for the Medical School for fiscal year, 1974-1975. 
Dean Soutter, hospital director John Stockwell, and Dr. Wheeler were furiously 
engaged in recruiting for the Hospital so that planning could occur well before 
the building was completed. Yet, as had happened in the two years prior to 
the Medical School’s opening, in 1973 legislators refused to pay for hospital 
personnel until the hospital was actually near completion. They balked especially 
at recruitment of what some legislators began to call “super-specialists,” such as 
heart surgeons.25 
Many of the same questions pitted Lamar Soutter against the UMass 
president. While Soutter had publicly promised that the hospital would not 
duplicate the strengths of existing Worcester hospitals but would instead 
emphasize tertiary care, legislators could not be persuaded to follow through with 
funding. Wood was in the uncomfortable position of trying to bring Soutter into 
line with the Beacon Hill perspective. In the summer of 1973, for example, Wood 
prepared an elaborate briefing paper for House Speaker David Bartley in advance 
of the latter’s meeting with Dr. Soutter. Soutter, he knew, would be lobbying for 
the medical campus budget at a time when the Hospital’s imminent completion, 
an increase in the Medical School’s entering class size from 40 to 64 students, 
and a concomitant increase in faculty, combined to raise the budget request by 
153% over the previous fiscal year. It was at this juncture, in fact, that Wood 
began to consider separating the Hospital’s budget from the School’s in future 
requests. (Soutter and Stockwell resisted this move initially because it made 
it more difficult for them to “rob Peter to pay Paul,” as it were, by “borrowing” 
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faculty salary lines from one fund and applying them – temporarily – to the other 
when needed. (They may also have feared that this would make it easier to cut the 
hospital budget or even eliminate it.)26 The President became wary of high-ticket 
hospital equipment purchases which might duplicate items already available 
at other Worcester hospitals. He cautioned Speaker Bartley regarding all these 
issues. Finally, Wood seems to have viewed Soutter’s philosophy of medical 
education with progressively less enthusiasm. The Dean’s vision of a research-
oriented school, Wood believed, was “duplicatory,” and an “old direction” that 
would not serve the state’s needs. All in all, even though the President was 
working for the Medical School’s ultimate good by trying to mediate between it 
and an increasingly impatient legislature, in the short term his actions were at 
cross-purposes with Dean Soutter’s and, undeniably, were being taken behind 
the Dean’s back. In this climate, it is little wonder that relations between the 
President and the Dean were chilly, or that the school viewed the approach of an 
outside Visiting Committee with heightened concern.27
Just weeks before the Visiting Committee was due to arrive, Wood wrote 
to Soutter complaining that he and his staff were not invited to meetings of 
the hospital and medical school planning committees. Soutter agreed to cut 
$600,000 and 60 new positions from his budget at the suggestion of state 
representative Joseph Early of Worcester, vice-chair of the House Ways and 
Means Committee. But disagreements continued. Wood explicitly wrote a series 
of questions for Soutter to consider in anticipation of the Visiting Committee’s 
review. One major concern was the “clarification of the extent to which the 
development of super-specialties is an inevitable consequence of the decision to 
establish a teaching hospital in a town which already has a number of community 
hospitals.” This, plus the likelihood that the hospital would not be self-supporting 
for a number of years –contrary to what the Legislature had been led to believe – 
were matters for the Visiting Committee to assess.28 
The Visiting Committee convened on February 6, 1974. It was asked to 
either ratify Soutter’s plans for the school, meaning a full-service medical center 
with both primary care education and a tertiary care hospital, or to acquiesce 
183
to the Legislature’s “buyer’s remorse” triggered by the steeply rising costs of 
such plans. The committee, a distinguished group of academic medical leaders, 
was chaired by Dr. Kenneth Crispell, Vice President for Health Sciences at the 
University of Virginia. Continuity with the previously established Committee 
on the Development of the Worcester Campus was assured by the presence 
on both committees of Drs. Brownie Wheeler and Sam Clark, Chairmen of the 
Departments of Surgery and Anatomy respectively.29 Its report, which was not 
presented to the Trustees until February 1976, carefully reinforced the need 
for a tertiary care teaching hospital, but as a foundation for good primary care 
education. It began: “The University of Massachusetts should continue its 
commitment to use its resources to encourage students to become primary care 
physicians and should develop postgraduate (or residency) training opportunities 
for primary care physicians…”30 In all, the report carefully ratified Soutter’s 
and the faculty’s vision for the campus while also emphasizing the need to give 
primary care its full measure of support.
On February 18, 1975, Dr. Soutter asked to be relieved of his duties for 
reasons of health, months ahead of his scheduled retirement. An irregular 
heartbeat and the tensions of the hospital struggle seem to have impelled his 
decision. Just two weeks before that, Wood had written to him, “On several 
occasions I have asked you to provide…FY 1975 departmental state funds budget 
allocations for the Medical School and separately for the Teaching Hospital…this 
information has not been provided …The Worcester Campus cannot continue 
operations under a single appropriation structure.” Wood’s main target may 
have been hospital director John Stockwell, but Soutter bore the brunt of Wood’s 
persistence.31  
Reactions to the news of Lamar Soutter’s sudden retirement were swift. The 
day after the announcement Worcester’s morning newspaper ran a story titled 
“Medical School’s ‘One-Man Army’ Resigns,” a direct quotation from department 
chair Bill Butcher. Butcher added, “Without him, I doubt the school and hospital 
would ever have become realities.” That sentiment was widespread. President 
Wood’s remarks to the Board of Trustees 12 days after Soutter’s announcement 
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are worth quoting in full:
The word most frequently used to describe Dr. Soutter in news 
stories and features since he was appointed in 1963 is ‘tireless.’ 
Whether it was at the State House, at Worcester, or at meetings 
of this Board, Bimi Soutter has given unsparingly of his energies 
and his time to the creation of the Medical Center. A Boston 
Globe reporter, writing in 1970 about the controversy over the 
construction of the teaching hospital, said: ‘If any school can 
overcome overwhelming problems by dint of sheer enthusiasm, 
UMass Medical certainly will.’ That enthusiasm and that relentless 
willingness to solve overwhelming problems, marked Dr. Soutter’s 
style from the moment of his appointment in December 1963.
I can testify from personal experience – he never hesitated to 
scold, chasten, and speak out for the school. When the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare failed to come up with $16.5 
million toward the construction of the teaching hospital, he 
described the agency as ‘totally immoral.’ When a newspaper 
columnist questioned the need for the hospital, Dr. Soutter said the 
newspaper’s founder would turn in his grave at the thought that the 
paper had become beholden to what he called ‘the big, powerful, 
private medical interests.’ 32 
Two weeks later, the Board heard a request from Dr. Guido Majno, chair of 
Pathology, that the Medical School’s library be named in honor of Dr. Soutter, 
the wish of the school faculty, administration, staff, and students. Although it 
violated the Board’s then-current policy against naming buildings in honor of 
living individuals, the request was enthusiastically granted. Soutter was also 
named Chancellor/Dean and Professor of Surgery Emeritus.33 
Reginald William (Bill) Butcher, Ph.D., chair of Biochemistry, was 
designated Acting Dean by President Wood and the Board of Trustees. Dr. 
Wheeler had been appointed Chief of Staff of the Hospital by the Board just 
five months earlier; his responsibilities for planning hospital operations and 
getting it open were now expanded.  (Butcher referred to Brownie and himself 
as “Mr. Outside” and “Mr. Inside” – they made a good team.) The two main 
administrative responsibilities of the Worcester campus thus were quickly 
apportioned for the near future until a replacement for the Chancellor/Dean 
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could be found. A sense of how critical their situation seemed, however, may be 
taken from Dean Butcher’s new nickname: “Acting Captain of the Titanic.”34 
                                                                                   
The Deal: A Tertiary Care Hospital for a Primary Care School
The year-long battle with Beacon Hill for the hospital dragged on. With 
the gubernatorial defeat in November 1974, of the Republican Francis Sargent 
by the Democrat, Michael Dukakis, the University gained a different kind of 
opponent, but an opponent nevertheless. Dukakis was concerned not merely to 
lower the state’s indebtedness, but to reform the health care system. Inflation 
was ballooning construction and fuel prices just at the moment when the state of 
Massachusetts faced an enormous budget shortfall of its own – an unprecedented 
deficit of close to $700 million during Governor Dukakis’ first year in office.35 
The budget deficit called for severe fiscal restraint by all state departments. 
University Hospital, scheduled to open in mid-1975, presented a multi-million 
dollar expense ripe for the cutting – despite the fact that its construction was 
almost complete. Newspaper articles glowingly described the new hospital’s 
“colored carpets…massive loads of equipment…four-ambulance loading dock...
awe-inspiring stillness [and] countless rooms…”36 To Governor Dukakis and 
his Secretary of Educational Affairs, Paul Parks, on the other hand, the hospital 
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represented all that they disliked about UMass Medical School – unnecessary 
expense in the service of a mistaken idea, namely, to create an elitist medical 
research institution educating medical specialists at the expense of primary care 
practitioners. Governor Dukakis saw the issue this way:
Look, what’s this [medical center] going to do for the thousands of 
Massachusetts residents that today don’t have decent affordable 
health care? That was our priority. This is all very interesting, 
a research-oriented medical school, but we’re interested in the 
folks, first, who can provide the care for the kind of people we’re 
concerned about, and secondly, whether or not thousands and 
thousands of Massachusetts citizens are going to have decent, 
affordable health care.  You know, what’s this going to do for those 
folks? And that was—was our priority, along with a concern about 
resources…37  
 
The people of Central Massachusetts, of course, understood the significance 
of the hospital quite differently. Organized labor understood its value in terms 
of jobs; local business and industry saw a more generalized boon to the regional 
economy; and local citizens looked to the prospect of being able to stay near 
home if a serious health problem loomed. The Comprehensive Health Planning 
Council of Central Massachusetts, Inc., especially chair Robert S. Bowditch and 
former chair, Robert D. Cope, added their support.38 Labor leaders James P. 
Loughlin, Dan Murray and others did likewise. Local politicians such as John 
J. Conte, Daniel J. Foley, James A. Kelley, Jr., David Bartley, and Joseph Early 
provided the linkage among these various groups and lobbied for the necessary 
votes on Beacon Hill. The local papers followed the story with passionate 
headlines: “Officials Predict ‘Disaster’ if UMass Hospital Stalled;” “Early Says 
Center, l to r, Governor Michael Dukakis, 
Secretary of Educational Affairs Paul Parks 
(Photo courtesy of the Department of Special 
Collections and University Archives, W.E.B. 
Du Bois Library,  University of Massachusetts 
Amherst)
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State Stifles Medical School Growth;” and “End Delay on UMass Hospital.” Dr. 
Wheeler, as the Hospital’s Chief of Staff, wrote a blistering letter intended for 
the editor of The Boston Globe bluntly explaining that, “If the medical school 
and its teaching hospital are allowed to become a political football that can be 
kicked about by any new cabinet secretary, they will soon become sub-standard 
institutions for both education and patient care.”39
Each side understood that the school itself would stand or fall with the fate 
of its proposed teaching hospital. On the Governor’s side, Paul Parks, Secretary 
of Education and prominent activist for integration of the Boston public school 
system, publicly stated a preference for using the hospital as an HMO with 
prepaid medical contracts for inpatient and outpatient care, rather than as a 
tertiary care hospital. He thought “we ought to…develop something in between 
a tertiary care hospital and a community hospital or community medical center. 
We could develop a new model, something that has not been done anywhere 
else in the country.”40 From another corner of the field, potentially competing 
institutions such as Boston University, led by president John Silber, also voiced 
strong doubts about state support for yet another academic health science center. 
After all, Silber claimed, the state could subsidize all the medical students it 
might need – and at much less cost – at private schools like BU.41 Governor 
Dukakis was less inflammatory, stressing his concern to see primary, not tertiary, 
care as the Medical School’s chief mission.42 
The battle came to a head during the summer and fall of 1975 over restoring 
$5.5 million to the state supplemental budget to complete the construction and 
equipping of the hospital. It played out primarily in two venues, on Beacon Hill 
and in meetings of the University Board of Trustees. Some idea of the activity of 
Worcester’s legislative delegation can be gained from the following news clipping:
State senators from the Worcester area rallied to the defense of the 
proposed teaching hospital at the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School in Worcester yesterday. Sens. James A. Kelley, Jr., D-Oxford, 
chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, Daniel J. Foley, 
D-Worcester, and John J. Conte, D-Worcester, issued a statement 
saying they were ‘confident that the Massachusetts Legislature will 
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find the bulk of the budget for the medical school…If Secretary Parks 
does not see fit to insert it as a supplementary request, we in the 
Senate will insert it,’ they said.43
 
Additional pressure was applied by organized labor, especially in the person of 
James P. (Jimmy) Loughlin, Secretary-Treasurer of the Massachusetts Labor 
Council of the AFL-CIO, and a Worcester native. Loughlin had been one of the 
first public figures to support Worcester as the medical school site in 1965. 
His presence at the school’s groundbreaking testified to his influence. Now, a 
decade later, Loughlin was an even greater advocate for the hospital. In a crucial 
meeting in Worcester, Governor Dukakis, Secretary Parks, City Manager Francis 
McGrath, acting Dean Bill Butcher, and Loughlin met at the nearly completed 
hospital so that Dr. Wheeler could show them around. Loughlin minced no 
words. If the Governor wanted Labor in his corner, he should understand how 
much Labor cared about UMass Hospital because, as Dr. Wheeler remembered 
Loughlin’s comments, “this was where the son and daughter of the working man 
was going to get his education, and they wanted it to be just as good as anywhere 
else.”44 
 A final agreement was elusive. The Governor’s objections to funding 
University Hospital, as noted above, were more than fiscal. One essential 
compromise, therefore, required the school’s senior faculty and administration to 
hammer out a new “Statement of Goals” that explicitly emphasized primary care 
education. Easing the development of the document, ironically, was the much-
lamented retirement of Dr. Soutter in February  1975. Tensions between the Dean 
and UMass President Robert Wood had likely impeded such recalibration of the 
school’s stated goals. President Wood now urged the faculty and administration 
at Worcester to re-think – and re-state – the School’s mission, reconciling 
the need for a teaching hospital with a fundamental commitment to primary 
care education. The task of shepherding a reformulated set of goals through 
the faculty fell to acting Dean Butcher.45 The “Statement of Goals” eventually 
presented to President Wood vividly demonstrates how much the Medical School 
was now prepared to acknowledge the Commonwealth’s expectations. 
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               In Dean Butcher’s words, “we were singing the song that the Legislature 
wanted to hear, but fortunately it was something I believed in, too.”46 As in all 
earlier statements, the first goal was to provide “excellent medical education” to 
qualified Massachusetts residents. The second goal, however, read as follows: 
“To emphasize the training of family physicians, or as they are called in a broader 
sense, primary care physicians. These include the specialties of Family Practice, 
STATEMENT OF GOALS The University of  Massachusetts Medical Center  as prepared by  The Faculty and Administration  of the Medical School  
 1.  Goals in Education   --      To provide excellent medical  education to    qualified residents of Massachusetts,     graduating 100 new physicians each year.                   --    To emphasize the training of  family                  physicians,  or as they are called in a                   broader sense, primary care physicians.                   These include the specialties of  Family                  Practice,  Primary Care Internal Medicine                  and Primary Care Pediatrics.   A sub -                  stantial majority of our graduates enter                   these specialties upon graduation.    2.   Goals in Service            --     To improve the delivery of medical care for      the citizens of the Commonwealth,  with      particular emphasis on those segments of      the population who are underserved.            --      To assist in the  development and provision      of  improved medical care programs and      delivery for those patients who are served by     other state health departments and agencies.        “Statement of Goals: The University of Massachusetts Medical Center, as prepared 
by The Faculty and Administration of the Medical School,” September, 1975, pp. 1, 
2.    For complete citation, see n. 47.   
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Primary Care Internal Medicine and Primary Care Pediatrics. A substantial 
majority of our graduates enter these specialties upon graduation.” 
            The document carried out a two-fold mission: to demonstrate the school’s 
commitment to accessible primary care for Massachusetts, but also to medical 
and educational excellence, an implicit defense of a tertiary care teaching 
hospital. The statement insisted, somewhat defensively, “The only acceptable 
education for health care is one based upon the highest standards of excellence…
The primary care physicians we educate must not be second-class doctors. They 
must be exposed first-hand to the latest and best methods…conducted in part 
where specialists can teach them, under expert supervision…”47 Governor Dukakis 
had begun attending Board meetings during this period and his response to 
the Goals revealed how closely his administration followed these events. After 
the Board had discussed the document, Dukakis “remarked that he had read 
the one-page list of Medical School goals and believed they were excellent.”  
Pressing his advantage, he urged the school to join with the Departments of 
Public Health and Mental Health in improving medical care to the clients of the 
state’s health institutions such as schools for special-needs students and mental 
hospitals. At the next month’s Board meeting, President Wood told his Trustees 
that the Statement of Goals “had had an important effect on the [Legislature’s] 
deliberations on the budget of the University Hospital this year...”48 
 Not everyone was so sanguine; some even questioned the Statement’s 
transparency. For example, although the body of the Statement included sections 
on the importance of research, in the brief executive summary research was 
nowhere to be found. President Wood saw the Statement as indicative of the 
“direction which this Medical School is taking,” but others expressed doubt. 
Indeed the Chancellor of UMass-Amherst asked, incredulously, if the Medical 
School “actually did not view research as one of its goals.” One of his deans had 
privately written him to say that, “The Statement …is commendable –but is it 
complete, or honest? Or is this (merely) a political statement? How does one 
justify, for example, supporting the over-supplied specialty of cardio-thoracic 
surgery as compatible with…these goals. I guess I just question the integrity of 
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the Statement as it stands.” Acting Dean Butcher was quick to reply that research 
was certainly one of the school’s goals, simply not one mentioned in the executive 
summary. Other Trustees jumped in to say that the Statement
…makes clear the necessity for a faculty of specialists, in order 
to give primary care practitioners a well-rounded training which 
would enable them not only to excel in their field, but also to know 
what lay beyond their competence. The impression was made [by 
the Statement of Goals] that it is vitally important, in describing 
the Medical School’s commitment to primary care, not to give the 
impression that it is a ‘trade school for general practitioners.’
And here lay the heart of the matter. Many of the first faculty members, including 
Acting Dean Butcher, were dedicated researchers. Yet, from the fall of 1975 one 
can date the faculty’s explicit identification with primary care education. As 
Chancellor Roger Bulger wrote in 1978, we “…have an unusual opportunity…
to better link the basic medical sciences, the traditional specialty orientation 
of medicine, and the provision of humane and compassionate primary care.” 
In short, this was the moment when the school 
acknowledged its hybrid identity.49
 Governor Dukakis and others in the 
statehouse still held out for additional concessions. 
He exerted leverage when negotiations for 
Chancellor Soutter’s successor reached the final 
stage. The background of Roger J. Bulger, M.D., 
President Wood’s choice to follow Lamar Soutter, 
was well suited to the situation. An internist and 
previously the Medical Director of the University 
of Washington Hospital and Chief of the Division 
of Allied Health Professions as well as professor 
of Community Health at Duke, Dr. Bulger was currently the Executive Officer 
of the Institute of Medicine. Bulger was known to be someone knowledgeable 
about, and interested in, health policy. He was particularly engaged by the issue 
          Roger Bulger, M.D. 
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of maldistribution of physicians geographically and by specialty. Wood was 
particularly impressed by Bulger’s “direct involvement in the development of 
national health policy,” but his reputation for tact and administrative finesse also 
must have looked appealing. As Wood frankly told his board, “The process of 
nomination was affected by current budgetary uncertainties.”50
            Governor Dukakis invited Bulger to meet with him and the Commissioners 
of Health and Mental Health, who quizzed him intently on the fallacy, as they 
believed, of locating a new, apparently redundant, medical center so close to 
Boston.  Bulger was able to convince them that a state medical school would 
not be a burden on the state but, rather, would deliver health care that no other 
school could deliver, as for example, in state schools for disabled children. 
In private meetings, Governor Dukakis, acting Dean Butcher, and Dr. Bulger 
agreed that the medical school should take on a role in providing medical and 
psychiatric care for clients under the authority of the Departments of Mental 
Health, Public Health, and Corrections, something that Dr. John Howe, III, a 
recent recruit in cardiology, was already working on. This was a pressing issue 
for the governor, given that in 1972 a class-action lawsuit had held the state 
responsible for “sub-standard care” at Belchertown and other state schools, 
resulting in a consent decree which mandated improved conditions. Better health 
care for the schools’ residents had become a priority.51 Among Chancellor Bulger’s 
first decisions, therefore, was to direct the medical school to pursue a contract 
with the Belchertown State School and Monson State Hospital to staff their 
medical departments.52  In Dr. Bulger’s words, “For me, it was an opportunity to 
show [Governor Dukakis] what a state school could do.” By December 1976, the 
Medical Center had entered into service agreements with five state institutions. 
Parenthetically, this initiative led to the development of a Psychiatry Department 
at UMass that strongly emphasized public sector psychiatry. The hiring of 
Boston Children’s Hospital psychiatrist Dr. Stanley Walzer, M.D. in 1977 – a 
strong advocate of public sector psychiatry – as the first permanent chair of the 
Psychiatry department, cemented the public sector orientation of psychiatry 
at UMass.  In 1978 the department received a state contract to provide care at 
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Northampton State Hospital and in 1982, at Worcester State Hospital (now, the 
Psychiatric Treatment and Recovery Center).53 
The final component of compromise, and surely the most important in 
the short run, was budgetary. After overwhelmingly voting down a Republican-
sponsored bill to de-fund both the hospital and the medical school, all sides were 
ready to compromise.54 The Trustees and school officials agreed to reduce the 
budget request for the hospital from $7.8 to $5.5 million. They further agreed 
to the insertion of a ceiling of $3.5 million on University Hospital’s deficit for 
fiscal year 1976 (ending June 30, 1976) and the creation of a legislative oversight 
committee for the first half of 1976. With these controls in place, and a general 
sense of the momentum behind the hospital, the Legislature passed a funding 
bill on November 8; the Governor signed it into law on November 10, 1975. The 
hospital’s Ambulatory wing opened in December, while the inpatient facility 
accepted its first patients in January 1976.55 
Opening the Hospital
 After more than a year of delays, the Hospital finally opened on January 
18, 1976. Far into the night before the official opening, John Stockwell, Hospital 
Director, the Chief of Staff and Chair of Surgery, Brownie Wheeler, and many 
others, were busy plugging in equipment, installing curtains, and generally 
making sure the place was fit to receive patients. Dr. Wheeler appreciatively 
acknowledged that, “The environmental services people, the janitors, literally 
stayed up all night to have the corridors clean, and everything neat and clean for 
the photographers and the press, and so forth.”56 One 72-bed floor was opened 
with 28 beds “available to start” and about 40 full-time clinical faculty. For the 
next two or three years, the hospital must have looked ghostly. Dr. Richard Irwin, 
who visited several times before joining UMass as Chief of Pulmonary Medicine, 
remembered that, “The first time I came out here, the inpatient census was 33. 
There was gravel, you know, where the parking lots are. There were only two 
cars in the parking lot…” Gail Frieswick, a nurse-administrator who eventually 
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became a Vice Chancellor and the hospital CEO, was one of several early 
employees to mention those parking lots, and especially how muddy they always 
were whenever it rained or thawed: “There was no parking and it was all mud. 
That I do remember vividly because everybody complained about the mud when 
it rained.” It took a decade to find money for a covered parking lot.57
             
               
          
               
             Dr. Arthur Pappas, chair of Orthopedic Surgery, admitted the first two 
patients, but Chancellor Emeritus Soutter was there, too, to welcome them.58 
Pappas, a native of nearby Auburn, was an orthopedic surgeon best known for 
his expertise in treating sports injuries, and a 
large practice at Boston Children’s Hospital.59 
He was also the consulting surgeon for the 
Boston Red Sox. (One of UMMC’s early Public 
Affairs directors, Carole Cohen, recalled the 
many occasions when her office was strictly 
forbidden to acknowledge the presence of 
Red Sox star players who were temporarily in 
residence under Dr. Pappas’s care 
– no matter how graphic the local 
headlines announcing their presence. 
Word always leaked out. One doctor, for example, recalled an inquisition by 
Hospital on opening day, January 18, 1976 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts  Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of  Massachusetts 
Medical School)
Susan Fitzpatrick, R.N. and Arthur Pappas, M.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University  of Massachusetts Medical School)
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his barber in a neighboring town: “Was it really true that the Red Sox came to 
UMass?” (Naturally, he answered “yes.”) Susan Fitzpatrick, who helped care for 
the first two patients, was the first RN hired and, like Dr. Pappas, remained a 
part of UMMC for many years.  The two patients, a 10-year-old girl from nearby 
Dudley and a 3-year-old boy from Worcester, might have felt dwarfed by the 
hospital’s cavernous size: as the only patients in a 400-bed hospital with only a 
few dozen doctors, nurses, and technicians on duty, they may have experienced a 
mixture of anxiety and amazement at their unusual situation. Both did well and 
at least one sent grateful notes and Christmas cards for many years afterward. 
That first week, most patients (there weren’t many) were admitted either by Dr. 
Pappas or by the plastic surgeon, Wallace Chang. The Emergency Room, under 
Acting Director Dr. Wayne Silva, opened the same day with Dr. Alvin Blaustein 
admitting the ER’s first patient.60
 The plans for the Hospital’s first year called for opening beds on a gradual, 
need-determined basis. But, indisputably, the growing numbers of medical 
students at UMMS would require a broad range of clinical services – and patients 
– to address their educational needs in the near future. Whereas in 1973, only 
16 students required clinical rotations, by 1975, 48 were doing clinical rounds, 
followed by 104 in 1977. Once the school reached its maximum enrollment, 
approximately 200 third- and fourth-year students would need clinical training 
at University or other hospitals in the region. Thus, the Hospital’s growth pattern 
attempted to balance educational need, patient demand, and strategies to further 
increase patient demand. As the “Maintenance Budget Request” for the Hospital’s 
first year of service noted, “The growth of the Medical Departments will be 
influenced by the rapidity with which the physicians [and surgeons] build firm 
referral patterns and the academic emphasis on a particular medical specialty.” 
The pattern of nurse staffing would follow the patterns established by the medical 
services. Overall, the total staff projected for the Hospital’s first year numbered 
175.61 Initially, besides Nursing, Housekeeping, Food Services, and Laboratory 
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Services, the clinical departments included Ambulatory Medicine, Anesthesiology, 
Cardiology, Medicine, Obstetrics-Gynecology, Pathology, Pediatrics, Psychiatry, 
Radiology, and Surgery. Within a year, their number and complexity grew 
enough to require a full organizational chart of departmental divisions and new 
departments, including Family and Community Medicine, Laboratory Medicine, 
Nuclear Medicine, Orthopedics, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, and 
Ophthalmology.62     
                      A fundamental dilemma, one that acting Dean Butcher described as being 
“caught between a rock and a hard place,” arose from the hospital’s desire to 
minimize direct competition with the local hospitals, on the one hand, and its 
need to stay within its agreed upon deficit ceiling by maximizing patient revenue. 
Regional collaboration, an early hope of the Worcester-region Comprehensive 
Health Planning Council, proved elusive. The idea for a Consortium of Worcester 
Hospitals originated in 1974 as a suggestion of a community visiting committee 
chaired by the president of County National Bank. The Consortium first met 
on October 31, 1974 and consisted of representatives from City, St. Vincent, 
Memorial, Hahnemann, UMass, and the Comprehensive Health Planning Council 
of Central Massachusetts, Inc. According to a newspaper account, they intended 
to discuss issues of “inter-hospital competition.” The meeting was called to “let 
everyone know what [UMass Hospital] is doing and for UMass to know what they 
are doing.” Two weeks later, the first indications of discord appeared when Dr. 
Soutter replied to a complaint from Helen Marie Smith, executive director of St. 
Vincent Hospital. She complained about the school’s plan to use its emergency 
room to care for local patients who are “not now receiving care.” Smith argued 
that offering outpatient care through the University Hospital ER violated the 
spirit of their agreement not to compete. (Soutter agreed, saying, “She has a 
point,” though he added that the school’s educational needs precluded his being 
able to abide by the agreement in this case.)63 
          The group established formal by-laws in 1979, and attempted to function 
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Current Departments* 64
   Department Status Chairman
Current
Full-time
Faculty
Additional
Faculty
Allocation
(FY75)
   Anatomy Established S. L. Clark, Jr. 9 --
   Anesthesiology Approval 
requested
M. D. Stanton-Hicks
(Appt. req.)
 -- 5
   Biochemistry Established R. W. Butcher 10 --
   Cardiovascular
      Medicine
Established J. E. Dalen 3 --
   Community and
      Family      
   Medicine
Established H. S. Fulmer 6 1
   Graduate Family
      Practice
Established R. E. Walton 2 1
   Laboratory
      Medicine
Approval to 
be requested
M. Kaplan (Acting) 0 4
   Medicine Established R. B. Hickler 11 4
   Microbiology Established D. J. Tipper 7 0
   Nuclear
      Medicine
Established L. Braverman 
(Acting) 
0 0
   Obstetrics and
      Gynecology
Established R. F. Hunter (Acting) 0 2
   Ophthalmology Established C. D. J. Regan 1 1
   Orthopedics Established A. M. Pappas 3 1
   Otolaryngology Established R. E. Gacek 1 1
   Pathology Established G. Majno 5 2
   Pediatrics Established H. B. Hanshaw 1 4
   Pharmacology Established N. C. Brown 9 --
   Physiology Established H. M Goodman 10 --
   Psychiatry Established E. Mason -- 2
   Radiology Established L. E. Hawes 2 2
   Surgery Established H. B. Wheeler 6 2
   Urology Established A. P. McLaughlin 1 --
      Departments for which approval has not yet been requested
                                          Animal Medicine                        W. Webster
                                          Dermatology                     0
                                          Genetics                                               0
                                          Neurology                                            2 (from Medicine)
                                                  Physical Medicine & Rehab.        0
                                          Radiation Therapy                               1
* c. June 18, 1975
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collaboratively. However, whether through genuine misunderstanding or 
deliberate subterfuge, the preemptive acquisition of a second linear accelerator by 
the same local hospital, St. Vincent, in violation of an understanding that no one 
hospital would, as it were, corner the local market on such services, reinforced 
the mistrust with which Worcester’s three largest hospitals, University, St. 
Vincent, and Memorial, viewed each other. The group soon ceased to collaborate 
meaningfully, resulting in increased hospital costs for the region as a whole since, 
in a faithful reflection of national spending patterns, each of the larger hospitals 
acquired the expensive equipment it felt essential to its own patients’ needs.65 
One major concession to regional planning was the decision by UMass and 
Memorial to divide the Obstetrics-Gynecology functions between them. Memorial 
had long been a major obstetrical center, which UMass agreed not to challenge; 
UMass, on the other hand, established an Obstetrics-Gynecology department 
emphasizing gynecology and especially gynecological oncology and other complex 
cases suited to a referral center, as well as establishing a Worcester Adolescent 
Pregnancy Program with Planned Parenthood. (St. Vincent, the only Catholic 
hospital in Worcester, continued its own obstetrical service.) Richard Hunter, 
previously the chair of OB-GYN at Memorial, became chair of the department at 
the medical center, with a residency shared by both institutions.66 
An Emergency Room and Trauma Center, on the other hand, were always 
part of the Hospital’s plan, despite the potential to compete with other hospitals’ 
emergency services. Similarly, although an emergency helicopter transport service 
received approval from the UMass Board only in 1982, it was clearly anticipated in 
the original plans, as evidenced by the presence of a helipad on hospital blueprints 
from 1968. Dr. Wheeler proposed the helicopter service based on his surgical 
experiences in Korea; in planning for the ER, he placed the helicopter pad “right 
outside the entrance to the Emergency Room.” As these services developed, so did 
opposition to them, both from Boston and closer to home. Lamar Soutter, according 
to Dr. Wheeler, never explicitly denied that UMass would include an Emergency 
Room. To be a fully developed teaching hospital, how could he have made such a 
pledge? After all, a hospital, and especially a publicly funded hospital, would be 
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obliged to at least stabilize patients who were brought to it in an emergency. Of 
course, such patients might well be referred to the medical center’s own physicians 
for follow-up. This prospect strongly suggested that UMass Hospital would, despite 
Soutter’s assurances to the contrary, directly compete with local hospitals. Local 
hospitals were correct to be concerned. By the summer of 1978, according to figures 
submitted to the state Department of Public health, the vast majority of ER patients 
at University Hospital originated in and around Worcester: 45% lived in the city of 
Worcester itself; 49% in the rest of Worcester County. As one sign of the importance 
of Emergency Medicine to the hospital, although it was initially a division within 
the Department of Medicine, it became a free-standing hospital department in 1991, 
the same year the American College of Surgeons awarded UMMC standing as a 
Level 1 Trauma Center. Emergency Medicine became an academic department in 
the school at the end of 1993 under the leadership of Richard Aghababian, M.D. 67  
Dr. Aghababian, a member of the first graduating class of the school (1974), 
after two years in an Internal Medicine residency in Cambridge had traveled to 
the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) to 
be part of the first fellowship program in Emergency 
Medicine, a program sponsored by the UCSF 
Department of Medicine and funded by the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation. When he first returned to 
the east coast, he worked as the ER chief at a regional 
hospital in Fitchburg while volunteering at UMass one 
shift per week. As Dr. Aghababian described it, the 
Emergency Medicine program at UMass developed 
in a “somewhat clandestine” fashion because of 
the lingering tensions with other local hospitals. 
Developing a robust Emergency Medicine service was 
a foundational goal, part of the Hospital’s drive to 
establish its unique importance to the health of central Massachusetts.68
The introduction of an emergency medical helicopter service in 1982 
Richard Aghababian, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of  the University 
of  Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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naturally facilitated this goal. It also provoked more concern, this time from 
hospitals in Boston, not just Worcester. Despite the presence of a helipad in early 
hospital blueprints, detailed planning for what became the New England Life Flight 
service only began in 1981. Boston University’s chief of surgery approached Dr. 
Wheeler to explore a cooperative 
helicopter transport service based 
at BU but the two institutions 
could never agree to what seemed 
like a fair division of costs – at 
least in the eyes of UMass. (That 
is why the other Boston hospitals, 
which had been approached before 
UMass, had not signed on with BU 
either.) In October 1981, the Board 
authorized UMass Chancellor 
Robert Tranquada, Roger Bulger’s successor, to prepare a proposal for the Board. 
On June 9, 1982, the helicopter service was finally approved after opposition from 
Boston supporters was quelled, but only for one year. 
It was inaugurated on August 31, 1982 and renewed the next year. Two years 
later, a tragic helicopter crash, the result of dual-engine failure, cost the lives of the 
pilot and the attending physician.. (The patient, strapped to a gurney, survived, as 
did the nurse, although she was seriously injured.) The program, after reevaluation, 
was resumed quickly. On May 20, 1985, the Board of Trustees reauthorized it 
on “a continuing basis.” By the fall of that year, a planned reunion for Life Flight 
patients anticipated sending invitations to 1,000 people.69 In 1991 when UMMC 
took over the ambulance service for Worcester, a service previously run by the Fire 
Department in conjunction with City Hospital, the UMass Emergency Department 
was no longer hiding in plain sight. With the ambulance service, a residency 
program, and Life Flight, it had become a major part of the hospital’s services.
         Life Flight,  1983
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School  Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of  Massachusetts Medical School)
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Staff and Program Development
 Recruiting for the clinical departments, given the continuing uncertainty 
over funding for the hospital, presented a greater challenge than did the hiring of 
basic science faculty and chairs (to be discussed in Chapter 8). Dean Soutter had 
played the major role in the earliest recruiting, with some assistance from John 
Stockwell, the man he recruited from Children’s Hospital of Minneapolis to be the 
first Hospital Director. But his chief ally in recruitment and early planning was 
Dr. H. Brownell (“Brownie”) Wheeler, an innovative young surgeon specializing 
in peripheral vascular surgery. Wheeler, a Kentucky native and a graduate of 
Vanderbilt University, Harvard Medical School, a residency at Peter Bent Brigham 
Hospital (now Brigham and Women’s) in Boston, and a fellowship at St. Mary’s 
Hospital in London, was a surgical pioneer; at St. Mary’s he had been the operating 
surgeon with his mentor, the British surgeon Charles Rob, during the first 
published series of carotid endoterectomies.70 Wheeler returned to the Brigham 
after his fellowship and pioneered the procedure there. He then also developed 
a non-invasive approach to identifying deep vein thrombosis (DVT), a technique 
known as “impedance plethysmography.”71 
 In the mid-1960s, when Lamar Soutter began scouting for talent, Brownie 
Wheeler was an assistant professor in Surgery at Harvard as well as Chief of Surgery 
at the Harvard-affiliated West Roxbury Veteran’s Administration Hospital, an 
appointment he’d been given at the age of 33. At the time, Dr. Soutter was the V.A.’s 
Chief Consultant in Surgery for the New England/New York region; he spent a lot 
of time at the West Roxbury hospital which happened to be only a few miles from 
his home. Wheeler attracted his notice when, despite his relative youth and junior 
status, he won a contest over a recruitment preference against Dr. Francis Moore, 
renowned Chief of Surgery at the Brigham, a senior professor at Harvard Medical 
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School, and, incidentally, one of Dr. Wheeler’s direct superiors. Wheeler, who had 
impressed Soutter with a combination of fairness, toughness, and compassion, 
was first invited by Dr. Soutter to help out with the planning in July 1964. As he 
recalled, “At the time…the entire UMass Medical School consisted of him and 
his secretary in [an office] in the old Boston Gas Building.”72 Wheeler became 
the school’s first 
paid faculty 
consultant in the 
fall of 1966 with the 
understanding that 
he would become 
the first chair of 
the Department of 
Surgery. He began 
as Chief of Surgery 
at St. Vincent 
Hospital in Worcester in 1971 until University Hospital opened in 1976 when he 
became the Chair of Surgery at UMMS.73 
              Wheeler was a ubiquitous presence at the Medical Center, taking on various 
roles such as Hospital Chief of Staff, founding chair of the Executive Committee, 
founding chair of the Educational Policy Committee, and innumerable recruitment 
and other ad-hoc duties.  He was also deeply involved in planning the physical 
layout of the hospital, the research facilities, animal quarters, and the Group 
Practice plan. Some years later, he also founded the palliative care program in the 
Department of Surgery as well as a school-wide committee, sponsored by the Lamar 
Soutter Library, to develop a program in Humanities in Medicine. There was little 
in the medical center’s early development, in fact, that Brownie Wheeler did not 
H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of  the 
University of  Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
203
help shape. Through a long and distinguished career here, he well deserves to be 
called “the patriarch of the place,” in the words of fellow department chair James 
Dalen. It is not surprising that President Wood turned to him as a mediator during 
Wood’s tense standoff with Dr. Soutter over the Worcester campus Chancellorship. 
One of Dr. Wheeler’s earliest recruits for the Department of Surgery, Bruce Cutler, 
M.D., recalling his impressions after 30-plus years, said of Brownie Wheeler, he was 
“the most fair and honest of any leader I ever dealt with.” Numerous interviewees 
have echoed this sentiment.74
 The Wheelers lived just two blocks from the Soutters in the town of Dedham 
– highly convenient when Lamar and Mary Soutter entertained potential recruits. 
Brownie and his wife Betty could walk over to join them for dinner. Afterward, the 
two couples would discuss whether the candidate was a good “fit,” a reference not 
only to academic and/or clinical excellence, but to a combination of collegiality, 
confidence, and excitement that Soutter especially valued. Even before Dr. 
Wheeler became a paid consultant to the school, he acted as the Dean’s unofficial 
sounding board and confidante during informal evening conversations at home. 
As Soutter wrote to President Lederle in 1966, of all the candidates he considered 
to become chair of Surgery (for Soutter, perhaps the most critical appointment), 
H. Brownell Wheeler, M.D., center, with medical students, 
residents and patient. (Photo courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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Wheeler was the best qualified by both “experience and temperament for the job. 
He is young, energetic, extremely tactful, and has shown considerable effective 
leadership in running the surgical service at the Roxbury V.A. Hospital.” Besides his 
administrative and clinical flair, Soutter judged that Wheeler’s “investigative work 
is excellent.”75
 Given Soutter’s and Wheeler’s backgrounds, it is understandable that many 
of the early faculty recruits came from Harvard or BU. One internist who arrived 
here in the early 1970s remembers hearing the place referred to as “Brigham 
West.”76 Many of the first clinical department chairs, including James Dalen 
(Cardiology), Arthur Pappas (Orthopedics), Stanley Walzer (Psychiatry), Roger 
Hickler (Medicine), and Brownie Wheeler (Surgery), either had been educated 
at Harvard hospitals, had spent much of their previous careers working there, or 
both.77 Their jobs were especially challenging, not only because of the uncertainty 
or at best, frugality, of state support, but because they were asked to achieve two 
distinct goals: to build up the specialty services implied by Soutter’s claim that this 
would be a referral hospital, and to bring in enough patients to fill hospital beds and 
outpatient clinics and supply sufficient educational opportunities for the students. 
            Soutter, a thoracic surgeon himself, no doubt with the agreement of Brownie 
Wheeler and John Stockwell, decided very early in the Hospital’s planning phase 
to make cardiac surgery and cardiovascular medicine centerpieces of the Hospital’s 
offerings. Despite having three large community hospitals, three smaller hospitals, 
and one state psychiatric hospital, Worcester did not have the kind of advanced 
cardiac surgery – coronary artery bypass surgery, valve repairs or replacements, 
for example – then becoming available in most cities of its size. Such procedures, 
besides extending lives considerably, also brought in substantial revenue to the 
hospitals that performed them. Cardiac surgery took time to develop. Soutter had 
high hopes of recruiting John J. Collins, M.D., the Chief of Cardiac Surgery at the 
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Brigham, an effort that provoked Board of Trustee-level discussions of the over-
scale salaries such surgeons would require and intensified unease over the direction 
the school might be taking under Lamar Soutter’s leadership.  One of the Trustees, 
Commissioner of Public Health William Bicknell, “expressed his belief that the 
impact of such specialties on the balance of a medical school teaching program 
deserves the most serious consideration, and questioned the impact such 
specialties would have on one of the goals of the Worcester Medical School – the 
training of family and community physicians.” He was sure that a “superspecialty 
[sic] department start-up could have a potentially adverse impact on the Medical 
School’s programs,” and added, “The need for additional cardiac surgical units in 
Massachusetts…approaches zero…”78
           Bicknell need not have worried. Collins withdrew his acceptance of the 
position in Worcester. Cardiothoracic surgery did not jump start the Hospital’s 
patient revenues and, although it developed into a much needed service for 
central and western Massachusetts and a financial mainstay of the hospital, it did 
so gradually. Wheeler believed, on the basis of conversation with other leading 
surgeons in the Harvard system, that some of the leaders of cardiovascular 
surgery in Boston actively tried to keep experienced surgeons from starting a 
new, potentially competitive program in Worcester. But, since the hospital had 
already hired several young surgeons who had been trained at Massachusetts 
General Hospital, UMass was able to at least start its program by having 
cooperating surgeons from Mass General, including the Chiefs of Surgery and 
Cardiac Surgery, Drs. Gerald Austen and Mortimer J. Buckley, respectively, 
preoperatively examine patients to confirm the need for surgery and, occasionally 
even perform the procedures themselves. Young surgical recruits, such as the 
future chief of cardiac surgery, Thomas Vander Salm, M.D., and the future chief 
of vascular surgery, Bruce S. Cutler, M.D., who both trained at Mass General, 
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Okike Nsidinanya Okike, M.D. from the Mayo Clinic, and others, carried the 
program on their own after four or five years.  But at the beginning, given chronic 
understaffing, Vander Salm and Cutler both performed many of the procedures 
and acted as interns, attending the patients at nights and on weekends.79 Again 
and again, in Dr. Wheeler’s words, “it was a big struggle to get the necessary 
approvals to do a lot of things that were competing with Boston, because there 
was a lot of organized opposition from Boston [hospitals].” With time, Dr. Vander 
Salm’s cardiac surgery unit became a genuine success for the hospital and the 
region.80
Thomas Vander Salm, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of  the University of Massachusetts Medical  
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
 Okike Nsidinanya Okike, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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Cardiology, however, did well from the beginning. Ironically, one of Dr. 
Collins’ long lists of demands to Soutter and Stockwell had been that James Dalen, 
then chief of one of the cardiac catheterization labs at the Brigham, be recruited 
to Worcester. When another of Soutter’s high-profile Harvard recruiting efforts, 
to lure the renowned cardiologist, Richard Gorlin, also fell through, Dalen’s 
recruitment became much more urgent. Dr. Gorlin had negotiated to become the 
head of a fiscally autonomous department of Cardiovascular Medicine, an unusual 
arrangement given cardiology’s typical placement as a division within a department 
of medicine. Now, despite Dr. Dalen’s more junior status than Gorlin, he became 
the beneficiary of Dr. Gorlin’s negotiating skills. He negotiated actively on his own 
behalf as well, insisting that Cardiology be responsible for catheterization studies, 
especially angiograms, rather than the Department of Radiology. Since one of the 
leading local cardiologists and a likely source of many referrals, agreed with Dalen, 
he won his point. In the meantime, he assured Cardiology of an early revenue flow.81 
Dalen recalled, 
I had just become an Associate Professor of Medicine. I was in 
charge of one of the cardiac catheterization labs, and like everyone 
else in Boston, I was very curious about the new medical school 
being built in Worcester. I certainly wondered who was going to be 
on the faculty there, particularly wondered who was going to be the 
Chief of Cardiology. I think many other cardiologists at Harvard, 
BU, and Tufts also wondered who would go there.
When Brownie Wheeler approached him about the position, he was delighted at 
the opportunity. Like nearly every early recruit to the medical center, Dalen saw 
it as “a wonderful opportunity, [a] brand new medical school, [to] build a whole 
department.” Dalen had been trained by another eminent cardiologist, Dr. Lewis 
Dexter, known for innovations in understanding the natural history of pulmonary 
embolism, its diagnosis, and prophylaxis. Dalen’s interests centered on preventive 
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cardiology, especially venous and arterial thromboembolism. This focus fortuitously 
harmonized with Brownie Wheeler’s work on deep vein thrombosis in the ’60s and 
’70s. At the time Dalen left Harvard for UMass Medical School, he was the principal 
investigator of the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MRFIT), one of the early 
trials of heart attack prevention. Dalen, who remained at UMMS for nearly 15 years, 
served as Chair of Cardiovascular Medicine, Chair of Internal Medicine, Physician-
in-Chief, and finally interim Chancellor at UMass before becoming dean and Vice 
President for Health Sciences at the University of Arizona. His clinical priorities, 
like Brownie Wheeler’s, played a crucial role in establishing the Medical Center on a 
sound footing.82  
Dalen began his work in Worcester in the spring of 1975. He and his first 
faculty recruits (Drs. Ira Ockene, who ran the UMass catheterization lab; John 
Paraskos, who was the first echocardiographer at the Brigham and designed and 
ran the heart station at the UMass hospital; Joseph Alpert, who later became the 
Chair of Medicine at the University of Arizona, and John P. Howe III, who later 
became a dean at UMass Medical School, president of the UT Health Science 
Center-San Antonio, and currently CEO of Project Hope), arrived about six months 
before the hospital opened. All had either been part of Dalen’s service at Peter Bent 
Brigham Hospital, had been trained by Lewis Dexter, or both. Dr. Dexter, too, who 
James Dalen, M.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)  
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retired from Harvard shortly after University Hospital opened, came to UMass once 
a week for a few years to teach third-year medical students.83 
Dr. Dalen understood the value of building up a patient base before 
embarking on major research initiatives. As he always insisted, “You’ve got to 
have a base…if you don’t have [patients], you have nothing…[The] first priority, of 
course, is teaching, and that’s why we’re here. In order to have teaching, you ought 
to have patients.”84 Dalen well understood that, “Worcester did not need another 
hospital. I mean, you know, you had St. Vincent, a very strong hospital; Memorial 
was a very strong hospital. And they had about four other ones. Well, it took 
time…people that live in central and western Massachusetts are not crazy about 
going to Boston for health care. If you have good health care in Worcester, they 
will come, if you reach out to them.” And that is exactly what they did:
I had four cardiologists just sitting on their thumbs, planning things. 
And just about that time the CPR became an important thing… And 
so we trained doctors in CPR all over the state, all over the western 
and central part of the state. We’d actually – we went to almost every 
hospital in…western and central Mass[achusetts] that would have us, 
and put on programs in… cardiac resuscitation. And that’s how we got 
to know all the doctors.85
            By 1978, hospital director Michael Bice could report to the Trustees that 
in the previous six months, almost all patient referrals from outside hospitals 
came from locations where UMass physicians had previously given continuing 
medical education classes. Dalen had made the conscious decision to compete 
for patients in the towns surrounding Worcester rather than in Worcester 
itself or, in Dr. Ira Ockene’s words, “to go after the doughnut and leave the 
doughnut hole alone... to go after patients who had previously been going 
to Boston, primarily from the suburbs around Worcester, the towns around 
Worcester,” to minimize “town-gown” conflicts. It did not hurt, either, that the 
then Bishop of Worcester became one of Dr. Dalen’s patients. Word spread. 
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Eventually, Dalen’s department created the second largest cardiac-care unit 
in New England. Within three years, UMass hospital was performing more 
cardiac catheterizations than Memorial and St. Vincent hospitals combined.86 
The outpatient clinics, which opened in May 1975, seven months earlier than 
the hospital, had seen 3,500 patients by January 1976; Stockwell was careful 
to report that only 30% of these patients were from Worcester.87
Two years after Dalen’s arrival, the new Chancellor, Roger Bulger, 
M.D., informed him that Roger Hickler, M.D., a respected internist, had 
decided to step down as the chair of Medicine. Dalen and Bulger both vividly 
remember their conversation. Dalen was offered two 
choices: to become the Chair of a reunited Department 
of Medicine, or to continue as the chair of Cardiovascular 
Medicine and spend the rest of his life fighting a new Chair 
of Medicine. He chose option one.88 
Roger Hickler was named the Lamar Soutter 
Professor of Geriatric Medicine and in 1978 established a 
division of Geriatrics within the Department of Medicine. In 
a related development, which had been in the works from 
the opening of the Hospital, they established a palliative 
care unit of five or six beds:
This program, [Chancellor Bulger told the Board], would be devoted 
to the care of people who were terminally ill and who had to be 
hospitalized for brief periods. The thrust of the program was to 
enhance the care of such patients at home…to help not only the 
patients but also the families of the patients. Such care, he noted, 
was reimbursable by both Medicare and the insurance companies. 
Home care of the terminally ill…involved the Visiting Nurse 
Association and volunteers, and a hospital back-up was needed. 
[Patients would receive] only such care as was necessary for brief 
periods of time…This would be the first such unit in a hospital in 
the United States.89
 Roger Hickler, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of the
University of Massachusetts  
Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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Coincidentally, at about the same time the Jewish Home for the Aged of 
Worcester County, located in Worcester itself, approached the medical center 
for assistance in developing fuller interest, awareness and competencies in the 
care of the elderly among Worcester-area clinicians and medical students. The 
medical center responded by establishing a small Gerontology Planning Office, 
headed by Rosalie S. Wolf, Ph.D., with an advisory council headed by Dr. Philip 
Caper, the new Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs (see below) as well as medical 
faculty such as Dr. Hickler, and community members. After a few years, it 
became plain that geriatrics programs were being developed at all three of the 
UMass campuses; a proposal for a University-wide center with partnerships 
among Worcester Consortium colleges seemed likeliest to win Trustee approval 
and, just as important, funding from the National Institute on Aging and private 
foundations. Under Dr. Wolf’s leadership, such a proposal was presented to the 
Board in 1981 with full support from the University president, David Knapp. It 
was established in February 1981 with seed money from the University.90
A Group Practice Plan for the physicians was enacted as early as 1974. It 
established that revenues collected for professional services be deposited in a 
Group Practice trust fund controlled by the medical school dean and used to pay 
overhead and operating costs of the practice, equipment, educational costs, base 
compensation, and fringe benefits for members of the group practice. Initially, no 
thought was given to the disposition of physician earnings over and above the level 
of base salary and fringe benefits; such overages were routed directly to the medical 
school dean to be used for “institutional purposes.” After the plan had been working 
for a year or so, however, Bulger and the clinical department chairs realized that 
the plan actually might be a disincentive to the “high-earning specialties” such as 
anesthesiology or surgery. In the fall of 1976, Dr. Bulger explained the problem to 
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ESTIMATED  FY77  PHYSICIANS’  GROUP  CASH  FORECAST*
SUMMARY
      CASH INCOME
                Estimated collection of FY76 receivables                                                       $100,000
                Inpatient, excluding Cardio-Thoracic                                                                986,000
                Cardio-Thoracic Program                                      186,000
                Clinic                                                                                                                 128,000
                Emergency Room                                                                                                83,000
                TOTAL                                                                                                          $1,483,000    
      EXPENDITURES
                Professional liability insurance                                                                          200,000
                Administrative Costs                                                               75,000
                Cardiac Surgery program                                                                                     55,000
                Group Practice salaries                                                                                      750,000
                Incentive overage                                                                                                 50,000
                Fringe benefit program                                                                                       250,000
                Repayment of  loan and interest                                                                         100,000
                Reserve fund                                                                                                          3,000    
                TOTAL                                                                                                          $1,483,000  
       
 
    *Doc. T76-098, “Cash Flow Shortfall in Group Practice Trust Fund, Memorandum to the Board  of 
     Trustees Executive Committee, June 1, 1976, Box “Trustees Documents, FY 1976, 001-101,” fol. 
     “Trustees Documents, T76,091-098,” Trustees, UM/A.
213
the Health Affairs committee of the UMass Board, urging that some of the overage 
be returned to individual departments for the chairs to use for departmental 
development, whether as faculty incentives or as investments in equipment or staff. 
Some of the overage, too, could be given to less high-earning departments such 
as Family and Community Medicine  or Pediatrics to redress resource imbalances 
somewhat. The remainder would be used by the dean. But by the end of its first 
year, the most serious problem posed by the Group Practice was the need to pay its 
physicians when the Hospital’s delayed start-up had made it impossible for them to 
generate much income for the first 6 months of the Group’s operation.91 
          
Nursing
 Establishing the Nursing service at the Hospital was equally complex. A 
team of nurse administrators from Utah had been hired to manage the hospital, but 
was fired after only a short time for failing to establish the necessary policies and 
procedures, hire sufficient nurses, or train them for the appropriate levels of care. 
After two years in operation, the Hospital was still trying to stabilize its nursing 
administration. Staff nurse turnover was also considered a serious problem even 
by the UMass Board of Trustees. The state’s lower than average wage scale was one 
important reason for these difficulties.92 But the problems ran much deeper. Anne 
Bourgeois, Ed. D., who was hired in 1978 to coordinate, standardize, and upgrade 
the nursing clinical practice (and who became Chief Nursing Officer in 1986 and 
President, University Hospital from 1998-2001), had been teaching at Hahnemann 
Hospital in Worcester, a diploma school, before coming to UMass. In an era 
when hospital-based, diploma-granting nursing schools were increasingly seen as 
inadequate for the demands of a newly professionalizing nurse workforce, UMass 
Hospital established a policy of only hiring collegiate-trained nurses. 
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Dr. Bourgeois, who had a Bachelor’s degree in nursing at the time, was keenly 
aware of the resentment that the new hospital had generated among local diploma 
graduates. 
They called this the white elephant on the hill…and it was like if you 
were living in Worcester, and you were a staff nurse, and you were 
working at City, St. V’s, or Hahnemann, or Memorial – probably 
especially Memorial – you did not go to work at UMass, because it 
was not the place to go. So any staff nurses that left where they were 
working had to be enticed with something other than either money 
or the reputation of the place. That’s really tough!93
Diploma schools feared they would be closed, as indeed they were over the ensuing 
decade. Another source of resentment, however, was based on the growing national 
trend toward “primary,” vs. “functional” nursing practice. “Primary” nursing 
emphasized the nurse’s responsibility for the continuity of care and therapeutic 
relationship with her/his assigned patients. Unlike an earlier model of nursing, it 
deemphasized the performance of specific nursing tasks in favor of coordination 
of the patient’s care, often in collaboration with a more narrowly credentialed 
provider, such as a Nurse Assistant (NA) or Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN). Gail 
Frieswick, Ed. D., the Associate Director for Clinical Practice (and eventually the 
Vice Chancellor/CEO from 1988 to 1995), hired Bourgeois a few months 
after her arrival at the hospital. Frieswick had been specifically charged to develop 
primary nursing as the standard of care throughout the hospital. Bourgeois’ 
experience in both the diploma and the collegiate traditions made her an ideal 
person to help new collegiate graduates master this new model of nursing, and the 
two made a formidable team.  An early ally, Dr. Lillian Goodman, was the chair 
of the nursing program at nearby Worcester State College (WSC). Goodman, who 
became the second dean of the UMass Graduate School of Nursing in 1995, along 
with Mary K. Alexander, a nurse practitioner and professor at WSC who in 1995 
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became an associate dean and a professor at UMass, were fierce advocates for this 
new direction in nursing and were invaluable in sending the Hospital their WSC 
graduates.  Internally, an education office was established to continually upgrade 
nursing skills as more advanced technologies and services were added to the 
hospital. Building by word of mouth, Frieswick and Bourgeois were able to hire 
more and more nurses. In 1977, too, the Hospital Management Board voted to raise 
nurse salaries to a par with other hospitals in Worcester and Boston. The nursing 
situation gradually improved.94  
 Frieswick undertook another difficult job – to transform the traditionally 
patriarchal relationship of doctors to nurses into a model of mutual respect 
consistent with changing professional and gender norms of the 1970s and ’80s. For 
example, in the beginning, the nursing administrators had no office space of their 
own; they used one of the patient rooms on the third floor. The process took time. 
Once Frieswick became Director of Nursing she began by visiting the clinical chairs 
in their offices every month.  At first, she remembered, 
            Gail Frieswick, Ed.D.
(Photo courtesy of the University  of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
             Anne Bourgeois, Ed.D.
(Photo courtesy of the University of  
Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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They did not want to talk to me...I just consistently came every 
month. I did not let them go. I did not let them up. I met with every 
individual clinical chair, and then I would start telling them about 
what was going on in the hospital…and I really focused on their 
clinical practice…I would get them involved with what they wanted 
in [the nurses’] clinical practice, because we needed to know…You 
know, after 17 years, you get to know people…They could come into 
our office anytime, Anne or I, and talk with us about anything.
 
This was a two-way street. Often, if a nurse was not performing at the necessary 
level of expertise, the doctors came directly to Bourgeois, then the Associate 
Director of Nursing, to solve the problem. Eventually, Dr. Frieswick was included 
in the monthly department chairs’ meetings and meetings of the Hospital 
Management Board.  As Dr. Frieswick put it, “We built bridges.” Collaboration 
became more essential every year since the hospital needed to increase its patient 
revenues to minimize its dependence on state funding and free those state revenues 
for the school. New floors could not be opened nor new services started without 
appropriate nursing to staff them. Collaboration was not optional.95 
Solidifying the Hospital’s Position: 1976-1986
 The opening of UMass Hospital in 1976 coincided with the arrival of the 
new chancellor/dean, Roger Bulger, M.D. and his wife, Ruth Ellen Bulger, Ph.D., 
Professor of Anatomy, Physiology, and Genetics. For the two years they were in 
Worcester, keeping the hospital on a positive trajectory was likely Roger Bulger’s 
most pressing and difficult challenge.96 One of his first major appointments, 
explicitly responding to this need, brought Senator Edward M. Kennedy’s chief 
health policy adviser, Samuel Philip Caper, M.D., into Bulger’s administration. 
A 38-year-old internist (non-practicing) and microbiologist, Caper was best 
known in Boston medical circles for having helped organize a “heal-in” at Boston 
City Hospital in the mid-1960s. After a stint as a researcher at NIH followed by 
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a position administering the outpatient unit of Boston City Hospital, he joined 
Kennedy’s Washington staff on the Senate Health Subcommittee, helping to write 
the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974. He and 
Bulger worked together when the latter led the health manpower initiatives of the 
Institute of Medicine. Bulger created the new position of Vice Chancellor for Health 
Affairs to accommodate the role he hoped Caper would play, namely, as a health 
policy expert whose government experience would facilitate the school’s dealings 
with the state and with regional health entities such as the other Worcester-area 
hospitals. As a measure of the importance of the position to the new Chancellor, 
it was explicitly described as the second senior administrative officer after the 
Chancellor/Dean.97
   At about the same time, the Board of Trustees established a Hospital 
Management Board. Mr. Joseph Benedict – past-President of the Federal Home 
Loan Bank of Boston, President of the Worcester-based Freedom Federal Savings 
Bank, a Brigadier General in the Army Reserves, and 
a close friend of Senator Kennedy – was named its 
inaugural chair.98 Benedict retained this post for nearly 
20 years during which he was a staunch supporter of the 
Hospital’s mission in central Massachusetts.99 
The Management Board was at first considered advisory 
to the Medical Center’s Chancellor.100 But in 1982 the 
Board, still with Benedict as chair, was reconfigured into 
the Management Board of the University Hospital and 
given stronger determinative powers. Of the 17-member 
Management Board, nine slots were explicitly reserved for 
members who worked and/or lived in the Worcester area, 
not including the medical center chancellor, the hospital director, a member of the 
Joseph Benedict
(Photo courtesy of the
University of Massachusetts
Medical School Archives,
Lamar Soutter Library,
University of Massachusetts
Medical School)
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medical staff elected by the hospital executive committee, and the chief of staff, who 
also were Board members. The University President or a designee and three UMass 
Trustees of the President’s choice filled out the membership. The Management 
Board’s actions were now subject directly to the University Trustees, but it was in a 
much more knowledgeable position to guide hospital policy.101
 The hospital’s opening, as discussed earlier, was tied to a commitment 
exacted by the Legislature that its operating deficit would not exceed $3.5 million 
during the first fiscal year of operations. Although it was expected to bring in about 
$720,000 in revenues during that period, it was expected to operate at a significant 
deficit for several more years.102 Nevertheless, within a year Chancellor Bulger 
reluctantly requested permission to seek a rate increase to bring hospital charges 
“more in line with those currently in existence at the major teaching hospitals of 
the greater Boston area.” The new rates would be higher than the charges for other 
Worcester hospitals, but thus would emphasize the special nature of their services. 
The increase, he added, would still not fully cover costs, but they would provide a 
small profit above Medicare and Blue Cross reimbursement rates that would give 
the hospital something to pay for operating costs and new inventory. In fact, the 
hospital’s revenues were only about $600,000, but with tight budgeting, Bulger and 
the hospital leadership managed to stay below their deficit ceiling.103
 In February 1977, as part of his mid-fiscal year report to President Wood 
– an attempt to wring additional funds for the hospital from the tight-strapped 
University budget – Chancellor Bulger summarized the hospital’s first full year 
of inpatient services. In fiscal year 1976, inpatient admissions numbered 657, 
averaging a daily census of 59 with 85 beds available in all. Outpatient Clinic visits 
reached 9532, Emergency Room visits, 1548, and Operating-Room procedures, 
387. Withal, only 74 professional positions had been authorized and only 69 had 
been filled. For staff positions, the discrepancy was 445.3 out of 606 authorized. 
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Bulger began by reminding Wood that their accreditation review by the LCME 
in the spring of 1976, while granting the school a three-year accreditation, had 
noted the urgency of fully opening the hospital prior to their next review in 1979. 
Justifying a requested mid-year budget supplement of $800,000 at a time when 
the entire state was suffering the effects of a stagnating economy and continuing 
inflation, he wrote, “The most striking accomplishment has been our success in 
attracting patients…The referral patterns from doctors in communities in central 
and western Massachusetts have been built much more rapidly than predicted.” 
But, this had created a problem, leading to “more acutely ill patients than originally 
anticipated… [T]he resulting demand upon the resources of the Center should 
be viewed as indicative of success...” Unfortunately, acutely ill patients require 
“continual nursing care, attention from doctors on a more frequent basis, and 
more items from medical and surgical supplies, including more expensive drugs 
in greater doses” than moderately sick patients. The cost of medical and surgical 
supplies, he noted, had risen by 10.5% in one year. Malpractice insurance costs had 
increased by nearly one-third. The only solution, he believed, was to move forward 
as rapidly as possible in hiring more clinicians, opening more beds, and establishing 
more hospital services, thus utilizing the hospital more fully and efficiently. Indeed, 
for FY78, Bulger requested that 90 more beds be opened for a total of 175. Yet, 
despite permission from the President’s office to fill 345 positions, the Legislature 
had not released the necessary funds by November 1977, forcing the Medical Center 
to hire personnel under non-permanent contracts.104
  The Legislature’s understandable reluctance and unavoidable inability to 
financially support the hospital’s need for growth, the Group Practice’s shortfall, 
and the difficulty of recruiting active doctors or nurses without an adequate 
payment mechanism all prompted Dr. Bulger and the University Board to 
investigate an alternative fiscal model for the hospital. (It was around this time 
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that Bulger ordered that half the lights in the medical school be turned off and 
the thermostats drastically lowered to conserve money; students could be found 
in the Lamar Soutter Library studying hard while bundled up in hats, scarves, 
gloves and down jackets.)105 
 Something had to be done. Rather than the hospital being tethered to an 
“expenditure appropriation” from the State, which would require them to return 
all revenues earned back into the state’s general fund, Bulger began exploring a 
“Trust Fund” model. The latter model would still require some state subsidy, but 
for a finite number of years. The bulk of income would be generated through the 
hospital’s revenues to be deposited into, and withdrawn from, a Trustee-governed 
trust fund. This would allow the hospital to minimize its dependence on the State 
and to manage its income and expenses more effectively. Such a fund could help 
sustain the (then struggling) Group Practice, or help fund the recruitment of 
established clinical faculty who themselves would bring in large patient panels, or 
help support other time-sensitive initiatives incident to any large enterprise.106 
 At the July meeting of the University Board of Trustees, President Wood 
announced a breakthrough. Just a week earlier Governor Dukakis signed into law 
the University’s FY1978 Appropriation Act that created a new trust fund which 
returned
…all hospital revenues to the Trustees for the operation of the 
hospital… Establishment of the trust fund, in contrast to other 
proposals presented to the Legislature, has the desirable effect 
of “uncoupling” hospital expenditures and revenues from the 
University budget, and will allow us to make orderly progress 
toward full operation of the hospital. This is a major step forward in 
the funding of revenue-producing enterprises in the state.
This was a significant political achievement for the hospital, and especially 
for Philip Caper; the new budget agreement coincided with heightened public 
concerns over escalating health care costs, especially those associated with 
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emergency and specialty care –precisely what the hospital was attempting to 
provide – and a lack of primary care doctors in rural and urban America.107 From 
the legislative perspective, the arrangement signaled something more precious: 
an end to seemingly infinite increases in their own outlays for the hospital. (In 
1980, anticipating the end of state subsidies to the Hospital, the UMass Board 
voted to create its own Hospital Trust Fund for the “maintenance and operation” 
of University Hospital, to be managed from the Worcester campus.)108 President 
Wood added, optimistically, “We anticipate revenues of approximately $13 
million during FY78.” At the same time, a state subsidy of $3.5 million covered 
the hospital’s anticipated debts for free care, bad debts, and educational efforts 
such as residencies (which numbered about 100 by then), medical student clinical 
rotations, and student preceptorships in the ambulatory clinics. By the middle 
of 1978, Michael O. Bice, who was appointed Hospital Director in July 1977, could 
report a “turnaround”: in January 1977, before the Trust Fund was in operation, 
some $400,000 was collected; in January 1978, the amount was $1,400,000. By 
opening units gradually, they expected to fully open the hospital’s 403 beds by 
the end of 1981.109
 Freeing the hospital to manage its finances independently of legislative 
restrictions and, especially, freeing it to plan beyond a year in advance, widened 
its horizons immediately. The year 1978, in retrospect, seems to have been the 
year when the Trustees stepped back and with high hopes assessed the hospital’s 
prospects for the long term. In mid 1978, the end of its second fiscal year, hospital 
leaders submitted a Five-Year Plan, as required by law, to the state and local health 
planning agencies.110  It optimistically included nine new initiatives projected for 
the coming five years, including the establishment of a regional cancer center, an 
inpatient psychiatric unit, a clinical research center of 8-10 beds, a rehabilitation 
medicine program, and further development of cardiac care programs and other 
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needed tertiary care services such as neurology, ophthalmology, and surgical 
subspecialties.111 Teaching, one of the hospital’s chief responsibilities, was also 
developing well. Three hundred residents and 300 UMass medical students rotated 
through the hospital, while another 300 or so health professions students of various 
sorts also utilized the clinical site for their studies. The latter activity, organized 
in affiliation with local and regional colleges and universities, constituted one of 
the unique roles a state medical center was expected to perform.112 Finally, the 
University could view the Hospital in a time frame longer than a single fiscal year.
 By the summer of 1978, 161 of the hospital’s projected 403 beds were staffed 
with the expectation that the remaining beds would open in stages until 1981, 
when the full complement would be available. By March 1979, a short-term, acute 
psychiatric ward, pediatric wards, palliative care, geriatrics, and cardiac recovery 
units were all in operation.  On April 18, 1979, a one-hour television special on 
Channel 5 titled “Just Hold My Hand,” most of which was filmed at the hospital’s 
palliative care unit, was broadcast nationally. The following month an open 
house for the general public showcased the hospital’s open heart surgery unit.113 
The following year, the medical center realized one of its key goals when it was 
designated as a Regional Trauma Center, the first in Massachusetts. And with the 
arrival of Dr. David Drachman, a leading researcher in Alzheimer’s disease, as chair 
of the department of Neurology and in 1984, director of a new Alzheimer’s Research 
Center, one of only five in the country, another of its strategic goals began to be 
fulfilled. The next year a Renal Transplant Service, something otherwise unavailable 
outside of Boston, was officially approved by the state, although not without an 
initial (and habitual) rejection by the state on the grounds that there were already 
seven transplant units in Boston.114 
A new University president – in this case, David Knapp – however, always 
seemed to require a year or two to be convinced of the medical center’s viability.  
223
For example, in talks with the Trustees’ Long-Range Planning committee in 
November 1978, Knapp, newly inaugurated in October, along with several Trustees, 
worried that the campus was in danger of overextending itself. Knapp cautioned 
against accepting “‘gift horse[s]’…which frequently turned out to be somewhat 
undesirable gifts.” He discouraged starting programs in podiatry, optometry, or a 
Master’s degree in nursing. Knapp revived the old issue of the “seeming incongruity 
[of] the Medical School’s emphasis on primary care and the Teaching Hospital’s 
emphasis on specialization.” In contrast to previous occasions, however, several 
Trustees now justified the need for a good tertiary care hospital for the education of 
primary care doctors. One of them even cited Lamar Soutter as his authority.115 
 In fact, the 1980s did prove a challenging financial terrain for UMass 
Hospital –like most U.S. teaching hospitals – to navigate. More and more large 
companies expressed alarm at the rising cost of employee health insurance, 
a concern that increased during the recession of the early 1980s. Also, on the 
national scene in 1981, Congress enacted the Boren Amendment to the Social 
Security Act, abandoning the previous, “reasonable cost” basis of hospital 
reimbursement in favor of what it hoped would be counter-inflationary formulas. 
Reagan-era politics reinforced these trends by flaunting the superiority of private 
sector economic behavior. Massachusetts responded to the Boren Amendment 
by adopting the “Chapter 372” statute of 1982. Described as “the culmination 
of a long and difficult negotiation process between the state administration and 
the hospital industry, the medical profession, Blue Cross, the private insurance 
industry, and the business community,” it reorganized the reimbursement system 
for hospitals for Medicare, Medicaid, and private payors. Moreover, it capped 
reimbursement rates at their 1982 levels and called for productivity goals for 
hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. In this climate, 
hospitals adopted measures to align their services more closely with community 
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demand, becoming, in short, more like businesses and less like charities.116 
Indeed, the impact of Chapter 372 on the UMass hospital included a hiring freeze 
and imposition of 2% cost reductions for the next two fiscal years.117 
During the five-year period of 1979 to 1983 inpatient admissions doubled 
and clinic visits increased by nearly that much. Chancellor Robert Tranquada, 
M.D., who succeeded Roger Bulger in 1979, could report in 1983 that the hospital 
was running in the black. 
Yet hospital margins were never sufficient to finance new initiatives. Costs 
remained high and stringent cost controls and layoffs became unavoidable. In 
this newly competitive climate – of capped reimbursements, diagnosis-related 
groups(DRGs), and managed care contracts – the hospital’s administrative 
culture rapidly if 
somewhat reluctantly 
took on a more 
corporate style than 
had been part of its 
makeup hitherto.  It 
entered an era of 
much closer financial 
oversight, of reliance 
on techniques such 
as management-by-objectives. Marketing, strategic planning, and business 
models permeated decisions about clinical planning and outreach.118 These were 
all apparent in, for example, the language Chancellor Tranquada deployed to 
successfully propose renovating the cardiovascular medicine service, traditionally 
one of the hospital’s strongest. In his words, “Without question, cardiovascular 
medicine will be one of the most active product lines in the health-care field 
Robert Tranquada, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of the 
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in the years ahead.”119 Janice Wyatt, the hospital director during this period, 
began issuing “Management by Objectives” quarterly reports to the Hospital 
Management Board (HMB). Everything from decisions about opening a new 
clinic to eliminating “pilfering” of scrub gowns received scrutiny from the HMB. 
If ordinary patient revenues were to be capped by 
the state and federal governments, then alternative 
ventures must be found to produce revenue for 
growth.  By 1984, the President, Board of Trustees, 
HMB, and medical school administration agreed 
to create a “private, non-profit and tax exempt 
corporation to serve as a holding company for a 
system of non-profit and for-profit…ventures which 
cannot be undertaken competitively by the hospital.” 
As Dr. Tranquada told the UMass Trustees Executive 
Committee, such a holding company would allow the 
medical center   to “reach capital markets promptly and economically” whether 
to raise money or to enjoy tax advantages unavailable to them now. Any profits 
earned by such ventures as, for example, a nursing home, a clinical laboratory 
business, off-site ambulatory centers, consulting services, or operating room 
software and so forth, would become charitable donations to the Hospital. They 
named the holding company “University Health Systems of New England, Inc.”120 
In short, as Tranquada wrote in the long-range plan for fiscal years 1984 
through 1989, the hospital would need to control costs while also satisfying 
local community demand for intensified tertiary care services. More than ever, 
he noted, it must distinguish itself and its services from the other hospitals 
in its region. Thus, the hospital proposed to expand areas of high demand 
(and reimbursement) such as cardiology, cardiac surgery, pediatric surgery, 
Janice Wyatt 
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gastroenterology, sports medicine, and, as originally outlined in 1978, develop 
centers for oncology, diabetes, and physical rehabilitation. The plan also called 
for expanded networks of primary care doctors and development of so-called 
“alternative delivery systems” such as health maintenance organizations, or 
HMOs.121 
The growth of the dialysis and kidney transplant programs exemplified 
this strategy. When Jeffrey Stoff, M.D., arrived at the medical center from Beth 
Israel and Harvard Medical School in 1983 to be the first chief of the Renal 
Medicine Division, the hospital had no dialysis center to support its patients. 
Dialysis was a province of Memorial Hospital. Nor did transplantation surgery 
take place anywhere outside of Boston. A total of three nephrologists – including 
Dr. Stoff – comprised the division which at the time of Stoff’s arrival cared for 
a total of 12 patients. In 2014, six satellite 
dialysis units are affiliated with the program 
and approximately 600 patients get their 
care through the Division. In order to 
accomplish such growth, Stoff consciously 
adopted the “entrepreneurial” model 
analogous to that first utilized by James 
Dalen for cardiology, namely, to send 
his steadily increasing division members 
out into the surrounding communities to 
establish outpatient offices. These faculty 
physicians spent 70% of their time, either in those community-based offices or 
at local, community hospitals where dialysis units could be established. The rest 
of their time was spent at the medical center to see patients, to teach, and to 
attend grand rounds, division conferences, and the like. The transplant program, 
                           Jeffrey Stoff, M.D.
    (Photo courtesy of the University of  
    Massachusetts Medical School Archives,  
    Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
    Massachusetts Medical School)  
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too, required careful planning and persistence, in this case, to win approval for 
a Certificate of Need in the face of near-unanimous resistance by the existing 
kidney centers in Boston. Once the CON was successfully won, another two years 
passed until the transplantation program opened in February 1986. By March 
2014, 1000 transplants had been completed, making this one of the largest 
programs in New England.122
The Challenges of Cost Containment, 1987-1992
 By 1988 University Hospital had succeeded in becoming the dominant 
provider of high acuity and emergency care in central Massachusetts. Its 
ambulatory clinics, too, reported record growth, with visits increasing by 40% 
between 1983 and 1988. But it was hamstrung by a lack of space for expansion 
of both the ambulatory services, on the one hand, and operating room space on 
the other. The hospital’s strategic goals now gave additional weight to expanding 
the ambulatory clinics;123 to consolidating and expanding cardiothoracic medicine 
and surgery; to opening a comprehensive AIDS program;124 and to becoming the 
regional hub for oncology and tertiary care pediatrics. As it looked to the future, 
UMass Hospital’s strategy increasingly depended not only on expansion of its 
areas of strength, but on development of strong networks with other regional 
hospitals and primary care doctors to ensure a strong and reliable flow of 
referrals—inpatient and outpatient.125 Ambulatory clinic expansion became all the 
more urgent because of the rapid infiltration of the UMMC catchment area by 
HMOs (37% of Worcester patients were enrolled in HMOs by 1988). Moreover, 
Medicare’s DRG prospective payment classifications, which went into effect in 
1983, decidedly favored outpatient over inpatient care (especially for performing 
a medical procedure rather than “mere” education or counseling), and shorter 
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over longer inpatient stays.126 In response, the hospital contemplated an 
approximately $150 million expansion (later reduced to $120 million) for acute-
care pediatrics and psychiatry,127 built the Joseph T. Benedict ambulatory care 
annex in 1991-92,128 entered into a joint venture to convert Fairlawn Hospital into 
a rehabilitation center,129 and helped preside over the closure of the foundering 
Worcester City Hospital, renovating and leasing its aging downtown site.130   
 
            
           
          University Hospital Annual Statistics, FY1977-1998 (rounded up)**
       Inpatient Visits   Outpatient/Ambulatory Visits*
1976  N/A      12,600
1977    2,800      45,000
1978    3,900      57,200
1979    5,500      83,000
1980    6,900    118,000
1981    8,500    118,000
1982    9,600    129,200
1983  10,300    143,900
1984  10,800    162,800
1985  10,600    183,400
1986  11,100    190,700
1987  11.400    201.600
1988  11.900    223.900
1989  12,700    190,000
1990  13,300    212,200
1991  14,300    233,000
1992  15,100    250,500
1993  15,600    271,500
1994  16,000    306,800
1995  16,600    384,300
1996  16,500    353,600
1997  17,600    389,600
* Excludes ancillary visits
** Figures for 1987 and 1988 were derived from data in UMMC Department of Public 
Affairs files for unpublished Annual Reports for those years. Many thanks to Mark 
Shelton for providing me with these files. Figures for 1989 were derived from Trustees 
Doc. T89-071, Trustees, UM/A. All other figures were derived from UMMC Annual 
Reports, 1982-1997, Publications Collection, UM/W.
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The stock market crash of October 1987 reduced the value of trust fund 
portfolios, adversely affecting the state budget and all state departments. A 
recession soon followed. As part of the state’s efforts to control its budget, the 
University, including the Medical Center, was subjected to a 5% mandated 
reversion of state funding, forcing hiring freezes, a three-week furlough of all 
University employees, and  other drastic measures. In general, the four-year 
period from 1987 to 1991, which overlapped the chancellorship of Leonard Laster, 
M.D. (1987-1990), was marked by unfriendly relations between the Medical 
Center and elected officials.131      
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The Dukakis administration renewed pressure on the hospital to become self-
sustaining. An on-site review of the hospital’s management was conducted by 
Mr. B. J. Rudman, Assistant Secretary for Management of the Massachusetts 
Executive Office of Administration and Finance. His report recommended 
“separating the Hospital and the Medical School, revising the structure of the 
Hospital Management Board and the reporting function of the Hospital Director” 
apparently to allow the hospital greater autonomy from the medical school. The 
investigation and report were initiated by the central Massachusetts legislative 
delegation in response to the Hospital’s decision to lay off more than 100 
employees to balance its budget.132 
A new Republican administration under Governor William Weld took 
office in 1991. For nearly the first year of Governor Weld’s term, the picture for 
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the medical center looked, if anything, even bleaker. The first signs of serious 
trouble occurred when the state legislature proposed furloughing state employees 
earning over $20,000 annually as a way to make up a $70-plus million state 
budget deficit. State employees would be asked to work without pay for anywhere 
from two to 15 days, depending on salary. As interim Chancellor Aaron Lazare 
wrote to Governor Weld, “the impact of the [Emergency Fiscal Controls] act...
both to the individuals and to the organization as a whole is disastrous; and it is 
detrimental to the economic good of the Commonwealth.” Five division chiefs 
in the departments of Medicine and Surgery immediately decided to leave. 
Other faculty members were “outraged.” Indeed, a few, particularly in the basic 
sciences, took direct action. Because much, or even the majority, of funding 
for their labs came not from the state but from either the NIH or from private 
foundations, letters were sent to Representative Joseph Early, Senators Edward 
M. Kennedy and John Kerry, and to the redoubtable Representative John 
Dingell, chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations as well a member of the Health subcommittee. 
Rep. Dingell was just then in the middle of a much publicized investigation of 
purported scientific fraud, but took time to write the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, Dr. Louis Sullivan, that “Not one cent of Federal research 
money should be diverted towards efforts to salvage the state’s financial 
health.” Nevertheless, despite having had no raises for the previous three years, 
Massachusetts state employees were subjected to the furlough.133
Even worse, Governor Weld’s proposed budget for fiscal year 1992 
called for closure of up to five state colleges and the total de-funding of the 
medical school. His announcement unleashed five months of intense lobbying 
by Dr. Laster’s successor, Chancellor Aaron Lazare, along with Albert (“Albie”) 
Sherman, Vice Chancellor for University Relations,134 others of the Lazare 
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administration, and the region’s political representatives. Worcester developer 
Norm Peters and other local community leaders also lobbied their local 
state representatives on behalf of the school.135 Local newspapers unleashed 
expressions of editorial outrage. Tours of the Medical Center for visiting state 
officials became a regular feature as did trips to Beacon Hill by Sherman and 
Lazare. During the Lazare chancellorship and thereafter, assiduous cultivation 
of state legislative figures – especially those from Central Massachusetts – never 
was allowed to flag.136 In this case, the Governor changed his mind: education 
was an “investment,” he ultimately decided, not an expense. The colleges and the 
medical school remained in his budget.137 
For the medical school, a close brush with de-funding provided a wake-
up call to become financially independent, or as close to that as possible. By 
1992, state funds comprised only 7% of the medical school’s annual budget. 
Where Massachusetts spent $4.39 per capita on medical education, the national 
average was $11.74. The Legislature now began to consider the prospects for the 
Medical Center to become fiscally self-sufficient.138 When the FY 1992 budget was 
finalized, including restored funding for the Medical School, the bill contained a 
Aaron Lazare, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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rider that mandated that the Trustees “study ways in which the…Medical School 
can increase revenues to sustain said medical school.” This is part of the context 
for the development of Commonwealth Medicine, the Development Office, the 
Technology Transfer Office, the use of the Worcester City Campus Corporation as 
a holding company, and other initiatives to promote financial independence.139 
The Trustees’ charge also included investigating the “implications of 
creating independent status for the medical school” or of the Medical Center’s 
becoming a free-standing non-profit institution. UMass Board chair Gordon 
Oakes delegated Trustee Michael Foley, a 1976 graduate of the medical school 
and a new member of the HMB, to organize a committee to carry out the study. 
The committee was called the “Privatization” committee in internal documents. 
The Foley Committee’s report, presented in 
April 1992 to the Board and to select legislative 
committee chairs, argued that the only way for 
the medical center to become more profitable 
would be to loosen its bureaucratic ties to the 
state. That is, “the Medical Center is…hampered 
only by the continued recision in its state 
appropriation and the barriers imposed on its 
entrepreneurial initiatives by a system that is not 
designed to respond to an aggressively competitive 
marketplace.” In short, freed of salary caps, 
wage freezes, reversion of some revenue to the 
state, and the need to work through the state 
building authority on every real estate or construction project, it could make 
much more money for the state than it would cost. And, of course, it would help 
if Massachusetts’s appropriation for public education were not at the bottom of 
               Michael Foley, M.D. 
 (Photo courtesy of the University of  
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of  Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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U.S. state averages.140 Ultimately, the Lazare administration, including Richard 
(Rick) Stanton as Deputy Chancellor for Finance and Administration and Thomas 
(Tom) Manning, as Deputy Chancellor for Operations, slowly loosened the 
regulatory coils restricting the school’s entrepreneurial reach.141 
But the University Board learned a different lesson from these events. In 
this economic climate the Hospital began to look – at least to some Trustees – 
more like a liability than an asset.142 Even as the hospital’s yearly returns showed a 
sizeable surplus, Medicaid reimbursement shortfalls and high expenses required 
the hospital to reallocate employees to positions at lower salary levels, freeze 
hiring, and to budget for lower overall costs and shorter average patient hospital 
stays. An analysis of the medical center’s physician salaries, too, showed that 
60.5% received salaries at or below the 50th percentile for the Northeast. Some 
faculty, notably in the Department of Surgery, had resigned, leaving serious gaps 
in staffing.143 Some of the Trustees began expressing concern over the University’s 
liabilities for the Hospital’s current or future deficits as well as the seemingly 
diminished prospects that revenues from the hospital could be used to enrich 
programs at the medical school. The Hospital’s fate would shortly diverge from 
the School’s.
A Divorce or a Merger? Privatization from 1993-1998
“It was a divorce and a merger.” Aaron Lazare, March 3, 2008
In 1993, the University Trustees directed the administration to divest 
itself of the hospital, a process that took five years to complete.144 This concluding 
section will consider the reasons for such a seemingly drastic action, the 
negotiations with UMass Hospital’s culturally and geographically closest 
competitor, Worcester Memorial Health Care, and some of the consequences of 
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the subsequent divestiture of the hospital.
Only 20 years after fighting the Sargent administration for hospital 
construction funds, 17 years after facing down the Dukakis administration for 
the funding to complete hospital construction, and just one year after receiving 
the Foley Report on the future of the Medical Center, why would the University 
be willing to divest itself of its teaching hospital?  First, a brief reminder of the 
broader context. Throughout the United States during the 1990s, hospitals – 
especially academic teaching hospitals – were finding it nearly impossible to 
stay ahead of their costs. Even if, as at UMMC, revenues grew (and they did not 
grow by much), costs always outpaced the gains. At the same time, U.S. health 
care costs rose at a faster rate than did the general cost of living, with hospital 
expenses frequently targeted as one of the major offenders. Both public and 
private sources sought control over the seemingly endless rise of hospital rates. 
Moreover, the direction of medical care was toward outpatient procedures rather 
than inpatient hospital stays in response to the price control pressures of large 
insurers, often expressed through HMO contracts with hospitals. The Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997, for example, made big cuts in Medicare reimbursements to 
hospitals. As insurance companies consolidated, as HMOs penetrated at least 
some metropolitan markets, and as the Clinton administration attempted to pass 
a health care reform bill, the financial fragility of high acuity hospitals became 
increasingly apparent.145 
Clearly, larger hospital systems with greater bargaining power vis-à-vis 
insurance giants and HMOs would be the likeliest to survive. Cost efficiencies 
and wide patient-referral networks would put them on a more even playing field 
with groups like Blue Cross/Blue Shield. As the President of the Massachusetts 
Hospital Association told the University Hospital Management Board in 1993, 
hospitals would need to “form relationships with other institutions [e.g.] 
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community hospitals,” to adapt to the increasing emphasis on “case managed 
care” and especially, the need to lower costs. Anticipating the Clinton health care 
reform efforts, he told the Board, “There is likely to be a deliberate movement 
toward national reform.”146 A wave of hospital consolidations did occur in many 
metropolitan marketplaces between 1990 and 2000. The number of mergers per 
year peaked in 1997 at 152 mergers, according to Cuellar and Gertler, falling to 18 
in 2000. Another study found that between 1990 and 2000 the average number 
of hospital mergers per year amounted to 58.147 In central Massachusetts alone, 
the number of independent, acute care hospitals decreased from eight to two 
between 1985 and 1998.148
 The Trustees were hardly unaware of such trends. Conscious of their 
obligation to all campuses of the system, they were not sanguine about the 
hospital’s future prospects. For example, in 1992, at the same meeting when 
Michael Foley gave an interim report from the “Privatization Committee,” the 
Board instituted a new practice – henceforth HMB minutes would receive full 
discussion rather than be approved with “the pro forma approach” of previous 
years. A few months later, Robert Karam, a UMass Trustee who had joined the 
University’s board as Vice Chair in 1991, joined the Hospital Management Board. 
(An insurance company 
executive, he had chaired 
the board of Southeastern 
Massachusetts University 
prior to its incorporation 
into the UMass system as 
UMass Dartmouth.)149 
He soon began to express concern over the University’s potential liability 
for hospital losses, some of which were due to the state’s insistence on full 
Robert Karam  (Photo courtesy  
of  the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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recovery of fringe benefits costs, and some due to the recent investment in 
renovations of the old Worcester City Hospital buildings. The UMass Board 
shared his concern. Chancellor Lazare’s reply reveals how cognizant he was of 
the pressure to dissolve the School’s financial ties to the Hospital. He informed 
the Board that Richard Stanton had been negotiating with the state to work 
out a solution. He continued, “...privatization, an issue looked at in depth by a 
committee led by Trustee Foley in April, may be the only acceptable alternative 
but that nothing could be implemented until all of the issues have been worked 
out at the state level which will take more time.”150 At the beginning of 1993, 
Trustee Karam called for an independent audit of the Hospital’s finances 
“because of its complexity.”151 
Sometime during that year, the Medical Center began a series of 
conversations with its closest Worcester peer and rival, Memorial Health Care, 
but without success. As noted earlier, the two systems shared a residency 
in OB-GYN and many Memorial physicians served as preceptors for UMass 
medical students. Moreover, Memorial had several robust research programs, 
especially in the Department of Medicine, in which UMass Medical School 
faculty collaborated. Peter Levine, M.D., the 
current Memorial CEO, had held a concurrent 
faculty appointment at the medical school 
and, as a hematologist who created a center 
for hemophilia studies, had worked closely 
with virologists at the medical school on the 
problem of tainted blood products; their 
work intensified once awareness of HIV-
                Peter Levine, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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tainted blood products and the tragic wave of hemophiliacs with AIDs became 
known in the mid-1980s.152 Of the possible hospitals in central Massachusetts, 
Memorial was clearly closest in structure and culture to University Hospital. But 
prospects for a merger between the two hospitals waxed and waned.153 Neither 
system considered the other a reliable negotiating partner – yet. In response 
to the Board’s concerns, Dr. Lazare requested that Board Chair Gordon Oakes 
create a “Task Force to work with [him] on the review of the future of the Medical 
Center…”154
In December 1993, the University Board directed the Medical Center to 
“continue to explore all restructuring and potential merger opportunities for the 
future.” Dr. Lazare recalled, “This was happening…to a lot of university hospitals 
– they were separating out their hospitals because, they said, ‘We’re not in the 
hospital business; we’re in the education business. We don’t want to take the 
risks.’ They were right…” In mid-1994, a special joint committee of the UMass 
Board concluded that because at this time a merger with the Medical Center of 
Central Massachusetts (as Memorial had renamed itself) “looks unlikely,” the 
need to reduce costs was paramount. George McClelland, chair of the finance 
committee of the Hospital Management Board, acknowledged the “urgency” 
of the Hospital’s financial status. He “reiterated the extreme losses resulting 
from the observation beds, new payer classifications, and decline in admissions, 
particularly surgeries, which created a situation where the Hospital was faced 
with an extreme reduction in margin for both February and March. They hoped 
to reduce costs by $40 million over the next three to four years while “retaining 
quality and service.” The hospital re-assigned 62 employees, laid off 50 others, 
and scrutinized new programs carefully. Chancellor Lazare told the clinical 
department chairs in September 1994, the Board’s “increased oversight of the 
Medical Center…is both necessary and welcome, particularly in the current health 
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care environment.” The Board of the University of Massachusetts was determined 
to divest itself of the Hospital. Albeit reluctantly, the Worcester campus 
leadership now began seeking a merger in earnest. They feared that if they did 
not succeed, the Trustees would likely sell the hospital to someone with no local 
ties to the school or to Central Massachusetts. Worse, it might be taken over by a 
hospital system in Boston.155
In the meantime, Memorial Health Care also was seeking a partner, and 
for many of the same reasons. After considering a merger with the locally-based 
Fallon Clinic they realized that the two organizations’ cultures would be too 
hard to blend; a hospital like Memorial, structured to organizationally mimic 
an academic hospital with powerful department chairs, clinically-based hiring, 
and a substantial amount of funded research, was not a good fit with an HMO-
style medical clinic. (Parenthetically, UMass’ leaders, despite a high level of 
respect for their counterparts at Fallon, came to the same conclusion.) After also 
considering St. Vincent, Dartmouth, and Brown as potential partners, Memorial 
began negotiations with an organization that could have proved seriously 
compromising to UMass Medical Center, Partners HealthCare in Boston. The 
Partners organization was created from the merger of two of Harvard’s leading 
affiliate hospitals, Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s. Memorial’s 
CEO, Peter Levine, M.D., had enjoyed a successful career as a hematologist and, 
as noted above, a leader in the care of patients with hemophilia. Having been 
Chair of the Department of Medicine, he was named the Memorial CEO after 
successfully negotiating mergers with Hahnemann and Holden Hospitals in 1991. 
Envisioning a merger with Partners in the mid-1990s, Levine thought Memorial 
could become an analogue of North Shore Medical Center, assuming an identity 
as a “Partners West” in parallel with North Shore’s identity as a “Partners North.” 
Having come to Worcester from the Harvard system, Levine initially thought the 
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arrangement could work well.156
Word of the serious negotiations underway between Memorial and 
Partners reached Chancellor Lazare. He and his team knew immediately that this 
would be disastrous both for the Medical Center and for Worcester. The Medical 
Center stood to lose a huge business in referrals for open heart surgery and other 
acute care services from Memorial; the city stood 
to lose its position as a medical hub for central and 
western Massachusetts. No longer would the largest 
employer in town be a local organization; worse, it 
would be Boston-based, Harvard affiliated – all that 
Dr. Soutter and the school’s early leaders had resisted 
so urgently since 1965. Lazare now began a quiet 
offensive of his own – in earnest. The objective: a 
merger with Memorial. 
As Rick Stanton recalled, “Aaron started to 
set up breakfasts with Worcester leaders, and he was 
always conscious of putting one Memorial Trustee in every group.”157  Lazare 
described these meetings:
What I did was have breakfast meetings with all the leaders of the 
community. And I met with them, just myself, with about twelve, 
fifteen people.  And I said, “You’re going to lose your hospital.  And 
if the Mass General buys this, then this medical school is going to 
have to merge with a hospital outside of Worcester, and Worcester 
will no longer be a center for medical care. Right now, the hospital 
business and the medical school together make Worcester’s 
economic anchor.  So we may do something with someone in Rhode 
Island, and the Mass General is going to own this place [Memorial], 
and Worcester is going to suffer.” So they put pressure on Memorial 
to merge with the medical school, with the hospital.158
Dr. Lazare, through Arthur Russo, M.D., then head of the UMMC Group 
Practice and someone with a working relationship with Peter Levine, alerted 
             Richard Stanton
(Photo courtesy of the University 
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Levine that UMMC was aware of their negotiations with Partners and would 
like to enter into serious talks of their own.159 Memorial’s Board by then had 
become convinced that a local merger would indeed better satisfy their interests. 
As Lois Green, MPA, a well-connected consultant to non-profit boards and the 
Memorial Board chair during the merger negotiations, summed it up, “We didn’t 
want to be a satellite.” Richard Glew, M.D., an infectious disease specialist, the 
Chief Medical Officer, and Chair of Medicine at Memorial at the time of the 
merger, was just as succinct: “Boston was our common enemy.”160 Levine and 
Russo then held at least two clandestine meetings to try and lay out the ground 
rules for their larger negotiating teams. Those larger meetings, which were 
held first at a modest hotel in Westborough and then, for nearly a week, at the 
Chatham Bars Inn on Cape Cod, included among others, 
Lazare, Russo, and Stanton from the Medical Center, 
Lois Green from the Memorial Board, Levine, Richard 
Glew, and David DeBruyne, Levine’s key administrative 
deputy, representing the staff at Memorial, and Robert 
Karam, representing the UMass Trustees. According 
to some accounts from both sides, they were not easy 
negotiations although both sides were committed 
to completing a merger. Ultimately, a series of what 
Peter Levine called “immutable principles” guided 
their decisions about how to structure the merger. In Levine’s words, they were 
intended to be:
…immutable principles, that would call for the new entity tying 
itself very closely to the Medical School, in terms of guaranteeing 
that we would be its principal site for teaching and research, 
clinical research, and so forth—and…to do a real, complete, full-
asset merger:  with a single set of departments under a single set 
of chairs, with a series of guarantees that we would leave the best 
             Lois Green
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and most productive aspects of each place intact, that we’d need 
chairs who would in fact understand the relative benefits of both 
[places].161
Mergers can be successful, as the Partners merger appears to be, or they 
can fail, as did the merger, at about the same time, of the hospitals of Stanford 
University Medical Center and the University of California-San Francisco.162 
The merger of UMass Hospital with Memorial was negotiated and given the 
Commonwealth’s legal imprimatur in 1997 and approved by the UMass Board in 
1998. In the medical school’s Annual Report for 1997, the merger was described 
as a boon for the local economy and for (clinical) research. 163 One of its immediate 
results was the contribution of approximately $30 million from Memorial’s 
endowment for the construction of a new research building for UMass Medical 
School, as well as assistance in fund-raising for the remaining costs (at least 
another $70 million). It opened as the Aaron Lazare Research Building in 2001.164
It probably took a decade for the combined entity to really gel. Peter 
Levine was chosen to become CEO of the new entity; after three years, he was 
succeeded by someone from the University 
side of the house, Arthur Russo. After 
Russo was forced to resign as a result of 
various missteps, Dr. Marianne Felice, 
the medical school’s chair of Pediatrics 
who had been  at Johns Hopkins until 
her arrival in 1998, was named interim 
CEO from 2001-2002. In 2002, John 
O’Brien, previously CEO of Cambridge 
Health Alliance health care system and 
Commissioner of Public Health for the city 
          Marianne Felice, M.D. 
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of Cambridge, was chosen to take over the Memorial system, effectively moving 
beyond unresolved issues of the merger and the possible charge of favoring one 
campus over the other. As the two hospital boards were merged into a united, 
and smaller, Board of Trustees, feelings were bruised. Robert Karam was named 
chair of the new UMass Memorial Health Care Board, and Lois Green vice 
chair. (Green never forgave the new Board for, in her eyes, preventing her from 
succeeding Karam as chair, an order of succession that had been traditional on 
the old Board.)165 Bruised feelings proceeded on down the hierarchy. When two 
sets of departments were merged into one, for example, a full complement of 
department chairs was displaced, almost all of them from the Memorial side since 
the general preference was to place the more academically senior chairs in charge 
of the merged departments.166 
For their part, full-time clinicians at UMass Hospital experienced a 
definite sense of abandonment resulting from the merger. From 1998, control 
of the Physician Group Practice was gradually transferred to the new hospital 
entity, UMass Memorial Medical Center.167 That became, in Dr. Lazare’s words, 
“The hardest part of the deal…the doctors didn’t work for us anymore. They 
could complain to us, but we didn’t hold the power…So, we lost the hospital, 
basically.”168  Except for those who were paid partially through research grants or 
for their curricular work as course directors or administrators, many clinicians 
no longer felt as though they were medical school faculty. For them, the process 
felt like a “divorce,” not a “merger.” These changes became clear in very concrete 
ways: first, pension and salary arrangements changed; much more profoundly, 
expectations about “productivity” changed, too, albeit much more slowly. 
Although new pressures for greater clinical productivity were occurring all 
across the United States during these years, whether in academic or community 
hospitals, many former UMMC physicians blamed the hospital’s privatization 
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for the heightened pressure to increase clinical “productivity” they began to 
experience.169
From Memorial’s viewpoint, the situation looked quite a bit different. Lois 
Green remembers the Board’s wrestling with these issues: 
How much is faculty time? How much is clinical time? And we 
looked at it in some of the clinics—the faculty weren’t in there 
very much, and then how do you measure productivity?  And the 
clinical system, to go forward had to increase its productivity or we 
wouldn’t have enough income. 
Peter Levine saw it this way:
And although we were doing research and teaching, the majority of 
[Memorial] physicians, whether full-time or private, were spending 
the majority of their time in very productive, effective clinical 
practice.  Whereas at the university, the majority of staff was 
pursuing, for the majority of their time, very effective teaching and 
research activities, and you know, maybe the average might have 
been forty percent of their time was in clinical practice, as opposed 
to seventy percent of their time.170 
 Again, in Aaron Lazare’s words, “When [previously] you hired a physician 
here, there was a culture that they are all academics…”171 Many felt deeply 
distressed to no longer be full-fledged citizens of a medical school. And, despite 
universal agreement that the former university hospital needed to bring its 
clinical numbers closer to the norm for a community hospital, such cultural 
differences rankled and stubbornly persisted for many years. Cultural differences 
ran just as deep among the two institutions’ nursing cadres. UMass nurses were 
unionized; Memorial’s were not. Nor did Memorial’s nursing staff wish to join 
the union at the University campus. Such differences of culture and professional 
identity – whether among doctors or nurses – have not faded completely even 
after nearly two decades. But, with the passage of time and the emergence of 
246
more pressing issues such as the need to adapt to the era of capitated care, 
those matters have become less prominent. With the rise of large federally 
funded, clinical research opportunities such as NIH’s Clinical and Translational 
Research center grants within a decade of the merger, the two hospitals began 
to strengthen their interdependencies. As envisioned at the time of the merger, 
UMass Medical School and UMass Memorial Health Care are tightly, indeed 
symbiotically, bound to each other.
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Chapter 6
Integrating Primary Care into the Curriculum: 
Community Medicine vs. Family Medicine
“…the Legislature…extended its support to development of the Medical School for 
two principal reasons. One…was the Legislature’s desire to guarantee opportunity 
for qualified Massachusetts residents to receive medical education within the 
Commonwealth….The second principal reason…was its desire to enable the 
preparation of practicing physicians who are likely to remain in Massachusetts…”
– Dean Lamar Soutter, M.D. to the UMass Board of Trustees, March 6, 1974.1
“[The University of Massachusetts Medical School will produce physicians] who 
are familiar with all basic fields of medicine, but who are trained in primary 
care medicine and who can be expected to choose to work in underserved 
communities. 
– “Statement of Goals,” prepared by the Faculty and Administration, September 
1975.2
“The original role [of the school]…was primary care…I don’t know if it was 
written, but it was certainly communicated…” 
– Frank J. Chlapowski, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus of Biochemistry and Molecular 
Biology, 2010.3
________________________________
 What was the mission of the Commonwealth’s medical school? Between 
1969 and 1975, that seemingly straightforward question lay at the heart of one of 
the strangest battles in the school’s history: a battle to retain the support of state 
legislators, to fulfill the school’s public mission, to live up to the expectations of 
its high-quality research faculty and, in short, to define the institution’s culture. 
It is no wonder then that, as these three epigraphs suggest, defining the school’s 
goals or mission presented something of a moving target. In 1975, as described 
in the previous chapter, an administration desperate to insure support for a 
new hospital gathered the faculty together to re-write its goals in a way that 
would fully acknowledge UMass Medical School’s commitment to primary care 
education. Simultaneously, uncertainty among some of the school’s early faculty 
over the curricular importance of primary care delayed its development within 
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the curriculum and pitted the relatively new field of community medicine against 
its even younger sibling, family practice.4 This chapter describes the struggle 
between these two specialties for dominance in the as-yet-undefined culture of 
the new medical school, a school that only gradually accepted its given mandate 
to promote primary care.  
Great Expectations, Unclear Goals
 A cursory look at the series of statements issuing from the Dean and Board 
of Trustees between 1966 and 1969 conveys a striking picture of the changing 
sense of institutional identity that evolved even before the first students arrived 
in the fall of 1970. At the outset, as was noted in Chapter 3, the Trustees were 
mostly concerned to produce an excellent institution that would offer more 
opportunities for Massachusetts residents to become doctors who would, it 
was assumed, care for the Commonwealth’s citizens.5 The concept of  “primary 
care,” as distinct either from general practice or specialization, only began to 
gain currency in the mid-1960s, the years when the Trustees produced an early 
statement of their goals for the school. The specialty of “Family Medicine” was 
not approved until 1969; in the meantime, the term usually signified general 
practice. In fact, a major report from the AAMC in 1968 specifically expressed the 
hope that medical schools would redirect their teaching toward “comprehensive, 
personal, and family health services.” But, despite the urging of some academic 
medical leaders, few schools acknowledged this goal until the following decade. 
Between 1971 and 1975, both the Bureau of Health Services Research of the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Institute of Medicine 
conducted studies to define primary care and consider how to introduce it more 
widely.6  The Trustees could not have readily articulated a desire for either 
“primary care” or “family practice” before then, given the relatively weaker 
voice in Massachusetts of medical practitioners outside the specialist-saturated 
environs of Boston.7 UMass Medical School’s original goals thus emphasized 
the quantity and quality of its graduates with little attention to the precise 
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characteristics of their future careers – other than a fervent desire for them to 
practice in Massachusetts.8
 In “Some Aims of a New Medical School,” an article Dean Lamar Soutter 
published in 1966 on designing a new medical school curriculum, he touched only 
briefly on the need to promote “family practice,” an issue he characterized as 
“quite vexed.” As remembered by biochemist William Butcher, one of the 
early department chairs, “[Soutter] was an elitist in the sense that the kinds 
of medicine he was most excited by were the kinds that get into the New York 
Times, because it’s very interesting science, because they can cure obscure 
diseases, etcetera….But…I would not say that he had closed his mind to anything. 
I think his response…to people pushing about family practice, or family medicine, 
would have been, ‘Yes, yes, but we also have to have cardiac surgery.’”9 Soutter’s 
attitude accorded with that of most early faculty recruits–particularly basic 
scientists like Butcher or research-oriented specialists like the vascular surgeon, 
Brownie Wheeler. In 1966 Soutter concluded that the most the school could do 
to promote interest in generalist medical practice would be to “let the students 
see family practice at its best on the community level, preferably from within the 
community hospital.” In 1967, in his first application for federal construction 
funding, written with considerable input from Dr. Wheeler, a section titled 
“Summary of the Aims of the Medical School” presented a more detailed picture. 
Again, generalist or primary care medicine was accorded only a small role. 
Instead, the application envisioned faculty and students who pursued lab-based 
research in the basic sciences and community-based research in fields such as 
“sociology, public and community health.” 
  By the winter of 1968, Dr. Soutter had expanded his curricular 
objectives.10 Somewhat abruptly, in the middle of another list of the school’s 
“Objectives” in the 1968 iteration of the federal construction grant proposal, 
the following words appeared: “After some consideration, we added to [our] 
objectives a more clear definition of the type of physician we should try to 
produce.” UMass medical graduates would be qualified to enter “any specialty,” 
but now they would be inculcated with an appreciation for “the health problems 
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in the slum areas and ghettoes by seeing them first hand. [They] should, 
through involvement in a program of community medicine, help to try to solve 
them.” Students should learn about health care workers and comprehensive 
health planning at the state and regional level. Finally they “must see the family 
physician in action in the usual community setting as well as learning how his 
services could be applied to provide the health care so badly needed in the poverty-
stricken areas of the state.” By 1969, the school’s “Aims” had evolved even further; 
now the first item on the list read, “The fundamental purpose of the school is to 
turn out practicing physicians who will improve the quantity and quality of health 
services available to people in the Commonwealth.”  Notably, health services, not 
family practice, was Soutter’s term of choice.11 
 This is not a subtle difference. It foretells a growing tension between 
the cultures of two relatively young – and potentially competitive – fields, 
community medicine and family practice, and tension over how to fulfill the 
school’s obligations to the vision of its political stakeholders. Increasingly, as we 
shall see, that vision centered on providing care – primary care – to all citizens 
of the Commonwealth. But, how could that best be accomplished – through 
community medicine’s “community-responsive” approach or, through family 
medicine’s patient-centered primary care? 
Community Medicine and Medicine for the Community
 Lamar Soutter’s newly expressed commitment to community medicine 
had crystallized around the fervor of one man, Dr. Hugh S. Fulmer, one of 
the school’s first department chairs. Soutter hired him in 1969 to establish a 
department of  “Community Medicine,” but Soutter had first met him several 
years earlier. Fulmer was part of a new trend to develop something termed 
“community-oriented primary care,” or COPC. The relationship between COPC 
and “community medicine” requires a brief detour. 
 The field of community medicine derives in part from the field of public 
health or, in the language of the nineteenth century, “Hygiene” and “Sanitary 
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Science.” When the American Public Health Association (APHA) was established 
in 1872, its founders dedicated it to the prevention, rather than just the cure, of 
disease. Eventually the APHA was dominated not by physicians but by officers 
of the many state and municipal health departments that were founded in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. The division between prevention, with its focus 
on entire communities, and clinical medicine, which focused on specific patients 
and their families, became quite pronounced. By 1968, physicians comprised 
only 29% of APHA members.  Attempting to mitigate this trend, the American 
Board of Preventive Medicine had been created in 1948 to legitimize the union of 
population health and clinical medicine in a new medical specialty. “Preventive 
Medicine” came to include a diverse group of subspecialties such as occupational 
medicine, and aerospace medicine, beyond what was termed “general preventive 
medicine.” Physicians who received Board Certification in Preventive Medicine, 
it was hoped, would create new departments or divisions in medical schools and 
further the project of infusing the ideology of prevention into American medicine 
at a time when curative strategies dominated most public discourse about 
medical care.12 Until forestalled by the growth of family medicine, the numbers of 
freestanding community or preventive medicine departments did increase, but as 
late as 1980 the Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine still struggled to 
find a full measure of acceptance within American medical education and health 
policy.13 
 The challenge remained – how to foster a clinical specialty which 
addressed itself to a synthesis of population health and primary care, especially 
one responsive to underserved communities. That was the challenge to which a 
handful of physicians addressed themselves in the 1950s.14 They had few models 
to follow. For example, in 1939 an English country GP with the unlikely name of 
Will Pickles published a book about his innovative way of practicing. As the only 
doctor in charge of seven rural villages, he had of necessity learned to combine 
“traditional public health epidemiology [and] primary care medical practice.” 
Pickles’ work was well known to primary care physicians interested in community 
health, but it was the work of Drs. Sidney and Emily Kark in the 1940s and 1950s 
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with the Pholela Health Center on a Zulu tribal reserve in Natal, South Africa, 
that emerged as one of the foundational models for American community health 
work in the U. S.15 Sidney Kark is credited with coining the term “community-
oriented primary care” in an article published in 1952. In a work published in 
1981 he explained that, “the skills of the primary-care practitioner should be 
based on a holistic concept of individual, family, and community health [yet] 
little attention has been given to the development of [primary care’s] potential for 
promoting the community health as a whole.” Community-oriented primary care 
(COPC) called for primary care of individuals and families, “health surveillance” 
of the community, measures to address the community’s health needs, 
participation by the community, and continuing assessment of the measures 
taken.16
 Kark defined communities as relatively small, for example a village, a 
neighborhood, even a collection of city blocks, but especially as a culturally 
cohesive entity. Geographic coherence might be necessary for a “defined 
population” but without cultural coherence, mere geographic affinity would 
not be sufficient. (Jack Geiger, M.D., famed health reformer and, with Count 
Gibson, M.D., instigator of the first federally funded community health centers 
at Columbia Point in Boston and Mound Bayou, Louisiana, echoing his mentor, 
Kark, called this the “geographic fallacy.”)17 In practice, communities targeted 
for COPC clinics usually were home to a medically underserved population. In 
the U.S. today the closest approximation to the Karks’ COPC model occurs in 
community health centers, the first of which were started by Geiger and Gibson 
between 1965 and 1968.18 But COPC was first put to the test a decade earlier at a 
clinic established in 1956 by a group from Cornell-New York Hospital under the 
leadership of Dr. Walter McDermott. McDermott, a renowned infectious disease 
specialist, had piloted a tuberculosis surveillance and treatment program for the 
Navajo nation in Arizona in 1952. From that project emerged a demonstration 
clinic at the Many Farms-Rough Rock tribal political district where a COPC 
model was applied to a wide spectrum of Navajo health needs.19 McDermott chose 
Kurt Deuschle, a physician trained in the principles of community medicine and 
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health surveillance who had already been working for him in Fort Defiance caring 
for Navajo TB patients, to head it up.20 Deuschle, in turn, hired some Navajo 
community members for health outreach, plus Hugh Fulmer, a young physician 
he had met when Deuschle was a resident and Fulmer a fourth-year medical 
student at Syracuse University. (Fulmer was inspired to pursue community 
medicine by one of Deuschle’s lectures.) In 1958, fresh from an internal medicine 
residency and a fellowship in pulmonary medicine at Syracuse (by then, SUNY 
Upstate Medical Center), Fulmer needed little persuasion to join Deuschle at the 
Many Farms community clinic in Arizona.21
          Fulmer had been working at Many Farms for two years when Deuschle was 
hired away to the new University of Kentucky Medical School by its founding 
dean, William Willard, M.D., one of Deuschle’s mentors at Syracuse. Willard 
was keen to launch a department of community medicine that combined public 
health and primary care. Willard recruited Deuschle in 1960 to create what 
became the first department of community medicine at a United States medical 
school. And Deuschle, in turn, recruited Fulmer to work with him there after first 
arranging for him to spend a year at the Harvard School of Public Health to learn 
epidemiology. Fulmer would eventually be hired away from Kentucky by Lamar 
Soutter. But from 1960-1968, he and Deuschle established a set of innovative 
medical school courses in community-oriented primary care at Kentucky. 
Hugh S. Fulmer, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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Deuschle also created a residency in preventive medicine. They never established 
a COPC clinic, however, because the chairs of the other departments thought it 
would be counter productive to have a satellite clinic located many miles away 
from the main campus at a time when the school was just getting started. Rather, 
Deuschle’s model, as implemented by Fulmer, was transposed onto the template 
of a six-week clerkship for second-year students. As Fulmer described it, they 
had, 
students choosing communities where they would carry out a 
four-fold approach, in which they would see individual patients 
in a doctor’s office, they would work up families in the home of 
patients…Then we had every student do a community health center. 
And we had them each choose an epidemiologic project [following 
our] very extensive second year course, ‘Epidemiology and Medical 
Care.’ 
As Fulmer saw it, “[The students] came out as mini epidemiologists.”22 After a 
few years in Kentucky, however, Kurt Deuschle confided to Fulmer that he was 
leaving to start a similar program at Mt. Sinai Medical School in New York City. 
Fulmer decided to return to the Northeast, too. 
            At just that moment –1967, to be precise – Lamar Soutter paid a surprise 
visit to Fulmer’s Kentucky office. In the aftermath of urban riots and, in Boston, 
a tense standoff over school integration in the mid-1960s, Soutter was looking 
for ways to integrate awareness of community health needs into the medical 
school curriculum. From talking to John Snyder, dean of Harvard’s School of 
Public Health, he learned about Fulmer’s work. When another old friend, Dr. 
Edmond Pellegrino, who was by that time at Yale but previously had chaired the 
Department of Medicine at Kentucky, also mentioned Fulmer, Soutter flew down 
to meet him. This meeting seems to have captivated the Dean’s imagination, 
considerably enlarging his vision of the UMass educational mission, as noted 
above. Fulmer recalls that Soutter just walked over to his office, unannounced. 
“[Bimi Soutter] just came right into my office and told me about the UMass 
Medical School… that he was the founding dean of this new medical school and 
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he was going to set up a department of whatever I might want to call it…” Fulmer 
added, “[Soutter] knew that he wanted to have something that represented 
this broad area of social medicine and public health, but he didn’t have a very 
clear idea of what that might be.” Fulmer remembered telling him, “Well, if I 
were going to do that, I would call it community medicine. It’s been a beautiful 
program here and I’d like to do that.” By that time, Fulmer added, “there were 
several schools around the country that had used the title ‘Community Medicine,’ 
and discarding ‘Preventive Medicine’…so I was going to take that title, if I were 
going to take a job at Massachusetts.” In this context, he wrote to Dr. Soutter 
that, “‘I want to set up two graduate programs. One will be [a] family medicine 
residency, and the other will be [a] preventive medicine residency. And at some 
point – I don’t know when that would be – I want to merge the two.’” Foreseeing 
a combined 4 to 5 year residency, Fulmer envisioned a program perfectly suited 
to carrying out the COPC model.23 Unfortunately for Fulmer, these plans collided 
head on with the growing professional independence of family medicine, which 
gained standing as a board-certifying specialty the same year Fulmer arrived at 
UMass.
 Hugh Fulmer arrived in Worcester with his family in 1969. He was 
awarded tenure, given the rank of full professor, and enjoyed the full support of 
the Dean. Indeed Soutter boasted in the construction grant application of 1968 
that he had recruited the person who had pioneered this approach to inculcating 
social awareness in medical students, a clear, if not entirely accurate, reference 
to Fulmer. Soutter also personally accompanied him in negotiations for student 
precepting at the Worcester Department of Health. Within his first three years 
Fulmer established a 3-week clerkship in Community Medicine for the first 
year students, a 54-hour course for second-year students in “Epidemiology and 
Medical Care,” and a 6-week clerkship for third-year students in Community 
Medicine, all based on the model established at Kentucky.24 Only basic science 
departments were in operation when he arrived at the school, although Brownie 
Wheeler, the founding chair of Surgery, was on hand (while also heading up 
Surgery at St. Vincent Hospital in Worcester) working with the Dean on faculty 
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recruitment and planning the hospital. The basic science department chairs, 
comprising the vast majority of the school’s Executive Committee, needed to 
approve new courses, but to Fulmer, they seemed uninterested in what he was 
doing – as long as it didn’t threaten their own portion of curricular time. As 
Fulmer wrote to the Worcester medical community, the field of community 
medicine “suffered badly in many schools because of insufficient recognition by 
administration and faculty, poor budgetary support, few and often part-time…
faculty, unimaginative and inappropriate teaching programs, and inevitably 
failure to stimulate and interest medical students.” 25 He was determined to avoid 
those pitfalls.
 Thus in the course outline for the first-year clerkship, he analogized 
Community Medicine to clinical medicine, describing clerkship activities 
as located in “what might be termed the ‘hospital without walls.’” Through 
observation and participation in the community, the student will “become 
seriously involved in the identification and solution of many real community 
health problems…much as hospital clinical clerkships allow the student to 
participate in finding real solutions of patients’ individual disease problems.” 
He went further: “The clerkship is…aimed at demonstrating the responsibility of 
the physician for leadership as the most broadly educated member of the health 
care team in the community,” a result of having learned about subjects such as 
biostatistics, epidemiology, and health services delivery. Perhaps because of the 
absence of outpatient clinics when he first arrived, Fulmer’s plans did not touch 
on primary care at all.26 
 Judging by the recollections of early medical students, Fulmer’s 
Community Medicine concept by Hugh S. Fulmer, M.D. 
(for complete citation see n. 25)
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introduction of community health in the pre-clinical curriculum was a huge 
success. Not only did he incorporate community experience into the students’ 
first two years of medical school – something highly popular and innovative for 
1970 – he hired faculty who were experts in epidemiology and biostatistics, but 
were nonetheless physicians, also a big plus with medical students.27 One early 
graduate, Michael Foley (d. 2013), a gastroenterologist in a Boston suburb, a 
consulting physician for the Boston Red Sox baseball team, and a former member 
of the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts, explained that: 
Hugh Fulmer was really one of the guiding lights to all of us and…
UMass was way ahead of people in terms of putting their first year 
students out in the community to learn things. I can’t remember 
exactly, but each of the students would pick a community to go to 
and study the public health and, you know, the medical set-up of 
each of the communi[ties]...Some people went to the Department of 
Health. Some people went to different towns that they grew up in or 
different health systems and stuff – big practices and stuff. 
Another early student, Leonard Finn, who eventually became a family 
practitioner, was sent to the Columbia Point health center in Boston to learn 
about community health and “how to organize a community for a community 
health center.”28 All of this took place during the three-week long break that 
surrounded the Christmas holiday. The students learned a lot. Dr. Foley, for 
example, decided to return to the town of Amherst where he had been an 
undergraduate. During his first-year community medicine clerkship, he told me,
I would go to the Town of Amherst Public Health Department and 
spend time with the Public Health Officer, and we’d go down to, say, 
the [supermarket] and close it up for a few days because somebody 
found a rodent in the roast beef. Or… we’d make calls with the…
town Animal Control guy because someone had a rodent coming 
up their toilet pipe or something. And, so, you saw that aspect of 
things. You’d spend time looking at health statistics at the state and 
at the town level. And I personally spent time with Amherst Medical 
Associates, a big multi-specialty group practice that influenced me 
to the thought that group practices were a good idea. And, so, we all 
had varied experiences.29
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Family Medicine Comes to Massachusetts
 Hugh Fulmer always emphasized that the core function of community 
medicine was to solve the health problems of communities.  Yet, to make the 
entire concept of “community-oriented primary care” workable, family practice 
needed to be incorporated into the department. Fulmer’s original goal had been 
to create, as mentioned earlier, a department in which family practice ultimately 
would be aligned with community medicine, particularly at the level of residency 
training, to produce primary care doctors who were “community-oriented.” 
Two parallel residencies would be developed and, as the residencies matured, 
they would be amalgamated into a joint program. He was well aware of the need 
to recruit more than epidemiologists or statisticians. The department needed 
practicing doctors who were committed to transforming traditional general 
practice into “family practice” and to supervise medical residents who anticipated 
earning family practice board certification. As it turned out, however, with his 
own training as an internist and his special enthusiasm for population-based, 
rather than patient-centered health care, Fulmer never really won over the family 
practitioners who were central to this vision. More ominous, he may never have 
clearly laid out his expectations when he hired the man who, as his second in 
command, became the moving force behind family practice at UMass.
 That man, Richard (Dick) Walton, M.D., had had a highly successful 
general practice in Holden, a town on the northwest border of Worcester, before 
serious complications of back surgery forced him to put his practice on hold for 
a few years. While recovering, Walton was heading the medical department of 
a large life insurance company whose president had been one of his patients. 
At the time Fulmer heard about him, Walton had been heavily involved with 
the Massachusetts Academy of General Practice’s efforts to transform itself into 
an organization of board certified “family practitioners” and to promote the 
transformation statewide. (The terminology can be confusing: “family practice” 
was the term used for the clinical activities of physicians who were board certified 
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“family practitioners.” The term “family medicine” signified family practice’s 
academic identity, the academic unit into which family practice was situated 
in American medical schools. It also came to connote the academic activities 
of family practice faculty.) Both Walton and Fulmer recall that Walton was 
hired to teach medical students in the community medicine courses while also 
running the new division of Family Medicine. This meant, crucially, that Walton 
was charged with carrying the main responsibility for developing an approved 
residency in family practice in time for the first class of UMass Med graduates, 
the class of 1974, to be admitted into it if they wished. This was a tall order, but 
Dick Walton was no ordinary general practitioner.  
Fulmer recalled him this way:
Dick Walton seemed to be the perfect person to join me…[He] 
knew all the practitioners in Worcester. And he also knew about 
the national movement to create a new specialty, family medicine. 
[He] was a dyed-in-the-wool, local family practitioner who loved to 
practice medicine. And he didn’t visualize himself as being a full-
time academician at all. He thought of himself as a practitioner…
who was very, very intent on creating a new breed [of] family 
practitioner. 30
Richard Walton, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School) 
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Before long, however, Fulmer realized that Walton, like many other generalist 
physicians in the Commonwealth, had very definite ideas about how to develop 
a family medicine residency. Perhaps more important, his contacts and political 
connections to general practitioners across Massachusetts – especially the 
recently renamed Massachusetts Academy of Family Physicians –gave him the 
kind of credibility that a newcomer – and an internist – like Fulmer never could 
match. 31 Walton’s recollections veer off definitively from Fulmer’s. In his re-
telling: 
I guess I’ve always been involved in trying to get things moving…
The understanding that I had with Hugh Fulmer was that they 
needed family physicians badly, they needed a Family Practice 
residency, and…from my standpoint, I said you can’t do that 
without a department of Family Medicine…it can’t be the tail kind 
of wagging the dog, that sort of thing. So our agreement was, that 
as I could put something together in Family Medicine and teach 
in Community Medicine [and] when we had adequate strength in 
the program, we would start a department of Family Medicine and 
I would head that up…So that was our agreement; that’s where I 
started…32
Within three years, it became clear to Walton that a department of community 
medicine would not be the right setting for a family medicine program, at least 
not when headed by someone who was not a family physician. Before we examine 
the results of the ensuing tug of war, we should first consider the philosophy and 
goals of the new field of family practice. 
From General Practice to Family Practice
“In the U.S.A. the rise of family practice was an unprecedented phenomenon 
in medical education…As a specialty based more on a function to be served 
than a new technology or research in the basic medical sciences, family practice 
developed, in part, as a response to perceived needs in society for better and more 
equitable distribution of medical services…and as a corrective to the problems of 
over-specialization and its attendant escalating costs.”
— G. Gayle Stephens, M.D. 33
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The clinical specialty of family practice officially came into existence 
only in 1969, an era of conflicting pressures on the medical profession when a 
demand for greater patient access to “continuing, comprehensive care” – that 
is, a demand for more family doctors – openly competed with a drive for more 
physician-scientists.34 Since most physicians, as we have seen, became specialists 
and clustered near major medical centers or the affluent suburbs, communities 
either too poor or too far from such centers, many of which existed in western 
Massachusetts, often lacked any health care provider at all. Still, no one wanted 
– or expected – specialization to disappear. The “old” country GP may have 
delivered “comprehensive, continuing care” but, by mid-20th-century standards, 
it wasn’t considered good care. Instead, in the words of one influential study, 
medicine needed “a new kind of specialist, the family physician who is educated 
to provide comprehensive, personal health care, because of the complexity 
of modern medicine and the health care system… [T]he preparation of large 
numbers of such physicians is essential if the public is to receive maximal 
benefits from American medicine.”35
Two major reports advocating a shift in medical manpower objectives, the 
“Millis” and the “Willard” Reports, were published in 1966 with support from, 
and endorsement by, the American Medical Association. Although no consensus 
was yet evident about what to call the new specialty, the reports clearly agreed 
about its social purpose and medical goals. The Millis Report, “The Graduate 
Education of Physicians,” spoke of the “primary physician” who would deliver 
“continuing, comprehensive care.” The Willard Report, “Meeting the Challenge of 
Family Practice,” advocated changes in undergraduate medical education, also for 
the purpose of increasing the number of primary care doctors.36 As is sometimes 
noted, the idea of comprehensive, primary care was itself not new – not only was 
it the ideal of American general practitioners dating back at least into the 19th 
century, it was invoked by the venerable Committee on the Costs of Medical Care 
in 1932.37 But, whereas the CCMC distinguished between family practitioners and 
specialists, the Millis and Willard reports termed such physicians “a new kind 
of specialist, the family physician who is educated to provide comprehensive, 
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personal health care.” Willard et al envisioned the family physician as the 
“captain of the health team.” The Millis Report, similarly, envisioned “him” as 
a “quarterback who will diagnose the constantly changing situation, coordinate 
the whole team.” Although there appeared to be wide agreement that “general 
practice” was no longer an adequate model of care, the terms we now use, 
primary care and family medicine, had not yet achieved general acceptance or 
stable definitions. The Willard Report authors acknowledged that they were 
working under the assumption that “family physician,” “primary physician,” 
and “personal physician” were synonymous. And indeed, the two reports held a 
shared conception of primary care medicine.38 Dr. G. Gayle Stephens, a pioneer in 
the family practice movement and author of one of that specialty’s seminal texts, 
told an interviewer,
… I think we used “family” [practice] as a synonym for general 
[practice]…And this is still an issue because the name has recently 
been changed to family “medicine”…I think this has to do with 
the professionalization of the specialty more than its ideology. 
We meant that all members of a family could be seen in the same 
medical facility, either independently or together, for their ordinary 
medical care. That’s what we meant.39
The Millis and Willard reports had been in the works for several years. 
Their main sponsor, the AMA, as well as countless family doctors across 
the country, eagerly awaited their findings. For nearly 20 years, ever since a 
concerned group of general practitioners had formed the American Academy of 
General Practice to try and address a crisis of legitimacy for general practitioners, 
many older doctors had begun to anticipate a movement to consolidate and 
professionalize generalist medicine. The AMA had begun sponsoring symposia 
and reports to encourage more residents to choose general practice. The Millis 
and Willard reports were products of this effort.40 Stephens remembered that 
when the two reports appeared, “We devoured them word by word…”41 Medical 
school curricula had increasingly deemphasized general practice over the course 
of the 20th century; the Advisory Board for Medical Specialties (now the American 
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Board of Medical Specialties), an umbrella organization founded in 1933, had 
begun by 1940 to discourage board-certified medical specialists from practicing 
general medicine at all. Full-time specialization would become the norm. By 
the late 1960s, when family practice began its serious push for recognition as a 
board-certified specialty, fewer than 20% of practicing physicians were still GPs. 
Fewer and fewer GPs, especially on the east coast, held hospital privileges to 
perform obstetrics; by the same period, only about one-third performed “major 
surgery” anywhere in the country.42
General practitioners tried to fight back. In 1947 they formed the American 
Academy of General Practice which, by 1970, still retained about 30,000 
members. They even attempted to start their own licensure process by launching 
the American Board of General Practice in 1960. But this battle could not be won. 
Not only did general practice no longer seem intellectually challenging to many 
medical students, but on a practical basis its long hours, relatively low pay, and 
geographic isolation appeared positively burdensome to many younger doctors. 
Between 1931 and 1965, the numbers of GPs in practice had dropped from 
112,000 to 66,000; by 1977, they comprised only 13% of practicing physicians. 
In Massachusetts, only 3,645 primary care physicians were in practice in 1973.43 
Thus, from the end of World War II until the creation of the American Board of 
Family Practice in 1969, the fate of the GP became increasingly dire.44 
Like the field of community medicine, an updated version of general 
practice would have to adopt the trappings and values of an academic medical 
specialty. As historian George Weisz has written of American medicine, “It is fair 
to say that at this point just about every physician is a specialist of one sort or 
another.” The evolution of family medicine bears out this claim.45 In this context, 
the clinical specialty known as “family practice,” sometimes referred to as the 
“heir of general practice,” is usually distinguished from its academic counterpart, 
“family medicine.”46  Leading family practitioners insisted on the need for 
academic credentialing including board certification, and a meaningful presence 
among the departments of American medical schools. As an academic discipline, 
family practice was known as “family medicine” by the early 1970s when the first 
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residency classes would have been graduating from medical school. Yet, as a 
leading textbook from 1980 acknowledged, precise definitions of family medicine 
took longer to agree upon than did a common understanding of “family practice,” 
a clinical approach that prepares the physician for a “unique role in patient 
management, problem solving, counseling and as a personal physician who 
coordinates total health care delivery.” The portion of family practice comprising 
its academic disciplinary profile – family medicine – took longer to define.47 
What were the salient features of family medicine as an intellectual discipline? 
Some early commentaries stressed its unique dependence on behavioral science 
and stressed this as the discipline’s core academic feature. By the end of the 
specialty’s first decade, however, family medicine was presented to residents as 
…that body of knowledge and skills applied by the family physician 
as he/she provides primary, continuing, comprehensive health 
care to patients and their families regardless of their age, sex, or 
presenting complaint. It is a horizontal discipline, sharing portions 
of all other clinical and related disciplines from which it is derived 
but applying these derivative portions in a unique way to families. 
In addition, family medicine includes new, incompletely developed 
elements, such as family dynamics in health and disease and its 
own areas of developing research.48
The proponents of family medicine were determined, in short, to shape a 
specialty that would encompass roles as both clinician and researcher. 
 Unlike community medicine, in which research and practice were directed 
toward entire communities, family medicine dedicated itself primarily to the 
individual patient and family as its locus of care giving and research. Clinical 
relationships rather than epidemiological studies were its coin of the realm, or in 
the words of one family physician, “‘individualized preventive medicine.’”49 Given 
the explicitly holistic, anti-reductionist frame of mind of family medicine, what 
theoretical underpinning grounded its approach? G. Gayle Stephens’ book, The 
Intellectual Basis of Family Practice, succinctly described how family medicine 
could turn the general art of medicine into the focused and research-generating 
knowledge of a medical specialty:
290
Patient management is the quintessential skill of clinical practice 
and is the area of knowledge unique to family physicians. Family 
physicians know their patients, know their patients’ families, know 
their practices, and know themselves. Their role in the health care 
process permits them to know these things in a special way denied 
to all those who do not fulfill this role. The true foundation of 
family medicine lies in the formalization and transmission of this 
knowledge.50
Stephens’ claim was a simple one: the doctor-patient relationship would be the 
special area of family medicine’s expertise, and the “patient” would be taken to 
include not only a single individual, but a complex figure embedded in a social, 
familial environment to which the physician must be attuned. At a time when 
public policy was calling for more comprehensive, continuous medical care, 
family medicine based its claim to specialty status on its ability to turn such 
attunement into a valid field of systematic research.51
By 1966, both the Millis and the Willard reports specifically called 
for primary care physicians who were residency-trained.52 During the years 
preceding the acceptance in 1969 of the American Board of Family Practice (the 
ABFP changed its name to the American Board of Family Medicine in 2005) 
as the official certification body for the new specialty, several experimental 
family medicine departments were established in other regions of the country, 
cohering mainly around the education of residents. One of these, organized 
by Fitzhugh Mayo at the Medical College of Virginia/Virginia Commonwealth 
University, was considered a bellwether for programs founded in the ensuing 
decade; another early program was created by Gayle Stephens in Wichita, 
Kansas; a third was located at the University of Rochester School of Medicine 
and Dentistry. (The Rochester residency, which started in 1967, was headed 
by Eugene Farley, another former practitioner from the Many Farms Navajo 
clinic where Hugh Fulmer had begun.) With the exception of the Rochester 
program, the demographic characteristics of most such programs were something 
of a harbinger: general practice may have been declining, but physicians in 
291
underserved and relatively rural parts of the country were determined to provide 
health care for their already under-served populations.53 
Thus farsighted physician-educators with ties to generalist medicine made 
several attempts during the 1960s to create models for family practice residencies 
despite signs of strong resistance within the profession. In 1964 a small group 
went so far as to incorporate the name “American Board of Family Practice” 
(ABFP) in anticipation of the time when the AMA and the American Board of 
Medical Specialties would recognize it as the legitimate licensing board for the 
specialty. But, as has been noted already, opposition from the American Board 
of General Practice (hastily established in 1960 to forestall such an eventuality) 
was openly reinforced by opposition from many internists through the American 
College of Physicians. General internists believed that they, not the dubious 
new specialists called “family practitioners,” should be the rightful heirs of the 
GP. The executive director of the AAMC, Ward Darley, was a behind-the-scenes 
supporter of family practice, but in 1965 he wrote to a colleague that he feared it 
would be “a long road between now and the time when the medical schools will 
give significant help in training senior people to serve as the quarterback of the 
comprehensive medical care team.”54 
 When political and social pressures did convince organized medicine to 
support an explicitly primary care specialty, the change was swift and focused 
on the newer, state-supported schools where family practice was often imposed 
by legislative mandate. The Liaison Committee for Medical Specialties gave 
formal approval to the application of the ABFP on February 8, 1969, followed by 
approval of the full Advisory Board for Medical Specialties, the National Board 
of Medical Examiners, and the other residency boards whose cooperation was a 
necessity. The American Board of Preventive Medicine was among those most 
encouraging to the new Board. Certification initially required competency in 
general internal medicine, some pediatrics and psychiatry, community medicine, 
and electives in uncomplicated obstetrics-gynecology, ambulatory surgery, or 
subspecialty fields. Over the next decade, the number of accredited residencies 
climbed. By 1975, 219 approved residencies were in operation with 70% of 
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medical schools having some sort of “academic unit” devoted to family medicine. 
Passage of the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976, which 
created capitated awards to medical schools on condition that the schools – in 
aggregate or individually – allot up to 50% of residency slots to primary care by 
fiscal year 1980, pushed these numbers higher. By 1978, approximately 22,000 
doctors had become board certified in family practice.55
 Dick Walton’s Umbrella: Founding Family Medicine at UMass
In Massachusetts, however, UMass Medical School was the only 
school willing to incorporate the new specialty.56 As a report prepared for the 
president of the UMass system, Robert Wood, summed up the situation in 1973, 
“Massachusetts ranks among the top ten states in every category in 15 of the 
20 specialties. However… the relative ranking of physicians engaged in general 
practice is 33rd… [T]his figure is significant for the type of health care that will be 
required in the Commonwealth in the years ahead.”57 These data were based on 
a 1970 survey conducted by the Massachusetts Academy of Family Physicians. 
The survey defined “primary care” to encompass not only family physicians, but 
pediatricians, general internists, and osteopaths. The inventory, as of December 
31, 1973, found 4240 primary care physicians (including 595 in primary care 
residencies) in active practice in Massachusetts, of whom 1124 were family  
physicians – slightly more than 26%. But, one-third of the latter were over 60 
years of age. Based on these criteria, there existed “a shortage of 1564 Family 
Physicians in Massachusetts…most prominent[ly] in Essex, Middlesex, and 
Worcester Counties.” The ratio in Worcester was 19.7 per 100,000.58 
At the same time, a small group of general-practitioners-turned-family-
physicians began to actualize the ideals of family practice within their own 
practices. In the towns and rural counties of central and western Massachusetts, 
some large practices still were led by doctors who had graduated before World 
War II and who had never felt the need to continue their postgraduate education 
(residency) beyond the internship year. Some of them were anxious to move 
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beyond general practice and involved themselves at the level of their state 
specialty societies. In fact, a collaborative study group from the recently renamed 
Massachusetts Academy of Family Physicians, working with researchers from 
Harvard Medical School, published a report in JAMA in 1971 about the content 
of current patient visits to general practitioners as a guide to the educational 
needs of future family practitioners.59 Dr. Robert Babineau, Sr., the founder of 
the Fitchburg family practice residency, and a member of the collaborative study 
group, remembers this period of transition from the perspective of a general 
practitioner with a thriving practice and an active presence in the Massachusetts 
Academy of General Practice, the forerunner to the Massachusetts Academy of 
Family Physicians:
I’d been in practice from 1951. I got involved with the Massachusetts
            Academy of what was then called General Practice, you know, just to
become involved with what was going on in the medical world, and 
over the ’50s and early ’60s, there was a big debate as you know 
about the future of general practitioners, because this was the era of 
specialties and everyone was beginning to specialize, in the ’50s and 
’60s. So those of us who were family doctors (well, what we called 
ourselves was GPs), thought that we should at least get involved 
in the discussion, because we felt that our type of practice made a 
lot of sense. You certainly needed specialists, but you also needed 
people who could kind of function as the primary care physician, to 
be the quarterback of the team, so called.
So we got involved in that and through that I got involved not 
only at the [national] level but at the state level, where we were 
having big discussions about the future of general practice, and 
through that…of course…the discussions then were about whether 
it should survive and those of us of course felt it should…[T]hen we 
had discussions about the name of this new group, and we didn’t 
think “general practice” – it sounded too broad – so we had big 
discussions at the national level and state levels about the future, 
and that’s when we decided to change the Academy. Along with 
those discussions were discussions that if we’re going to survive, 
we need more training, so the residency issue was brought up along 
with the discussions about name change, and eventually we all 
decided that we needed to develop a residency program to train our 
future doctors, and we decided that they should be called “family 
physicians.”60
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By 1973, it was apparent to the UMass Board, the President, and the 
Legislature, that the school must develop a coherent and positive approach to 
increasing the numbers of family practitioners in the state. The original vision 
behind the new school, however, coexisted less than comfortably with these 
efforts to promote primary care. In the words of Lamar Soutter’s successor as 
Chancellor/Dean, Roger J. Bulger, M.D., the school, “while embracing many of 
the objectives of newer, so-called community-based schools, has had these goals 
and missions superimposed on those of a faculty already firmly entrenched, 
with great strength in the basic medical sciences and a keen interest in pursuing 
excellence in research.”61 Hugh Fulmer’s vision for the Department of Community 
Medicine had clear plans – and a mandate from the Dean – for educating medical 
students to understand the big picture of health and disease. The institutional 
commitment to primary care education was more ambivalent. In 1966 Soutter 
had written, “The responsibility for providing a healthy climate for family 
practice in which it can flourish is not ours, but that of the medical profession 
itself through its state and national societies. Specifically, exactly how far we can 
go to assist students to develop an interest in this field is hard to say without 
further study.” It is telling that in 1972, when the administration and an extensive 
array of faculty and consultants wrote a five-year planning document for the 
Worcester campus, the subcommittee dealing with residency education contained 
no one identified with primary care; in Worcester, as in most medical schools at 
the time, attention gravitated toward procedure-oriented specialty training in 
hospital settings.62  
A shift in the economic and political landscape, however, brought 
legislative pressure on the medical school to demonstrate a commitment to 
family medicine. Between 1972 and 1975, a steady stream of inquiries reached 
the UMass President, Board of Trustees, and Dean Soutter asking how the 
medical school was addressing the Commonwealth’s need for family doctors. 
Even the accreditation team for the LCME, which surveyed the school in June 
1972, recognized the problem. Among their recommendations for improvement 
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was the following: “The Dean, clinical faculty and University officials are urged 
to start studying immediately the problems of ambulatory care at the University 
Hospital…Unless the necessary decisions can be made soon, the University 
may find itself by default locked into outmoded patterns and practices in their 
teaching and service programs.” Other pressures were directly linked to the state 
budget. At a time of growing inflation, Governor Sargent’s administration wanted 
to consolidate the governance of all state education programs which heightened 
scrutiny of the UMass system. No one could ignore the implications of threatened 
budget cuts. Legislators wanted to hear about the prospect of more family doctors 
out in their districts. When the Board of Trustees approved changing the name 
of the department from “Community Medicine” to “Community and Family 
Medicine” in 1973, the idea was praised as both “valuable and timely.” A memo 
from President Wood to the Speaker of the House, David Bartley, primed him for 
a meeting where Dean Soutter would be lobbying for money for the new hospital. 
He urged Bartley to emphasize the “truly public character of the School, the need 
for it to be at the forefront of innovation and change in medical education; the 
need for it to be responsive to public requirements.” Wood wanted –needed – to 
“re-orient” the Dean to a realistic appreciation for the requisite balance between 
“research as contrasted to family and community service…”63 Members of the 
Board of Trustees eagerly questioned Soutter about how many of the school’s first 
graduating class of 1974 were going into family practice. “In actuality, only 4 of 
the 16, or 25%...,” he told them.64
  In this climate Dick Walton turned most of his attention to creating a 
family practice residency. It is not possible to know when he set his sights on 
creating a separate department, but within two years, Hugh Fulmer’s plans for a 
combined Community and Family Medicine department would be turned upside 
down by the family physicians Walton recruited. 
 The timeline was a challenge. Between 1972 and July of 1974, Walton 
needed to recruit faculty, identify residency teaching sites for ambulatory practice 
that were affiliated with community hospitals, develop a curriculum, obtain 
provisional accreditation, attract the first class of residents and, even more 
296
important, apply for a federal grant to fund the program so that neither the local 
residency sites nor UMass Hospital had to pay for the residents themselves.65 
In his initial appointment as a division chief rather than a department chair, 
Walton had little clout within the school – in sharp contrast to his many contacts 
in the medical community outside the school. (That would change, however, as 
he cemented alliances with some of the more powerful clinical faculty around a 
shared commitment to improved primary care.) In the meantime, articles began 
to appear in the local paper proclaiming that, “Medical School Here Encourages 
Students to Enter Family Practice.”66
 In response to the request of both the Dean of the medical school and the 
UMass Trustees, Walton set about creating a five-year plan for the program. In 
a 1975 list of institutional objectives for the new residency program, prepared as 
part of his five-year plan, Walton enumerated the following institutional goals:
1. To develop a statewide network of residency programs…under a University 
umbrella.
2. To help define and develop a system of health care delivery and the functions 
of the family physicians under that system.
3. To develop an early and organized continuum of educational exposure to the 
discipline of Family Medicine for the undergraduate.
4. To increase the supply of well-trained family physicians in Massachusetts and 
New England.
5. To encourage a closer link between the University and the practicing 
physicians; including…teaching; [continuing medical education]; and facilitated 
linkages for patient consultation and referral.
6. To establish in collaboration with the practicing family physicians a strong 
research base in the training programs in the areas of clinical, operational, 
educational and basic research.
7. To [better define] the discipline of Family Medicine, and [integrate] those 
portions of the other specialties and basic sciences that seem most applicable.
8. To develop the basic science and clinical skills of community medicine in… 
undergraduate, graduate and continuing education…to make the family physician 
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a more effective community physician. 
Interestingly, among a second series of educational goals, he included one 
that specifically addressed the community-oriented primary care model, namely, 
“To determine the health related problems of the community in which the [family 
doctor] practices and to utilize [his or her] and others’ skills to diminish these 
problems.”67 
The linchpin of the program, however, was a set of alliances Walton 
developed with several ambulatory care practice settings. He produced a plan 
that has been known ever since as the “Umbrella.” The residents, Walton decided, 
should have a choice of three different outpatient sites: one rural, one inner-city, 
and one urban-suburban location. Each health center would have admitting 
privileges at the hospital to which its patients lived closest, with the residency’s 
central site at Worcester City Hospital until University Hospital was open 
and ready for them. Linking the three umbrella “spokes” would be the Family 
Medicine Department itself. Daniel Lasser, M.D., current department chair, 
explained the idea behind Walton’s structure: “This enterprise was going to be a 
true partnership and collaboration involving the university, the community and 
a series of community…hospitals and health centers…it was really going to be 
a community-based program.” Lasser remembers that when he first arrived at 
UMass as the family practice residency director, 
Dick Walton had these diagrams. I got here in ’79 and the first 
thing people said was, you have to take a look at Dick’s diagrams 
and memorize them and imprint them in your brain. One diagram 
was a triangle – university, community and health center. The 
second diagram was an umbrella…The umbrella was a whole series 
of different training tracks to meet the public need. And so there 
was going to be an inner city track that was going to be based at a 
community health center...They were going to develop a rural track 
[and] a private practice track.68
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           Walton persuaded three sites to affiliate with the new residency, while 
a fourth site, Dr. Babineau’s independently credentialed family practice 
residency at Fitchburg, became formally affiliated five years later. The sites 
included the Barre Family Health Center (rural; 1973), the community-run, 
federally-funded Family Health and Social Service Center of Worcester (now, 
the Family Health Center-Worcester) in downtown Worcester (inner city; 1974), 
and, the Hahnemann Family Health Center (urban-suburban; 1975). In 1979, 
the Fitchburg Family Practice Center (later renamed the Community Health 
Connections Family Health Center) became the fourth site to affiliate with 
the program, representing a private practice model in a predominantly blue 
collar small city. The main residency site initially was housed at Worcester City 
Hospital in the inner city.69 
 In the words of Carolyn Cotsonas, Dr. Walton’s departmental 
administrator: 
It shouldn’t be underestimated how effective Dick was as a leader 
and a negotiator…He was extraordinarily charming…he came on 
like a farm boy, only he was brilliant. He was the king of aphorisms 
– you know, ‘You can catch more flies with honey than with 
vinegar,’ and ‘I sometimes forget that when I’m up to my eyeballs 
in alligators, I’m here to help drain the swamp,’ and so on. He had 
a wonderful sense of humor and was a wonderful leader. He really 
rallied people around, and he…was very politically savvy, he made a 
lot of external alliances that became very important.70 
Such alliances, especially with administrators at community hospitals like 
Worcester City and Holden, became especially important because the residents’ 
services and referrals of patients to the inpatient units also meant a lot to the 
survival of the hospitals, at least for a few years. The first site to be established, 
the Barre Family Health Center, was greatly facilitated by Walton’s personal 
ties to the administrator and physicians at its affiliate, Holden Hospital, where 
Walton had had a flourishing practice and had been chief of medicine and 
pediatrics.71 
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Shaping a new Residency
 Walton’s powers of persuasion were needed not only to attract faculty and 
residents, but also to gain commitments from the health centers and community 
hospitals with which the residency had its affiliations. The curriculum in the early 
years, when the program was based mostly at City Hospital, demanded a shared 
spirit of adventure, “making do.” As Walton wrote in a 1975 program description, 
The process of residency training is designed to be goal oriented rather 
than time oriented. Within three years, residents will be evaluated 
from a set of educational objectives, or goals…It is expected that 
educational objectives will help both residents and faculty to define 
[individual resident] needs…Individual resident responsibility will…
vary according to the fulfillment of goals…72 
Residents were expected to master the core aspects of internal medicine, 
pediatrics, minor (office-based) surgical procedures, preventive medicine, and 
for some, obstetrics and gynecology. All residents were assigned to a two-person 
team. Everyone was expected to round during mornings while in the afternoons, 
half would work the inpatient units and the others would take seminars at the 
various health centers or at City Hospital; team members on the inpatient wards 
in the afternoons would cover for their own patients as well as their partners’. At 
the health centers, residents would meet with social workers, nurses, specialist 
consultants, and allied health professionals to review patient management 
questions, or would attend practice management seminars; at the hospital, they 
would attend seminars on “preventive medicine and patient care.”73 
 A less tangible, but crucial goal of the curriculum was the development 
of the capacity for self awareness and empathy. Most family practice residencies 
incorporated an explicit curriculum in the behavioral sciences, especially 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology. A distinctive aspect of their curricula 
addressed itself to the residents’ psychological, rather than intellectual, growth.
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At UMass Medical School, as at approximately 60 other programs, a technique 
known as the Balint group, named for the work of the Hungarian-born English 
psychiatrist Michael Balint in the 1950s, has been a mainstay of professional 
development for both residents and faculty. In the Worcester program, three 
Balint groups were in operation by 1980.74  
 Residents from each program site were assigned to inpatient rotations 
in the hospitals associated with each different site. The attitudes toward family 
practice in a given hospital could, therefore, create qualitative differences in 
the experiences each site provided. Some rotations were notoriously unfriendly 
to family practice residents; others were more amenable, especially in smaller 
community hospitals previously staffed by general practitioners. Obstetrics was 
especially problematic since some OBs clearly viewed family doctors as potential 
competitors, and lesser-educated ones at that. One of the early graduates 
remembered that, “In those days…it was a matter of finding places that were 
receptive to having family medicine residents be involved in OB [Obstetrics]. St. 
Vincent was receptive but…Memorial was openly hostile to the idea of family 
doctors being involved in OB. They didn’t want family medicine moving into 
the arena of OB.”75  Likewise, some internal medicine rotations, especially at 
University Hospital in that period, were quite unfriendly to the family practice 
residents. General internal medicine was itself just crystallizing as a distinctive 
subspecialty, something discussed in Chapter 7, and the boundary lines with 
family practice were not yet established. Dennis Dimitri, who completed his 
residency in family practice at the Dean Street/Hahnemann site, recalled,
At Hahnemann, the teams consisted of combinations of Family 
Medicine and Internal Medicine (IM) residents and we all worked 
very cooperatively together …At the University Hospital, it was a 
little bit different because the Family Medicine residents doing 
inpatient medicine rotations there were kind of like visitors or 
interlopers on the Internal Medicine service – there would be one 
or two of us at a time integrated into what was basically a medicine 
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service. So I had good experiences there, and the residents I worked 
with…I got along with OK, so the experience there was OK on a 
resident-to-resident basis. But the faculty at the university, not all 
but some of them, were still not quite sure why there were these 
Family Medicine residents taking up time on our Internal Medicine 
service. So that was a less supportive environment.76
 A distinctive culture bound members of the program together during 
the first decade of the residency. Many were aware of the precariousness of 
the new department’s financial standing and the still-experimental nature of 
family practice in the eyes of many specialists. A few of the early cohort explicitly 
recalled feeling distrusted by the attending physicians they encountered at the 
hospitals, as in these words from a 1982 graduate of the residency:
 ... it was still an era when family practice was new enough, 
particularly here in Massachusetts, that there were derogatory 
comments; frankly, there was active discrimination – oh, the 
short end of call schedules, a lot of it was subtle stuff... There were 
comments – well, of course internists will learn more about this 
than you will, pediatricians are more qualified to deal with this 
than you are – there were people that took the opportunity to sort 
of impress upon us that we should regard ourselves as second-class 
citizens and inadequately trained pediatricians, internists, and ob/
gyns as opposed to family docs, and those were clearly the people 
who didn’t get it.77
 In the face of these conditions, Walton fostered a sense of camaraderie by 
hosting the residents at his own house (even after nearly 40 years, his wife, Sue, 
recalled that early group as a part of their family), and they all collaborated on 
a large garden at the back of the residency director’s house.78 John Frey, M.D., 
the first residency director, acknowledged that in those days Worcester was not 
much of a draw for potential residency recruits. But, the idealism of the mission 
– and their commitment to it – plus a demonstrably familial ethos among many 
residents and faculty, often did the trick. An iconic photo of the first residency 
class, replete with spouses and children piled up together at an indoor volleyball 
court, did double duty as a wall decoration and a recruiting tool.
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Bob Singer, who graduated from the Fitchburg program in 1981, spoke to the 
group’s esprit de corps:
I do remember that there was a sense of pride that we were 
family practitioners. We had a distinctive way of dressing which 
distinguished us… the chief of medicine at that time, whose name 
I do not recall, said to me at one point that you can always tell the 
family practice residents because they all look like they’re ready to 
go outside and chop wood. So, many of the male residents would 
wear working boots, hiking boots, as opposed to regular men’s 
shoes. The men did not wear dungarees but wore more casual khaki 
pants, there was an agreement that the men in family practice 
would not wear ties, whereas there was an agreement that the men 
in internal medicine would wear ties. Very few of the family practice 
doctors ever adopted the white coat, although there were certain 
situations in intensive care where it might be worn…
 
Stepping back, Dr. Singer interpreted these choices as trying to identify more 
with the patients than with the medical hierarchy. Contrast this with the dress 
code established for students and residents by Dr. James Dalen, chair of the 
Department of Medicine at UMMS at the same time: “All the men were expected 
Family Medicine residents and families play volleyball- 
from residency brochure, c. 1975 (Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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to wear ties except on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.” (Dalen made this 
exception only after being caught tie-less on a Saturday morning by one of his 
medical students.)79 
Such a philosophy of medicine fit well with the atypically egalitarian, 
counter-cultural moment in American society with which the discipline’s early 
years coincided, an upsurge of political and social activism throughout American 
society and in many other Western nations. In the United States, the Civil Rights 
and anti-Viet Nam War movements insistently brought social inequality to the 
attention of the nation’s political leaders and citizens during this same period.80 
Physicians calling for a renewed covenant with the underserved through the 
mechanism of primary care medicine, what Jack Geiger has called “the use of 
health care as an instrument of social justice,” now found support from outside 
the profession and growing consensus within it.81 Many of the first generation of 
family practitioners, roughly those entering the field from the mid-1960s through 
the 1970s, shared a philosophy of social activism and a pronounced commitment 
to the provision of health care to all segments of society. In the words of Dennis 
Dimitri, M.D., a 1982 graduate of the program,  
[T]he very fact that you were doing family medicine instead of some 
other more narrow specialized pursuit or an academic pursuit or 
whatever, was in and of itself…an indication of a different level of 
social responsibility…I don’t want to overstate what we were doing, 
but I really feel strongly that it was very much more a kind of a 
social statement and calling to go into family medicine back in the 
1970s than it might be today.82 
Dr. Lucy Candib, for example, joined the program 
at the Family Health  and Social Service Center as a 
second-year resident in 1974 after several years of 
feminist activism while at Harvard Medical School. 
Considering her future career, she chose Family 
Medicine because, “I had decided 
family medicine 
 Dr. Lucy Candib (Photo courtesy of the University 
of  Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter  Library, University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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would let me develop the medicine side and keep the activist side.”83  
Dr. Dimitri put it this way:
I think part of why many people went into family medicine at that 
point in time had a lot to do with the social environment at the time, 
and there was a lot of feeling about the need to provide a different 
kind of medical care, medical care that was more responsive to 
patient needs. As opposed to being driven by the academic needs 
of the medical school, it was driven by the community needs of the 
people who needed care. And I saw family medicine as a specialty 
that really responded to that…I also understood that meant you had 
to be, not just in a hospital environment but in a community health 
center, in a place where most people got most of their care.84
A major confrontation precipitated by the residents at the City Hospital 
site in 1976 exemplifies the way that politics and culture shaped the residency. 
A combination of factors – the seriously deteriorating conditions at Worcester 
City Hospital and a national movement among residents to unionize for better 
pay and shorter hours on call – led many residents based at City Hospital 
(particularly from Family Medicine and Internal Medicine) to demand that the 
city authorize a larger budget outlay for City Hospital and that the residents 
be recognized as a collective bargaining unit. Close ties between doctors and 
residents to their patients were the real strength of family medicine, especially 
in an impoverished downtown setting such as City Hospital’s. In no time, local 
neighborhood groups mobilized demonstrations and press conferences to 
support the residents, whom they perceived as acting for the benefit of the entire 
downtown community. The senior medical staff at the hospital, on the other 
hand, saw them as troublemakers, upstarts in a system that was struggling for 
financial support and in danger of being closed down entirely by the city. While 
Dr. Walton defended his residents behind the scenes, larger economic forces 
soon made their case moot. As rumors flew that the city would close the hospital 
because of its own fiscal shortfall, the residents found that their contracts at City 
Hospital would not be renewed. (City Hospital was closed down in 1991.) By 1978 
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Family Medicine residents were headquartered at University Hospital, like the 
residents in other programs. Over the next few decades, explicit political ideology 
was transmogrified into implicit assumptions about the responsibilities of family 
practitioners to their patients.85 
 The UMass program was quickly successful, soon filling all its allotted 
residency slots. (By 1980, the program had graduated 38 residents; by 1981 it 
reached its full strength of 12 graduates per year.) Yet, for its first few years, 
program funding was a subject of constant concern. Dr. Stephen Earls, a resident 
at the Barre Family Health Center from 1974 to 1977 who later became Medical 
Director there, marveled at the challenges faced by the program:
In the early days, the whole time I was a resident it was one crisis 
after another. And… everything was just developing while we 
were doing it, so rotations would have problems and there’d be 
an emergency meeting. Grant applications were due. Everybody 
was new at this so nobody quite knew the pace of getting a grant 
application ready for the residency and so there was Carolyn 
Cotsonas [a lawyer and program administrator who was also 
married to one of the first-year residents, Dr. Leonard Finn] and 
Dick Walton working long into the night to get the grant done in 
time. It was all very chaotic and stressful…Lots of morning meetings 
to plan this, that, or the other thing.86
The Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971 (P.L.92-157) provided 
Stephen Earls, M.D.  (Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School) 
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funding for training programs in primary care, including family medicine, and 
Walton was able to apply for such funding. By the late 1970s, the Department 
was the recipient of its first Title VII grant, administered through the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a grant to train faculty and 
community doctors to supervise residents and students learning to be family 
doctors. That program, which lasted until 2005, was overseen by a UMass 
Med education specialist named Mark Quirk who began by holding weekend 
workshops for family medicine educators. This small initiative slowly grew into a 
major departmental program.87 Around the same time, and of specific interest to 
the Family Health and Social Service Center of Worcester (FHCW), Title V of the 
Special Health Revenue Sharing Act (PL94-63) of 1975 gave financial support to 
neighborhood health centers.88  
Family Medicine Secedes from the Union
 While Dick Walton was busy starting the residency, his relationship with 
Hugh Fulmer began to deteriorate as their divergent interests and objectives 
became clearer. In short order, Walton developed a reputation – at least in the 
Dean’s office – for being too “gung-ho.”89 Fulmer always saw primary care as 
necessary but insufficient to what he understood as true “community medicine.” 
In 1973, he did agree to rename his department “Community and Family 
Medicine,” but simply to reassure new family practice faculty recruits and ease 
the accreditation process. From his perspective this signified nothing more than 
another step toward his original goal of creating a hybrid residency combining 
both disciplines. To Fulmer, caring for individuals and families, while important, 
was not the end goal; community surveillance and public health action on behalf 
of total communities were his beacons.90
 For Walton, on the other hand, Fulmer’s was a vision seen through the 
wrong end of a telescope. Individual patients and their families represented a 
nearly sacred responsibility. Whenever possible, data-driven community health 
initiatives were a valuable addition to a clinic or health center’s mix of services. 
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But they never animated his vision of family practice. Although, like community 
medicine, family practitioners were committed to practices with deep roots in 
specific communities, the concept of “community” functioned differently in each 
one’s approach. As Dan Doyle, M.D., a member of the second graduating class of 
the UMass Family Medicine residency, explained,
…there was an ideology of family medicine that had to do with 
knowing the whole patient. The buzz word ‘biopsychosocial’ hadn’t 
come around [yet], but really that’s what it was, a biopsychosocial 
approach, knowing the whole person, the importance of the 
family, caring for families together, so while the ideology of family 
medicine wasn’t politically progressive, [it] was very congruent with 
that perspective of caring for the underserved and recognizing the 
importance of the culture of the patient and also trying to minimize 
the social distance between the doctor and the patient.91
Family doctors – especially those who worked in community health centers – 
aspired to a deep connection with their patients’ social communities, but for the 
sake of enhanced patient care; community change was welcome, but patients, 
individuals and families, came first. One residency graduate from 1982, who 
still practices in Worcester, remembered learning this from the example of his 
mentors in the program:
One of the things I really remember from [Dr.] Lucy Candib, who 
was over at Main Street…I remember her talking once [about] the 
importance of embedding yourself into the community where you 
practice and not just seeing it as a place where you might come in 
and have a job for a few years and then move on because you’ve 
got some academic aspirations or whatever else, but if you really 
wanted to do family medicine, that you lived in the community, you 
joined the community in whatever ways work for you. 92 
 More concretely, Walton had expected from the beginning to be given the 
freedom to develop a department of his own. Instead, he found himself, or so he 
recalls, unable even to gain access to the department’s budget figures. Inevitably, 
perhaps, he and the other senior family medicine faculty concluded that they 
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could not work within Fulmer’s departmental structure. In the spring of 1974, 
on the eve of the family practice residency’s going “live,” Dr. Walton presented 
an ultimatum to Dr. Fulmer and Dean Soutter: create a separate family medicine 
department or the residency faculty would resign en masse. Fulmer was shocked 
and still refers to Walton’s actions as a “bombshell,” and as “seceding” from his 
department.93 Lamar Soutter was furious, having only recently tacked with the 
political winds, writing in a budget memo for the UMass President that “The most 
vitally needed physicians at the moment are family practitioners…We regard 
as one of our primary responsibilities the turning out of family practitioners.”94 
With the residency due to open in only three months, Walton gave the Dean little 
choice.95 Soutter conferred with his Executive Committee and called a meeting 
of Fulmer, Walton, and representatives of the Massachusetts Academy of Family 
Physicians. In a Solomonic gesture, he made Walton the head of a Department 
of Family Medicine that was limited in scope to graduate education and the 
residency. Fulmer remained head of Community and Family Medicine with his 
charge reduced to undergraduate medical education, but with the rights to use 
the federal training grant for primary care preceptors, a grant that Walton had 
considered his.96
 It should be no surprise that the breakup of the original department of 
Community Medicine left bitter feelings. Fulmer’s COPC vision never gained 
traction after the departmental split. As for the family practice residency, neither 
the program’s strong growth nor even its support by Massachusetts legislators 
(most of whom were more comfortable with the family practice primary care 
model than with COPC) insulated Family Medicine against the school’s fiscal 
ups and downs. For several years it could not feel sure of budget support from 
the medical school. A showdown in 1975 cleared the air somewhat. As Walton 
described the situation, “They [school leaders] loved to talk about Family 
Medicine all around the state. And that was our problem. We talked about it and 
then when the budget came, we were the low person. We didn’t get what was 
promised.” Thus, only a year after the program was launched with Dick Walton 
having promised medical school money for the educational contributions of the 
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independently operated residency sites, in Dr. Daniel Lasser’s words, the “med 
school turned around and said, ‘What money? We never told you [that] you had 
any money to give to these health centers.’ So all of a sudden, these health centers 
have made commitments, and the health centers were independently owned and 
operated.” Under such circumstances, who could tell how long they would agree 
to affiliate with the Medical School?97
  This became a major crisis for family practice in Massachusetts and for 
the school’s relationship with the legislature and with a new governor, Michael 
Dukakis. In 1975, Walton was in a Boston hospital recovering from spine 
surgery when he was visited by the assistant to the Chair of the Senate Finance 
Committee.98 As Walton tells the story, she asked him: 
…how we were doing and what was going on. I said, ‘We’re having 
difficulty.’ I said we were paraded out at budget time, but we’re put 
in the closet the rest of the year. I said that was fine, as long as we 
get our money… She said, ‘Well, I’ll talk to the Senator…’ Well, the 
senator put an earmark on the budget which meant that the medical 
school couldn’t spend their money until we got our budget…That 
made me even more popular than usual. 
In short, with lobbying behind the scenes from at least one fellow UMMC chair 
with excellent political connections, campaigning by the Massachusetts Academy 
of Family Physicians, and a governor whose administration had made health care 
access and lower costs a priority, a $750,000 appropriation was earmarked for 
the Department of Family Medicine for 1976-77. After that, Walton observed, “the 
budget process was a little bit easier for us. What they said we’d get, we got.”99 
Yet the field of family practice, like general internal medicine or pediatrics, would 
take at least another decade to become as integral to undergraduate medical 
education at UMMC as it had become to residency training and outpatient care. 
This will be the subject of Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
Primary Care Education Hits its Stride
 From UMass Medical School’s current vantage as an institution nationally 
ranked among the top 10% of U.S. medical schools for primary care education 
since 1995 – at times ranking third or fourth – it may be difficult to believe 
how long it took UMass to focus on primary care.1 In contrast to some state 
medical schools, especially those with rural constituencies such as Minnesota 
or North Carolina, or even a few private schools such as Case Western or 
Rochester, it required more than a decade for primary care to fully take hold 
in the undergraduate medical curriculum.2 Family medicine, as was noted 
earlier, endured many battles before winning its place at the table. But family 
practice neither was, nor is, the only primary care discipline to which medical 
students might be drawn. The UMass departments of Medicine and Pediatrics 
are an important part of this story. They, however, did not actively promote 
primary care residency education, outpatient services, or even primary care 
undergraduate medical education until the mid-1980s.3 This chapter will describe 
the gradual process by which primary care came into its own at UMMC.
Eventually, the intensifying call on both the state and national level for 
more ambulatory care could not be ignored. 4 On the state level, in 1984 the 
UMass Board of Trustees approved the medical school’s first iteration of the 
“Learning Contract,” whereby two-thirds of a student’s tuition would be forgiven 
if she or he committed to practicing in Massachusetts for a year following 
residency; often this entailed practicing in a medically underserved region – by 
definition a location lacking primary care doctors. Further, as noted in Chapter 
5, University Hospital devoted itself during the late 1980s and 1990s to the 
cultivation of ambulatory care clinics for specialty and generalist medicine 
both to generate inpatient referrals and as a fiscally desirable end in itself. 
Finally, as also noted earlier, the rise of various mechanisms to contain national 
health care costs all had in common a faith in the role of the primary physician 
as a “gatekeeper” controlling access to more expensive, specialized care. In 
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response to all these trends, the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-
1990s witnessed the creation of new, cross-disciplinary approaches to promote 
primary care among students and residents at UMass Medical Center. By then, 
family practice was merely one of several departments with strong primary care 
interests.5 
An important first step occurred when Community Medicine and Family 
Medicine reunited as a single department. Parallel initiatives developed by the 
departments of Medicine and Pediatrics ultimately converged with programs 
from the unified department of Family and Community Medicine. Their shared 
enterprise of faculty development and curriculum reform was further spurred 
by the university’s winning a total of eight years of funding from the Generalist 
Physician Initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation from 1992 to 
2000. The 1990s thus were years where the medical school generated a coherent 
culture of primary care education, a cultural inflection that is now accepted as 
part of the school’s core identity. Indeed, given the national recognition UMass 
has received for its primary care education programs for the past two decades, 
few UMass Med faculty members today realize that this was not the case from 
the outset. The institutionalization and growth of primary care at UMass reflects 
nothing so much as its evolution beyond the fears of its founding generation 
that it not become “trapped” in the mold of a “community” medical school. After 
the school’s first two decades, faculty and administrators could feel reasonably 
confident that UMMS could successfully incubate both primary care and 
research. Moreover, they had little choice.
Reuniting Family Medicine and Community Medicine
 Although the school’s 1975 “Statement of Goals” mentioned “primary 
care” internal medicine and “primary care” pediatrics, as well as family practice, 
the former two were at best in a formative state the late 1970s. In reality, the 
principal exemplars of primary care were the family practitioners out in the 
community. Within the school, primary care had not fully matured. For the 
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moment, the bifurcation of Community Medicine and Family Medicine into 
separate departments presented an embarrassing reminder of the distance 
between goals on paper and their actualization. True, the family practice 
residency had begun to flourish. By the end of June 1976, the program graduated 
its first four family practitioners and was on track to graduate eight more in 
1977, by which time three ambulatory care sites were operating as residency 
training centers.6 Over the next five years, however, even as the residency sites 
developed and the numbers of family practice graduates grew proportionately, 
the unfinished business of integrating primary care into the Medical School’s 
hierarchy faltered.  
Richard Walton had resigned as department chair for health reasons and 
soon moved to a new position as director of the University of North Carolina 
Medical School’s Area Health Education Center (AHEC) based in Asheville. Soon 
after, residency director John Frey also decided to leave UMass for the University 
of Wisconsin.7 A sense that the department was “going through a lot of leadership 
transitions [and] turmoil…” in the words of one former resident, was hard to 
ignore. In 1979 Dr. Daniel Lasser, a family physician from the National Health 
Service Corps previously stationed in western Massachusetts, succeeded Dr. Frey 
as the residency director, which may have assuaged the residents’ unease. But 
the status of family medicine as an academic discipline at UMass did not soon 
recover from the turmoil.
With the Family Medicine department focusing on the residency 
and patient care, on the one hand, and Community and Family Medicine 
concentrating on research and undergraduate teaching, on the other, a message 
was conveyed that family medicine was not really ready for prime time as 
an academic field. In Chancellor Roger Bulger’s words, “The split has been 
confusing to students, faculty and outsiders, uneconomical, divisive, and 
generally counterproductive. The divisions and bad feelings separating the two 
groups were sufficiently deep so as to prevent reunification until recently.” Not 
until Dr. Fulmer proposed stepping down as chair of Community and Family 
Medicine was it possible to unite the two departments under a single chair.8 In 
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the spring of 1977, this was accomplished. The Board of Trustees was asked to 
agree to a new structure for the departments under the name of “Family and 
Community Medicine,” with the family practice residency as an integral part. 
This realignment reflected the rising profile of the specialty of family practice 
in Central Massachusetts and on Beacon Hill. Dr. Robin Catlin, a British-born 
family practitioner who had been first hired by Dr. Walton but had developed 
a reputation as a researcher, was named the new department’s chair with the 
responsibility of unifying it in practice as well as in name. One change with 
major significance for the school’s future identity as a place for both primary 
care education and basic sciences research was the development of a new 
undergraduate course, “An Introduction to Patient Care,” reintroducing the 
principles of primary care – especially family practice – into the curriculum in 
the first two years of medical school. A community medicine residency was also 
planned to begin in July 1977. Still, as Catlin wrote in a memo to Dr. Bulger, “One 
of the goals of restructuring is to provide family physicians as role models for 
undergraduate [medical students].” That goal took much longer to accomplish.9
The program took more than a decade to flourish within the school. Some 
faculty and former residents remember that, from their outposts at the various 
community health centers in central Massachusetts, they viewed the Medical 
Center as a Star Wars-like “Evil Empire” or, in a reference to the dark gray granite 
on the original facade, as the “Death Star.”10 Adding to Dr. Catlin’s difficulties, 
although legislative support for primary care continued strong, support for the 
school was always subject to legislative second thoughts. Thus, when a nearly 
million-dollar budget cut was threatened by the Governor’s office in 1981, the 
Medical School’s Chancellor, Robert Tranquada, M.D., who succeeded Dr. Bulger 
in 1979, dared to hold the family practice residency hostage unless his budget 
was restored. Putting on his best poker face, he told the Worcester legislative 
delegation that without those funds, “The family practice residency will have 
to be closed as soon after July 1, 1981 as possible [eliminating] all 48 residents 
in the only accredited Family Practice program in Massachusetts.” Adding 
substance to the threat, the residency program could demonstrate that, of 38 
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family practice graduates, 23 (more than 60%) chose to remain in Massachusetts 
after completing the program. Behind “closed doors,” Tranquada told the faculty, 
“I’m doing that because if I identified it as your money, maybe they won’t cut it.”11 
 Given the department’s shaky history at the School, the residents didn’t 
share Dr. Tranquada’s confidence. Here is how one of the residents remembered 
the showdown:
When I was a third year resident…there was a typical legislative 
battle going on about the budgetary constraints, and I guess the 
legislators were making some noise about what they were going to 
do with whatever portion of the medical school budget they used 
to contribute in those days, and… our impression was that [the 
Chancellor] was using us, the Family Medicine residents, as a pawn 
in his financial battle, because he said [to the Legislature], ‘Well, 
if you do that, the first thing I’m going to do is I’m going to have to 
eliminate the family practice residency.’
So as you might imagine, we were all pretty distraught and upset 
about that, so in my role as the [co-]chief resident I was charged 
by my fellow residents…to meet with Dr. Tranquada…to present 
to him sort of this manifesto from the Family Medicine residents, 
displaying our displeasure with being used and tossed around in 
this battle, and I just remember making an appointment, having 
to go there, and waiting in this big office, and feeling like a little 
pipsqueak sitting there, and in the end having this very pleasant 
talk with Dr. Tranquada and sort of being reassured that everything 
would be OK and that the Family Medicine residency was really 
very important to the school and that they’d never do anything to 
jeopardize it . . .12
 The Chancellor’s tactic worked. By the end of July, the Legislature 
overrode Governor King’s budget reductions for higher education, including 
the appropriation for the family practice residency. That the medical school’s 
chancellor could feel reasonably confident his tactic would succeed eloquently 
attests to the esteem in which family practice was held in Massachusetts. The 
standoff of 1980-1981 was the last occasion when the school’s support for the 
residency seemed in doubt. For one thing, all the hospitals with which the 
residency sites were then affiliated – City, Holden, Hahnemann, and Memorial – 
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either closed, as in the case of Worcester City Hospital, or merged with Memorial, 
as was the case with University Hospital. Many family practice residents’ 
patients were referred back to the Medical School’s affiliated hospitals, thereby 
reinforcing the value of the residency to generate patient referrals. Second, many 
family practice program graduates remained in Central Massachusetts after their 
residencies. Indeed, research into the demographics of the first 30 years of the 
residency has shown that about 50% of program graduates chose to remain in the 
state – as the school’s founders had hoped – while another 16% remained in New 
England. Over a period of about 15 years, a residency that began as a community-
based initiative became more tightly knit within the UMass hospital system.13 
 Ironically, however, the Department was not fulfilling its mandate to 
promote family practice among the school’s own students. After Dr. Catlin’s 
departure from UMass, Dr. Lynn Eckhert, M.D., M.P.H., a pediatrician, became 
first the acting chair in 1982 and then 
the permanent chair of the department 
from 1984 to 1998. As she approached 
her new role, she considered the overall 
situation in which the department 
found itself. Again, as mentioned above, 
the department’s success in recruiting 
UMass students to family practice 
residencies, compared with graduating 
classes’ interest in other primary care 
specialties, had stayed low, possibly 
a result of the Department of Family 
Medicine being “exiled” from the undergraduate medical school curriculum 
by Dr. Soutter in 1974. In 1979, for example, only 7% of graduates, or about 
seven students, entered family practice residencies; for the next few years, 
the trend was downward.14 Clearly, relegating undergraduate family medicine 
courses to community medicine faculty was increasingly detrimental to the 
reputation of family practice as a career choice among medical students. Even 
Lynn Eckhert, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University 
of Massachusetts Medical School) 
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after the reunification of the two departments, students were sometimes actively 
discouraged from choosing family practice for their residencies. Dr. Eckhert, was 
dismayed to find that only 3% of UMass Med graduates chose to specialize in 
family practice after graduation. A graduate of the school from the class of 1989 
remembered specifically hearing that he was “too smart” to go into the field. One 
year, the annual medical student show depicted the department as an outhouse. 
And, since the Departments of Medicine and Pediatrics had begun developing 
their own generalist tracks, the family practice residency now had to compete 
with these specialties to attract UMass students into primary care.15  Something 
had to be done within the walls of the school to bring the same enthusiasm from 
UMass students for family medicine as was being generated for the other primary 
care specialties by the late 1980s.16 
That became Dr. Eckhert’s first goal. During the 1990s, when the AAMC’s 
medical workforce goals aimed to send 50% of medical graduates into primary 
care, she noted that “Family Medicine had decided that half of those people 
would be in family medicine.” The department, in other words, had set a goal of 
25% of UMass Med graduates entering family medicine residencies. By the late 
1990s, family medicine residencies were attracting more students, partly because 
of overall changes across the curriculum and partly, according to Eckhert, 
because of the department’s success in achieving grant funding to develop 
primary care teaching from the first year of the student’s work. “We started this 
longitudinal clerkship,” Dr. Eckhert recalled, “which was eventually taken over 
by the medical school, and now it’s done in Family Medicine, Ped[iatrics ] and… 
Medicine.” One of the original Family Medicine preceptors for the program, Dr. 
Michele Pugnaire, eventually became Senior Associate Dean for Educational 
Affairs.17 
 In research, the Department was beginning to hold its own. It had always 
been hoped, as Dr. Lasser put it, that “if you got the people with academic 
backgrounds and they sat next to the people who were the clinicians, somehow 
this mind-meld would take place…” That is not what happened. By the end of 
its first decade, the department had incorporated, along with family practice 
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physicians, researchers in community medicine (some of whom were originally 
hired by Hugh Fulmer) and a group specializing in the behavioral sciences. 
These groups, particularly in concert with a preventive medicine residency, an 
occupational health residency, and a Master’s 
of Public Health program run through UMass-
Amherst, developed their own lines of research 
in areas such as smoking prevention targeted 
at children and adolescents, the effects of 
second hand smoke, problems of the homeless, 
effective behavioral health interventions suited 
to primary care settings, and so forth.18 One 
outstanding, core member of the department’s 
preventive medicine faculty was Alfred 
Yankauer, M.D., M.P.H.  (1913-2004). 
Yankauer joined the department in 1973 
as a full professor, having already worked 
for the New York City and the Rochester, 
New York departments of public health, the 
New York State Department of Maternal and Child Health (as Director), the 
World Health Organization in Madras, India, and the Pan American Health 
Organization. He came to UMass from a position as senior researcher at the 
Harvard School of Public Health. His work steadily addressed the issues of health 
inequities, especially those resulting from racial segregation and other forms 
of discrimination. Two years after coming to UMass Medical School, he began 
a 15-year stint as the editor of the American Journal of Public Health. At his 
retirement from the editorship he was awarded the APHA’s Award of Excellence, 
one of many such awards he received over the course of a productive career (at 
his retirement from UMass, he had published 209 articles).19
By the time Dr. Lasser succeeded Dr. Eckhert as chair in 1998, the 
department had achieved sufficient visibility and acceptance to sustain a 
thoroughgoing restructuring, the product of a department-wide strategic 
Joseph DiFranza, M.D. studied 
the ease with which children and 
teens could purchase tobacco 
products. (Photo courtesy of the 
University of  Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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planning retreat in 1998.20 The results were far reaching. Foremost, the 
department tackled the longstanding disconnection between the disciplines of 
family practice and community health. In Dan Lasser’s words, 
The connection between family practice and community health 
was broken. And it had always been broken – broken in the sense 
that, while people were coexisting in the same department, on 
the same floor, there wasn’t a lot of interaction that was taking 
place. And then from the student’s point of view, there was very 
little understanding of the difference between family practice and 
community health.21
This reflected a national trend. In the U.S., 
departments of community or preventive 
medicine, which were represented in nearly 
two-thirds of all accredited medical schools 
in 1970, declined steadily as freestanding 
departments as reflected in both numbers of 
FTEs and overall spending from the mid 
1970s to the present. Departments of family 
medicine, encouraged by federal project 
grants and capitation payments, proliferated. By 2011 community or preventive 
medicine departments existed as freestanding departments in fewer than 
one-third of accredited medical schools.22  In the majority of cases, they were 
subsumed under departments of family medicine (see table below).23
 
Daniel Lasser, M.D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of  Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar  Soutter Library, 
University of  Massachusetts  Medical 
School)
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As a direct result of its restructuring at UMass in 1998, the department 
changed its name. Now known as the Department of Family Medicine and 
Community Health (FMCH), it encompassed multiple disciplines as distinct 
but full-fledged partners. Divisions were established in which, despite their 
individual identities as Clinical Services (family practice), Community Health, 
Research, and Education, one common theme linked them all to a central 
departmental identity: a focus on caring for vulnerable or underserved 
populations. After all, again quoting Lasser, “…family medicine and community 
health are complementary disciplines. They’re both based out in the community. 
But family medicine really focuses on individuals and families, although most of 
the time on individuals…And community health [has] a different set of issues.” 
To better reinforce the linkages among them, Lasser decided that every division 
head should have had previous experience working in the Public Health Service, 
the Indian Health Service, the National Health Service Corps, or in community 
health centers – in short, should have had experience with medically underserved 
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populations.
 Interestingly, this emphasis also made possible increased support for 
COPC-like initiatives. As a group of FMCH researchers from UMMS wrote in 
2009, “With the specialty’s founders feeling strongly that family physicians 
should be the doctors for their communities, the specialty of family medicine 
has committed to instruction in numerous community-related skills meant to 
complement clinical training.” Over time, the UMass residency has increased 
its explicit coverage of community-involvement skill instruction for residents.24 
In these ways, the department acknowledges the original vision of both Hugh 
Fulmer and Dick Walton, one in which clinical practice responds to the needs of 
individuals and families within communities.25
In from the Margins: Primary Care in Internal Medicine 
and Pediatrics
            The issue is not whether the country has a sufficient supply of physicians 
but whether the physicians that our academic medical centers produce are 
congruent with our country’s health needs. We aren’t educating the kind of 
physicians needed by society.  (Robert Petersdorf, M.D., President, AAMC, 
1990)26
Some of the same social forces that buoyed the creation of family 
practice also contributed to the establishment of primary care residencies in 
the specialties of internal medicine and pediatrics a few years later. For internal 
medicine, cultivating a generalist orientation overturned a long tradition. The 
formation of the specialty of internal medicine was intended – from the outset 
– as a rejection of the culture of Victorian general practice. Rosemary Stevens 
writes that the term “internal medicine” in the U.S. denoted, “a focus on the 
physiological and chemical bases of disease rather than on the family, generalist, 
more folksy approach of general practice.” Thus the American College of 
Physicians, founded in 1915, was intended explicitly as a spur to the adoption of 
“biological medicine.” Despite exceptional figures such as Dr. Francis Peabody – 
whose famous plea to “care for the patient” was intended as a corrective to these 
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newer trends in medicine – by the time of the creation of the American Board of 
Internal Medicine in 1936, the field had come to signify specialized, technology-
inflected,  20th century medicine.27 One exemplar of the turn toward the 
technological during the first quarter of the 20th century was Dr. Richard Cabot, 
who ran a private practice in Boston from 1896 to 1926. Cabot’s approach to 
practice was built upon a reputation for diagnostic sophistication grounded in the 
ostensibly objective data of laboratory analysis. He ultimately chose to “delegate” 
the responsibility for deep knowledge of the patient’s life circumstances, the core 
of the generalist approach, to medical social workers and pastoral counselors. He 
is credited with the idea for the first hospital department of social work.28 
After World War I, many internists, following the availability of new 
diagnostic technologies, became subspecialists, focusing on particular organ 
systems and treating patients mainly for acute occurrences. Eugene Braunwald, 
M.D., renowned cardiologist, researcher, and professor of medicine at Harvard, 
described internal medicine during the first three quarters of the 20th century 
this way: “First and foremost, the internist was a generalist with a capacity to 
integrate multiple and complex medical problems, to elucidate difficult diagnoses 
(internists were often called ‘diagnosticians’), and to establish therapeutic 
strategies for patients with serious illnesses.” 29 Inpatient care comprised a major 
component of the internist’s work. Analyzing the course taken by general internal 
medicine, two academic internists wrote in 2006 that “internists, especially 
academic internists, were deeply ambivalent about primary care, feeling that 
it did not measure up in intellectual rigor to traditional Oslerian internal 
medicine.”30 Bruce Weinstein, M.D., who held the first general internal medicine 
fellowship at UMass Medical Center, remembered that, “It was very unusual to go 
into general internal medicine or to go practice in the community,” even as late as 
1983 when he came to Worcester.31 
To some extent, therefore, the creation of primary care internal medicine 
residencies in the U.S. during the 1970s cut against the grain.  It was foremost a 
response to external pressures, the national concern over a lack of, generically 
speaking, family physicians. Likely, too, it evidenced recognition that the new 
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opportunities for growth of outpatient care ought not to be yielded to family 
practitioners without a fight. Publication of the Institute of Medicine’s report 
on primary care, Report of a Study: A Manpower Policy for Primary Health 
Care  in 1978 may have been another impetus.32 Before 1970, fewer than 5% of 
medical school “primary teaching hospitals” had functioning general internal 
medicine units; by 1979, such units could be found in 77% of such hospitals. Two-
thirds of these were founded between 1975 and 1979. The Society for General 
Internal Medicine, with assistance from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
was organized in 1978.33 According to a survey conducted in 1979, the need to 
staff ambulatory clinics as well as to teach generalist residents was the primary 
reason for establishing these units. It is sometimes claimed that the development 
of generalist residency tracks in internal medicine and pediatrics resulted 
mainly from the availability of federal funding through the Health Professions 
Educational Assistance Act of 1976. However, most programs were founded 
before the legislation was on the books. At least in their first decade, clinical 
revenues, not federal grants, seem to have supplied the bulk of the funding for 
general internal medicine divisions.34 
Despite the proliferation of primary care units of some kind in a majority 
of medical schools, the largest number of primary care practitioners emerged 
from schools that were fundamentally committed to primary care in the first 
place. The characteristics of such schools, one study indicated, included being 
“publicly owned, relatively new, and located in states with a proportionately 
larger rural population; [having] formal departments of family medicine; 
and [receiving] more Title VII funding for their primary care programs.” The 
“values and reward structures” of a particular institution, however, were even 
more important as a predictor of a school’s contribution to the pool of primary 
care physicians. The history of UMass Medical School suggests that another 
characteristic, implicit in the foregoing, was a state legislature determined to get 
its money’s worth in the form of generalist physicians for its constituents.35  
One site with a pronounced early involvement in cultivating a generalist 
approach to patient care was the University of Rochester, in part an outgrowth 
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of the work of the psychosomaticist George Engel, M.D., in promoting a 
“biopsychosocial” approach to the clinical encounter in general and, to the act 
of diagnosis specifically. Interestingly, Engel’s well known explicit formulation 
of the “biopsychosocial model” in 1977 was intended to counter what in his view 
had become the dominance of a reductively biomedical approach to illness and 
disease.36 Another of the early generalist tracks in internal medicine, and one 
of the most influential, was created in 1973 by William T. Branch, Jr., M.D. 
at the Peter Bent Brigham (now Brigham and Women’s) Hospital, an affiliate 
of Harvard Medical School. An early recruit to the Department of Medicine’s 
Primary Care division at UMMS, Dr. Lynn Li, began 
her residency at the Brigham in 1975. She recalled, 
“…there were four of us residents who wanted to do 
more primary care, because if you know traditional 
medical residency training, it’s all ICU and inpatient, 
and a lot of very intensive medicine…[But, when] you 
actually go in the office, you’re faced with a patient 
who is walking and talking. You don’t know what to 
do with them!”37 The Brigham program included a 
substantial component of office medicine in years two 
and three. In 1982, after nearly a decade running 
the program, Branch published a widely known 
textbook of the major problems of ambulatory care 
from the general internist’s perspective. The chapters were designed to follow the 
patient’s presentation of a problem, and the differential diagnostic process that 
should ensue from there, followed by analysis of lab and other diagnostic tests, 
the “approach to the patient, and the management of the illness.” Diagnostic 
tests were to be discussed in light of their predictive value and cost effectiveness; 
clinical problems were to be “considered in light of their epidemiology.”38 For 
the sake of comparison, a comparably prominent textbook for family practice 
residents from the same period, written by the chair of a department of family 
practice, aimed to “produce a primary physician trained to treat the whole 
Lynn Li, M.D. (Photo courtesy 
of the University of Massachusetts 
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patient and not merely a diseased part.” This included, “preventive and health 
maintenance,” family dynamics, medical sociology and anthropology, medical 
records and “family charts.” Both authors invoked the terms “continuing” and 
“comprehensive” care, but reflected the distinct differences in emphasis that 
characterize the two specialties.39 
During its first decade or so, general internal medicine nationally and, as 
we will see, at UMMS, did not thrive. For the national picture, one can draw on 
several studies that were published in 1985 in an attempt to assess the status of 
such programs after about 10 years experience. The picture did not look good. 
Less than 5% of internal medicine residency slots were allotted to general internal 
medicine at the time. According to one study, general internists on medical 
school faculties accomplished little research; nor, on average, did they spend 
much time in outpatient clinics. Like most internists, in fact, they spent a large 
percentage of time caring for inpatients. In the ambulatory setting, they were 
judged to be doing well with the sickest of their patients, such as those with acute 
diabetes, hypertension, and so forth, but not so well with chronic cases requiring 
continuing care.40 
With the passing of another decade, however, the fortunes of general 
internal medicine turned for the better. The Accreditation Council for Graduate 
Medical Education’s (ACGME’s) Residency Review Committee for Internal 
Medicine “mandated a continuity clinic experience for all internal medicine 
residents.” As more generalists were hired to cover these clinics and as more 
intense exposure to ambulatory general medicine increased, general internal 
medicine became a feature of departments of medicine in academic medical 
schools. Research, too, became possible as new funding for health outcomes 
research provided apt subject matter for general internists.41 Furthermore, in 
1996 the Institute of Medicine “revised the definition of primary care to include 
‘the community context of medical practice’.”42 Just as important, perhaps, 
were the opportunities for professional development offered by the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation’s Generalist Physician Initiative, a program that 
began in 1989 and lasted until 1997 and that, as I will show, was critical to the 
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flourishing of generalist medicine at UMass Medical Center.43 Whereas in 1980, 
68 medical schools in the U.S. had formal general internal medicine divisions, 
by 2010, the number had more than doubled. At present, the Council of the 
Society of General Internal Medicine (SGIM) views its members’ strengths 
to be “practice innovation,” clinical research, medical education, and quality 
and safety initiatives. It faces the same challenges as the specialty of family 
medicine in the persistent under-reimbursement of primary care in relation to 
more procedurally-driven specialties, but it also must contend with the strong 
preference for basic science research that prevails among subspecialty internists. 
Family medicine, as a primarily community-based specialty, is not generally held 
to that standard. In 2013, the Council of the SGIM claimed as its mission: 
General internal medicine aims to achieve health care delivery that 
is comprehensive, technologically advanced and individualized; 
instills trust within a culture of respect; is efficient in the use of 
time, people and resources; is organized and financed to achieve 
optimal health outcomes; maximizes equity; and continually learns 
and adapts. 44
Among American pediatricians, organized resistance to a growing bias 
against generalist practice began relatively early, in 1953, when a group of 
pediatricians gathered informally at an American Pediatric Society meeting to 
discuss the lack of attention to “outpatient” pediatrics. In 1960 they founded 
the Association for Ambulatory Pediatric Services (renamed the Ambulatory 
Pediatric Association in 1969). During these years, the pediatrician Robert J. 
Haggerty lead an initiative at Boston Children’s Hospital to orient his program 
toward a comprehensive, “patient-oriented” approach that even extended to 
pioneering interdisciplinary care teams and a family medical record.45 Evan 
Charney, M.D., chair of Pediatrics at UMass Medical School during the years 
leading up to and including the Generalist Physician Initiative, of which more 
will be said below, recalled that period as “a little bit of the feeling of a group 
huddled together to…determine whether or not there was a legitimate place for 
ambulatory pediatricians within the academic pediatric community.” Through 
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the early 1980s this trend consolidated into the creation of residency tracks, 
national meetings, and professional publications, including an influential volume 
on the essentials of residency education for primary care pediatrics co-authored 
by Evan Charney. Other members of the Pediatrics Department at UMass at 
the time also played prominent roles on the national scene. Thomas DeWitt, 
M.D., for example, served as president in 1993 of what was by then called the 
Association for General Pediatrics (the name change was initially voted down as 
too risky for academic pediatricians). DeWitt and Kenneth Roberts, M.D., the 
pediatrics residency director at UMMC, co-edited the manual Pediatric Education 
in Community Settings during DeWitt’s presidency, an indication of the growing 
professionalism of community-based pediatrics education. It was the first of 
its kind. By the late 1990s, in parallel with general internal medicine, general 
pediatrics had become a presence in academic health centers.46
  Primary Care at UMass Med: Beyond Family Practice
 At UMass Medical Center, the responsibility for primary care, as 
described above, was initially taken on by the family practitioners, as was 
happening nationally in the early 1970s. When Roger Bulger, M.D., was named 
Chancellor/Dean in 1976, his Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs, Philip Caper, 
M.D., specialized in health care policies designed to maximize community-
based primary care, a close fit with family practice. A prime example was the 
launch of the Area Health Education Centers, or AHECs, a program funded 
through the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976 and, at 
UMass Med, spearheaded by Caper. AHECs were intended to disperse primary 
care professional development opportunities to regions of the United States 
experiencing shortages of generalist physicians. Early on, as at the University of 
North Carolina School of Medicine as well as UMass, AHECs were implemented 
in conjunction with departments of family medicine. In all cases, they were 
designed to augment generalist physicians’ professional development. For the 
duration of the 1970s, the AHEC program along with the swift expansion of 
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family practice residencies comprised UMass Medical Center’s main primary 
care initiatives. UMass partnered with Tufts and Boston University who held 
subcontracts to run AHEC programs established in Springfield and Boston. 
Caper’s successful application for AHEC funding in 1978 placed the medical 
center among only five successful applicants, in part a reflection of Caper’s own 
connections to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 
as HHS was called at the time, and to insiders such as Senator Edward Kennedy 
who were working for enhanced access to primary care. The campus visit in 1978 
by Joseph Califano, then Secretary of HEW, signaled this growing emphasis on 
primary care education and outreach. Califano lauded the medical center’s work 
as “the wave of the future.”47 
   The “future” did not arrive for another 15 years. Primary care was far less 
visible in the departments of Medicine and Pediatrics than in Family Medicine 
during UMMC’s first decade, a period when the medical center’s highest priority 
(aside from giving the appearance of devotion to primary care) actually was the 
successful launch of its tertiary care hospital. In 1978 Dr. Lynn Li was the first 
physician hired at UMass Med directly from a primary care internal medicine 
residency. The year after she arrived, her group was explicitly named the General 
Medicine and Primary Care division within the Department of Medicine. Of the 
four or five doctors in it, however, she was one of two trained to be a generalist. 
(Hugh Fulmer, who directed the division from 1979 to 1983, was the other.) 
Three of Dr. Li’s colleagues ultimately returned to their original specialties of 
infectious diseases and gastroenterology as soon as those divisions were formally 
established. In those days, the General Medicine clinic was located next to the 
hospital’s main entrance on the first floor. Bruce Weinstein, M.D., who in 1983 
became the first general medicine fellow at UMass, first with Hugh Fulmer, then 
with Harry (“Moe”) Green, was the Chief of General Medicine and Primary Care 
at UMass for many years. He remembers the institution during his first years as 
“a very subspecialty-dominated institution…the subspecialists ruled.”48 
 Pediatrics did not differ in this regard.Dr. J. Barry Hanshaw, M.D., a 
pediatrician and microbiologist from the University of Rochester arrived to 
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become chair of Pediatrics in 1975, months before the hospital ever admitted 
its first patient. He emphatically described the 
plight of his Pediatrics inpatient unit during 
the first years of the hospital: “We certainly had 
nothing like volume. You know, on a good day 
we might have had six patients.” He needed to 
build up a strong academic department where 
the combination of good care and specialized 
expertise would draw inpatient referrals and 
help build up the hospital. During that first 
decade after the hospital’s opening, neither the 
Department of Pediatrics nor Medicine could 
afford to put much effort toward their outpatient 
work; the 
hospital’s inpatient wards demanded their 
attention.49 
 Dr. Weinstein echoed these views. Of 
Medicine he insisted, “the Department at 
that time was very heavily driven by inpatient 
medicine… we were avid for patients, everyone 
was…the two giants were Memorial Hospital 
and St. Vincent. And UMass was really trying 
to get patients. We had a patient shortage…” 
The division of General Medicine and Primary 
Care had a very different feel in the 1980s. “I don’t remember how much time 
we had to see a patient.  I’m going to guess it was probably about a half-hour or 
so, and maybe 45 minutes or an hour for a new patient, but it was much more 
generous than we [have] now, and we just didn’t have that many patients. I 
don’t remember being harried or rushed or frantic at those times. I remember a 
little bit of twiddling my thumbs and not being that busy.”50 Thirty years later, 
the ambulatory caseload for internal medicine at UMass is extremely heavy. 
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Weinstein likens the transformation to a “mom-and-pop” store that turned into a 
“Macy’s”: 
 
We [General Medicine] have a very large budget in the Department 
of Medicine, which has about 15 different divisions, depending on 
how you count them. We’re probably very – close to the very top, 
in terms of number of patients we see, cash receipts. We’re just big. 
We’re big and bustling. We have over 50,000 visits a year. We have 
25,000 patients….We could see 300 patients a day downstairs…
We have 33 residents…We’re very, very large. So we’re not the poor 
stepchild anymore…And so we have parity now, and respect. 
In Weinstein’s words, “for the institution to thrive, the specialties needed us 
– they needed patients coming in through us, and that was not only with our 
division [but also] from Worcester and the outskirts.”51  Yet, as late as 1984, 
even the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) site visitors to the 
medical school expressed concern that primary care be better integrated across 
several departments. Under “Concerns,” they wrote: “The [UMMS] institutional 
goals and objectives should be made consistent with the school’s program 
development, and the scope of primary care should be expanded to include 
Internal Medicine and Pediatrics, as well as Family Medicine.”52
During the 1980s, a gradual convergence of the departments of Family 
Medicine, Medicine, and Pediatrics around primary care faculty development 
grew out of the needs of newly busy outpatient clinics. As noted in Chapter 5, the 
growth of ambulatory services far outstripped projections. Residents were needed 
to help staff the clinics and these residents, in turn, needed to learn community-
based practice skills if they were to handle outpatients competently. As had 
become clear at national meetings of internists and pediatricians, community-
based practices were the best place to train residents for generalist practice. But 
first, someone must train practitioners in how to teach residents these skills. 
Such teaching did not come naturally, especially to doctors not based at medical 
centers. Innovative programs to train faculty to teach family medicine, general 
medicine and pediatrics became essential aspects of the growth of generalist 
medicine at UMMS and elsewhere. 
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Faculty development programs came into their own at UMMC under the 
direction of Mark Quirk, Ed. D., an educational psychologist in Family Medicine 
and Community Health. Quirk, who came to the medical school in 1978, catalyzed 
the growth of interdisciplinary collaboration focused on faculty development. 
He first arrived as a doctoral candidate in educational psychology and cognitive 
development from Clark University in Worcester. He was hired to assist the 
original director of the New England 
Faculty Medical Education Development 
project, an innovative, federally funded 
program to train faculty to precept medical 
students in family medicine. After the 
project director left UMass, Quirk took 
it over, built it up, and eventually helped 
expand its scope beyond the Family 
Medicine department faculty and residents. 
Initially, the program brought together 
faculty from all New England medical schools with family medicine departments 
four times a year for workshops focused on “teaching and learning.” Over the 
years, even as it expanded to include other faculty, its goals remained constant. In 
Quirk’s words: 
How do you take a student in your office or at the bedside, a learner 
– could be a student, resident, or a fellow – and how do you teach? 
How do you understand what they need? How do you develop your 
goals and objectives based on those needs? What’s the array of 
teaching styles and methods that you use to assess those needs…
And how do you provide feedback and evaluation? 53 
As Daniel Lasser explained, “It runs parallel to the clinical process. You walk in 
the room and you say, ‘What is the purpose of the visit, what does the person 
need, in the next 5 minutes what do I need to accomplish? How am I going to 
accomplish it, and how will I know whether or not I accomplished that?’”54 
Meanwhile, the Department of Pediatrics initially generated its own 
Mark Quirk, Ed.D. (Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School 
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primary care faculty development program independent of Quirk’s. Under the 
leadership of Evan Charney, M.D., chair of Pediatrics, and pediatrician Thomas 
DeWitt, the department had introduced community-based faculty development 
as early as 1986. They realized that a community-based residency, increasingly 
the trend in U.S. pediatrics departments, depended on having a cadre of trained 
pediatricians out in the community to teach the residents. In 1987 they won a 
Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) faculty development grant. These grants 
were initially intended for family practice, but 
in 1981 they were opened to general internal 
medicine and general pediatrics applicants.55 
DeWitt also began collaborating with Quirk’s 
faculty development program. Kenneth 
Roberts, residency director for Pediatrics, who 
arrived in 1988, devised the acronym GNOME 
to summarize and condense the Community 
Faculty Development Program’s basic pedagogic 
structure (described by Daniel Lasser above): Goals, Needs, Objectives, Methods, 
Evaluation.56  Decades later, one can still find images of gnomes sprinkled 
through the program’s teaching materials as well as gnomic figurines on the 
shelves of the Clinical Faculty Development program office. 
Within a few years of Roberts’ and DeWitt’s collaboration with Quirk in 
community faculty development, the Department of Medicine decided to join 
them, with Drs. Sarah Stone and David Hatem leading the effort. In 1994 the 
three departments successfully obtained the first interdepartmental faculty 
development grant funded by HRSA.57 That program, known as “Teaching for 
Tomorrow,” became the basis for the Community Faculty Development Center. 
Eventually it was renamed the Clinical Faculty Development Center as it came 
to include hospital-based faculty, too. At the time of writing, it trained faculty 
from 15 or 16 medical schools in New England and New York State. By 2013, the 
Center had trained more than 1000 clinical educators, including physicians and 
Evan Charney, M.D. (Photo courtesy 
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others.58 
A parallel initiative for residents was formalized in 1987 as the “Resident 
Education in Office Practices” program. Susan Starr, Assistant Professor of 
Pediatrics and the program educator, explained its rationale:
So, the idea was that…since time began, if you were trained in 
Pediatrics, you were trained in hospital medicine. That’s how it 
was. Yet eighty percent, at least, of the pediatricians who were 
trained went out and worked in the community, but they were never 
trained in the community. So Ken [Roberts] 
and Tom [DeWitt] got together and said, “This 
makes no sense. Let’s have a major portion of 
the training be in community offices…It caught 
on like wildfire…every place has a Community 
Pediatrics [program with] residents out in 
community offices…When they graduate, they 
hit the ground running.59
Evan Charney wrote, “It is rapidly becoming the 
national model for continuity practice experience for 
pediatric residency education…”60 The program held 
a 10-year celebration in 1997, a mark of its success. 
By this time, residents who had graduated from the program were themselves 
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hosting residents in their own community practices. 
 
  Primary Care in the Undergraduate Medical Curriculum
From the late 1980s, medical students, too, benefited from the revitalized 
commitment to primary care education at UMass Medical School. For example, 
a course called “Communication Skills” utilized standardized patients (SPs) with 
small groups of students, an initiative introduced by Paula L. Stillman, M.D., 
the Associate Dean for Curriculum. Stillman is 
widely credited with being one of the earliest 
medical educators to develop the use of SPs 
in medical education, something she began 
in the early 1970s as the clerkship director in 
Pediatrics at the University of Arizona-Tucson. 
Over the course of her 11 years at UMass from 
1982-1993, the use of SPs for medical student 
education expanded from the atypical to the 
norm at most medical schools, including 
UMass. At UMass, Stillman also developed a 
45-minute session for residents utilizing SPs. SPs could mimic actual patients but 
were superior to them in their ability to standardize the illness presentation for 
every student as well as feedback encompassing both physical and psychosocial 
data, a bulwark of primary care, but of course, crucial for all clinicians.61  
The collaboration of the chair of the Psychiatry department (and future 
Chancellor/Dean), Aaron Lazare, M.D., with Mai-Lan Rogoff, M.D., a psychiatrist 
and soon-to-be Associate Dean for Student Affairs, and a relatively new 
assistant professor of medicine, Sarah Stone, M.D., also played an important 
role in the flowering of primary care in undergraduate medical education.  By 
many accounts, the late Sarah Stone (1956-2001), a general internist, became 
the linchpin of interdepartmental programs in primary care undergraduate 
medical education. Colleagues remember Stone almost reverently for her 
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“gorgeous smile,” her sense of humor “like one of the boys,” and her “visionary” 
commitment to teaching community-based ambulatory care. Bruce Weinstein, 
who succeeded her as chief of the division of General Medicine commented that 
she “left very big footprints in the medical school. I think a lot of people consider 
her one of the real pioneers in medical education 
here…Sarah…really developed the idea of patient-
centered care.” The Sarah Stone Excellence in 
Medical Education award, given annually at UMMS 
since 2002 to honor faculty educators, attests to her 
legacy.62 
Stone and Aaron Lazare began collaborating 
soon after her arrival as a young faculty member in 
1986. Lazare had come to UMass from Harvard four 
years earlier to chair the Department of Psychiatry. 
Lazare, both before and after becoming Dean of the 
Medical School in 1990 (and Chancellor in 1991), was 
internationally known for his work on the psychology 
of the physician-patient relationship and of the medical interview through 
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articles such as “Hidden Conceptual Models in Clinical Psychiatry,” “Shame 
and Humiliation in the Medical Encounter,” and texts on the psychosocial 
underpinnings of the medical interview. Lazare’s experience at Harvard Medical 
School and Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) appear to have contributed 
directly to the success of his partnership with Stone on primary care curriculum 
reform at UMMS. For example, in addition to directing the operation of the 
MGH inpatient psychiatric unit and, subsequently, all six outpatient psychiatric 
clinics, Dr. Lazare held major teaching responsibilities for both residents and 
undergraduate medical students. Opportunely, from 1968 to 1976 Dr. Lazare 
worked with John Stoeckle, M.D., the renowned internist and advocate for 
primary care who at the time was the Director of Internal Medicine at MGH. 
Lazare served as the Psychiatry Coordinator for Stoeckle’s “Introduction to 
Clinical Medicine” course. As Lazare’s insights into interviewing psychiatric 
outpatients coalesced during this period, so did his realization that they could 
be adapted to primary care. Just as the internist George Engel, based in the 
Psychiatry Department at the University of Rochester, crafted a “biopsychosocial 
model” for students learning the art of the medical interview, Lazare, two 
decades later, adapted a psychiatrically derived, multidimensional approach 
to interviewing into the undergraduate primary care curriculum at UMass 
Medical School. His multi-dimensional approach proceeded from the premise 
that the patient brought his or her own explanatory framework into the doctor’s 
office. No interviewer should neglect to find out “what the patient believes is 
wrong with him [or her] and what he [or she] expects should be done about it.” 
Second, he believed, “the problem should be viewed from four points of view: 
the biologic, the psychodynamic, the sociocultural, and the behavioral.” Finally, 
Lazare recognized the need to resolve a potential conflict between the patient’s 
understanding of the problem and that of the physician through a process of 
negotiation.63  
 Drs. Stone and Rogoff, too, were interested in the dynamics of the clinical 
encounter, a perspective that converged with that of both Lazare and with the 
Family Medicine residency’s use of Balint groups, described in Chapter 6, to 
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help physicians face so-called “difficult patients.” Bruce Weinstein described the 
situation faced by many generalists in internal medicine:
…as our practices grew, we started getting very tough patients that 
were making us crazy. We didn’t know why…We just knew that 
there are some patient interactions that are as smooth as silk, and 
some that leave you scratching your head or give you a headache, or 
you see them on your schedule and you cringe. And so [Dr. Stone] 
said, ‘Well, I’m going…to try to better understand that.’64
Soon after her arrival, Drs. Stone and Lazare joined forces to hold weekly case 
conferences for members of the General Medicine and Primary Care division. 
From this period dates the emergence of general internal medicine onto the 
larger stage of primary care medical education at UMMC. Both physicians were 
committed to the idea of patient-centered care. Lazare had written about this 
since the 1970s, in particular on the advantages of asking the patient, “How 
are you hoping I can help you today?” Their weekly conferences evolved into 
“bringing actual patients in, some tough patients, with [Lazare] conducting 
interviews in a way that we’d never seen…before…from a psychiatric perspective 
but with a medical model…”65 From these case conferences evolved a new course, 
“Medical Interviewing and Clinical Problem Solving,” which Stone and Rogoff 
created in 1990 for first-year students that combined interviewing and problem-
solving. In Stone’s words, “We use real or simulated patients and talk about their 
clinical problems…A lot of things can make an interview difficult…including 
a discussion of a patient’s sexual history, a situation where you have to give a 
patient bad news, or an ethical dilemma.”66 
 Out of this early course, the format of the “Physician, Patient, and Society” 
course took shape. From 1975, a multidisciplinary course called “Introduction 
to Patient Care” introduced students to the behavioral and social sciences along 
with “family and community medicine, human sexuality, ethics, emergency 
medical training and introductory physical diagnosis.”67 The new “PPS,” which 
was required for first- and second-year students, was organized around small 
groups of 10 or 12 students with two faculty members from any field who worked 
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to develop the students’ patient-centered interviewing skills. In Dr. Weinstein’s 
view, before the late 1980s, patient-centered interviewing “did not really exist 
[here] except in little pockets…the school has always had this sort of charge to 
train primary care physicians, and this was really a core change in what they were 
doing…getting trainees very early in their career – their pre-clinical years – to 
kind of learn how to talk to patients and see them as human beings and not as 
diseases.” Typical cases might include a patient with a terminal illness, one who 
needed an interpreter, “a patient with vague complaints that …are just all over 
the place,” or, “a rambling patient you can’t rein in.” It became foundational for 
UMass students. According to Weinstein, for a while it was known at UMass as 
“the Sarah Stone course…”68  
The Generalist Physician Initiative
I strongly believe that we can be a national leader in keeping with this initiative, 
and still maintain our stellar reputation for biomedical research and clinical 
services. (Aaron Lazare, M.D., 1994)
 With these words, Chancellor/Dean Lazare placed a public bet that 
research and primary care could flourish in tandem at UMass Medical School. 
His remarks heralded the School’s recently awarded Generalist Physician 
Initiative (GPI) grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, a six-year 
project lasting from 1994 to 2000 to reinvigorate primary care medical education 
at U.S. medical schools.69 The school successfully applied for a GPI planning 
grant in 1992, the culmination of the previous five or six years’ preliminary 
work, described above. The two-year grant, given to only five medical schools in 
the United States, enabled UMass Med to align its educational and admissions 
programs to support the intensive work that, it was hoped, would lead to a full 
six years of funding. The school’s pre-planning efforts began in 1991 when a 
multidisciplinary group including Mick Huppert from Family Medicine and 
Community Health and Evan Charney, learned of the Foundation’s call for 
proposals. The opportunity coincided with curriculum changes such as the 
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new “Physician, Patient, and Society” course with its emphasis on the patient 
interview. In 1993, as part of preparations to apply for the full GPI grant, the 
Office of Medical Education was reconfigured as the hub of curricular matters 
across all departments. A major restructuring of the curriculum in 1994 (to be 
discussed further in Chapter 10) capped these efforts.70 
 In 1994 the school was one of 14 nationwide to be awarded the full 
implementation grant. With Chancellor Lazare as Principal Investigator, 
the departments of Medicine, Family Medicine and Community Health, and 
Pediatrics partnered with three local health care entities: UMass Medical Center, 
the Fallon Healthcare System, and the Medical Center of Central Massachusetts 
(renamed Memorial Health Care in 1997), all of which contributed significant 
support, both monetary and in faculty time. The GPI goals can be summed up as:
•	 Changes in admissions policies and procedures, resulting in a larger 
proportion of students with a predisposition to primary care;
•	 A restructuring of the undergraduate curriculum, to increase student 
exposure to generalist role models and community-based experience, 
resulting in at least 50% of graduates intending to pursue generalist 
careers; 
•	 An increase in the number of generalist residency positions, and changes 
in residency program curriculum, resulting in an increase in the number of 
residents entering generalist practice; 
•	 Practice environment initiatives, including strategies to assist transition 
into practice of primary care residents.71
  By the end of 1996, year three of the GPI, UMMS had become recognized 
as a leader among medical schools for its success as an incubator of primary 
care doctors. The school’s three primary care divisions joined forces to promote 
a new approach to admissions, medical education, residency training, and 
faculty development in the community. The admissions office, for example, 
under the leadership of Dr. Jeffrey Bernhard, a dermatologist, and from 1996 
under Dr. Michele Pugnaire,  a family physician, added five generalists to the 
Admissions Committee as well as a supplemental “Generalist Orientation” 
appraisal form for interviewers to standardize the assessment of candidates. 
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Additionally, a new Primary Care Advisor program paired up generalist 
faculty with incoming students predisposed to becoming primary care doctors. 
Community-based physicians increasingly were 
enlisted to interview prospective students.72 Not 
only did the “Physician, Patient and Society” 
course emphasize primary care, but ambulatory 
clerkship experiences during the students’ 
clinical years proliferated. Helpfully, the state’s 
Learning Contract with students, which had 
promised tuition reimbursement for one post-
residency year of practice in the Commonwealth, 
was redrawn in 1994 to reward a four-year 
commitment to primary care in the state. 73 
Added to the increased emphasis on 
primary care in the medical school curriculum, residency slots for general 
internal medicine, general pediatrics and family practice were augmented (or 
realigned). Overall, 63% of residents in all programs were placed in community-
based practices for continuity clinic experiences. A new residency track with eight 
slots for general medicine/pediatrics also was established. These innovations in 
turn reinforced the work of the Community Faculty Development Center, where, 
as noted above, community-based physicians were given training so that they 
could competently and comfortably become teachers for the medical students 
and residents who now clamored for community-based office experience. An 
innovation of Susan Starr helped to focus awareness on the issue of mentor 
competency: she created a scale to measure “Teacher Identity” in community 
preceptors as a first step toward increasing the commitment to teaching of 
intensely busy clinicians out in the community.74
 The early 1990s marked another milestone for primary care at UMass, 
the opening of the Joseph T. Benedict Primary Care Building in 1992. The 
Trustees agreed with Chancellor Lazare’s suggestion to dedicate it to Benedict, 
the founding chair of the University Hospital Management Board, a devoted 
Michele Pugnaire, M.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Masssachusetts 
Medical School) 
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supporter of the school – especially with his friend Senator Edward Kennedy 
– and also a grateful patient. Benedict had started out working in Worcester 
at the American Steel and Wire Factory while in high school (where his Polish 
immigrant father also worked) until a baseball scholarship (he was a pitcher) 
took him to the University of New Hampshire. After stints as a teacher and school 
principal, he worked at the Worcester Housing Authority where his exceptional 
leadership in the aftermath of the Worcester tornado of 1953 led to his offer of 
a job at a bank specializing in home financing. Ultimately he became president 
of the Boston Federal Home Loan Bank and then returned to Worcester as head 
of Freedom Federal Savings. As Benedict saw it, his support for the Medical 
Center allowed him to repay a debt to the hospital (and to Dr. Brownie Wheeler) 
for having saved his life 20 years earlier after a disastrously botched treatment 
(elsewhere) for a life-threatening condition.75
 The Benedict building housed the ambulatory divisions of the departments 
of Medicine, Pediatrics, Family Medicine and Community Health and, at the 
time, Psychiatry and Employee Health. Since the day in 1979 that the Governor 
vetoed approximately $800,000 for construction of an ambulatory care unit at 
the medical center, acquiring such space had become an increasingly pressing 
need. Ambulatory patient demand grew dramatically between 1980 and 1990 – 
from 87,000 adult and pediatric patient visits to 200,000 visits. The opening of 
the building coincided with UMass’s award of the GPI planning grant and gave 
Chancellor Aaron Lazare with Joseph and Mary  Benedict at 
the dedication of the Joseph T. Benedict Primary Care Building 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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an added boost to the enlivened spirit of primary care services and education.76 
In 1995 the medical center opened the Dr. John Meyers Primary Care Institute, 
honoring Meyers, who was president of the Worcester-based Fallon Clinic 
for two decades, for his staunch commitment to primary care. The Institute’s 
first director, Dr. Jerry Gurwitz, oversees a two-year fellowship in “managed 
primary care” as well as research projects on primary care practice and quality 
improvement.77
As a result of these broad and deep innovations, UMass Medical School 
has been ranked in the top 10% of medical schools for primary care education 
since 1995. According to AAMC figures, in 1987 UMass Medical School 
matriculants were no more likely than the national average to list primary care 
as their intended specialty. In contrast, by 1995 the percentage far exceeded 
the national average, 53.6% vs. 41.1%. Of its graduating class for 1995, 50.8% 
stated an intention to enter primary care, placing UMMS in the top 5 nationally. 
Turning to residency graduates, by 1995, 59% were entering primary care 
practices. That same year, the AAMC ranked the school #4 in the percentage 
of graduates of the classes of 1989-1991 currently in primary care practice.78 In 
1996, UMMS ranked second out of the 62 U.S. medical schools that graduated 
the highest share of M.D.’s entering primary care, according to the March 1996 
issue of U.S. News and World Report. Nationally, the picture is less promising. 
According to a 2010 report by the Council on Graduate Medical Education, 
physician participation in primary care practice has declined and seems to 
not be reviving; in general internal medicine, numbers of available residency 
slots have declined by 900 between 1998 and 2008. According to a study from 
2012, “Currently, 31% of U.S. physicians practice in primary care specialties, 
but less than 25% of physicians in training are currently entering primary care 
practice…20% of general internists care only for inpatients.”79 
At UMass, however, despite a difficult gestation, primary care came into 
its own by the end of the 1980s, genuinely living up to the school’s commitment 
to primary care education in the 1975 Statement of Goals. In 2007, 55% of UMMS 
graduates entered primary care residencies; family practice was the choice of 9% 
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of that number, or 5% of the total class.80 Primary care does not completely define 
the culture of the school, nor was it intended by its founders to do so. But for 
close to a quarter century, it has more than held its own.81
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Chapter 8
Becoming a Research University, Part 1:
Securing a Place for Basic Research, 1970-1990
  Introduction
 This chapter and Chapter 9 will describe UMass Medical School’s 
surprising emergence during the 1990s from its predicted trajectory as 
predominantly a “community” medical school in which primary care education 
was its main raison d’être, to a health sciences center reputed nationally and 
internationally for its contributions to biomedical research. I will examine the 
crucial steps taken by early leaders in the basic science departments to lay down 
a foundation for future growth. Indeed distinguished work was produced here in 
the school’s first two decades. UMMS leaders in the bench sciences accomplished 
this in spite of—or possibly because of—the “laissez-faire” attitude of early 
chancellors, most of whom were too busy fighting off fiscal threats to both the 
school and the hospital to be able to give much attention to strategic growth in 
the basic sciences.1 As this chapter shows, a fundamental change in expectations 
for the school was a precondition for the controversial decision in 1988 to appoint 
as chancellor someone who was not primarily a clinician but a researcher, 
Leonard Laster, M.D. Chapter 9 will then trace the surprising repercussions of 
Dr. Laster’s brief chancellorship. 
 Research on a Shoestring 
  It takes a vivid imagination from today’s vantage to grasp the fragility 
of the research enterprise at UMass Medical School during its first dozen or so 
years. All school activities, with the exception of one or two faculty labs, were 
housed in the modest quarters of the Shaw building until the new medical 
sciences building opened in October of 1973. By then, the Shaw building was 
filled to capacity with students, faculty, administrators, staff, and custodians, 
including a grand total of 25 who were basic science faculty. Not that the Shaw 
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building had been fully converted from its modest origins as a candy and tobacco 
products warehouse. Faculty, staff, and students tolerated a building in which the 
roof leaked and the heating and air conditioning malfunctioned.2 There was little 
choice but to use it since the school’s main building, housing its clinical and basic 
science wings, would not be ready for occupancy until 1973-1974. 
  Administrative quarters were established immediately in the Shaw 
Building. Dean Soutter, his secretary, and his administrative assistant, Muriel 
Sawyer (Harrington), all occupied one office suite in a corner at the front of 
the building. The early researchers, however, found the setting a bit more 
challenging. R. William “Bill” Butcher, one of the first department chairs 
to arrive, remembered it—albeit fondly—as “basically kind of a dump.” The 
Medical Science building, where laboratories would be housed, opened floor 
by floor. The faculty adapted in a variety of ways. During his first year or two, 
Butcher’s laboratory was housed at the campus of the Worcester Foundation 
for Experimental Biology in Shrewsbury—not at the Shaw building. Graciously, 
he also arranged for the handful of early faculty members to eat lunch at the 
Foundation, especially on Saturdays. Another of the early chairs, Sam Clark, 
M.D., head of the Department of Anatomy, retained his research lab at Harvard 
until the summer of 1970. Allan Jacobson, who was a post-doctoral fellow at MIT 
working on the regulation of gene expression when he was recruited in 1973, kept 
his MIT lab until his permanent laboratory in the Medical Sciences building was 
ready in 1974.3  
 
 
 
 
 
Basic Science Departments and Chairs, c. 1972-1973 
  
                       Anatomy         Sam J. Clark, Jr., M.D. 
 
                       Biochemistry         Reginald W. Butcher, Ph.D. 
 
                       Microbiology         Donald J. Tipper, Ph.D. 
 
                        Pathology         Guido Majno, M.D. 
 
                        Physiology         H. Maurice Goodman, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
           374
Nevertheless, the departments of Anatomy, Biochemistry, Microbiology, 
Pathology, and Physiology set up rudimentary working laboratories in the Shaw 
Building. The building also contained preliminary versions of the library, headed 
by Donald Morton, Ph.D., the dissection lab, the morgue, and an animal room. H. 
Maurice (“Moe”) Goodman, Ph.D., chair of the Department of Physiology from 
1970 to 2006, described the scene this way:
Across the hall from us, Sam Clark, who was the initial Chairman 
of Anatomy, had two young faculty people. One was Sandy Marks, 
the other was Frank Chlapowski, and Shirwin Pockwinse was 
his technician...It was really very friendly, and very congenial…
the warehouse had a fairly high ceiling, and the wall between 
the labs didn’t go all the way up; it went like three-quarters of 
the way up. So things would occasionally fly over the wall, and 
certainly conversations and so forth. It was a very friendly kind 
of environment…And we had one classroom there. There was one 
large room also that was used by the Purchasing Department, and 
Personnel Department, and all; they were all in one big room. 
We had one room for lecturing, and then another one was being 
developed for when we had the second year…we had to have two 
lecture rooms—we had two classes! Bench work was downstairs and 
at the back of the building.4
One wonders how any work was accomplished at all. Shirwin Pockwinse, 
who was hired by Dr. Clark as a technician straight out of college, ran his lab’s 
transmission electron microscope, the lab’s scanning electron microscope, and 
eventually supervised electron microscopy for faculty and trainees in Anatomy 
and other departments. She worked there for more than 40 years. Pockwinse 
remembered that additional offices were carved out of the Shaw Building as 
needed but that young faculty such as Merrill Kenneth Wolf, M.D. and Susan 
Billings-Gagliardi, Ph.D. of the Anatomy Department were in a lab that was next 
door to the department office: “They kind of set up on desks there…but it worked! 
I mean, we got a lot of research done. We had our electron microscopes there. We 
had just one and Pathology had one.”5
 Crowded and under-equipped laboratories were not the major threat 
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to the early faculty’s optimism. Within two years of the School’s opening, the 
government of Massachusetts experienced one of its periodic budget crises, 
producing reduced outlays to the medical school just at the time it was on the 
brink of expanding to its anticipated full size. This resulted from the so-called 
“Shepard Amendment,” designed on behalf of the Massachusetts Taxpayers’ 
Foundation by former Commissioner of Administration and Finance under 
Governor Sargent, Charles Shepard. As one commentator noted, “In passing 
the Massachusetts State Budget for Fiscal Year 1973, 
the State Legislature adopted a plan drawn up by the 
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation resulting in 
the freezing of $67 million of the $2.2 billion State 
budget. This freeze affects every department in the 
State. Under the terms of the freeze, Governor Sargent 
cannot spend more than 15% of the $67 million without 
legislative permission.” Dean Soutter expressed his 
disappointment in his budget testimony to the Board 
of Trustees: The resultant budget cuts, he noted, 
coincide with “the start of clinical education, six new 
departments, increased student body from 40 to 64, preparation for opening the 
Power Plant, preparation for opening the new $64,000,000 Basic and Clinical 
Science building [i.e. the Medical Science building], operation of the entire 
Shaw Building and newly created labs for a full year…”6 The Liaison Committee 
on Medical Education (LCME), the accrediting body for U.S. medical schools, 
also expressed concern. Its “Summary and Recommendations” in 1972 starkly 
observed, “It is not clearly apparent that the authorities recognize the magnitude 
of the financial support which this institution will require in coming years”7
 All things considered, it should not be surprising that a spirit of adventure, 
of pioneering and starting something new, characterized the ambitions of many 
of the early faculty, something that persisted for at least a decade. For example, 
Moe Goodman remembered that in January 1970, with snow thick on the ground, 
accompanying Lamar Soutter from the partially renovated Shaw building up 
H. Maurice Goodman,Ph.D. (photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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Plantation Street to view the main campus site. Goodman stood with Dean 
Soutter, “looking down on this huge hole, and the lake on the other side. And as 
[Soutter] was talking—and he was so charismatic—as he was talking about the 
building, and what it was going to look like, I could see it sort of rising out of the 
ground!” Goodman remembered thinking, “I’ll take this job. This is exciting! This 
is a chance to do something new.” Neal Brown, who arrived in 1973 as a professor 
in Biochemistry and soon moved into the position of chair of Pharmacology, 
remembered Lamar Soutter as a very “assuring fellow.” When the Boston 
medical schools resumed attacks on the school just before University Hospital 
was completed, “Soutter was the kind of guy who said, ‘Eh, you know, it’s a little 
artillery coming in. It’ll stop. Don’t worry about it.’” 8 To Brown, UMass Med 
seemed:
a very welcoming place. You had the sense that it was just wide 
open…When I got here there were like 40 total staff—the animal 
care guy to the professors—only 40 of us. And the school—the class 
size had just led into 40…So you had a feeling, you know, all this 
empty space, and oh, the sky’s the limit. And it was. And it was wide 
open. The dean let you do anything.  It was so non-bureaucratic.9
 Goodman, a physiologist from Harvard who became the backbone of early 
efforts to generate a vibrant research community here and is widely viewed as one 
of the most important figures in the school’s first two decades of development, 
was also attracted to the new and untried.10 He had been in one of the early 
classes at Brandeis as an undergraduate and from there moved on to a “relatively 
new” integrated doctoral program in medical sciences at Harvard. The chance to 
do things “for the first time” was part of the attraction of UMass for Goodman, as 
it was for many of his fellow faculty members in the school’s first decade. (He also 
valued the “goal of providing the opportunity of a medical education for children 
of working-class parents,” something he found “compelling.”) Allan Jacobson 
was attracted here by the prospect of starting a new lab, with all-new equipment, 
and even being promised the opportunity to participate in future recruitment. 
Dr. Guido Majno, a world renowned pathologist, was recruited in 1973 by Dr. 
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Soutter and Maurice Goodman to chair the department of Pathology after less 
than satisfying experiences at Harvard and then Geneva. He and his wife, Isabelle 
Joris, Ph.D., also a faculty member in Pathology, remained at UMass until 2002. 
Michael Czech, Ph.D., who was recruited in 1981 as the chair of Biochemistry, 
had been at Brown University. He remembered that, “what I saw here was just 
an astounding, almost a blank slate, at least in the Biochemistry Department, 
based on the availability of tremendous amounts of space, tremendous amounts 
of resources, and an opportunity to do things in my own research interests that 
were either not possible, or highly improbably to be done in the environment at 
Brown.”11
 One reason these scientists could feel so optimistic was their 
understanding of the Medical School’s mission. Dr. Goodman recalled his first 
meeting with Lamar Soutter in 1969, for example, when Soutter told him that 
the “charge from the legislature was to create a medical school whose quality 
would be second to none in New England.” As Chapter 5 has already described, 
that goal meant different things to different people. In the case of Governor 
Michael Dukakis, it meant different things at different points in his career. But 
to the cadre of scientists brought to UMMS during its first decade or so, even the 
fight to win the hospital from the state legislature did not dissuade them from 
a core belief that primary care medical education should and could coexist with 
a first-rate research enterprise. Neal Brown understood the tension this way: 
“…although the institution was formed around the concept of primary care…it 
was still clear that research was going to be held at a premium eventually—that 
UMass would become known for its research because it was the way you relate 
to the…outside world as a medical school.  That’s what most American medical 
schools do.”12  
 In 1984 Dr. Goodman surveyed the evolution of the Medical School’s 
mission for his department’s external site reviewers. He wrote, 
The original mission of the medical school, as interpreted by Dr. 
Soutter, was to provide excellence in medical education and in 
patient care in order to equip our graduates to pursue those aspects 
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of medicine that best suited their talents and desires. Subsequently 
pressures mounted and political support for the school was 
marshaled among those groups that favored increased primary 
care, and the development of a strong family practice orientation…
The basic science departments, nevertheless, continued to regard 
their mission in the more traditional light of providing excellence in 
teaching and the development of a strong research base. Although 
research ranked rather low in the enunciated goals for the medical 
school in the early seventies, this view was never subscribed to by 
the basic sciences departments and has been substantially reversed 
in recent years.13
 
It would be no exaggeration to write that the history of research at UMass 
Medical School hinges on the faculty’s and administration’s success in, as 
Goodman wrote, substantially reversing the limitations seemingly imposed on 
the school during its early struggle to win funding for the hospital. 
 Fortunately, two of the first basic science chairs to be recruited, Moe 
Goodman of Physiology and Bill Butcher of Biochemistry, were sufficiently 
experienced and canny to size up the situation almost immediately. Equally 
fortuitous, Dean Soutter did not stand in the way of their devising a plan to 
circumvent state-mandated institutional obstacles to growth. Bill Butcher, whose 
research concerned metabolism in white adipose tissue, had been the student of 
Earl Sutherland, who became a Nobel Laureate in 1971 for research on the action 
of hormones. Butcher had followed Sutherland to Vanderbilt, where he was an 
Associate Professor and an Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute 
before being recruited to UMMS in the spring of 1969. He was originally hired for 
the chair of Physiology but when James Ashmore, the chair of Biochemistry and 
the man who had introduced him to Lamar Soutter, decided not to stay at such a 
seemingly high-risk institution, Butcher moved over to Biochemistry to which he 
felt a more robust affinity.14  
 Of course, he then had to find a chair for Physiology. Butcher had known 
Maurice Goodman from national meetings, given their common interest in 
hormonal regulation of metabolism. Butcher alerted Lamar Soutter to the 
possibility that Goodman, at the time a young Associate Professor in the 
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Physiology department at Harvard, would be a good choice for the job. Goodman 
was already establishing a distinguished career in metabolic physiology. His 
thesis advisor, Ernst Knobil, a renowned reproductive endocrinologist who had 
shown that growth hormone is species-specific and later isolated the regulatory 
mechanism for one of the reproductive hormones, “had an interest in growth 
hormone, and we started looking at metabolic responses to growth hormone. And 
I did my thesis on growth hormone and free fatty acid mobilization from adipose 
tissue, in both monkeys and rats. And we published, I think, five papers based on 
that thesis work.” Goodman, who remained chair of Physiology at UMMS for 36 
years, went on to an extremely productive career. Indeed, one of the first two NIH 
grants awarded to a UMMS researcher, Goodman’s proposal to study “Growth 
Hormone Action on Fat Metabolism,” was continuously funded for decades 
beginning in September 1970.15
  Butcher and Goodman together laid the foundation for all subsequent 
research administration at UMass Medical School. As active researchers and 
chairs of young departments with untried faculty—in Physiology, for example, 
the original faculty members were just out of graduate school—they understood 
the need to establish an infrastructure to support research. Even more urgent, 
in their view, was the need for money to help establish their younger, as-yet 
unfunded, faculty members. Between the two of them, they set up nearly every 
formal structure for the research enterprise on campus over the course of the next 
10 to 15 years. Some of their ideas proved inordinately innovative. For example, 
according to Goodman, sometime in 1971 or early 1972 during a meeting of the 
(handful of) basic science chairs, Butcher hit on an idea that is still credited by 
scientists at UMMS as, simply, a stroke of brilliance. Dr. Goodman described 
the plan they came up with, courageously approved by Lamar Soutter, to bolster 
ongoing basic research using the indirect cost monies returned to the school by 
NIH for each NIH grant:
And we came up with the idea that if we want to really develop 
research here, why not use that money as investment in research? 
This was Bill’s idea, but I think the three of us, Bill, Sam, and I—
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Sam Clark—went to Lamar with the proposal that we, the basic 
scientists, be allowed to keep all of the overhead money to develop 
research, and we would handle it in a way that half of it would stay 
in a central pool, and the other half would go back to the earning 
departments, for the development of research. This was a unique 
situation in the country, and Lamar agreed…16
 By 1980, the practice was well institutionalized of dividing up indirect 
cost funds so that the 50% retained by the Dean’s office was directed to the 
administrative body Butcher and Goodman also devised, known as the Scientific 
Council, of which more will be said below, to use for establishment of core 
facilities, grants administration, small-scale repairs and maintenance, and so 
forth. But the other half was returned to the departments in proportion to the 
amounts of money each had generated in grants. Of that 50%, half went toward 
incentive rewards for the grants’ principal investigators (PIs)—not something 
to underestimate—and the remainder was used to help sustain the vibrancy of 
their department’s research environment.17 As John Sullivan, M.D., who was 
hired in 1978 as the first physician investigator in the Pediatrics department and 
went on to a renowned career as a viral immunologist, summed it up, “And…
in my opinion, that is the single most important event, historically, in allowing 
the research enterprise to grow and develop at this institution. Because based on 
everything I know from serving on study sections and visiting universities across 
the country, there is no other institution that had that kind of investment.”18
 The primary administrative instrument for carrying out interdepartmental 
research initiatives was, as mentioned above, the Scientific Council. The Scientific 
Council included faculty members from all the research departments. Particularly 
in its first decade, its workings reflected a shared sense of institutional solidarity. 
Department chairs like Goodman, Butcher, and Donald Tipper (of Microbiology) 
took care to hire faculty who would be collegial and who shared at least some 
overlapping research interest with others in their departments—Allan Jacobson 
called this the “no jerks” principle, although he didn’t use the word “jerk.” 
Likewise, the Scientific Council was run as “politics, as it ought to be done. 
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Meaning… ‘You vote for my thing; I’ll vote for your thing. We all need this, and 
let’s just work on convincing Moe that he can go over his budget.’”19 Again, 
quoting Jacobson, 
…in those days, the Scientific Council was a very influential body. 
So Moe ran the Scientific Council…and it was the…research body on 
campus that thought long-term. We had a lot of money…And so we 
started developing the notion of core facilities, and that meant that 
we were looking for ways to help research be subsidized, whether it 
be with equipment or technical help, or whatever. And everybody 
was, again, very socialistic, looking for ways to develop facilities and 
expertise here that we needed to make this place better.20
Initially, Butcher and Goodman shared responsibility 
for grants administration; during the semester in 
which one or the other was responsible for a medical 
school pre-clinical course, the other would step in and 
do the administrative work. But the Scientific Council 
always seems to have been Moe Goodman’s charge. 
Moreover, in 1975, when Lamar Soutter resigned 
unexpectedly, Butcher was made acting Chancellor. 
At that point, Goodman took on both the grants 
administration office and head of the Scientific 
Council. He was widely appreciated for the skill and 
fairness with which he carried out this important 
role: “Moe was an excellent steward. [He] was reasonable, but he also had high 
standards.”21 Goodman’s recollection of the group culture of the time echoes 
Jacobson’s:
We, as a small group of faculty, were embattled by a variety of 
outside forces which, on occasion, threatened our very existence 
as a Medical School. This led to a great deal of cooperation and 
interdependence, for faculty within any given department and 
between departments. There developed a sense that individual 
strength depended upon collective strength…In addition, much of 
the basic needs for research were provided on a communal basis 
Allan Jacobson, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
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within the department by initial startup finds. This fostered a sense 
of sharing…”22
 Once Bill Butcher’s term as acting Chancellor ended with the arrival of 
Chancellor/Dean Roger Bulger in 1976, he was appointed Associate Dean for 
Scientific Affairs, a position that had “overall responsibility for support of the 
research community including oversight of the few communal facilities that were 
available then. In its early years it did some long term planning and managed the 
small overhead fund. The dean of Scientific Affairs also served as an advocate 
of the research community in dealing with the accounting, the purchasing, 
personnel, physical plant, library, and computer departments.”23 Three years 
later, when Butcher left UMass, Goodman succeeded him as Associate Dean for 
Scientific Affairs while retaining an influential role on the Scientific Council. 
Decision-making with regard to investment in equipment remained squarely with 
the Scientific Council. (Goodman remembered that the “first expensive piece of 
machinery they bought was a cell-sorter, for about $30,000.”) By the 1980s, the 
Council included some researchers from the clinical departments such as the well 
known endocrinologist Lewis Braverman, M.D., and pediatric immunologist John 
Sullivan, M.D., whose work on HIV infection will be discussed in Chapter 9. 24 By 
1994, when Goodman stepped down from his responsibilities as Associate Dean 
for Scientific Affairs (while continuing to chair a large department), the Medical 
School was ready to institutionalize the apparatus of scientific administration as a 
“strongly top-down” organization under a Vice Chancellor of Research. 
 In truth, the growth of research at UMass increasingly benefited 
from—one might even say depended on—attention and support from top-tier 
administrators to galvanize and pay for key recruiting and program initiatives. 
That simply did not occur until the end of the school’s first decade. Chancellor 
Roger Bulger (1976-1978) had devoted most of his energies—appropriately—
to the challenge of launching the hospital and related clinical outreach efforts 
such as the AHEC program, the opening of the Tri-River Family Health Center 
in Uxbridge, and committing UMMC to staffing the Commonwealth’s various 
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state schools for developmentally delayed children and adults. Bulger strongly 
supported the faculty’s push to establish a doctoral program, discussed in 
Chapter 10, but research, in these early years, was largely left to the management 
of researcher-administrators such as Butcher and Goodman.25
Growing Pains: the 1980s
 The 1980s comprised a decade of subtle growth in sponsored research 
at UMMC. Significant progress occurred on diverse fronts, yet not until the 
end of the decade did the campus engage in a coordinated strategy to expand 
research activity on campus. By the mid-eighties, a number of researchers were 
beginning to express concern. Although some faculty regarded Bulger’s successor, 
Robert Tranquada, M.D. (1979-1986), as taking a “laissez-faire” attitude toward 
research, in fact he led the Medical School to take several significant steps toward 
the maturation of research.26 The clinical system required much of Tranquada’s 
energy and vigilance, as described in Chapter 5. Tranquada was nevertheless 
quite mindful of the campus’ need to nurture its research infrastructure and 
strengthen the numbers of active researchers on campus. Three milestones 
of the campus’s emergence as a mature research institution were established 
during Dr. Tranquada’s administration: transforming a doctoral “program” in 
medical sciences, first approved during Roger Bulger’s chancellorship, into a full-
fledged Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences (GSBS), described in Chapter 
10; addressing the need to accumulate resources to recruit a critical mass of 
researchers; and helping to create—and then utilize—expanded, flexibly designed 
space for research at the newly built Worcester Biotechnology Research Park. 
 As Dr. Tranquada understood the situation, “the state-funded faculty 
positions numbered 200 when I arrived, and they numbered 200 when I left. So 
the challenge was how do you finance additional faculty positions without any 
additional state money?” Moreover, state law forbade supplementing full-time 
state salaries by any means other than clinical revenue or the Chancellor’s fund 
derived from practice plan revenues and from state contracts. As a first step, 
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the Faculty Practice Plan members agreed to donate approximately 10% of their 
earnings to the Chancellor’s Fund for use in hiring. But, Tranquada emphasized, 
researchers also needed to earn a “substantial amount of their revenues from 
competitive grants and contracts. So we began to look for highly qualified and 
successful basic science faculty, to add to the very competent faculty that we had, 
but it was a small faculty.”27
 In the more successful basic science departments, this approach was 
viewed as advantageous because whatever money a researcher received from 
sponsored research to offset his or her salary would be redirected for that 
department’s use in either recruiting non-tenure track faculty or other basic 
needs such as equipment or lab personnel. And through ingenious strategies of 
resource management, some early researchers managed to have a national impact 
rapidly. Fredric Fay, whom Goodman recruited as a newly-minted Ph.D. from 
Harvard, was a good example of how excellent research could proceed even while 
the school was still gestating a research culture. Fay worked on the physiology 
of smooth muscle tissue. The department’s first external site review (1978), 
described Fay and his research as follows: “His research concerns the generation 
and regulation of contractions in single, isolated smooth muscle cells. He has 
had continuous NIH support for this work and also holds an RCDA [Research 
Career Development Award, or K-04]…His studies…have attracted International 
attention, and he is now the recognized authority in his area of research.” Fay 
became a full professor within six years of his arrival. His prominence was made 
possible by unusual technological ingenuity as well as an ability to reach out 
to other researchers. Fay was renowned for applying imaging techniques far in 
advance of what was in general use at the time. Through financial support from 
overhead trust funds dispensed by the Scientific Council and the Physiology 
department, crucial donations of equipment from DEC (Digital Equipment 
Corporation, at the time headquartered in Massachusetts) in 1983-1984, he was 
able to bring together a digital microscopy team, the Division of Biomedical 
Imaging, to measure the intracellular force of smooth muscle cell contraction.28 
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As Allan Jacobson explained, 
[Dr. Fay] cobbled together an imaging group that included 
physicists and programmers [and] people who had microscopy 
expertise. The goal was to pursue his smooth muscle studies 
at really high resolution. He had people who were using space 
program software to deconvolute images that were otherwise 
blurry, and things like that….29
When UMMC created the Program in Molecular Medicine in 1989, Fay, along 
with his imaging group, was among the first to move into the new and explicitly 
interdepartmental setting. At the time of Dr. Fay’s sudden death in 1997, he was 
internationally known for his work.30 
 Dr. Susan Leeman, also a professor of Physiology (1980-1992) was the 
first scientist at UMass Medical Center to be elected to the National Academy 
of Sciences (in 1991) for her isolation and characterization of the two peptides 
“substance P” and neurotensin. Although Leeman’s neuropeptide discoveries 
were largely made prior to her coming to UMMC, she was highly regarded not 
only for that work but also as a potential link among neuroscience researchers 
on campus and to the immunology research being carried out by Aldo Rossini, 
M.D. and others. Goodman wrote to Chancellor Tranquada of Leeman, “She 
is…a major institutional resource and asset.” Like Fay’s work on digital imaging, 
Leeman’s research generated an interest in establishing an interdepartmental 
program, in this case dedicated to neuroscience research, which she led from 
1984 through 1991 when she left to take a position at Boston University.31 The 
cell biologist Lydia Villa-Komaroff, Ph.D., said to be the third Mexican American 
woman to receive a U.S. doctorate in the sciences, in 1978 was recruited to the 
Microbiology department (renamed Molecular Genetics and Microbiology in 
1980, it become part of Microbiology and Physiological Systems, or MAPS, in 
2010), after having worked with Harvey Lodish and David Baltimore at MIT, 
followed by a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard. Earlier in 1978, she was lead 
author on a paper describing the successful use of bacteria to clone insulin, a 
worldwide first. In 1985 she returned to Harvard to spend more time on research. 
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After a distinguished career there and at Northwestern University, she became 
the CEO and Chief Scientific Officer of the Whitehead Institute in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. In 2011 she became a member of the governing board of the 
Massachusetts Life Sciences Center.32
 Despite the presence of outstanding researchers in both basic science 
and clinical departments at UMass Medical Center within its first decade,33 
and despite the gratitude some felt for the 
amplitude of the resources available to them 
in those early years, by the time Chancellor 
Tranquada had been in Worcester for a few 
years many researchers were beginning to 
feel impatient about the pace of growth. 
Maurice Goodman surveyed the situation 
for Tranquada a few months after the latter’s 
arrival. In December 1980, the Chancellor 
held a strategic planning retreat with all 
department chairs and senior administrators 
to discuss the fiscal situation of the medical 
center. Research productivity was high 
on the agenda. Tranquada focused on the 
addition of “active clinical investigators and 
a Center grant” to better integrate clinical and basic research in areas such as 
immunology, endocrinology and specifically, diabetes.34 Several months later, a 
memo in preparation for a research retreat from John Howe, III, a cardiologist, 
Academic Dean and Provost, and an influential member of Tranquada’s senior 
leadership group, proposed, for starters, to beef up the institution’s “Research 
Goals.” His proposed version began: “To strive for excellence in research as the 
only legitimate foundation upon which to structure our programs in service and 
education.”35 
 At the retreat, held in the winter of 1982, an explicit comparison was laid 
out for the faculty of revenue from all sources at UMMC, the average revenues of 
Fredric Fay, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
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other “new” medical schools, and the average of “established” medical schools. 
The figures for federal grant funds showed UMMC exceeded the average of all 
new schools in the current fiscal year ($8.9 million in direct costs for UMMC 
versus a comparison figure of $7.8 million on average for all “new” medical 
schools).36 Significantly, the majority of these funds were generated by the basic 
science departments, not through clinical research. 
Compared to the average figure listed for more 
established schools ($11.2 million), the figure 
looked rather meager. These were not easy times for 
public medical schools; an article in Time Magazine 
in 1983 described the declining support for state 
university systems across the U.S.37
 As part of UMMC’s drive to strengthen its 
research output, a process of long-range planning 
was undertaken in 1984. In elucidating (once 
again) the institution’s mission, the document 
noted that, “A major corollary of our mission 
in health science education is the underlying 
philosophy that the primary underpinning of excellence in medical education is 
excellence in research.”38 Although the long-range 
planning process remained incomplete throughout 
the 1980s, this particular attempt signaled a new 
resolve to give as much attention to research as to 
the clinical enterprise. One sign of this new resolve 
was Dr. Tranquada’s all-out effort to recruit a 
leading researcher in diabetes to strengthen an area 
where several productive lines of research already 
were in place. Thus, in 1980 and 1981 initiatives were 
launched to bring Michael Czech, Ph.D., a noted 
insulin researcher, from Brown University to UMass 
Medical School. In Czech’s words, Tranquada and Howe were, “very excited 
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about the area of diabetes, very enthusiastic about amplifying the diabetes field 
here.” Endocrinology was already strong in the clinical departments due to the 
presence of Lewis Braverman, M.D., director of Endocrinology and Metabolism, 
chair of the department of Nuclear Medicine, and a world renowned thyroid 
researcher and co-author of the standard text The Thyroid.39 With assistance 
from Braverman, Aldo Rossini, M.D., a highly respected diabetes researcher, had 
just been recruited from the Joslin Clinic in Boston and planned to collaborate 
with Arthur Like, M.D., who had come to UMass from the Joslin Research 
Laboratory. As Michael Czech put it, they were aware that their research “had 
the potential to translate into the clinical arena in a really major disease. 
[Diabetes] became a very very important disease to tackle.”40 Dr. Like had had the 
opportunity to bring a unique colony of experimental animals, the bio-breeding, 
or BB, rat to UMass in collaboration with Errol 
Marliss of the University of Toronto. The BB 
rat has “a spontaneous autoimmune disease” in 
which it destroys its own pancreatic beta cells, 
the cells required to produce insulin—both in 
rats and in humans. Rossini and Like, with other 
colleagues at UMMC and elsewhere contributed 
importantly to demonstrating that Type 1 
diabetes is an autoimmune disease. Rossini’s 
research was directed toward understanding 
how to foil the autoimmune response to the 
transplantation of insulin-producing islet cells. 
His research was funded for 30 years by the NIH, 
including a MERIT [Method to Extend Research in Time] award. (Rossini, with 
Ruth Lundstrom, a Diabetes Nurse Practitioner and Certified Diabetes Educator, 
also wrote The Diabetes Handbook and ran a robust clinical division of Diabetes 
and Endocrinology.)41  
 Given this rich environment, bringing Michael Czech to UMass from 
Brown, according to Chancellor Tranquada, epitomized his strategy for 
Aldo Rossini, M.D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar soutter Library, 
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leveraging research on both the basic and clinical science fronts. Czech has 
become “a recognized leader in the field of insulin action and signal transduction 
in diabetes and obesity, and recently developed methods for RNAi-mediated gene 
silencing in cultured adipocytes.”42 Even before he arrived at UMMC, Czech had 
great standing as a researcher whose work was devoted to, in his words, “insulin 
action at the molecular level, receptors and cell membranes, and other signaling 
molecules within the cell.” These interests “extended…into the disease area of 
diabetes, since insulin action is a critical ingredient of insulin resistance in Type 
II diabetes. And of course, that also relates very much to Type I diabetes, in terms 
of the etiology of the disease relating to insulin as a fundamental deficiency.”43 
From the Chancellor’s perspective, Czech represented an opportunity to bolster 
both the school’s clinical research on diabetes and diabetes-related basic 
research. Czech’s work was at the forefront. Only a year after moving to UMMC, 
he received the Eli Lilly Award in Diabetes Research; the Joslin Medal and 
Banting Medal followed in 1998 and 2000, respectively.44 As Dr. Roger Davis, 
who arrived from England to work with Czech less than a year after Czech’s move 
to UMMC, and whose career is discussed below, explained,
At that time—this was before the DNA revolution, and recombinant 
biology… people were first beginning to get ideas about which 
proteins are the ones which were mediating effects, things like 
insulin. And…Mike Czech’s laboratory had… done the initial 
experiments, where they could actually identify the protein 
that actually bound insulin. So in terms of the beginnings of 
understanding at the molecular level exactly how insulin worked, 
this was really the beginnings of the whole story.45
Moreover, Tranquada emphasized, “it was clear that [Czech was] really interested 
in what was going on in Worcester and saw it as an opportunity to grow. And that 
was so important!”46 
 Czech, then, not only continued his own research, but also attracted 
others to create a critical mass of diabetes researchers. For example, another 
recruit from the Joslin Center, William Chick, M.D., was recruited by Czech and 
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Rossini in 1981. Chick was trying to develop a biohybrid pancreas that could be 
implanted in humans with Type I diabetes. Although most of the diabetes work 
at UMass Med focused for many years on Type 1 diabetes and autoimmunity, 
Czech’s research also amplified and broadened the work being done on Type 
2 diabetes. In 1983, with Chick as director (Dr. Rossini became the director in 
1998), the Medical Center became one of only 12 institutions funded by the NIH 
as a Diabetes-Endocrinology Research Center (DERC).47 
 Another recruiting success with long-term consequences was the hiring in 
1982 of Aaron Lazare, M.D., a professor of psychiatry at Harvard, to become the 
chair of the Psychiatry Department at UMMC. Tranquada explained,
One of the reasons that I was so enthusiastic about having Aaron 
come was because he and I both agreed that one of the things 
we needed to do was to reach out in our affiliations. We did not 
have enough psychiatric in-patient work to be an effective source 
of training for residencies in psychiatry. We had to have access 
to additional beds, and we knew that that had to be through 
affiliations.  Aaron was very effective in moving us in that 
direction—not only that, but subsequently, in attracting state funds 
for programs that his department would run.48
Dr. Lazare, who would ultimately become Chancellor/Dean at UMMC from 
1991 to 2007, continued the trend begun by Chancellor Bulger and the previous 
Psychiatry chair, Stanley Walzer, to emphasize the Psychiatry Department’s 
links to the public sector in Massachusetts—whether state schools for the 
developmentally disabled such as Belchertown, or state psychiatric hospitals 
such as Worcester State, Westborough State, and other such inpatient psychiatric 
hospitals. As designed by senior departmental administrator and future Deputy 
Vice Chancellor for Operations, Thomas Manning, contracts with such state 
institutions brought income to the department and the medical school and helped 
stabilize professional staffing at these sites. (In 1987, Worcester State Hospital 
barely avoided being placed under a judicial consent decree on account of 
inadequate medical staffing and services; the agreement to allow the Psychiatry 
Department both to staff WSH and to run a residency program there, proved 
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crucial to the Hospital’s regaining full accreditation.)49 Lazare successfully 
recruited two leaders in the field of Law, Psychiatry, and Ethics and of Forensic 
Psychology, Paul Appelbaum, M.D. and Thomas Grisso, Ph.D., respectively, who 
invigorated the state of Massachusetts’ forensic mental health services as well 
as writing the leading manual on the assessment of psychiatric competence to 
consent to treatment.50 
Dr. Tranquada’s goal of invigorating basic and applied research called for the 
acquisition of additional and up-to-date, research facilities. After a decade in the 
Medical Science building, researchers persistently complained about the lack of 
space and the inflexibility of available research space. Dr. Tipper remembered 
that:
 …this medical school was designed, both physically and in terms of 
its departmental structure, in a very classical fashion. There were 
six floors—actually, seven floors in the building, but the bottom one 
was administration, so the other six floors means six departments, 
with Anatomy at the bottom, and Pharmacology at the top. And that 
was it. There was no space designated for anything called Genetics, 
or anything remotely resembling that…
 The architect designed it for its external appearance.  He must have 
got advice on how to build labs, but it was advice from practically 
the 19th century, as far as I can tell. Anyway, it was certainly not late 
20th century structure. The labs were inflexible. Benches couldn’t be 
moved. There was very little room for larger pieces of equipment.51  
By collaborating with the Worcester Area Chamber of Commerce (WACC) to 
build a biotechnology park on unused medical school property on Plantation 
Street, Tranquada gained access to research space designed to its specifications 
Paul Appelbaum, M.D. (Photo courtesy of 
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that would become available years sooner than if the university had built it for 
itself. 
 Building Biotech Park was not a simple transaction, however, and might 
not have been completed without timely assistance from the Governor’s office. 
Tranquada’s term as UMMC Chancellor coincided with Massachusetts’ economic 
rebound from the worst effects of the oil embargo-induced recession of the 
mid-1970s. Sometimes described as the “Dukakis miracle,” the state’s economic 
rebound actually began before Governor Dukakis returned to office for his final 
two terms (1983 to 1991). Unquestionably, though, Dukakis was quick to focus on 
measures to strengthen the state’s biotechnology sector and, more important for 
UMass, to broaden their impact to include cities outside the Boston catchment. 
As Dukakis commented, “one of the things about a medical school is it can have 
an enormously important economic stimulating effect on its host community.” By 
the early 1980s, when Dukakis won his “rematch” against Governor Edward King, 
he recalled that, “my thinking was evolving on this, and healthcare as a major 
part of this state’s economic revival began becoming more and more important to 
[my] urban strategy…where state government really was focused on reviving the 
Worcesters, and the New Bedfords, and the Lowells, and the Lawrences, and the 
Springfields, and the Fall Rivers, and so on.” Dukakis readily acknowledged that 
the idea to create a biotechnology incubator on surplus state land in proximity 
to UMass Medical School originated during his predecessor, Edward King’s, 
administration. Worcester’s business community, too, through the WACC and its 
development arm, the Worcester Business Development Corporation (WBDC), 
was intent on finding a way to revitalize the city and, at least since 1981, hoped 
Governor Michael Dukakis (Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School, Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School) 
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to lure biotechnology companies beyond the I-128 corridor and into central 
Massachusetts.52 The plan had stalled. Trustees of Worcester State Hospital sued 
over the alleged impropriety of transferring state land to the commercial sector, 
leaving the project in a legal limbo.53
 The idea presented an opportunity to solve the school’s laboratory 
expansion problem. State law made it cumbersome and expensive for a state 
institution to construct new buildings. The WBDC’s hoped-for biotechnology 
park would enable UMass Med to rent new laboratory space, rather than having 
to build it. Accordingly, in 1982 Tranquada advised a special meeting of the 
UMass Board of Trustees that UMMC would waive all interest in a 29-acre parcel 
of Medical Center land across Plantation Street from the campus to allow it to be 
declared state surplus. Michael Dukakis made it one of his campaign pledges to 
central Massachusetts that his administration would make sure the project came 
to fruition. It became “a big priority” for his administration as well as for local 
state legislators and Congressman Joseph Early. Following Dukakis’s election 
in 1983, the WACC created an entity known as the Worcester Biotechnology 
Research Park. In 1984, following Dr. Tranquada’s recommendation to the 
Legislature, the land formerly held by UMMC was ceded to the WBDC to 
be developed through its creation of the Worcester Biotechnology Research 
Institute, or WBRI. Chancellor Tranquada was made an ex officio member of the 
WBRI Board in 1984. By 1984 the legal challenges had been dismissed and a year 
later, Governor Dukakis named the MBR Park one of his administration’s five 
statewide Centers of Excellence.54 Construction of the Worcester Biotechnology 
Research Park’s buildings began in 1986. Its first tenant, Cambridge Bioscience 
Corporation, signed a lease within weeks of the dedication. UMMC arranged to 
lease 20,000 square feet of laboratory space at Biotech Park, but did not take 
occupancy of what would become Biotech 2 until 1989.55 
A Fork in the Road
 Having successfully collaborated in opening the Worcester Biotechnology 
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Research Park, provided leadership for several key clinical and research 
initiatives, and having overseen the successful launch of the Graduate School of 
Biomedical Sciences and the Graduate School of Nursing (both of which will be 
described in Chapter 10), Chancellor Tranquada left UMMC to become the dean 
of the medical school at the University of Southern California. His announcement 
in May 1986 set in motion a series of decisions that, albeit painful, ultimately 
resulted in the medical school’s transformation into a stronger institution with a 
national reputation for both primary care education and scientific research. This 
critical period, one which resulted in the setting of a new course for the school, 
lasted at least until 1991.56  
 The process of choosing Dr. Tranquada’s successor was fraught with 
conflict. Looking back at these events from the vantage of the 21st century, it 
is difficult to avoid interpreting the tensions of these years as the precursor 
rumblings of a seismic shift in the underpinnings of UMass Med. From a present-
day vantage, in other words, it is hard not to see the uneasiness over the choice 
of Chancellor Tranquada’s successor as anything other than a contest over the 
long-term direction of the medical center—choosing whether it would become 
renowned for its basic and clinical research, or rather, cultivate its designated 
place in Massachusetts as a center for primary care medical education and 
excellent, but regional, tertiary care and clinical research. To view the events to be 
described below in that way, however, would oversimplify the dilemmas faced by 
UMMC in the late 1980s. It would also commit the historical fallacy of “present-
ism,” that is, of interpreting the past through the lens of the present. When Dr. 
Tranquada announced his intention to return to California in May 1986, no one 
at the University of Massachusetts, whether in Worcester or in the President’s 
office, could have foreseen that the University Hospital would within a decade 
prove more of a financial burden than the Trustees could responsibly tolerate. 
Nor could anyone have forecast that basic research at UMass Med would become 
as successful as it did within that same decade. 
 In fact, a “Leadership Retreat” held just a few months before Tranquada’s 
resignation demonstrated how far campus leaders were from viewing research 
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as a top priority. Notes from the Retreat indicate that the majority of initiatives 
being considered were aimed at bolstering clinical growth. Moreover, strong 
resistance even to the initiatives under consideration revealed a serious division 
among department chairs. At a time when the Physician Practice Plan was 
facing more than a million-dollar deficit, a discussion of new program priorities 
chaired by Maurice Goodman yielded the following opinions: “Some committee 
members had strong feelings about not curtailing our growth because of limited 
space resources; we are much too young an organization to be thinking about 
leveling off our growth. Other committee members felt that the reality is that we 
must curtail growth because of the general climate of cost containment.” Serious 
misgivings about the power vested in the Scientific Council also surfaced.57
 In short, UMass Med seemed to be in the doldrums. Despite efforts to 
bolster the growth of research at the medical center during the Tranquada years 
via serious recruiting, cementing a strong graduate education presence, and 
acquiring additional, fully adaptable research space, many leading researchers 
believed the school’s research profile still did not meet their needs.
At the same time, a growing sense of competition between researchers and 
clinicians simmered in a setting of scarce resources. The somewhat torturous 
path toward a revised research mission statement illustrates the situation. In 
1987, the research component of the Worcester campus’s mission statement 
was further revised to reflect the new emphasis on centers of excellence on 
campus and the earliest coordinated efforts to promote collaboration with the 
biotechnology industry, something also of great interest to Governor Dukakis 
and to the UMass Board of Trustees.58 Yet after five years of successive revisions, 
the “research” segment of the long-range plan for the UMass-Worcester campus 
remained unfinished. Nor would it be completed any time soon given that the 
campus, currently embroiled in a search for Dr. Tranquada’s successor, was 
deeply divided over its long-term goals: would it put most of its resources behind 
projects to strengthen the hospital and ambulatory clinics, or would it finally 
commit serious resources to recruiting researchers to bolster the excellent, but 
small cadre already in place?  
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 The research community on campus by the time of Chancellor Tranquada’s 
departure strongly believed that this was the moment when the campus’ 
research sector must be reinforced or, likely, it would wither into insignificance. 
Simply put, the emergence of powerful technologies to advance research at the 
molecular and cellular levels—gene sequencing, linkage mapping, recombinant 
genetics, monoclonal antibody production, advances in visualization, to name 
a few—accelerated the unification of previously diverse biological specialties 
under the rubric of  “molecular biology.” As one historian of medical education 
has observed, “If any one aspect of the molecular revolution demonstrated that 
a new era in basic biomedical research had begun, it was the coalescence of the 
once separate ‘preclinical sciences’ into a single field speaking a single molecular 
language.” Adapting a definition of molecular medicine from Francis Crick, 
another writer has written that it “encompasses the structure and interactions of 
the building blocks of living things, particularly proteins and nucleic acids, and 
studies of gene structure, replication, and expression.” Within that extensive and 
supple framework, the research of faculty members in a range of departments 
began to converge, if not outright overlap.59
 This is not to suggest that this evolution was sudden or, indeed, 
unforeseen. The term “molecular biology,” at least in the American context, 
was coined in 1938 by Warren Weaver, director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
natural sciences division, although his usage of the term was more generic than 
what would obtain during and after the 1950s.60 The National Science Foundation 
(NSF) first used the term “molecular biology” in 1952, a year before the discovery 
of the double helix structure of DNA, that is, before “the post-double helix 
narrowing of the term to molecular genetics,” in historian Toby Appel’s words. 
By the mid-1960s, a sense of molecular biology’s inevitable ascendancy was 
widespread. Indeed the NSF’s Molecular Biology Program section head from 
1966-1969, Eugene Hess, viewed the concept as “not a discipline, but rather a 
level of organization or approach to the study of life.”61  Neal Brown, founding 
chair of the Department of Pharmacology, recalled that in 1965 or 1966, when he 
was finishing up his doctorate at Yale, 
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there was a guy; he was always kind of a laconic fellow, [a] 
professor, and he always had his feet up on his desk. And he said, 
‘Come here, Brown. I want to show you the future’…And he slapped 
down the first issue of The Journal of Molecular Biology. He says, 
‘That’s where it is.’ That’s where it was, yeah.62
At UMass in 1970, Moe Goodman understood the desirability of 
establishing a physiology department that did not focus on “whole animal” 
systems. Planning the department with his first recruit, Fredric Fay, Ph.D., he 
knew that, at that time,
…the biochemists were doing things on a cellular level and 
physiology was still working on the whole animal level. And there 
was…nothing in between…So the theme that we adopted was we 
were going to do cellular physiology that would bridge the gap…and 
remember, this was before molecular biology really got underway 
and people were still trying to study the physics of blood flowing 
through tubes.63
Donald Tipper, founding chair of the Department of Microbiology, reflecting on 
the early 1970s when he began recruiting faculty for his department, was “forcibly 
reminded of the vicissitudes of establishing a first class microbiology department, 
representing the best in the exploding field of molecular biology while fostering 
its integration with medical microbiology, immunology, physiology and 
pathology.”64 Allan Jacobson reiterated, “[The Microbiology department] tried 
really hard to build what amounted to a molecular biology department, people 
who care about DNA, or RNA, or gene control in various ways, genetics.”65  
 In short, the first generation of researchers at UMass Medical School knew 
they were trying to lay the groundwork—conceptually and fiscally—for a new era. 
By the early 1980s, a second-generation “molecular revolution” in biology had 
moved beyond discovery of the structure of genetic materials to the capacity to 
visualize and manipulate them experimentally. Roger Davis, Ph.D., who joined 
Michael Czech’s laboratory as a postdoctoral fellow from Cambridge in 1982, 
reflected that at the time, 
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there was this massive revolution in molecular biology, and being 
able to isolate DNA fragments, clone proteins, and to actually 
really start working with molecules, was…a revolution both in 
understanding, but also in terms of techniques which then became 
possible that were never possible before [e.g.] molecular cloning, 
being able to mutate DNA at will, and to study how things worked 
essentially by taking it apart at the molecular level. You could use 
DNA to actually make any change in anything you wanted, and then 
find out how it works by pulling things apart.66
UMMC scientists faced a paradoxical problem well described by Michael Czech:
Remember, in 1981 when I came here [the research enterprise] was 
really in its infancy…I would say it was very good. But it was not, 
in general, the breakthrough science that bigger institutions were 
enjoying…And that was a problem because recruiting great people 
requires, fundamentally and primarily, the great magnet of other 
outstanding scientists. Everyone wants to be with other outstanding 
scientists in the science business, just like in a baseball team. So 
to recruit great people, you had to have great people—the typical 
Catch-22, the typical egg and chicken problem…And we were, I 
think, mired in that chicken and egg problem literally all the way 
through the eighties.67  
 Roger Davis vividly recalled the sense of uncertainty that seemed pervasive 
among researchers here at the time. He was among the first researchers to join 
Czech’s Program in Molecular Medicine when it was founded in 1989. In 1990 
he became the first UMMC researcher to become a Howard Hughes Medical 
Institute Investigator, a status he continues to hold as of this writing. In 2002 
he was named to the H. Arthur Smith Chair in Cancer Research. That same year, 
Davis was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.68 The goal of his research is to 
understand “the role of inflammatory responses in disease processes. A specific 
focus of [the] research is the function of stress-activated MAP [mitogen-activated 
protein] kinases in cancer, diabetes, and neurodegeneration.” In 1994 and 1995, 
soon after Davis’s lab had mapped and cloned a previously unstudied genetic 
pathway implicated in this stress response with important implications for 
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Alzheimer’s, stroke, traumatic brain injury, and diabetes, he was the most cited 
researcher in the world.69 
 Davis considered the later 1980s as “actually a very dangerous time.” 
In addition to the school’s relative youth and lack of resources to bring in 
established researchers exemplifying what Davis called the “molecular biology 
revolution,” some of the outstanding researchers already here were “raided by 
other institutions.” He remembered
a conversation with Mike Czech and…a couple of other people. 
I remember we had discussions that there were two things that 
were likely to happen at UMass.  One [was], two of our esteemed 
colleagues had been recruited away, and quite likely a year from 
now both of us would end up moving away, probably to two 
different institutions as well. And the other possibility [was] that we 
[might] do something different and new.70
Spatial considerations played a large part. As Roger Davis explained, reiterating a 
point also made by Donald Tipper, the original Medical Science building, by this 
time nearly 20 years old, 
…was a stratified building. If you were in Biochemistry, there was 
really very little interaction with people on the floor above and the 
Roger Davis, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy of 
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floor below. And as a result, we had old-fashioned—Pathology was 
this; Biochemistry was this, and other departments were that, Cell 
Biology was that, with very little intermingling.  And I think that 
what was really missing was the idea of shaking everything up, 
and realizing that all biomedical science was the same, and that 
we needed people from very different disciplines to come together, 
to really cross-fertilize expertise from Biochemistry, to Molecular 
Biology, to other things.71
 Deeper concerns underlay these frustrations, a feeling, as Maurice 
Goodman reflected much later, that, “the mission of the medical school was to 
develop primary care, and that we really didn’t need another Harvard, and we 
didn’t need to have a strong science and research and intellectual component, 
other than the intellectual aspect which related to patient care.” Moreover, the 
researchers perceived,
…a developing schism and a developing competition for resources. 
The only sources of funding at the time were clinical income, 
the relatively small state appropriation, and the overhead on 
research grants. Very little effort or progress had been made in 
philanthropy…So there was really a shortage of money, and a 
shortage of space, and a burgeoning clinical establishment, as well 
as a burgeoning scientific establishment. And we were sort of at a 
stalemate at the time; it appeared that we had gone about as far as 
we could go, or at least as far as we could go under the Tranquada 
kind of leadership.72
These varying concerns, a sense of crisis among the researchers, persuaded 
leading researchers at UMMC to urge the President of the UMass system, David 
Knapp, to seek out a new chancellor who would shake things up and, perhaps, 
put research at the top of his or her priorities. It would appear that Knapp and 
the Trustees were indeed persuaded by their arguments. 
 Leaders of the clinical operations at UMMC, however, did not see the 
situation from anything like the perspective of the basic scientists. Worse, they 
seem not to have understood that at the level of the President’s office, priorities 
were beginning to shift.  The clinical chairs’ assumptions were understandable; 
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yet they evince a wide gap between the cultures of clinical medicine and basic 
research at that time. As described in Chapter 5, 
University Hospital had begun to show a profit in the 
early 1980s, had become a certified regional trauma 
center, and was becoming the dominant center for 
cardiac care in Central Massachusetts. Yet its profit 
margins were slim. The intrusion of HMOs into 
the health care scene resulted in close competition 
among the region’s hospitals and a desire to push 
the UMass Hospital out in front of its competitors. 
Counterbalancing the aspirations of the basic 
scientists in 1986 one must weigh the aspirations of 
the clinical faculty.
James Dalen and the Clinicians’ Perspective: 
the Road not Taken 
 At the time of Chancellor Tranquada’s decision to leave UMass, President 
Knapp reported to the Board of Trustees that he had canvassed the Worcester 
faculty and would recommend James Dalen, M.D. to be Acting Chancellor. (Barry 
Hanshaw, chair of Pediatrics, had been named Dean and Provost earlier that 
year in recognition that the campus was by now too complex for anyone to be 
both Chancellor and Dean.) Dalen, who arrived at UMMS as Chair of Cardiology 
in 1974 and became chair of the Department of Medicine in 1978, was also a 
member of the Hospital Management Board. Although he was strongly identified 
with the clinical work of the medical center, he was widely known and respected. 
In 1976 he became president of the American College of Chest Physicians and 
soon after, the editor of the Archives of Internal Medicine, both prestigious 
positions indicative of a strong national reputation.73  Dalen was widely—and 
justifiably—seen as a key reason for the hospital’s viability in a highly competitive 
market. Among some members of the clinical faculty, the hospital was known 
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as “the house that Dalen built.”74 It was evident, especially to the clinicians, 
that competition among hospitals in the new era of managed care required the 
oversight and strategic intensity of a seasoned hospital administrator—someone, 
in short, like Dr. Dalen. In this context, Moe Goodman, who was named by 
President Knapp to head the search committee for a new chancellor, was asked by 
clinical colleagues not to “rock the boat.” Goodman elaborated:
  
There was strong competition between UMass and not only Saint 
Vincent’s, but also Memorial, and growing need to break…into the 
leadership role in locally providing health care…And therefore, 
there was a strong feeling that we ought to maintain the status 
quo…75
Unfortunately for Dr. Dalen, although he and many of the clinical chairs 
and faculty at UMass were enthusiastic about his appointment and hoped it 
would lead to his being named permanent Chancellor, the President, Trustees, 
and the search committee already were determined to name someone from 
the outside. Indeed, at about this time Dalen was offered the deanship of the 
University of Washington Medical School, and President Knapp urged him to 
take it.76 Dalen made crucial contributions to the growth of the UMass hospital 
and thus to the stability of the school. But his priorities and style of research 
James Dalen, M.D. (Photo courtesy 
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did not seem to align well with the vision of UMMC’s future coming into view. 
Chapter 5 in part described Dalen’s successful launch of the Department of 
Cardiology. Two additional examples of successful initiatives he inaugurated, one 
the work of Judith Ockene’s Division of Preventive and Behavioral Medicine, the 
other Jon Kabat-Zinn’s Stress Reduction Clinic and mindfulness-based stress 
reduction program (MBSR), may serve to illustrate both Dalen’s farsightedness 
and the distinctive character of his leadership. Both exemplified initiatives 
of great importance to the reputation of the medical center. Both pursued 
significant advances in human health and wellbeing. Neither one, however, fit 
easily into the “molecular” paradigm for research that had begun to shape the 
President’s and the Trustees’ vision for UMMC for the coming decade. 
 The division of Preventive and Behavioral Medicine was instituted by 
Dalen under the leadership of Judith Ockene, Ph.D., founding chief of the 
division since 1983. Ockene first worked with Dalen at the Harvard School of 
Public Health as a psychologist. They focused on behaviors that carried a high 
risk for heart disease, especially smoking, as part of Dalen’s Multiple Risk Factor 
Intervention Trial (MRFIT). When Dalen came to UMMC in 1974, he brought 
Ockene’s husband, Ira Ockene, M.D., with him to open the catheterization lab. 
Eight years later, he also invited Judith Ockene to set up a program of her own 
design in cardiac preventive care. She became one of the few women division 
chiefs at the hospital. Soon she established a pattern of winning large research 
awards, such as one in 1986 for $4.4 million to study community-based anti-
smoking measures, one of several such grants she received between 1984 and 
1989. An adviser to several U.S. Surgeons General and the scientific editor 
or author of successive editions of the Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking 
and Health, in 1990 Ockene was awarded a Surgeon General’s Medallion for 
Exemplary Service for her work on prevention or cessation of smoking. She was 
also made the Barbara Helen Smith Chair in Preventive and Behavioral Medicine 
in 2001. More recently, in work for which she became equally well known, she 
became a principal investigator on several branches of the Women’s Health 
Initiative studies, running large clinical trials either alone or in collaboration with 
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the Fallon Clinic of Worcester.77
The Stress Reduction Clinic and the Birth of Mindfulness 
in Health Care
 Dr. Dalen took a calculated risk by giving Dr. Ockene, a psychologist, 
carte blanche to create a division of preventive and behavioral medicine. He 
took a much greater risk, arguably, in bringing a young, almost totally unknown 
molecular biologist, Jon Kabat-Zinn, Ph.D., into his department to develop a 
program in stress reduction techniques for UMMC patients. Today the concepts 
of “mindfulness” and what Kabat-Zinn called “mindfulness-based stress 
reduction” (MBSR) are internationally known. A recent study of the influence 
of mindfulness meditation techniques, Mindful America (2014), considers Jon 
Kabat-Zinn one of the three main “wellsprings of the American mindfulness 
movement.” Its author writes, “The universally acknowledged turning point for 
the mindfulness movement’s relationship with science and medicine is 1979, 
when Jon Kabat-Zinn started the Stress Reduction and Relaxation Program at the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School.”78 A recent search in the published 
English language scientific literature indicates that studies utilizing MBSR have 
increased more than fifty-fold between 1999 and 2014.79 Kabat-Zinn founded 
Judith Ockene, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy of the University 
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the UMMC Stress Reduction Clinic in 1979 and the Center for Mindfulness in 
Medicine, Health Care, and Society (the latter established with colleague and 
UMass successor, Saki Santorelli, Ed. D.) in 1995. 
 Kabat-Zinn has defined “mindfulness” as “the awareness that arises 
by paying attention, on purpose, in the present moment, non-judgmentally...
in the service of self-understanding.”80  The concept is part of a tradition in 
American medicine that can be traced back at least to Harvard cardiologist 
Herbert Benson’s studies in the late 1960s, work that was popularized in 1975 
with the publication of The Relaxation Response. Investigating the effects of 
“transcendental meditation” (TM), a yoga tradition that became well known in 
the 1960s through Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, Benson measured TM’s physiological 
effects and observed that it can lower heart rate, oxygen consumption, blood 
pressure, and general metabolism. Subsequent studies by Benson’s colleagues 
related meditation practice to a reduction of the body’s response to the stress-
related hormone, norepinephrine.81 Benson’s work stimulated subsequent studies 
and wide interest. (Indeed, he lectured at St. Vincent Hospital in Worcester in the 
1970s.)82 
 Kabat-Zinn’s path was quite different from Benson’s. Although he must 
have been aware of that work, there seems to be no direct connection between 
the work of Benson at Harvard and Kabat-Zinn at UMass.83 Rather, Kabat-Zinn’s 
development of MBSR was rooted in Buddhist traditions that began to spread 
in the U.S. in the 1960s and 70s mainly through the teaching of American-born 
masters who had been educated in Southeast Asia or Korea. Such teaching, 
whether at Zen centers such as that founded in Rochester, New York in 1966, 
or at Theravada centers such as the Insight Meditation Society established in 
Barre, Massachusetts in 1973, made a deep impression on Kabat-Zinn and many 
others.84 Kabat-Zinn’s story is that of someone with a scientific background 
also trained in Buddhist meditation; he understood that meditation’s health 
benefits would not reach deeply into American society unless they could be re-
contextualized within the culture of American bio-medicine. The wide-open 
culture of UMass Med in the 1970s, along with Dr. Dalen’s unusually welcoming 
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attitude toward preventive and behavioral approaches to cardiology, provided 
an opening for what might have seemed a holdover from the hippie world of the 
1960s. Even in the late 1970s meditation was considered part of health care’s 
“radical fringe,” as Kabat-Zinn has often acknowledged.85 As he reflected in 2011, 
…from the beginning of MBSR, I bent over backward to structure it 
and find ways to speak about it that avoided as much as possible the 
risk of its being seen as Buddhist, ‘New Age,’ ‘Eastern Mysticism’ 
or just plain ‘flakey.’ To my mind this was a constant and serious 
risk that would have undermined our attempts to present it as 
commonsensical, evidence-based, and ordinary, and ultimately a 
legitimate element of mainstream medical care.86
 Kabat-Zinn received a doctorate in molecular biology with Nobel Laureate 
Salvador Luria at MIT. (His father was a scientist at Columbia, and respect for 
the culture of western science runs throughout Kabat-Zinn’s story.) But, he was 
“really interested since early childhood in the whole question of consciousness, 
and how are we conscious beings.” In 1965 at MIT he attended a lecture by Philip 
Kapleau, author of The Three Pillars of Zen, and felt, “this is what I’ve been 
looking for my whole 21, 22 years of being alive!” He completed his doctorate in 
1971, but rather than pursuing a career in molecular biology he began devoting 
more time to yoga and meditation, searching, as he put it, for a way to find a 
“right livelihood” for himself, a “worthy work.”87 He became ever more committed 
to understanding, practicing, and teaching mindful meditation.
 In 1976, unemployed and with a family to support, he began a postdoctoral 
fellowship working with Robert Singer, Ph.D., member of the Anatomy 
Department at UMMC.88 And while his heart wasn’t in the work of his lab, he 
did begin to hold ad hoc yoga classes for anyone in the medical center as well as 
“yoga for anatomists” sessions for his colleagues.89 Kabat-Zinn became convinced 
of the health benefits of his techniques. With the goal of “bridging [the] two 
epistemologies of science and dharma,” an idea for a clinic began to crystallize. 
During his stay at a retreat at the Insight Meditation Center in the spring of 1979, 
Kabat-Zinn “had a ‘vision’ that lasted maybe 10 seconds…I saw in a flash not only 
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a model that could be put in place, but also the long-term implications of what 
might happen if the basic idea was sound and could be implemented in one test 
environment.” He had been rounding with Drs. Thomas Winters, Robert Burney, 
and John J. Monahan, leaders respectively of the hospital’s primary care, pain, 
and orthopedics clinics.90 Now he thought he saw a way to move forward. As 
Kabat-Zinn reconstructed the events, 
I asked them things like, ‘What percentage of your patients do 
you feel like you actually help? What percentage [of patients] get 
better?’ And the three of them wound up saying different variants 
of, ‘Maybe fifteen, maybe twenty percent of people I see get better, 
really respond to our treatments.’ And I said, ‘Well, what the hell 
happens to the others? That’s like 80 percent, 85 percent.’ And 
they say, ‘Well, they either get better on their own, or they never get 
better.’
And I said to them, ‘Well, do you think that it might be valuable if 
you had a place in the hospital that you could send all the people 
that in some sense you don’t know what to do with anymore? 
They are not getting better …We’d create a clinic in the form of a 
course that was designed to teach people how to take better care 
of themselves, and particularly designed for the people falling 
through the cracks of the health care system, and challenge them 
to do something for themselves that no one on the planet could do 
for them, that you can’t do for them, that their spouse can’t do for 
them, that their parents can’t do for them, that their clergy can’t do 
for them, that no one can do for them; namely, that your patients 
have to…take some degree of responsibility for their own health and 
wellbeing.91
 With encouragement from these clinicians, Kabat-Zinn proposed 
that a stress-reduction program become part of the Ambulatory clinic at the 
hospital. (It didn’t hurt that the hospital was half empty in 1978.) In 1979 the 
Stress Reduction and Relaxation program opened down on Level A as part of 
the Physical Therapy department, operating only two days a week. (The head 
of Physical Therapy generously offered her office for the patient interviews 
Kabat-Zinn conducted before, during, and after the program.) The core of the 
program was—and is—an eight-week course (originally it was 10-weeks) utilizing 
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meditation and gentle yoga techniques to develop, as he wrote, “‘new kinds of 
control and wisdom in our lives, based on our inner capacities for relaxation, 
paying attention, awareness, and insight.’”92
 Kabat-Zinn decided to write a pilot grant proposal to NIH to document 
MBSR’s effectiveness in reducing pain and hypertension. This required his 
holding a faculty position. In turn, that required the support of the chair of 
the Department of Medicine, Dr. Dalen who, at the time, knew nothing about 
him. Significantly, the Cardiovascular Medicine division chief, Joseph Alpert, 
M.D., a close associate of Dr. Dalen, became interested in the potential of 
stress-reduction techniques for his patients. Alpert, who agreed to become co-
principal investigator on Kabat-Zinn’s grant proposal, intervened. Dalen paid a 
surprise visit to Kabat-Zinn and they struck a deal: Kabat-Zinn would receive an 
appointment as an instructor in the Department of Medicine and would measure 
his patients’ outcomes as rigorously as possible. At the end of one year he would 
present his findings to the department at 
grand rounds. If Kabat-Zinn could show that 
the Stress Reduction Clinic had been effective, 
Dalen would give him a regular appointment 
in the department. In this way, what he now 
called mindfulness-based stress reduction 
became part of the regular offerings of UMass 
Medical Center. In 1983 Kabat-Zinn became 
a member of Judith Ockene’s division of 
Preventive and Behavioral Medicine.93
 But his standing within the medical 
school was not particularly secure. One incident involved the chair of Surgery, 
Brownie Wheeler. One day early in the clinic’s operation, Kabat-Zinn was lying 
on the floor of the Faculty Conference Room, leading a group of patients in the 
first scheduled class of the stress reduction program. He was “midway through 
guiding [them] in an extended lying-down meditation known as the body scan.” 
The patients were all on colorful yoga mats. Kabat-Zinn was attired in “a black 
Jon Kabat-Zinn, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy 
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tee-shirt, black karate pants,” and no shoes. Suddenly, a large group in long, 
white coats, some with stethoscopes, entered the room led by Dr. Brownie 
Wheeler, someone Kabat-Zinn had heard of but had never met. Dr. Wheeler 
stopped, looked around, walked over to Kabat-Zinn (who was by then leaning on 
one elbow to better appraise the situation), and asked him what was going on. 
Kabat-Zinn explained what he was doing, while Wheeler’s group looked around. 
Finally, Dr. Wheeler asked, “Are these our patients?” When Kabat-Zinn replied, 
“Yes,” Wheeler led his group out the door, saying “We’ll find someplace else to 
hold our meeting.” Over time, with at least tacit support from Drs. Dalen and 
Wheeler, the Clinic’s reputation grew. Since 1979, thousands of patients have 
been referred to it by central Massachusetts physicians. From 1992 to 2000, 
Kabat-Zinn and Santorelli also established an inner city clinic based at Worcester 
City Hospital, and from 1992 to 1996, a program for Massachusetts prison 
inmates that worked with 10% of the inmate population.94 
 From the perspective of the history of the medical school, what seems most 
interesting is the way that Kabat-Zinn tried to adapt a meditation and yoga-based 
clinical intervention to the research-driven culture of an academic health science 
center.95 Because this dimension of Kabat-Zinn’s and his colleagues’ work was 
deliberately embedded early on, the Center for Mindfulness in Medicine, Health 
Care, and Society still exists at UMMS—albeit not without a few institutional 
“near death” experiences.  Despite having powerful supporters (or, at least, no 
powerful enemies) among UMMS’s clinical leaders, the Stress Reduction Clinic 
could never have afforded to coast along on anecdotal stories of success. It had to 
document its effectiveness systematically. It had very little money for research, 
particularly in the early years, but Kabat-Zinn and his small staff tracked clinical 
outcomes using a standardized symptom checklist designed by the National 
Institute of Mental Health. Kabat-Zinn also used a psychological assessment tool, 
the Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90-R) with, “nine different so-called psychiatric 
dimensions to it. And then I could at least see whether I was seeing symptom 
reduction over the course of the eight weeks… [The] question was, ‘would these 
symptoms get better, training them in mindfulness and mindful Hatha yoga?’ 
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And they did. And we were documenting it.”96
 Kabat-Zinn wrote his first paper in 1982, focusing on the clinic’s chronic 
pain patients.97 Additional papers followed, but widespread national recognition 
occurred more as a result of the publication in 1990 of his book Full Catastrophe 
Living.98 When the journalist Bill Moyers created the television series “Healing 
and the Mind” in 1993, a five-part broadcast that eventually won an Emmy and 
many other awards,  Kabat-Zinn’s work was the entire focus of one segment 
titled “Healing from Within.” At the conclusion of the segment Moyers reported 
that, according to Stress Reduction Clinic findings, 75% of its patients reported 
moderate to great improvement in their symptoms and 90% had continued some 
form of meditation four years after taking the eight-week class. Kabat-Zinn and 
MBSR had begun to reach a national audience.99 
 As the Stress Reduction Clinic became more established within the 
Division of Preventive and Behavioral Medicine, several changes occurred. 
The first involved the recruitment in 1983 of Dr. Saki Santorelli, Ed. D., an 
educational psychologist. Santorelli quickly became the clinic’s second in 
command and took over much of the clinic’s medical student teaching and 
clinical work while Kabat-Zinn focused on external collaborations. Santorelli 
had acquired years of experience with yoga 
and meditation prior to becoming an intern 
with Kabat-Zinn in 1982. In 1983, he was 
made the Assistant Director of the Stress 
Reduction Clinic at UMass Hospital. In 1995, 
the Clinic spawned a research and fund-
raising unit called the Center for Mindfulness 
in Medicine, Health Care, and Society which, 
besides acting as an administrative hub, 
sponsored research conferences, professional 
internships in MBSR, and research. It 
was funded not by hospital reimbursements but, after the first few years, by 
direct payment from clients, grant funding, and philanthropic donations. Many 
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professionals were requesting some form of training to teach MBSR at their own 
institutions. In 1996 the Center began to offer a certification program as well 
as more intensive, multi-day retreats.100 Kabat-Zinn became Executive Director 
of the Center, while Santorelli took over as the director of the Stress Reduction 
Clinic. Santorelli participated in the medical school curriculum, offering a Stress 
Reduction class to medical students and in the 1990s, worked with Dr. Sarah 
Stone in the Physician, Patient and Society course described in Chapter 7.101
 In 2000, Kabat-Zinn retired from the medical center. He continued to 
write and to lead workshops, many in collaboration with Santorelli. Santorelli 
became Executive Director of the Mindfulness Center, which evolved into the 
umbrella organization for both the hospital-based Stress Reduction Clinic and the 
professional education and MBSR research activities based at the Medical School. 
Four months after taking over, he learned that the clinic was about to be scuttled 
by the Hospital. Since its merger with Memorial in 1998, the former University 
Hospital had not had an easy time. A need to achieve financial stability now led 
the hospital’s leadership to demand drastic budget cuts from, among others, the 
Stress Reduction Clinic. Moreover, an unsuspected accounting error revealed that 
the clinic was seriously in debt.102 
 As Santorelli recalled, this looked like the “end of the line” for MBSR at 
UMass. It was certainly a trial by fire for Santorelli. After months of negotiations, 
he heard some potentially good news from the Medical School’s leadership: Rick 
Stanton, Deputy Chancellor for Finance, and Tom Manning, Vice Chancellor for 
Operations, had decided the Center for Mindfulness in Medicine, Health Care 
and Society was “worth saving.” Santorelli understood that Manning’s “real 
terms” were: “Maintain your academic and scholarly work, run your operation 
like a business, float your own boat, or you’ll be out of here.” The hospital-based 
clinical referral service, the Stress Reduction Clinic, ceased to exist; instead, 
private, paying patients would register for courses in MBSR at the medical 
school-affiliated Center for Mindfulness in Medicine, Health Care and Society. 
Fundraising and fees from professional training workshops in MBSR would 
also help pay the bills. As part of the medical school, however, research such as 
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the use of brain imaging techniques to track the effect of MBSR on addiction, 
depression, chronic pain, and other conditions, played a key part in sustaining its 
academic credibility.103 
A Painful Transition
 Regardless of successful and innovative programs in clinical and 
behavioral research, regardless of Dalen’s importance to the success of the 
hospital, and regardless of the desires of the clinical faculty, by 1986 the basic 
science faculty, UMass President Knapp, and some of the Trustees, all believed 
the school’s future course must emphasize molecular science if it were to 
realize its full potential. Without publicly stating as much, the search for a new 
chancellor was intended to look outside UMMC.104 At the same time, James Dalen 
and Brownie Wheeler—the most powerful of the clinical chairs—seemed to be 
the hands-down, local favorites to become the next chancellor. When President 
Knapp named Dalen Acting Chancellor in 1986 but did not extract a pledge that 
Dalen would not seek the permanent appointment, many in the medical center 
and the community at large understandably thought the die was cast. The search 
for Chancellor Tranquada’s successor, therefore, ushered in a period of false 
hope, internal division, and bitter feelings. This was unlike anything previously 
experienced by UMass Med in its nearly two decades of existence.
 Dalen later said publicly that at first he hadn’t been certain he wanted 
the job. After a few months, however, he realized how much he enjoyed it, and 
put his name up for consideration. Dalen’s numerous friends among clinical 
faculty, patients (including the local Bishop), the local press and, especially, 
local politicians, proved to be both a source of strength for him and a weakness. 
During the first few months of the search for a new chancellor, which turned out 
to be a bruising, year-long process, a stream of local newspaper articles described 
the latest developments in cardiovascular research, treatment, and prevention 
strategies, especially those with a direct link to UMass Medical Center. Dalen’s 
name was mentioned prominently in all of them. In fact these were newsworthy 
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developments. One called attention to the “Worcester Heart Attack Study,” 
initiated by Robert Goldberg, Ph.D., of the Division of Preventive and Behavioral 
Medicine, part of Dalen’s Department of Medicine, a study subsequently directed 
by Dalen and his chief of Cardiovascular Medicine, Joseph Alpert. Begun in 
1979 as a long-term study of heart attack patients treated in all 16 hospitals in 
the Worcester area, its first published conclusions came out in the May 24, 1986 
Journal of the American Medical Association and showed a “decline in mortality 
rates from coronary disease in metropolitan Worcester.” Prominent mention 
also was made of UMMC’s place among only 13 medical centers to be authorized 
to engage in clinical trials of “tissue-type plasminogen activator” (TPA), a new 
heart attack therapy. Finally, also within the first few months of the search for Dr. 
Tranquada’s successor, another article cited the $4.4 million grant won by Judith 
Ockene and Robert Goldberg to develop smoking prevention programs. Ockene, 
as noted above, was a Dalen protégé and a division chief in Dalen’s department. 
To an outside observer, it would have seemed that much of the innovation and 
excitement at UMass Medical Center emanated from the work of faculty in 
Dalen’s Department of Medicine.105 
 Dalen’s supporters might have felt less confident had they taken a closer 
look at the composition of President Knapp’s search committee. Among the seven 
members from the Medical Center, three were basic scientists and one was a 
leader of University Hospital’s major competitor (Memorial). To the extent that 
Dr. Dalen was seen as a proponent of University Hospital’s expanded reach into 
central Massachusetts and, implicitly, someone unlikely to sacrifice his goals for 
the sake of basic research, this committee was primed to look elsewhere for a 
Chancellor.106 When Dalen was interviewed by an editor of the Worcester Gazette, 
Robert Nemeth, who asked him about his vision for the Medical Center, his reply 
must have given the research side of the campus pause. He told the newspaper’s 
readers, “Things will center around the hospital. How the hospital will adjust 
to the changes [in the economic environment] will determine our success.” He 
added that he hoped to enhance the Medical Center’s prevention program and to 
develop a first-class cancer center, something Dr. Tranquada had also promoted. 
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He made no mention of basic research.107
 President Knapp, on the other hand, along with many of the Trustees and 
influential researchers on campus such as Drs. Goodman and Czech, felt that the 
search was, in Goodman’s words,
…an opportunity to raise the medical school to a new level, that we 
were an okay medical school, but if we really aspired to be a great 
medical school, we needed the kind of leadership that would pull us 
forward. 
And my charge, as chairman of the search committee, was to find 
a candidate who would bring us to that next level, that would 
presumably involve [the institution] in expansion, since we were 
really bursting at the seams.108
 As the hopes and expectations of the clinical side of the institution 
confronted the quite different goals of the basic scientists, the Trustees, and 
President Knapp, what ensued was one of the messier executive-level searches 
in the medical school’s history. The search committee winnowed a longer list of 
potential candidates presented by an executive search firm down to a group of 
five who were given an initial interview, including James Dalen. But when the 
committee recommended three finalists for consideration by President Knapp 
and the Board, word leaked out that Dalen was not among them. Suddenly 
everyone from 17 Worcester-area state legislators, to the Bishop of Worcester, to 
members of Dalen’s own department (who began a petition drive), weighed in on 
the exclusion of the popular acting Chancellor. One of the local newspapers wrote 
an editorial titled, “Give Dalen a Chance.” The same paper also reported a rumor 
alleging that a “Jewish conspiracy” was behind the exclusion of Dr. Dalen; the 
totally unfounded rumor apparently arose because all of the top three candidates 
were Jewish, while Dalen was not. The newspaper reported outrage after 
President Knapp remonstrated with the clinical chairs over the charge: “‘No one 
here at the medical center has the faintest idea where [President Knapp] got that 
idea,’ said [Joseph] Alpert, who is Jewish. [Alpert] said some doctors who are 
Jewish are backing Dalen and other Jewish doctors are on the other side.” After 
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two of the three finalists dropped out, the Board proceeded to choose Leonard 
Laster, M.D., chancellor of the Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU) in 
Portland, as the new chancellor of UMMC. At that point, state Senator John 
Houston urged the Massachusetts attorney general to investigate the university’s 
apparent violation of the Open Meetings law. (The law required that “semifinal 
rounds of a search must be open to the public.”) President Knapp reluctantly 
reinstated Dr. Dalen to the list of finalists and, at least technically, reopened 
the search. The Board then met in public as a search committee of the whole 
to interview the two remaining candidates, Laster and Dalen on July 29, 1987. 
Immediately after, they reconvened in private and formally (re)elected Dr. Laster. 
James Dalen left UMass in 1988 to become the dean of the University of Arizona 
College of Medicine; in 1995 he was named Vice President for Health Sciences 
there.109
 Knapp told the press that “Dr. Laster is a man of great vision, a builder 
and motivator who has successfully mobilized private and public support for 
the [OHSU].” His motivation for choosing Leonard Laster were shared by the 
majority of Board members and the search committee, namely, that it was time 
to try something new. Dr. Laster, when asked how he envisioned the future 
of UMass Medical Center, told reporters, “It is an institution poised to leap to 
greatness or accept a future of making do and [just] surviving without going to 
the heights.”110 Publicly and privately, Dr. Laster, President Knapp, and search 
committee chair Maurice Goodman were unanimous in their belief that the 
medical center was suffering from a lack of commitment to research excellence. 
Laster commended himself to the search committee particularly because of 
his accomplishments at OHSU. During his decade in Portland, Laster had 
taken a school with a middling research profile—something directly related to 
its anemic levels of state support and to its apparently ineffectual attempts at 
fundraising—and, with the strong support of then-U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield, 
turned it into the nationally well-regarded home of the Vollum Institute, a center 
of neuroscience research. UMMS, it was felt, suffered from the same problems as 
OHSU: declining state funding and a dearth of philanthropic donors to finance 
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recruitment packages, endowed chairs and, especially, new research facilities.
 Laster’s career had begun at the NIH clinical center researching diseases of 
the gastrointestinal tract. Teaming up with various colleagues there to investigate 
a variety of mysterious disorders presented by patients referred to his service, 
he and his colleagues identified several new diseases. To Laster, their successes 
arose directly from the way the Clinical Center at NIH was organized:  
And this is one of the wonders of the NIH: you could walk down the 
hall to another building, and there was someone who was a world 
authority on metabolism in that field…This down-the-hall capacity 
was just an amazing way to foster basic research. And that’s 
relevant to what I used as my model in subsequent activities.111
The NIH model became the template with which Laster approached the 
challenges presented by a series of, in his view, underperforming medical schools. 
He spent a few years at Downstate Medical Center, and then nearly a decade 
at OHSU. His goals for Oregon Health Sciences University seemed to fit the 
needs of UMass: “[T]he need was, in my judgment, to give the place an image, 
to the people of the state, of excellence, excitement, and to turn the recruitment 
difficulty around by being a place to which the top people would want to come.” 
His success there led the UMass search committee to invite him to apply for the 
position here. President Knapp told him, as Laster remembers it, “The place 
needs a rejuvenation.” In Knapp’s view, as understood by Dr. Laster, “there was 
a need for a shot in the arm for the institution. [Knapp] said it was a chance to 
build something; it had some excellent people, and it did. When I came to visit, 
I met some people who were of top caliber. And I got the impression that he 
wanted me to replicate the story from Oregon.” In particular, Knapp hoped that 
Laster could persuade the Massachusetts legislature to provide stronger support, 
something he had accomplished in Oregon.112
 Laster’s successes at OHSU had come at a price, however, something 
Maurice Goodman and David Knapp apparently learned only after he had 
been hired by UMass Medical Center. Several years into Dr. Laster’s tenure in 
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Portland, he received a highly negative job review for having “an abrasive style of 
leadership.” Of equal significance, he made lasting enemies there of longstanding 
faculty who felt threatened by the resources and attention being lavished on the 
new research centers and their newly recruited faculty. The same factors would 
play out at UMass Med. Dr. Laster’s term there proved short, but with long 
lasting, positive effects on the research profile of the school.113
 Laster’s chancellorship at UMass lasted from October 1987 until August 
1990. During that relatively brief span, several significant initiatives were set in 
motion. One successful venture involved getting legislative and Board approval 
to fund the new ambulatory clinic (later named for Joseph Benedict, as discussed 
in Chapter 5). More far reaching was the successful initiation of the Program 
in Molecular Medicine (PMM), to be discussed in Chapter 9. In October 1988, 
Dr. Laster announced to the UMass board that the program would focus on 
“molecular biology as it relates to human medicine, cancer, brain disease, 
Alzheimer’s, genetics, aging, immunology, and [viral] disease[s]. The Department 
will be housed in the Bio-Technology Research Park and will be headed by Dr. 
Michael Czech, Chairman of Biochemistry.”114  
 The Molecular Medicine program, represented Laster’s vision for a 
Leonard Laster, M.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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revitalized research profile at UMass Medical School; it led to many advances at 
the Worcester campus. Laster himself, however, could not effectively oversee the 
deep changes inherent in his vision. His managerial style was indeed abrasive, 
as had been observed in Portland nine years earlier. Philanthropy had not 
flourished, although, in fairness, such things take more than one or two years 
to develop. Nor had he been successful in reaching a rapprochement with the 
state’s legislators, despite having hired someone who was well connected to 
many influential state politicians, Albert (Albie) Sherman.115 By 1990, most of 
the medical center chairs were fed up with what to them seemed the arbitrary 
leadership of Chancellor Laster. After two years, they staged a “revolt.” In a 
secret meeting arranged by Dr. Arthur Pappas in August 1989 in the Owners’ 
Box during a Boston Red Sox game (Roger Clemens, the Red Sox’s star pitcher, 
was on the mound), the department chairs decided to approach President Knapp 
about their difficulties with the Chancellor. Although this proved fruitless, by 
the following summer even former Laster supporters such as Dr. Goodman were 
willing to press Knapp’s successor, Joseph Duffey, to remove Laster from his 
position. (David Knapp had resigned in early 1990, partly due to the fallout from 
his support for Leonard Laster.) Once again Dr. Pappas arranged a meeting at 
Fenway Park with Brownie Wheeler, Maurice Goodman, Aaron Lazare, UMass 
Trustee Michael Foley, UMass Board Chair Gordon Oakes, and President Duffey. 
With even Dr. Goodman insisting on the need for change, and the open hostility 
of the state legislature toward Dr. Laster, Duffey was willing to act.116 
 Psychiatry Department chair Aaron Lazare, who had been made interim 
dean in 1989 with strong support from the other chairs after the much respected 
and liked dean, James B. (Barry) Hanshaw, M.D. had resigned, was named 
permanent Dean of the medical school in July 1990. Leonard Laster resigned 
shortly after that, effective August 31, and Lazare was appointed Chancellor ad 
interim in October 1990. In June 1991 the Trustees appointed him Chancellor/
Dean, a title he held until 2007.117 By reuniting the offices of dean and chancellor, 
as had been done under Lamar Soutter, the Trustees were heeding a call to end 
the turbulence that had marked the administration of Dr. Laster. By choosing 
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Aaron Lazare, they were signaling a desire to see someone with strong leadership 
skills who would also pay heed to the urgent need of the basic sciences for parity 
with the institution’s clinical departments.118 Chapter 9 will describe the school’s 
return to relative calm and the consolidation and unprecedented growth of basic 
science research. Excellent leadership and extraordinary research were necessary 
for these developments to occur, yet without the decision to divest the hospital, 
made in the mid 1990s, it might not have been possible for the school to achieve 
its transformation.
Aaron Lazare, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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  Chapter 9
Becoming a Research University, Part 2: 1990-2012
 
 The institution Aaron Lazare inherited, according to many accounts, 
was reeling from a crisis both financial and of esprit de corps. This chapter will 
describe Chancellor Lazare’s efforts and those of his successors, Dean Terry 
Flotte and Chancellor Michael Collins—largely successful—to bring some stability 
and even harmony to the campus by addressing the needs of basic and eventually 
clinical researchers. (Parallel efforts to enhance undergraduate medical education 
are described in Chapters 7 and 10.) The chapter begins with Lazare’s initiatives 
and follows with several examples of institutional expansion through scientific 
innovation, acquisitions, and innovative service; these initiatives include AIDS 
research and therapy, the Program in Molecular Medicine, the Worcester 
Foundation for Biomedical Research, MassBiologics, and Commonwealth 
Medicine.
Aaron Lazare: Finding a Balance among Stakeholders
 Looking back on this period in 2005, Lazare wrote of his administration, 
“Our first goal in 1990 was (literally) to survive.”1 Dean Hanshaw’s resignation, 
a result of finding it impossible to work with Chancellor Laster, had occurred 
only six weeks before the Liaison Committee for Medical Education (LCME) 
accreditation visit in November 1989. Lazare was asked to succeed him. In 
the LCME report, both Hanshaw and Lazare were singled out for praise. The 
LCME visiting committee plainly stated its concern with “the governance 
and administrative structure of the institution, the stability of its leadership, 
and whether an effective and harmonious working relationship among top 
management has been achieved.” Further, the LCME reviewers noted that, 
“The proposed molecular medicine program…arouses considerable concern 
among a sizable number of faculty that it may dilute or erode effective teaching 
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programs…and downgrade education as a priority.”2 Finally and most important, 
they cited the unstable “financial resources and management” of the institution.3 
 After taking over the Medical Center’s leadership in September 1990, Dr. 
Lazare concluded that its poor financial health was tied to its troubled relations 
with its major “stakeholders,” notably the legislature, the media, and business 
and community leaders in central Massachusetts.4 Relations with the state 
legislature were at low ebb in the early 1990s. For example, the state contribution 
to UMMC’s budget had been 11% in fiscal year 1988; by fiscal year 1990 it 
dropped to 8.5%. In 1994 it was further reduced to 7.84%, a level that remained 
largely unchanged.5 Worse, in 1991, as described in Chapter 5, Governor Weld 
threatened to entirely eliminate the Medical Center from the state budget. 
Although that threat was overcome, it would take several years for Chancellor 
Lazare and others to establish reasonably smooth dealings with Beacon Hill. 
Indeed in 1991, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the state imposed a furlough resulting 
in the sequestration of $3 million of the institution’s budget. UMass Med 
employees felt battered, unsure of their future, and this applied to the researchers 
as much as anyone.6 
 The institution seemed to be at a crossroads. Could UMass reinvigorate its 
primary care curriculum at the same time as it re-committed itself to promoting 
basic science research? Would it find the resources to pay for such ambitions? 
Fortunately, it is no exaggeration to say that Lazare established “a special 
rapport with the legislature and the city of Worcester.”7 He made a special effort 
to cultivate the business, cultural, and political leaders of Worcester. And he 
revitalized the school’s identification with public service by “committing the 
school’s resources and expertise” on behalf of better care at state institutions such 
as Worcester State Hospital and Framingham State Prison for Women. These 
contracts supplied the model for an extensive program of consulting to state 
departments through the new division of Commonwealth Medicine, formally 
established in 1999. Within a decade of its creation, Commonwealth Medicine, 
led for many years by Thomas Manning, was able to contribute enough to 
underwrite a significant portion of the school’s yearly budget.8 
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 Chancellor Lazare also turned his attention to healing the damaged 
sense of collegiality among faculty and staff, a quality which many faculty 
and staff cited as a major reason for remaining at UMMS over the years. 
Maurice Goodman reflected that
Aaron did a lot of smart things. The first thing that he did was 
involve the entire community in developing a mission statement. 
And I think that…got people feeling that we’re all part of the same 
[organization]. He didn’t make any overt moves to strengthen 
the basic sciences immediately. He did manage to pour oil on the 
waters… And Aaron made the connection with Worcester. He 
turned that around completely…He became Chairman of the United 
Way of Worcester [and] a lot of moves…that tied the medical school 
to Worcester.9
As one of his first actions as dean (but while still the interim chancellor), Dr. 
Lazare engaged the entire campus in the process of writing a mission statement, 
the first since 1975 and the first ever to involve faculty, students and staff, not 
only upper level administrators and department chairs. It was complete by 
the beginning of 1991. Clearly the process of writing it, involving the input of 
hundreds of campus employees and students, was intended to boost campus 
morale.  Significantly, it emphasized that “we operate on the assumption that 
the three major health care objectives (education, service, and research), are 
complementary and inseparable…The pursuit of all three objectives must occur 
at the same time.” Unlike the statement of 1975, research was declared an equal 
partner with education and service, and no attempt was made to mask this 
reality. Chapter 7 described some of the initiatives that energized primary care-
based curriculum reform during the 1990s such as the Generalist Physician 
Initiative. Just as visible were efforts taken by the Lazare administration on 
behalf of basic research.10 
 When the Trustees appointed Lazare the permanent Chancellor and united 
that position with the position of medical school dean, they were responding 
to an overwhelming mandate from almost all sectors of the Worcester campus. 
Lazare, according to the report solicited by the Trustees, was seen as a “healing” 
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and unifying influence on the campus and the Worcester community. That 
confidence was not fully shared by a “vocal” minority group of scientists who 
sincerely believed that a national search would yield a Chancellor more in tune 
with their needs.11 Lazare was surely aware of these reservations and worked hard 
to counter them. Early in his first year as Chancellor/Dean, Lazare authorized a 
strategic planning report for research, completed in September 1991. The report’s 
three recommendations, including the creation of the position of Vice Chancellor 
for Research, the establishment of a formal technology transfer office, and a new 
office of development, were implemented over the next three years.12 A retreat 
specifically for the basic science department chairs and relevant administration 
leaders was held in June 1992.13 Researchers on campus had good reason to 
insist that the administration attend to the needs of the research faculty. As they 
looked at a recent tabulation of the Medical Center’s rank in NIH awards, it was 
clear that between 1990 and 1993, UMass-Worcester’s standing had significantly 
declined as growth stagnated due to lack of space and funds:
UMass Medical Center Summary of NIH Extramural Support 14
Year  Rank  Total Number of Awards  Dollars
1989  36  141     $29,043,067
1990  37  151     $30,794,921
1991  40  149     $31,115,855
1992  45  139     $29,613,026
1993  47  141     $31,844,085
True, compared to public medical schools in the Northeast for fiscal year 1992, 
UMass ranked second, just behind the University of Maryland and in the top 
quarter of all public medical schools founded after 1965. Nevertheless, other 
schools were putting more resources into the effort and rising in the ranks. 
UMass Med was falling behind.15 A second research retreat, held in April 1993, 
concluded that, “Basic science departments have experienced shrinkage of 
revenue from all sources simultaneously.” Among other key points from the 
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retreat was the following: “Bold investment of capital that permits expansion of 
faculty is our best hope for survival and continued vitality. Dollars invested in 
Molecular Medicine, for example, will be recouped within less than 5 years after 
inception of the Program.”16
 With so much riding on initiatives like the Program in Molecular 
Medicine, and a feeling of pervasive belt-tightening in the other basic science 
departments, research leaders in concert with the Scientific Council requested 
certain measures to improve the institution’s chances of making progress. 
For one, they persuaded the Chancellor to increase the outlay for recruitment 
packages for both junior and senior research faculty and chairs. By 1994, the 
Chancellor had agreed to fund such recruiting packages from his budget.17 The 
administration was now committed to coordinated research planning; the basic 
science chairs began meeting on an increasingly frequent and regular basis 
with Lazare. In addition, Edward Bresnick, Ph.D., hired in 1994 for the new 
position of Vice Chancellor for Research, began centralizing all research-related 
functions. Bresnick, who also was the president 
of the American Association for Cancer Research, 
had been director of the Norris Cotton Cancer 
Research Center at Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical 
Center before coming to UMMS. He is often 
credited with helping to actualize many initiatives 
of importance to basic science research at UMMS, 
including the details of the absorption in 1997 
of the Worcester Foundation for Biomedical 
Research by the school.18 After Bresnick’s 
retirement around 2000, the basic science chairs 
established the Research Advisory Council to coordinate research priorities. 
John Sullivan, whose important role in the prevention of mother-to-infant 
transmission of HIV will be described below, was appointed director of the Office 
of Research and in 2006, Vice Chancellor for Research.19 
 Lazare and his executive team of Tom Manning and Rick Stanton 
Edward Bresnick, Ph. D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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settled on a strategy of diversification of revenue sources as the means to free 
the institution from its vulnerability to decreased state funding. Lazare was 
successful to an unprecedented degree in external fund raising for the Worcester 
campus. During his nearly 17 years as chancellor, for example, the medical school 
received funding for 28 endowed chairs or professorships.20 In all, the campus 
benefited from more than $200 million in philanthropic gifts. Commonwealth 
Medicine also supplied key resources (described below). Finally, at a time of 
expansion at NIH, it made good sense to invest heavily in research and hope to 
reap a return on that investment in both dollars and institutional reputation. 
The NIH budget increased dramatically between 1998 and 2003 and thereafter 
somewhat less steeply until 2010.21 
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During this period, as part of a drive to secure high quality research space at 
a reasonable and predictable cost, the school purchased both Biotech 1 and 
2 buildings and an office building on South Street in Shrewsbury.  In 2000, 
the Irving and Betty Brudnick Neuropsychiatric Research Institute (BNRI), 
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part of the Department of Psychiatry, opened under the sponsorship of the 
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health for research of the biological 
underpinnings of mental illness. In 2001, the Aaron Lazare Research Building 
(LRB) opened.  The Ambulatory Care Center (ACC), developed to house a variety 
of clinical centers of excellence, was begun in 2006 and completed in 2010. 
Finally, the Albert Sherman Center (ASC) was opened on December 12, 2012.23 
Research of “National Distinction”
 These accomplishments required years to bring to fruition. At the 
beginning of Lazare’s term as Chancellor/Dean, as we have seen, the prospects 
for achieving what Lazare habitually referred to as “national distinction” looked 
far from promising. Despite this environment, from the end of the 1980s, one 
can easily discern the institution’s maturation into a multifaceted school with 
a research identity at least as robust as its identification with primary care. 
During this period, the development of programs in HIV/AIDS therapeutics 
and research, the Program in Molecular Medicine and other research initiatives, 
the acquisition of the Worcester Foundation for Biomedical Research and the 
Massachusetts Biologics Laboratories, and the creation of Commonwealth 
Medicine, should be examined in some detail.
Lazare Research Building (Photo courtesy of the Office 
of Communications, University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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AIDS Research and Therapy, 1987-present
   Immunology, virology, and, specifically, research on HIV/AIDS straddled 
the line between the worlds of the clinician and the bench researcher. From 
the beginning, despite the paucity of research faculty, there existed what John 
Sullivan has characterized as “little pockets” of common research interests in 
infectious disease mechanisms, in particular in virology and immunology. Barry 
Hanshaw, M.D., founding chair of Pediatrics, was a well-known researcher 
of cytomegalovirus (CMV), while Neil Blacklow, M.D., chief of the division 
of Infectious Diseases in the department of Medicine, was also well known 
for his work on gastroenteric viruses. In Pathology, David Purtilo, M.D., the 
discoverer of X-linked lymphoproliferative disease (XLP)—a fatal vulnerability 
to Epstein-Barr virus, was continuing to research the effect of the Epstein-Barr 
virus on the immune system. Francis Ennis, M.D., who was recruited from NIH 
by Dr. Blacklow, was nationally recognized for work on the immune response 
to influenza. In the basic science departments, these interests coalesced with 
the work of people like the immunologists Raymond Welsh, Ph.D. whose lab 
demonstrated that “natural killer cells become activated during viral infections 
and contribute to natural resistance to viruses,” and Robert Woodland, Ph.D., 
Raymond Welsh, Ph. D. (Photo  courtesy 
of the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
Robert Woodland, Ph. D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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who studied the role of lymphocytes in the regulation of the immune response.24 
Even in 1978—two years after the Hospital’s opening—when Sarah Cheeseman, 
M.D., an internist and virologist interested in CMV, and John R. Sullivan, M.D., 
a pediatrician and viral immunologist interested in Epstein-Barr virus, arrived 
at UMMC intending to become clinical investigators, these were not misguided 
ambitions.25  
 In 1981, when what became known as HIV (the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus) was first described, Sullivan, Cheeseman, Blacklow, Ennis, and others 
were positioned to adapt their efforts to respond to its demands. Cheeseman, 
who had worked on CMV as a 
fellow in the Harvard laboratory 
of Martin Hirsch, was a member 
of the Infectious Disease division 
in the department of Medicine, 
eventually running the Diagnostic 
Virology Laboratory. Sullivan joined 
the department of Pediatrics and 
soon headed the Pediatrics inpatient 
service. Both were drawn into the 
deepening enigma of HIV/AIDS.26 
Sullivan, along with Neil Blacklow, 
M.D., chief of Infectious Diseases and after 1990, chair of the department of 
Medicine, Francis Ennis, M.D., Richard Koup, M.D., then an instructor in 
Medicine and part of Sullivan’s laboratory and at this writing, the director of 
immunology at the NIH Vaccine Institute, and Katherine Luzuriaga, M.D., a 
postdoctoral fellow in Sullivan’s lab in 1987 who went on to become a faculty 
member in 1990 and an internationally known AIDS researcher, all became 
central figures at UMass in the search for a drug to effectively treat—and even 
prevent transmission of—HIV. Cheeseman, Sullivan, and Luzuriaga, as well as 
nurse practitioners Carol Bova and others became early members of the tight-knit 
cohort of clinicians who staffed the early AIDS clinics, one for adults and one for 
Sarah Cheeseman, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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children, at UMass Hospital.27
 This is a story in which bench science, clinical research, and patient care 
are braided together. For example, Sullivan began studying primary Epstein-Barr 
virus in adolescents, which is infectious mononucleosis, for which he received his 
first RO1 (an NIH investigator-initiated research grant) in 1981. Soon he learned 
that infants who had received blood transfusions and as well as hemophiliacs 
who had received Factor 8 concentrate were presenting with immune system 
devastation. According to one hypothesis at the time, herpes viruses such as 
Epstein-Barr and CMV might be the source of infection. Sullivan contacted Drs. 
Peter Levine and Doreen Brettler at Memorial hospital, who were running the 
New England Area Comprehensive Hemophilia Program. They agreed that Drs. 
Sullivan and Cheeseman could test these 
patients’ immune responses to E-B 
and CMV viruses. That led to a second 
RO1. “And,” as Dr. Sullivan noted, “we 
actually…ended up being the first to 
describe that the majority of individuals 
with hemophilia who were receiving 
Factor 8 concentrates had in fact been 
infected with this virus [HIV], because 
of the Factor 8.”28
 When it became clear that the unknown agent was likely a virus, Sullivan 
began to study ways to identify it—to “culture the virus.”
And then in 1985, in my immunodeficiency clinic, I saw this child…
had swollen lymph glands, and there was some question about 
the immune system.  And that was our first case of congenital 
HIV infection. And then it became apparent that this was a virus 
that was really spreading in our population, that women were 
getting pregnant and then passing the virus to their babies. So 
we immediately took the focus on: well, how does this virus get 
passed from mother to child?  And we started investigating when 
it’s transmitted by collecting specimens—identifying women who 
are infected when pregnant, and then collecting specimens from 
John Sullivan, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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cord blood and placenta at birth, and then following the babies and 
taking samples, and isolating the virus. And we were actually one of 
the first laboratories to show that most of the virus was transmitted 
during the birth process—that as the baby passes through the birth 
canal, the baby is exposed to the virus and infected.29
 As soon as the retrovirus had been isolated, first by the Pasteur Institute 
(1983) and then by Robert Gallo’s laboratory at NIH (1984), Sullivan acquired 
a sample and, before a commercial assay was available, designed his own 
antibody assay to isolate and identify the virus in patients. In 1984 Sullivan 
and his colleagues set up an anonymous HIV testing site, the first in central 
Massachusetts, at UMass Hospital. As he later told an interviewer, there was 
“a lot of controversy in those days about: well, if you can’t do anything about 
it, why test for it? But I thought it was important that if people knew they were 
infected, they could at least take precautions not to infect somebody else.”30 They 
advertised the anonymous testing site all over the city of Worcester. 
In the evenings we would see…not patients, these were at the time 
mostly healthy people, who thought they were healthy, anyway, who 
knew they had risk factors for HIV, whether it be sex—males having 
sex with males, or intravenous drug use, or contact with prostitutes. 
So in the evenings, we would stay around, at 6 o’clock here, and 
people could come in, and we gave them directions, and they could 
come up and we would do pre-test counseling, take a blood sample. 
It was anonymous—they’d have a number, and we didn’t know 
people’s names or anything. And we’d run the test, and then they’d 
come back two weeks later and we would give them the result with 
the appropriate counseling.31
   At first, they could do nothing for the adults except to warn against 
infecting others or, in the case of a pregnant woman, treat her newborn with 
Bactrim for pneumocystis carinii. AZT (Zidovudine), the first AIDS drug 
to be approved by the FDA for clinical use (in 1987), became available for 
investigational use in 1986. At that point, Sullivan, Cheeseman, and their 
colleagues at UMass were able to start treating with it. In 1987, with Neil 
Blacklow as principal investigator, UMMC received a five-year NIH grant to 
447
become one of 17 U.S. clinical study sites for treatment of adult AIDS patients 
with antiviral therapy which, for the next six years, meant AZT.32 
 But, as a pediatrician, Sullivan was primed to consider the problem of 
mother-to-infant transmission of HIV, the timing of transmission, the mode of 
infection, and the need to find a way to prevent it. Just as important, by 1987, 
the clinic was seeing more and more women and children infected with HIV.33 
At just this point, another virologist from UMass who worked just down the hall 
from Dr. Sullivan, Robert Eckner, Ph.D., was hired by a German pharmaceutical 
company named Boehringer Ingelheim (BI). BI, which had a research and 
manufacturing facility less than two hours by car from Worcester in Ridgefield, 
Connecticut, was in the early stages of a search for a new AIDS drug. Eckner 
was hired to work on the new project in December 1987. At Eckner’s suggestion, 
BI also contracted with Sullivan to screen their new products. As science writer 
Rebecca Anderson has written, “Sullivan had developed methods to safely isolate 
HIV from infected patients and use it to observe the virus’s ability to infect and 
proliferate in human cells under controlled laboratory conditions.” Now he 
began screening several BI compounds against the virus. The first BI compounds 
were ineffective, but in 1989 Sullivan showed that a compound—later named 
Nevirapine—could prevent HIV replication in his assay.34 
 From this point on, Sullivan and colleagues from UMass Medical School, 
along with Douglas Richman, M.D. from UCSD, began a collaboration with BI. 
Their work eventuated in the development of a drug that became a foundation 
of worldwide efforts to prevent mother-to-infant transmission of the AIDS virus, 
Nevirapine. In 1990, with the support of the NIH’s AIDS Clinical Trials Group 
network (ACTG), of which Sullivan and Cheeseman were members, the FDA 
approved clinical trials of BI’s Nevirapine. It also urged BI to design a trial of 
the drug for children, something that Sullivan himself was advocating with the 
company and with the ACTG.35
  The first clinical safety trial of Nevirapine for adults (after the drug’s 
accelerated approval by the FDA, BI marketed it under the name “Viramune”) 
was begun at UMMS on January 21, 1991 under the supervision of Dr. Sarah 
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Cheeseman.36 As she recalled it:
[W]ell, first for Boehringer Ingelheim we did a true Phase One 
pharmacokinetic study [of Nevirapine]. And Rick [Koup] handled 
the lab specimens. His wife, who was my clinical trial coordinator, 
Carol Bova, who was our nurse practitioner, and I. We were the 
team…we had these groups of four patients per dose come in, and 
they had to spend the night, so they had observed [a] fast from 
midnight on. And at the time we had a four-bed observation unit, 
where people who had procedures and needed to stay longer than 
two or three hours were kept.  That wasn’t in use on the weekends, 
so we could use it Sunday night for our patients to stay over, and 
then on Monday there was another room that was available for 
actually administering the drug, and having the patients wander 
around…
[W]e would come in on Sunday night, review again with the 
patients what was planned, and then they would spend the night, 
and I think one of us was always here. And then the next day—I 
mean, we gave the first dose of Nevirapine ever to a living human 
being here...37  
At the same time, John Sullivan and Katherine Ruiz de Luzuriaga, M.D., by then 
a young assistant professor, Richard Koup, and others, were working in Sullivan’s 
lab to try and determine how to diagnose HIV infection in newborns so as to 
effectively time therapeutic interventions. It was a tricky problem. Luzuriaga 
explained that,
…we did a lot of the work on early diagnosis…and applying those 
methods to figuring out when babies were infected. So when you 
apply those diagnostic criteria, there are actually patterns. So about 
20 percent of babies were positive at birth…they had been infected 
in utero. About 60 percent [were] negative at birth, but positive 
after birth, like a week or so after birth, and those babies were 
likely infected during delivery, or intrapartum. And then a small 
percentage in places where there is breast-feeding—it’s anywhere 
from actually 20 to 40 percent—were negative at birth, but positive 
sometime later, suggesting that they had been infected through 
breast milk.38
Between 1991 and 1994 Sullivan, Koup, Luzuriaga, and others, in the words of 
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Dr. Luzuriaga, “published what is now widely used as the definition for timing 
of infection.”39 Since Sullivan had been working with BI all along, and since he 
had been advocating for a pediatric trial of Nevirapine almost from the start of 
his collaboration, UMass Med became the first site for the pediatric Nevirapine 
studies.40  
 Katherine Luzuriaga, who was pregnant with her first child, carried out 
the first pediatric safety trial of Nevirapine in June 1991. As she emphasized, 
“it’s one thing to be a pediatrician when you haven’t had kids. It’s another thing 
to have gone through pregnancy, and have the kids, and really you develop a lot 
of empathy, you know, with the parents and the children. And it was tough to 
see these moms get sick, or die, and no longer be able to care for their kids. It 
was tough to see these kids get sick so quickly. So I think that’s what really drove 
us.” As with the adult clinic, the pediatric AIDS clinic 
and clinical studies were “a story of teamwork.” Many 
of the families had very limited resources, sometimes 
even lacking basic electricity and water and reliable 
refrigeration for medicines at home. “We had fabulous 
nurses who helped us in the clinics every step of the 
way…They just served as case managers and got these 
kids and their families whatever they needed. We also 
had fabulous social workers…”41  
 Tragically, many of the mothers and infants in 
those first trials in 1991 did not survive, but the picture 
has since improved. In 1995 the FDA approved the 
three-drug retroviral “cocktail” for clinical use in adults, an approach developed 
by the lab of Martin Hirsch, Dr. Cheeseman’s former mentor at Harvard. From 
then on, in developed countries where the cost and complexity of this regimen 
could be managed, survival rates climbed dramatically. (After the FDA approved 
Nevirapine in 1996, it or another drug in its class of non-nucleoside reverse 
transcriptase inhibitors became one of the three drugs in this regimen—again, 
a regimen available only in wealthier nations; nowadays, however, the regimen 
Katherine Luzuriaga, M.D.
(Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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usually includes a protease inhibitor rather than a Nevirapine-like drug.)42 Today 
Luzuriaga sees patients, some of them now in college, who are quite healthy. 
Dr. Cheeseman, describing her experience with adult patients who received the 
combination antiretroviral therapy, put it this way:
Well, I mean the big change is we’re not focused on death… And 
now…I’m still a primary care physician for a great many of my 
patients… A large majority of my patients date from the late 
eighties, so we’ve been together a long time and some of them, 
many of them, were very sick back then, and expected to die 
anytime. And so we look at each other with these sort of silly grins: 
“We’re talking about your cholesterol! Can you believe it?”43 
 Sullivan, Cheeseman, and Luzuriaga are unanimous in their spontaneous 
expressions of appreciation and respect for the nurses who worked alongside 
them in the AIDS clinics and trials. Their work has also evolved. Today Carol 
Bova, nurse practitioner and Ph.D., for example, is a professor in the Graduate 
School of Nursing at UMass-Worcester and runs the Positive Life Skills Program 
for HIV-infected women in Central Massachusetts. 
Her clinical work focuses on improving community-
based clinical care for HIV- and hepatitis C-infected 
individuals and their families, particularly those 
with comorbid conditions such as depression and 
substance abuse. With Carol Jaffarian, another 
UMass nurse-researcher, she helped create an HIV 
education and prevention program in Armenia. 
Another nurse practitioner and Ph.D. recipient, 
Donna Gallagher, joined UMMS after two decades 
of work in Boston, first as an oncology nurse and 
then, in the early 1980s, as a palliative care specialist 
for patients dying of AIDS. The transition did not 
feel radical to Gallagher, who saw her oncology practice as being “a partner in 
a struggle,” a partnership with the patient. In the mid-1980s, Gallagher helped 
Carol Bova, Ph.D., R.N., A.N.P. 
(Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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to create an AIDS home health care referral and care service located in Boston 
but serving the entire state of Massachusetts, the Community Medical Alliance. 
As a result of her work there, in 1987 she received a call from Allan Chuman, 
now with the Department of Family Medicine and Community Health but at 
the time affiliated with the Center for Health Policy and Research at UMass. 
He invited Gallagher to become the director of a Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA)-financed project to train Massachusetts providers in 
AIDS care. It was called the New England AIDS Education and Training Center. 
From 1988 on, they began developing curricula 
and workshops to train health care providers 
and medical and nursing students in the care of 
persons with AIDS. The program continues as of 
this writing, from within UMMS’s Commonwealth 
Medicine; Gallagher has faculty appointments 
in both the department of Family Medicine and 
Community Health and the Graduate School of 
Nursing. She has also been extensively involved 
in global health care, whether in Romania, Haiti, 
South Africa, or Liberia, particularly to organize health care for populations 
facing HIV/AIDS in epidemic proportions. She and Katherine Luzuriaga co-direct 
the UMMS Office of Global Health, which was established in 2009.44 
 Today, it might seem as if the questions underlying research and 
therapeutics for HIV+ persons have changed—at least in wealthier nations, 
just as the combinations of drugs being used have changed. In Luzuriaga’s 
words, pediatric AIDS specialists can now wonder about “…what are the best 
markers for a state in which the virus is so low that it would not rebound if 
we took them off [antiretroviral medication]?”45 The problem of prevention, 
however, persists as urgently as ever, especially the prevention of mother-to-
child viral transmission. A case from 2012, known through the media as the 
“Mississippi baby,” demonstrated again how difficult it will be to effect a “cure” 
in individuals who have contracted the infection. Drs. Luzuriaga and Deborah 
Donna Gallagher, Ph.D., A.N.P., 
F.A.A.N. (Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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Persaud, M.D., a pediatric HIV specialist at Johns Hopkins, consulted on the 
case of a baby born to an HIV+ mother who was treated by Hannah Gay, M.D. 
at the University of Mississippi Medical Center—Jackson. Dr. Gay, another 
pediatric HIV specialist who was a member of the NIH clinical trials network 
and had collaborated previously with Luzuriaga and Persaud, treated the baby 
with a three-drug antiretroviral combination only 30 hours after birth. The 
triple-drug regimen was continued for 18 months, but stopped when the mother 
interrupted the treatment. The baby was next examined by Gay after a five-
month hiatus, and showed no detectable trace of the virus. Initially the case 
was hailed as a “functional cure” of AIDS and Luzuriaga, Persaud and Gay were 
celebrated worldwide. Unhappily, in 2014 the virus reappeared in the child 
who was restarted on antiretroviral therapy and seemed to be doing well. Dr. 
Anthony Fauci, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
director, concluded, “The case of the Mississippi child indicates that early 
antiretroviral treatment in this HIV-infected infant did not completely eliminate 
the reservoir of HIV-infected cells that was established upon infection but may 
have considerably limited its development and averted the need for antiretroviral 
medication over a considerable period.”46
 No easy cure of AIDS seems in the offing, but prevention does seem 
to be feasible. That is where the work of John Sullivan reenters the narrative. 
Sullivan was always focused on the problem of protecting the newborn from the 
risk of infection either in utero or while passing through the birth canal. Would 
Nevirapine, given while an HIV+ woman was pregnant, prevent transmission 
of the virus to her baby? While AZT was shown to be effective, the dosage was 
intense, complicated and unforgiving—conditions that made AZT an unappealing 
drug for use in developing countries where the rate of new infection was 
exploding. Nevirapine proved to be a less expensive, more convenient drug that 
helped prevent maternal-to-infant infection in poorer countries. 
 Sullivan worked with the World Health Organization to develop a trial 
and designed it specifically for use of Nevirapine. In 1995, the ACTG authorized 
a small clinical safety and bioavailability trial led by Sullivan and Luzuriaga, 
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and the NIH established the HIV Network for Prevention Trials (HIVNET). By 
1999, a protocol designed by Sullivan of a dose of Nevirapine for the mother 
during labor plus a booster dose for the baby two to three days postpartum had 
proven effective in prevention of infection to the infant. That same year, he 
launched the South African Intrapartum Nevirapine Trial (SAINT) comparing 
Nevirapine, short-term AZT and the drug 3TC. Although South African internal 
politics bogged down the trial for two years, the protocol was utilized in a trial 
in Uganda that demonstrated its effectiveness.47 In 2000, BI announced that 
it would “offer Nevirapine free of charge for five years to developing countries 
for use in preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission.” The same year, WHO 
and UNAIDS “endorsed single-dose Nevirapine for use in general practice.”48 
John Sullivan credits the collaborative spirit he found at UMMS for the eventual 
success of Nevirapine:
I mean, it was an incredible experience, because very few of my 
colleagues had the…luxury, I should say, of being in a place where 
you’re involved in discovery.  You can take it in the clinic, and then 
actually see it through clinical trials to FDA licensure, and then see 
it used throughout the world. I mean—that’s an incredible journey 
that very few have the opportunity to participate in. And you know, 
just being in the right place at the right time, and it happened.49
The Program in Molecular Medicine
 In addition to the ongoing AIDS research, Chancellor Lazare inherited 
another significant research nexus that, like the work of Sullivan and Luzuriaga, 
was poised to blossom. Despite Chancellor Laster’s administrative shortcomings, 
his few years in Worcester proved to be a watershed for basic science research at 
the Medical Center. In Michael Czech’s words, 
Len Laster had a terrific vision, and a very inspiring vision…of how 
UMass Medical School could participate in changing the world 
by high impact science… [Laster’s] leadership created the notion 
of building [the Program in] Molecular Medicine as a vehicle to 
start that process. [W]ithout Len, we wouldn’t have Molecular 
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Medicine.50 
The initiative Dr. Laster launched for a Program in Molecular Medicine (PMM) 
had barely begun when he resigned. Fortunately, just enough progress had been 
made by the end of 1990 that it would have been almost unthinkable to withdraw 
the institution’s support. 
 The campus expansion carried out during the Lazare administration 
played a crucial role in allowing the PMM to succeed. The vision of a cross-
disciplinary unit of molecular researchers struck a deep chord with many 
scientific leaders at UMass Med. As noted previously, in 1989 40,000 square feet 
of laboratory space had already been leased for five years in Biotech Park.51 This 
was the first tangible step toward realizing the vision shared by Laster, Maurice 
Goodman, Michael Czech, and other researchers on campus. (And in 1992, 
Chancellor/Dean Aaron Lazare received approval from the University’s Board 
of Trustees to purchase Biotech 2 for $14.4 million.)52 The LCME reviewers of 
1989 had noted that UMMS “has a proud record of rapid growth, development 
of fine facilities, and the achievement of pre-eminence among the nation’s 
newer medical schools in its biomedical research activities, including the level 
of external financial support for such research.” The “Basic Science” portion of 
the 1989 Self-Study had stated that among 
the 41 medical schools founded since 1960, 
UMMS ranked 3rd in NIH research support.53 
But, as Roger Davis explained (Chapter 8), 
the departures of a few highly promising 
researchers during the late 1980s and a lack 
of resources, including appropriate space, 
to recruit their replacements suggested 
that UMMC’s research achievements could 
evaporate unless strong countermeasures were 
taken as soon as possible.54 
 The Program in Molecular Medicine thus was deliberately conceived 
Michael Czech, Ph.D. (Photo  courtesy 
of the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts  Medical 
School)
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to spark a research growth spurt across the entire campus, as measured by 
recruitment, external funding, scientific discoveries, and honors and awards. 
Dr. Laster, on the advice of senior researchers internally and externally, had 
approached Michael Czech, Ph.D. to develop and lead it. Seed money was 
supplied mainly from approximately two million dollars in accumulated Scientific 
Council funds.55 According to the Program’s founding charter, drawn up by an 
advisory committee consisting of all the basic science department chairs or their 
representatives, PMM was established to:
strengthen and promote the research efforts of the entire Medical 
Center, by developing and fostering a strong interdisciplinary 
scientific environment with multiple technical capabilities. The 
Program is expected to facilitate recruitment of internationally 
recognized scientists and to catalyze productive collaborations 
among faculty at this institution. The long-term goal for the 
Program is to serve as a major catalyst in the continued growth and 
stature of biomedical research at the Medical Center.56
  Although Michael Czech and the school’s administration fully intended 
to recruit researchers in a national search for PMM, initially their only option 
was to recruit from within the school itself. At first, this did not engender much 
resentment. John Sullivan recalled that the reaction of his colleagues when he 
joined PMM was more like, “You guys are crazy…What are you doing? You’re 
going to go across the street? How could you possibly leave this building?’”57 
But, after the program began to be more successful and internal recruitment 
had begun to leave noticeable gaps in existing departments, a certain amount 
of resentment became evident. A white paper on “The future of Basic Science 
Departments at UMMS” from 1992 referred to feelings of “anguish” and the 
“alienation” within the basic science departments resulting from the seemingly 
arbitrary way that PMM faculty were selected.58 As Gary Stein, who was then 
chair of Cell Biology and did not lose people from his department, viewed it:
 
Okay, so we’re looking at a period of time when you had, really, 
an austere budget. And…I felt very strongly that you don’t build 
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programs at the expense of existing programs… what you are doing 
is you’re subtracting expertise. You’re subtracting components of a 
department’s environment. I was very strongly in favor of building 
Molecular Medicine, but my preference was to go ahead, to allocate 
resources, and recruit some outstanding people from the outside, 
rather than going into departments and taking.59
The anguish resulting from the creation of the PMM, however, reflected deeper 
issues than personal resentment or differences in administrative strategies. The 
white paper, written by Gary Stein and Maurice Goodman, elaborates the issues 
clearly and merits extended quotation:
At one time there was a readily identifiable approach or philosophy 
that went along with each of the basic sciences, and although each 
might have attacked the same problem and perhaps even reached 
the same solutions, the experimental techniques, strategies, 
emphasis, and interpretation were unique for the discipline. Thus, 
anatomists (now cell biologists) emphasized the structure and 
the organization of a biological system while to the physiologist, 
organization was interpreted in a functional sense, and the 
biochemist emphasized the reaction mechanisms and perhaps 
molecular structure of the components involved. All of these aspects 
are now fair game for the cellular biologists that populate the 6 
basic science departments…
…Now cell biologists, biochemists, microbiologists, physiologists, 
pharmacologists, and pathologists all use the same ‘tools.’ It 
can be argued that the current arrangement of departments 
coincides more with curricular needs and with memberships in 
professional societies than with scientific endeavor. The question 
arises as to whether there is adequate justification to maintain the 
6 basic science departments, especially with shrinking resources 
and the potential for moving to an integrated or problem-based 
curriculum...60
The argument continued with a strong affirmation of the rationale for retaining 
the traditional scientific departments on both scientific and political grounds.61 
In the short run, the traditional departments were retained but, in keeping with 
national trends—budgetary as well as intellectual—a number of departmental 
consolidations occurred at UMMS between 2006 and 2015.62 
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 With few extra dollars available for recruitment in the early 1990s and, 
at the time, modest starting salaries relative to competing institutions, the only 
way the PMM could grow was to develop a track record from within which 
would then act as a magnet, it was hoped, for up-and-coming external recruits. 
Czech was authorized to invite selected UMMS researchers to join Molecular 
Medicine, researchers with “diverse, but overlapping scientific interests in order 
to probe molecular mechanisms that underlie physiological processes and the 
diseases associated with them.”63 In practice, this meant they moved their labs 
and overhead funds from existing departments to the new Biotech Park across a 
fairly busy thoroughfare from the rest of the campus. Initially the PMM faculty 
all held tenured or tenure-track appointments in one of the regularly constituted 
medical school departments. By 1996, an internal report on the basic sciences at 
UMMS reported the following: “Although campus enthusiasm for the PMM was 
initially tempered by concerns about its distance from the main building and its 
apparently elite status, such concerns have diminished substantially as the PMM 
faculty have become integrated into the research community,” and the Graduate 
School.64 In 2000, when the “Program” was designated a department (although it 
retained its original name), faculty could be recruited or transferred into PMM as 
their home department. 
 John Sullivan’s lab was the first to move to the PMM in Biotech 2 in 
December 1989. Dr. Czech’s laboratory soon followed. About the same time 
(1990), Roger Davis, who also moved into PMM, was successfully nominated 
to become a Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator, the first of a string 
of such successful nominations.65 Over the next two years 10 other laboratory 
groups drawn from seven different UMMC departments moved into the 
PMM space.66 Initially the PMM researchers were organized into three major 
concentrations: structural biology, cellular signaling pathways, and regulation 
of gene expression and function. In some cases, an individual laboratory was 
deemed to be sufficiently successful and complex to require designation as a 
program in itself. An example is the laboratory of Michael R. Green, M.D., Ph.D., 
another Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator, whose field of gene 
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function and expression was designated a “program” and eventually moved into 
the Lazare Research Building when it opened in 2001.67
 The recruiting of Dr. Green illustrates what the scientific leadership at 
UMMS hoped to accomplish through the PMM. Michael Czech’s approach to 
recruiting had always been, as he put it, “to advertise universally, world-wide, to 
make calls to senior leaders…and look for the very, very best athletes, so to speak, 
the best scientists—in terms of the highest possible quality—that were out there, 
without too much regard for what they’d work on…”68 But he was acutely aware 
that he needed to recruit a senior scientist of the first rank from outside UMass 
in order to cement the program’s credibility in the eyes of the general scientific 
community and, given the transition occurring in the Chancellor’s office, at 
home, too. One potential senior recruit in 1990, from Harvard, changed his mind 
at the last minute and instead of coming to UMMS, went to Stanford. That was 
a low point. But within months, Czech succeeded in bringing Michael Green, 
M.D., Ph.D., and his laboratory, also from Harvard, to the PMM. Green’s studies 
of eukaryotic gene transcription have identified genetic factors that inhibit 
melanocytes from progressing to melanomas. His lab uses “transcription-based 
approaches and functional screens to identify new genes and regulatory pathways 
involved in cancer.”69 Green was named a Howard Hughes Medical Institute 
investigator in 1994, to the National Academy of Sciences in 2014, and to the 
National Academy of Medicine (formerly, the Institute of Medicine) in 2015.70
  In 1994, too, Michael Czech was able to recruit a young scientist to 
the Program in Molecular Medicine, Craig C. Mello, Ph.D., directly from a 
postdoctoral fellowship at the Fred Hutchinson 
Cancer Research Center in Seattle. Mello, principally 
(although not exclusively) in collaboration with 
Andrew Z. Fire, then of the Carnegie Institution 
of Washington’s Baltimore laboratory and, after 
2003, Stanford, has investigated and elucidated the 
workings of RNA interference, or RNAi, to silence 
and thus to regulate genes. As they worked with the nematode worm, C. elegans, 
C. elegans (Public domain image 
courtesy of the National Library of 
Medicine)
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or, as Mello has called them, “these poor elegant little animals…,” it was not 
initially clear what they had discovered. As Andrew Fire wrote, “[W]e had every 
reason to think we were in ‘the twilight zone.” 71 From the perspective of Michael 
Czech and the intended purpose of a unit such as the PMM, Mello’s story is 
instructive. As Czech recalled:
Craig came, and he was a great young investigator. He was a young 
kid; he had his bumps in the road. There were times where his 
funding was very tight, and I think uniformly we always said to 
Craig what we said to everybody, and that is, ‘We don’t care about 
the money. We care about your science. Can we help? Go ahead 
and go into the red if you need to, just keep doing the great science 
you’re doing, especially when you’re working in an area like RNAi, 
that is completely new and we don’t know what’s going to happen.’ 
Because this could [have been] a total artifact… 
And…for a couple of years, Craig was going around to faculty 
meetings and around the corridors saying, ‘I’ve got this amazing 
finding. I don’t know what to do with it.’ Many people would have 
waited to get tenure before putting all their energies into something 
so unusual. But to Craig’s credit, he stuck with what he knew to be…
important, had to be something real—couldn’t be an artifact, if it 
were that dramatic, that amazing.72
Mello and Fire were awarded the 2006 Nobel Prize 
in Physiology or Medicine. Mello has continued to 
explore the role of RNA in genetic regulation and 
information dissemination.73  
 UMass has continued to attract leading 
scientists working on RNA biology, its role in gene 
expression and regulation, and the potential of 
using RNA in designing therapeutic interventions 
in humans. The presence of top-tier laboratories 
certainly helped, as did the successful campaign 
to fund and build a new research building on 
campus, the Aaron Lazare Research Building (LRB), designed (with serious input 
by the researchers for whom it was intended) in a much more open style than 
Craig Mello, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusets 
Medical School)
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the original medical sciences building. Money for the LRB was made possible 
both by the agreement concluding negotiations with Memorial Health Care 
for UMass hospital (see Chapter 5), but also from what was, at that time, the 
most successful fund-raising campaign in the school’s history. The LRB opened 
in 2001.74 The LRB’s open floor plan reinforced the sense that departmental 
affiliations would no longer define, to whatever extent they had done so before, 
research collaborations. Scientists such as Phillip Zamore, who arrived less than 
2 years before the LRB opened, remember this period as one of great expectation: 
“It was a really exciting time, because the sense 
was, given the opportunity to reorganize where 
people were, how they were grouped, and what 
resources they had, plus the ability to recruit new 
young people, and for even junior faculty like me 
to have a strong voice in who got recruited—it was 
really empowering.”75 And, as noted above, this 
was a period of unprecedented expansion of NIH 
funding.
 From 2006, the University Board of 
Trustees urged the creation of a university-wide 
strategy for stem cell research. In the wake of 
Craig Mello’s award of the Nobel Prize in the fall 
of 2006, the University and, especially, the medical school became beneficiaries 
of the Governor Deval Patrick administration’s new willingness to jump 
start biotechnology via university-based as well as private-sector initiatives. 
The Patrick administration established a Life Sciences Initiative with the 
Massachusetts Life Sciences Center (LSC) as the agency through which state 
monies would be disbursed in a competitive proposal process. The University 
received $90 million from the LSC toward the construction of the Albert Sherman 
Center at UMass Medical School, a 500,000 square foot research and education 
facility which opened at the end of 2012,  nearly doubling the research capacity 
of the school. Designed to foster collaboration and translational research, 
Phillip Zamore, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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the Sherman Center is home to the Advanced Therapeutics Cluster, which is 
composed of the RNA Therapeutics Institute and the Gene Therapy Center.76 
The LSC also provided the medical school with funding for a stem cell bank and 
registry on the former Worcester Foundation campus in Shrewsbury.77 
 Just as important in successfully attracting additional top-tier scientists 
to UMass Medical School was the presence of other top-tier scientists. Phillip 
Zamore, Ph.D., who in 1998-99 with Thomas Tuschl and colleagues (their senior 
author was Phillip Sharp, a Nobel laureate from MIT) was the first to produce 
the phenomenon of RNA interference in vitro, was persuaded to accept his 
first faculty position at UMMS because of the presence of Michael Green (his 
dissertation advisor) and Roger Davis. Davis, whose lab had been across the 
hall during Zamore’s work with Green in the early 1990s and who recently had 
been the most cited researcher in the world, went out of his way to tell him how 
welcome his presence would be.78 In 2007, Craig Mello and Zamore personally 
initiated recruitment of two other RNA research leaders, Melissa J. Moore, Ph.D., 
and Victor Ambros, Ph.D. The results were described in a Boston Globe headline 
as “UMass Medical School recruits two RNA stars.” Melissa Moore, a Howard 
Hughes Medical Institute Investigator, was in 
part recruited by Zamore, whom she had known 
when working in the lab of Nobel laureate Phillip 
Sharp. Moore’s work focuses broadly on gene 
regulation through RNA mechanisms, such as the 
structure and mechanism of the spliceosome, “a 
macromolecular machine” that removes introns, 
or “incoherent strings of nucleotides that 
interrupt the coding regions of genes.” More 
recently her work also has explored the role 
of RNA metabolism in neurodegeneration.79 Victor Ambros, after deciding to 
move to UMass Medical School from Dartmouth, was quoted as saying, “When 
I heard that Melissa Moore was planning to move [to UMass], that was sort of 
the clincher.” Ambros and Moore had known each other since their days at MIT 
Melissa Moore, Ph.D. (Photo  
courtesy  of the University of  
Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts  Medical School)
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when Ambros worked in a lab across the hall from her. In 1993, Ambros and his 
lab, using C. elegans as a model, identified the first microRNA molecule. Ambros 
studies the role of microRNAs in regulating 
development. In 2008 he received the Lasker 
Award for Basic Medical Research.80   
 Responding to the intensification of 
molecular biology research at UMMS, especially 
RNA research, the school announced plans in 
2009 for an RNA Therapeutics Institute (RTI) 
to be led by Craig C. Mello, Ph.D., with Melissa 
J. Moore, Phillip D. Zamore, and Victor Ambros 
as co-directors. That same year, groundbreaking 
took place for the Albert Sherman Center (ASC), a building intended to provide 
space not only for the RTI and other molecular research programs, but also for 
medical, nursing, and graduate education. With the completion of construction of 
the ASC, the RTI began operations. 
 When in 2007 Terence R. Flotte, M.D. arrived at UMMS to become dean 
of the medical school, executive deputy chancellor and provost, he brought with 
him an outstanding research program in gene therapy.81 He was instrumental 
in creating the Gene Therapy Center, directed by Guangping Gao, Ph.D., to 
facilitate research using the adeno-associated virus (AAV) vector in gene 
therapy design.82 Dean Flotte’s own research focuses on lung diseases such as 
cystic fibrosis and alpha-1 antitrypsin (AAT) deficiency. A deficiency of AAT, a 
genetic mutation, results in conditions consistent with emphysema and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). In 1993, Flotte, with colleagues at Johns 
Hopkins, was the first to use the adeno-associated virus as a vector to deliver 
“corrective” genes into the bodies of adults with cystic fibrosis.83 Beginning in 
2003 and reported in 2006, he directed a first-in-human Phase I clinical trial 
of an intramuscular recombinant AAV2-AAT trial in adults. He and his lab are 
conducting Phase II clinical trials and are hopeful that it will become a viable 
therapy for lung disease due to AAT deficiency.84 The AAT mutation also is a 
Victor Ambros, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy 
of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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contributor to liver disease. In 2012, Phillip Zamore, Christian Mueller, Ph.D., 
and Terence Flotte designed an artificial microRNA to suppress mutant AAT 
genes occurring in the liver, combining it with a corrective AAT gene using the 
AAV delivery system.85 
 Neurotherapeutics also has come to represent a significant target of 
the research under way at UMMS in the past decade, a development strongly 
signaled by the arrival in 2008 of the neurologist and leading amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS) researcher Robert H. Brown, Jr., D. Phil., M.D. as Chair 
and Professor, Department of Neurology. In 1993, while director of the Day 
Neuromuscular Laboratory and the Muscular Dystrophy Association Clinic and a 
professor at Harvard Medical School, Brown and colleagues, 
“discovered the first gene linked to the inherited form of 
ALS, called SOD1.” At UMMS, in 2009 with John Landers, 
Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Neurology, 
Brown discovered an ALS gene variant that substantially 
improves survival of individuals with ALS. With a longtime 
UMMS collaborator, Dr. Zuoshang Xu, Brown and his lab 
are engaged in “pre-clinical development of a novel therapy 
for familial ALS, using a 
viral vector to deliver 
synthetic microRNA.”86 In 
2009, Brown and Melissa 
Moore organized a monthly 
faculty discussion group drawn from several dozen 
laboratories working on neurological mechanisms 
of disease. In 2010, this group formalized as the 
Neurotherapeutics Institute under the leadership 
of Drs. Moore, Brown, Neil Aronin (who specializes 
in research on Huntington’s Disease, independently 
and in collaboration with Phillip Zamore), and Marc 
Freeman (who studies glial cells). 
Robert H. Brown, Jr., 
D. Phil., M.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University 
of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
Neil Aronin, M.D. (Photo courtesy
 of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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*information not available 
** includes sponsored activity – federal and private grants, contracts and overhead 
*** Source: UMMS Annual Reports 
Fiscal Year Number of 
Institutions 
Receiving NIH 
Funding 
UMass Medical 
School Rank 
NIH Funding 
Amount 
(in millions) 
1978 * * $    6.3  ** 
1979 * * $    9.3  ** 
1980 * * $   10.7 ** 
1981 * * $   12.9  ** 
1982 * * $   17.4  ** 
1983 * * $   21.7  ** 
1984 * * $   22.7  ** 
1985 * * $   29     ** 
1986 * * $   30.4  ** 
1987 * * $   34.7  ** 
1988 * * $   39.5  ** 
1989 * * $   46     ** 
1990 * * $   50     ** 
1991 * * $   54    ** 
              1992 1980 68 $ 30.7 
1993 1519 * * 
1994 2216 69 $  35 
1995 2270 70 $  35 
1996 2257 56 $  46 
1997 2405 56 $  50.5 
1998 2170 54 $  57 
1999 2536 57 $  60.8 
2000 2659 58 $  73.7 
2001 2490 56 $  81.5 
2002 2627 58 $  89 
2003 3127 58 $  98.8 
2004 3224 56 $ 106.8 
2005 3459 56 $ 114.7 
2006 3402 57 $ 109 
2007 3335 49 $ 119 
2008 3043 50 $ 122.8 
2009 3035 45 $ 135 
2010 2944 42 $ 152 
2011 2818 43 $ 150 
2012 2598 45 $ 140 
2013 2503 46 $ 130 
2014 2527 42 $ 131.6 
UMMS Research Funding 1978-2014*** 
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The laboratory of Allan Jacobson, since 1994 the chair of Molecular Genetics 
and Microbiology (renamed Microbiology and Physiological Systems in 2012), 
has focused on the definition of and elucidation of the mechanistic functioning 
of a process named nonsense-mediated mRNA decay (NMD), a form of genetic 
quality control. Jacobson explained, “This turned out to be a quality control 
pathway which would rid the cell of messenger RNAs that had these premature 
stop codons. And basically, it prevented the accumulation of partial proteins that 
were synthesized, because these were toxic to the cell.” NMD is a process found 
in all eukaryotic cells and presents a robust possibility for design of a molecule 
that can treat the many heritable disorders in humans that result from “nonsense 
mutations,” such as cystic fibrosis or Duchenne muscular dystrophy.87  
 Many other examples of UMMS’s strengthened research profile can 
be noted. In the department of Cell and Developmental Biology, for example, 
Gary Stein (who was department chair from 1988 to 2012) and Janet Stein had 
made a significant contribution by cloning the human histone gene and in the 
understanding of cell cycle control and cell growth mechanisms, especially in 
bone tissue. They were joined here by their collaborator, Jane Lian, Ph.D. in 
1989. Lian’s laboratory at Boston Children’s Hospital had focused on early 
stem cell differentiation into osteoblasts. At UMass, the Stein and Lian labs 
focused on understanding the full cycle of cell specialization, growth, and 
Janet Stein, Ph. D. and Gary Stein, Ph.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
466
division of bone tissue. Jeanne Lawrence, Ph.D., who joined the Department of 
Cell Biology in 1985, and is currently interim chair of the department, has long 
been recognized for her studies of chromosome 
regulation by non-coding RNA and nuclear 
and genome organization. As she explained, 
“Our lab has long worked on uncovering basic 
mechanisms whereby the expression of normal 
genes is controlled during development—the 
process known as epigenetics.”88 Specifically, Dr. 
Lawrence identified the XIST gene (located on the 
X chromosome) that is responsible for turning 
off one of the two X chromosomes in female cells 
by effectively “painting” it with a nuclear RNA. 
This discovery led to the  realization that this 
naturally occurring X chromosome “off switch” can be rerouted to neutralize the 
extra chromosome responsible for trisomy 21, also known as Down syndrome. 
In 2013, Dr. Lawrence was able to confirm this theory by turning off the extra 
chromosome in trisomy 21 cells in a laboratory setting.89
 The laboratory of C. Robert Matthews, Ph.D., who became chair of the 
department of Biochemistry and Molecular Pharmacology in 2001, carried out 
important research into the mechanisms of protein 
folding.90 In 2012 Celia Schiffer, Ph.D., professor of 
Biochemistry and Molecular Pharmacology, was named 
founding director of the Institute for Drug Resistance. 
Building on work she had begun at UMMS more than a 
decade earlier, her research derives from the insight that 
drugs are not typically designed to ward off resistance; 
yet microorganisms causing diseases such as AIDS or 
tuberculosis are quick to evolve into pathogens that 
can evade previously effective drugs. Schiffer and 
her collaborators work to unravel the mechanisms of 
Jeanne Lawrence, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
Celia Schiffer, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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drug resistance in order to develop therapeutics that can avoid resistance.91
 These and numerous other research networks at UMMS reflect the 
ubiquity of interdisciplinary collaboration in the basic sciences today. They also 
attest to the success of the vision first entertained by Chancellor Laster, and 
carried forward by Drs. Czech and Goodman and, ultimately, by Chancellor 
Lazare and his successors, Dean Terry Flotte and Chancellor Michael F. Collins.92
The Worcester Foundation for Biomedical Research, 1944; 1997-
 One of Lamar Soutter’s earliest allies in the Worcester community 
was Hudson Hoagland, Ph.D., co-founder and co-director of the Worcester 
Foundation for Experimental Biology, as it was known from 1944 to 1995. As 
noted in earlier chapters, Hoagland gave spirited public support to the medical 
school’s being located in Worcester. In 1997 the Foundation, now known as the 
Worcester Foundation for Biomedical Research, merged with UMass Medical 
School. Today it is principally recognized for its crucial role in the development 
of the first oral contraceptive and in carrying out the first systematic study of 
the breast cancer drug Tamoxifen. The Foundation had deep roots in Worcester 
         Hudson Hoagland, Ph. D. and Gregory Pincus, Ph. D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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history. It was founded by two Clark University biologists, Hudson Hoagland, 
Ph.D. (1899-1982), at the time chair of Biology, and Gregory Goodwin (“Goody”) 
Pincus, Ph.D. (1903-1967), his friend and a professor in his department. The 
two had known each other since graduate school at Harvard. By 1944, both had 
suffered setbacks in traditional academic settings such as Harvard, Columbia, 
and now, Clark University. It seemed time to try something new. Hoagland, a 
neuroendocrinologist, came from a family that had owned a prosperous foundry 
and rolling mill machinery plant; he had many connections in the Worcester 
business and manufacturing community—which was fortunate. Were it not for 
financial contributions received from the Worcester community in their early 
years—the Foundation’s benefactors ranged from the heads of large companies 
to small business owners and everyday working people—the Foundation’s co-
directors would not have been able to purchase a 12-acre estate in neighboring 
Shrewsbury to house their enterprise.93 Nor would they have been able to recruit 
researchers, such as the reproductive biologist M. C. (Min Chueh) Chang, Ph.D. 
(1908-1991), who arrived from Cambridge University in 1945 to work with 
Gregory Pincus as a fellow. Chang’s 
distinguished career was spent entirely 
at the Foundation. (Resources were so 
tight in the early years that Hoagland, 
Pincus, and Chang all pitched in with 
chores such as mowing the lawn, 
maintaining the animal quarters, or 
acting as night watchman.)94  Chang 
originally intended to exclusively pursue 
his interest in vitro fertilization by 
working with Pincus. But six years later, 
Margaret Sanger (founder of Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America) and 
Katherine McCormick (the widow of 
the heir of the International Harvester 
Min Chueh Chang, Ph. D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical School 
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Company’s founder, Cyrus McCormick, and herself, an early MIT graduate and 
staunch supporter of contraception) persuaded Pincus to focus on the search for a 
safe and effective oral contraceptive. At that point, Chang joined Pincus in trying 
to tackle the problem.95 Pincus was aware of earlier research from 1937 showing 
the antiovulatory effect of progestins in rabbits. His great contribution lay in his 
decision to focus on research using progesterone-like hormones.96
 It is fair to say that from 1951 until Gregory Pincus’ death in 1967, the 
creation of the birth control pill occupied the majority of his attention. At Sanger 
and McCormick’s urging, Pincus negotiated with an initially hesitant Planned 
Parenthood Federation to pay for the initial testing until other sources of funding 
could be found. Eventually, however, McCormick herself supplied the majority 
of their funding for contraceptive research from her own funds, with some 
funding provided by the G.D. Searle Company. Both the G.D. Searle and Syntex 
companies supplied synthetic progesterone for testing—an essential condition 
since the substance was difficult to isolate and expensive. Pincus and Chang 
worked as a team. Pincus oversaw research and testing at the Foundation, sought 
out pharmaceutical company partners, and arranged a partnership with Dr. 
John Rock of Harvard to conduct clinical trials. Meanwhile, Chang indefatigably 
performed the majority of the tests in search of a potential contraceptive that was 
sufficiently active in animals to be worth testing in humans. And McCormick, 
through periodic visits and letters, not to mention her generosity, added the 
impetus to move ahead quickly. On June 23, 1960, the federal Food and Drug 
Administration approved Searle’s compound, Enovid, as an oral contraceptive 
based on the research conducted at the Worcester Foundation and the results of 
more than 2000 clinical trials conducted in Haiti and Puerto Rico.97 
 Although the Foundation was best known to the public for the 
development of the first oral contraceptive, researchers worked on many other 
projects during the more than half century of its independent existence. 98 
M.C. Chang’s major scientific achievements, for example, lay in his pioneering 
investigation of in vitro fertilization, work that prepared the way for the first 
successful human birth through in vitro fertilization in England in 1978.99 
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John McCracken, Ph.D., another senior scientist at the WFBR who arrived as 
a fellow in 1964 and remained until 1997, chose to come to the WF because, 
in his estimation, it was at that time the leading steroid research center in the 
world. The Foundation hosted NIH training programs in steroid biology, in 
neurobiology and a Ford Foundation-funded program in reproductive biology; 
these programs supported 10 fellows each. By 1951, they employed 57 men and 
women; by the late 1960s, approximately 300 international researchers had 
worked at the Worcester Foundation.100 In 1967, the Foundation employed 350 
people (including postdoctoral fellows), occupying 11 buildings. Its budget ran to 
$4.5 million.101
 Endocrine, reproductive, and neuroendocrine biology, reflecting the 
interests of Pincus, Chang, and Hoagland respectively, took precedence until 
Pincus’ death in 1967 and Hudson Hoagland’s retirement the following year. A 
gradual shift began after 1970. In that year, after a brief interregnum under the 
directorship of Mason Fernald, Hudson Hoagland’s elder son, Mahlon Hoagland, 
Ph.D., an eminent molecular biologist in his own right and a co-discoverer of 
transfer RNA, agreed to become the director of the Worcester Foundation.102 
Reflecting Hoagland’s interests, research at the Foundation now turned 
toward work in molecular biology and cancer. 
In 1976 the Mimi Aaron Greenberg Cancer 
Research Institute was established. During 
the 1970s, WFBR researchers “undertook the 
first systematic study of anti-tumor effects of 
the anti-estrogen tamoxifen and initial studies 
of aromatase inhibitors.”103 In 1985, Thoru 
Pederson, Ph.D., a molecular biologist who had 
joined the Foundation in 1971 and had become 
the head of its Cancer Research Institute, became 
President of the Foundation. In 1995, two years 
before the Foundation’s merger with the medical 
school, its name was changed to  the Worcester 
Thoru Pederson, Ph.D. (Photo 
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Foundation for Biomedical Research (WFBR). 
 In 1997, a time when the WFBR was facing severe financial challenges, 
the medical school’s strategy, as we have seen, called for an expansion in both 
space and in basic research. As a result of the merger of the Foundation with 
UMMS, a number of WFBR scientists became members of the faculty at UMMS. 
Thoru Pederson, for example, investigates the “functional significance of specific 
protein-RNA interactions in eukaryotic gene expression, with particular emphasis 
on RNA traffic and processing as well as domains in the cell nucleus where these 
events are set in motion.”104 Pederson is now the Vitold Arnett Professor in the 
department of Biochemistry and Molecular Pharmacology as well as Associate 
Vice Provost for Research. Many other Worcester Foundation scientists such 
as Joel Richter, Ph.D., George Witman, Ph.D., and Gregory Pazour, Ph.D., also 
transferred their activities to the medical school, principally in the departments 
of Cell and Developmental Biology, Biochemistry and Molecular Pharmacology, 
the Program in Molecular Medicine, and Microbiology and Physiological 
Systems.105 The Worcester Foundation today continues as a philanthropic entity 
through the Hudson Hoagland Society, working on behalf of research and 
education at UMMS.
MassBiologics, 1895; 1997-
 On December 4, 1996, the University Board of Trustees voted to accept 
the transfer of the Massachusetts Biologics Laboratories (MBL) from the 
jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health to that of UMass 
Medical School.106 The transfer became effective on January 1, 1997. Following 
the transfer to UMMS, the first Executive Director of what became known as 
MassBiologics was Donna Ambrosino, M.D., formerly of Harvard Medical School. 
In 2011, Dr. Ambrosino was succeeded by Mark S. Klempner, M.D., previously 
the founding director of the National Emerging Diseases Laboratories at Boston 
University. Klempner was named Executive Vice Chancellor for MBL.
 Originally established in 1895 as the Massachusetts State Antitoxin and 
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Vaccine Laboratory and directed by renowned epidemiologist and bacteriologist 
Theobald Smith, M.D., the Laboratory was housed in 
a few small rooms at Harvard’s Bussey Institution. 
Over the next decade, the laboratory manufactured 
and distributed such vaccines and antitoxins as those 
for smallpox, typhoid, meningitis, tuberculosis, 
and diphtheria—all without charge—through a 
distribution network initially to Massachusetts 
physicians and then through hundreds of municipal 
Boards of Health. Originally, these were to be 
distributed only within the state, but after 1914, 
the state laboratory received a federal license 
for interstate sale of its biologic products. In 
1914, the Antitoxin and Vaccine Laboratory 
and the Diagnostic Laboratory were incorporated together as the Division of 
Biologic Laboratories of the Department of Public Health. By the 1990s, the 
Laboratories had grown into a large research, 
development, and manufacturing unit devoted to 
research and production of vaccines, antitoxins 
and, since 1977, antiviral immune globulins. Much 
of its work began to focus on so-called orphan 
diseases such as cytomegalovirus (CMV), infant 
botulism, or respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). 
Some misunderstanding and confusion arose, 
however, from the management of the licensing for 
manufacture of RespiGam, the immune globulin 
for RSV. As a result, the state was directed to 
transfer management of the Biologic Laboratories 
to UMMS, a transaction viewed as beneficial both 
to the University, to the Laboratories, and to the 
public. As the UMass Trustees’ official motion of 1996 declared, the Laboratory’s 
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work benefits the public through programs “supporting childhood immunization, 
orphan products, and the public health.” The Trustee also authorized what 
became known as MassBiologics to enter into subcontracting agreements to 
manufacture biologic products for private companies.107 Throughout the 2000s, 
MBL was engaged in the creation of monoclonal antibodies for diseases such 
as Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (E. coli), severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS, in collaboration with NIH), and Clostridium difficile (C. diff.). 
Projects since 2011 have included a partnership with the University of Maryland 
School of Medicine under a joint contract with the Defense Advanced Research 
Products Agency (DARPA) to produce the monoclonal antibodies for a study 
intended eventually to produce a vaccine against Enterotoxigenic Escherichia 
coli (ETEC). In addition, MBL is developing an agent to prevent the tick-borne 
infection of Lyme disease. At the time of writing, MassBiologics is the only 
remaining non-profit, FDA-licensed vaccine manufacturing institution in the 
United States. 108
Commonwealth Medicine, 1999-
 Realizing that neither the state of Massachusetts, the NIH, or other 
external funding sources could keep up with the medical school’s expanding 
research budget needs, Chancellor Lazare, with Richard (Rick) Stanton, Deputy 
Chancellor for Finance Administration, and Thomas (Tom) D. Manning, Vice 
Chancellor for Operations, sought other ways to attract support. In 1999, Lazare, 
Stanton and, especially, Manning created a health care consulting division of the 
medical school, named Commonwealth Medicine. Its success has been crucial to 
the school’s continued expansion. The underlying principle of Commonwealth 
Medicine (CWM), to further the public service mission of UMMS, was first 
elaborated by Chancellor Roger Bulger in the 1970s, as mentioned in Chapter 
5. At the time, he agreed to Governor Dukakis’ request that the state’s medical 
school help solve one of the Commonwealth’s pressing health and human service 
problems—deficient health care at state schools for developmentally delayed 
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individuals. The resulting contracts between UMass Med and the state dispatched 
UMMC-affiliated health care professionals to provide care at a small number of 
state-run institutions such as the Belchertown State School. Again in the 1980s, 
when Worcester State Hospital (since 2012, called the Worcester Recovery Center 
and Hospital) was threatened with closure, Lazare and Manning arranged for 
the Department of Psychiatry at UMMS to take responsibility for medical and 
psychiatric care at the hospital, helping to ensure WSH’s continued viability.109 
 With the initiation of CWM in 1999, the concept of partnering with the 
state expanded dramatically. Commonwealth Medicine describes itself as a 
“public, non-profit consulting and service organization” serving government 
agencies and non-profit and managed care organizations. Through CWM, UMMS 
continues to provide direct clinical services to state institutions. But CWM has 
vastly expanded its mandate to improve health outcomes for Massachusetts 
citizens while also saving money for the state through research, consulting, and 
staff management in the areas of “health care operations and administration, 
health law and economics, and health care financing.” In Massachusetts and, 
since 2006, in states beyond Massachusetts, CWM has helped state governments 
to manage correctional health systems, Medicaid infrastructure and cost 
recovery, community case management, learning disability assessments, and 
health policy studies, most recently regarding the “Patient Centered Medical 
Home” initiative in Massachusetts.110 In 2007, CWM was responsible for staff  
at more than 30 locations in the state. CWM consulting groups have assisted 
state agencies including the Department of Mental Health and the Executive 
Office of Health and Human Services in streamlining and consolidating 
reimbursement claims for Medicaid services, planning the implementation of 
new state health policies, and in providing continuing professional education 
in best practices for pharmacy managers and others. In the process, CWM has 
also contributed to many of the key operations at the medical school in financial 
as well as intellectual ways. At the end of the 2006 fiscal year, CWM revenues 
totaled $324.5 million, coming close to doubling its earnings in four years.111 
As Chancellor Michael F. Collins wrote in 2011, “Conservative estimates of 
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Commonwealth Medicine’s impact suggest savings for the state of Massachusetts 
on the order of billions of dollars over the past decade.”112
 In large part, CWM’s successes were due to the vision and specific 
experiences of CWM’s developer and leader for thirteen years, Tom Manning. 
Starting with a career in counseling, his responsibilities rose steadily upward in 
administrative scope and responsibility over 
the course of a 35-year career. Beginning as a 
school counselor for the Department of Youth 
Services at the Lyman School in Westborough, 
Massachusetts, by 1977 Manning had become 
the Business Manager and Steward for 
Worcester State Hospital. A year later, after 
Aaron Lazare had become chair of the UMMC 
Psychiatry Department, he hired Manning to be 
his department administrator. Of importance to 
the future creation of CWM, Manning devised 
strategies to carry out Dr. Lazare’s and his commitment to UMMS’s public 
service mission. Manning formulated a public sector policy for the Department 
of Psychiatry that contributed to its increased responsibility for psychiatric 
services at Worcester State Hospital as well as its numerous contracts with the 
Department of Mental Health. When Lazare became Chancellor/Dean in 1991, he 
appointed Manning the medical School’s CEO and Associate Vice Chancellor for 
Operations. (Among the many duties Manning took on, none was more visible 
than managing the replacement of the original medical school’s dark granite 
facade with weather-tight, lighter materials.) In 1998, he became Vice Chancellor 
for Operations at UMMS, adding Commonwealth Medicine to his responsibilities 
in 1999. In his role as one of Chancellor Lazare’s two principal advisers (along 
with Rick Stanton), and particularly in his leadership of CWM, Manning had an 
impact on the growth of UMMS, indeed, in Chancellor Collins’ words, a “legacy 
that few can match.” 113
 After Manning’s retirement in 2012, he was succeeded by Joyce Murphy, 
Thomas Manning  (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical 
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who had joined UMMS in 2006 as Vice Chancellor and CEO for CWM, and was 
named Executive Vice Chancellor at Manning’s retirement. Murphy joined CWM 
after having been president and CEO of Carney Hospital, founding president of 
St. Mary’s Center for Women and Children, and vice president of St. Margaret’s 
Hospital for Women, all in the Dorchester neighborhood of Boston.114 Murphy’s 
career, like Manning’s, began within the orbit of Massachusetts social services. 
Murphy noted that:
You know…some people have lots of opportunities. Other people, 
by an accident of birth, are born into circumstances that are very 
challenging, and I am a big believer in early intervention, and 
prevention, and rehabilitation. I mean, people make mistakes, but I 
do think in most cases that there is hope for change.115
Early in her career, Murphy became the superintendent of the Massachusetts 
Correctional Facility in Framingham, Massachusetts, a facility for women. 
There she created the first pre-release residency 
program for women prisoners, many of whom were 
mothers of young children. The program focused, 
in her words, “on women’s issues” including 
vocational training. Murphy also persuaded the 
Children’s Museum in Boston to create a space at 
the prison for inmate mothers to be able to play 
with their children during visits. Creativity and a 
sense of mission were called upon again when she 
took over as the head of St. Margaret’s Hospital 
in Dorchester, a subsidiary of the Caritas Christi 
Health Care System. Caritas had decided that the 
hospital, which housed a large perinatal unit and was a fixture of this low income 
Boston neighborhood, must be closed—both for fiscal and for medical reasons. 
Murphy’s charge was to find a way to salvage this anchor of its North Dorchester 
community. Within about 18 months, she created the St. Mary’s Center for 
Joyce Murphy, M.P.A. (Photo 
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Women and Children on the site, redeveloping the hospital by attracting tenant 
partners and investors, including a nonprofit daycare center and an early 
intervention center for at-risk children.116
 In 1997, after six years at St. Mary’s, Murphy was recruited to become 
the CEO of Carney Hospital in South Dorchester, a part of the Caritas Christi 
Health Care System. At the time, the Caritas System’s CEO was Dr. Michael 
Collins, who in 2007 became the Chancellor of UMass Medical School. Murphy, 
as it turned out, joined UMMS in 2006, a year before Collins’ appointment as 
interim chancellor. She was recruited by Rick Stanton (with whom she had 
briefly worked in the state Department of Revenue) to work as Tom Manning’s 
second in command specifically because Commonwealth Medicine needed 
someone with experience in managing hospitals, prisons, and revenue systems—a 
natural fit for Murphy. Commonwealth Medicine was trying to develop a more 
innovative and fiscally astute management approach to the state’s prison health 
care system. More than that, Murphy could see the potential in Commonwealth 
Medicine because, “it has the public service, it also has the business acumen, 
and the economic force to support the medical school, science, education, and 
discovery.”117 Since 1999, Commonwealth Medicine has been important to the 
state and it has been crucial to UMass Medical School.
***
 Looking back over the transformation of UMass Medical School’s research 
culture, environment, and accomplishments from 1970 to 2012 and beyond, the 
contrasts are striking. From their beginnings in a tobacco warehouse and a few 
borrowed laboratories at Harvard and the Worcester Foundation, researchers 
by 2012 had filled the basic science wing of the original building, spilled over 
to Biotech Park and the Lazare Research Building, and moved into the Albert 
Sherman Center. From the perspective of the University of Massachusetts 
system, the medical school’s emergence as a research leader can be discerned in 
statements made to the Board. In 1997, for example, University Vice President for 
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Economic Development Thomas J. Chmura told the Board that, “the University 
historically generated an income of less than a couple hundred thousand dollars 
[from licensing intellectual property]; last year, primarily at the Worcester 
campus the University generated about three quarters of a million dollars in fees 
and royalties and brought in about $3 million dollars of industrial R&D [largely 
because of the] leadership of the Worcester campus.”118 More striking, by 2007 
the medical school ranked 49th among all U.S. institutions receiving NIH funding. 
By 2014, it ranked 42 out of 2527 institutions, the 2nd percentile.119 Another 
marker of its changed status, seemingly made inescapable by the presence of 
a “home-grown” Nobel Prize, was the recognition by state officials of UMMS’s 
impact on the state’s economy and centrality to the growth of biotechnology 
research and development across the five-campus UMass system. Governor 
Deval Patrick’s Life Sciences Initiative of 2008, which earmarked $60 million 
for medical school programs and infrastructure, definitively marked this new 
standing. In 2015, UMMS Chancellor Michael Collins received the Massachusetts 
Biotechnology Council’s MassBio Leading Impact Award.120 This is a far cry from 
the constant threat of de-funding that dogged the Medical School during its first 
25 years.
 Maurice Goodman commented in 2006, “This is a different era. I mean, 
we’re big time now! We’re not small potatoes anymore. We’re not striving for 
recognition, and we have big time competition.”121 Goodman expressed some 
concern, however, about the effect of the school’s rapid growth. He commented, 
“we’ve hired an awful lot of people who have very little teaching responsibility, 
and so their performance in getting grant dollars tends to be the criterion for 
measurement, just as earning clinical dollars is the criterion for measurement 
of success in productivity [within the clinical system]—which I think very 
unfortunate.”122 In short, UMMS is engaged in a delicate balancing act. The 
following chapter will consider how the educational mission enshrined in the 
1975 “Goals” of UMass Medical School—to produce primary care physicians for 
the state—has been carried forward amidst the pressure to establish (and to pay 
for) UMMS’s transformation into a leading research institution and will look at 
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the school’s culture from the point of view of its students and faculty.
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Chapter 10
Education: Students, Faculty, Curriculum
Despite what members of the public may think, we do not manufacture doctors 
as the Ford Company turns out cars. What we do is to enable you to develop your 
minds scientifically, to provide you with an opportunity to learn much of the body 
of knowledge of medicine which man has accumulated, and to inculcate into you 
those principles of conscientious concern, kindness and thoughtfulness which 
the physician must use…to serve sick people to the fullest extent of his ability.1 —
Lamar Soutter, “Welcoming Address to the First Class,” September 15, 1970
 
Introduction
 This penultimate chapter examines the nature of the educational mission 
at UMass-Worcester, including the evolution of its three schools: the Medical 
School, the Graduate School of Nursing, the Graduate School of Biomedical 
Sciences, and their educational partner, the Lamar Soutter Library. It will 
also attempt to convey more directly than in previous chapters, the character 
and culture of the institution as expressed by medical students, faculty and 
administrators. Education, surely, was the primary raison d’être for the founding 
of UMMS. Yet, the school’s reputation for excellent primary care education took 
two decades to nurture. Thus the story of medical education at UMass Medical 
School hews closely to the trajectory described in Chapter 7 for the full emergence 
of primary care at UMass Med in the 1990s. It has been a theme of this book 
that the school always had as its core mission—albeit implicitly in its first two 
decades—the integration of primary care and biomedical research. Interestingly, 
the emergence of primary care as a full partner in the curriculum occurred in 
tandem with the growing maturity of the school’s research enterprise. The seeds 
of educational revitalization were planted in the 1980s, but only during the 1990s 
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and beyond, first under Chancellor/Dean Aaron Lazare and then, Dean Terry 
Flotte, did they visibly flourish.
Medical Education in the United States: Flexner and Beyond
 By the late 1960s, medical education reform—frequently termed the 
“Flexnerian revolution” in acknowledgment of Abraham Flexner’s catalytic 
influence half a century earlier—had reached the limit of its capacity to improve 
medical school curricula. Flexner had theorized a model of medical pedagogy 
in which the “hypothetico-deductive reasoning process” of the basic medical 
sciences would be applied to clinical reasoning—clinical medicine as an applied 
science. Two years of pre-clinical, basic science courses typically preceded two 
years of clinical clerkships, electives, and trial internships. In the Flexnerian 
“discipline-based” pre-clinical curriculum, students were taught “normal 
structures, functions, and processes of the body organized by disciplines such 
as anatomy, physiology, microbiology, histology, and biochemistry, followed by 
pathophysiology and disease management.”2   
Far from supplying a basis for the second, clinical half of medical 
education, students experienced little carry-over from the methodology and 
content of pre-clinical course work into the clinical years. By the sixties, 
widespread dissatisfaction with the bifurcation of the medical curriculum was 
evident. Such concerns prompted Western Reserve School of Medicine (today, 
Case Western Reserve) to initiate an organ-based curriculum in the 1950s to 
maximize opportunities to integrate the basic science material as well as create 
linkages to its clinical implications. In the 1970s, “problem-based” curricula were 
developed at McMaster (in Ontario, Canada), Michigan State, and the University 
of New Mexico medical schools to remedy the problem of the basic science-
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clinical science divide.3 
  Nevertheless, most medical school curricula perpetuated the 
structure of the classic, post-Flexner model. From the end of World War II 
subspecialization rather than primary care, cast a long shadow over medical 
curricula; the development of new technologies and the availability of clinical 
fellowships encouraged clinical subspecialization. In the basic medical sciences, 
opportunities for NIH funding encouraged the growth of full-time research at 
medical school campuses.4 In 1984, when the Association of American Medical 
Colleges (AAMC) published the GPEP Report (on the “General Professional 
Education of the Physician”), it elaborated two disappointing, overall trends 
in U.S. medical schools: the increasing specialization of medical practice and 
education; and, the “priority most medical faculty members accord to research, 
patient care, and training of residents and graduate students,” rather than to 
medical student education. The GPEP authors hoped to reignite an interest in 
the “general professional education of medical students.” The report called for 
a reduction in lecture hours, the establishment of specific criteria for evaluating 
clinical performance, an emphasis on problem-solving rather than mere retention 
of facts, and the integration of clinical problem-solving with basic science 
principles.5 
 Financial constraints made this difficult to accomplish. Federal 
capitation payments to medical schools, begun in 1971, were terminated in 
1981.6 Moreover, new attempts to control health care costs through inpatient 
prospective payment systems led hospitals to hire clinical faculty whose main 
job was to see patients, produce clinical revenues, and teach relatively little. 
The availability of clinical models and mentors for medical students was slowly 
reduced to what medical sociologist Renee Fox called “a small, diminishing 
percentage of the members of massively large and continually expanding medical 
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school faculties.” By the 1990s, several studies of medical education reform 
concurred that the results could be labeled, “reform without change.”7 These 
same cost pressures also resulted in shorter hospital stays and an increased 
acuity of condition of hospitalized patients. Such conditions are less conducive 
to effective instruction either of medical students or residents and gave rise 
to public concerns over patient safety. As one response, resident duty hours 
were shortened and, more profoundly, studies were undertaken to explore the 
interlocking issues of quality assurance, professionalism, and medical pedagogy, 
first for resident education and then for medical students.8 Early in the 21st 
century, curriculum reforms began to focus on outcomes, that is, “an emphasis 
on abilities, a de-emphasis of time-based training, and the promotion of learner-
centeredness.” The implementation of what has been termed “competency-based 
medical education” (CBME) centers on specific competency standards and 
skills for lifelong learning and problem-solving.9 Most recently, the AAMC has 
promulgated a list of “entrustable professional activities” (EPAs) that encode 
the core set of professional skills that every medical graduate must certifiably 
master before entering residency. While the ostensible goal of this initiative is 
to maximize patient safety, the potential drawbacks of CBME or EPA curricula 
lie in their potential to emphasize pragmatic, task-oriented aspects of physician 
competence while overlooking the less tangible—or measurable—qualities of 
clinical excellence.10 Although the evolution of the medical curriculum at UMMS 
reflects national trends and local pressure, it has retained the multidimensional 
understanding of medical professionalism inherent in its original mission to 
educate primary care doctors.
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The Shaw Building Years, 1970-1974 
Early Curriculum 
 Planning for the UMMS curriculum began at least two years before the 
school opened in 1970. Lamar Soutter was considering the school’s educational 
program when he first approached Hugh Fulmer about teaching community 
medicine in 1968, as discussed in Chapter 6. When he and Brownie Wheeler drew 
up the application for federal construction funds for the teaching hospital, they 
devoted an entire section to the planned curriculum.11 Both men envisioned a 
nontraditional curriculum for their brand new school. They entertained a range 
of innovative ideas. Dr. Wheeler remembered that, 
…one thing we wanted to do differently was have a more 
multidisciplinary curriculum, and particularly to introduce the 
clinical department teaching early in the course of the student’s 
education, so that the basic science seemed more relevant to the 
ultimate practice of medicine. We had been impressed with…Case 
Western Reserve, in terms of curriculum change, and thought it 
might be interesting to try to have a more fluid curriculum in which 
different departments participated in a multidisciplinary course 
which introduced clinical elements early on, and made the basic 
science relevant to the clinical issues involved…We thought having 
one campus with a smaller group of faculty would allow us to do 
things somewhat better.12
 Initially they hoped that students could individualize their programs 
of study as much as possible and that students would utilize “free, 
unscheduled time within each period” for his or her own benefit. As 
described in Chapter 6, at Hugh Fulmer’s direction a curricular pathway 
was reserved throughout the first three years for students to learn 
community medicine both through formal class work and mini-clerkships 
out in the communities of Massachusetts. This was genuinely innovative 
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for its time. Another desired innovation was the institution of a grading 
system of “fail, pass, and honors,” the latter to be reserved for students 
showing “exceptional interest, endeavor, and achievement.”13 
 Only the latter two ideas initially came to fruition. Integrating 
clinical material systematically into the first two years of the curriculum 
proved impossible. Again in Brownie Wheeler’s words, “We simply didn’t 
have the people on board to start that way…We had some volunteer faculty 
members from the community, but we couldn’t really put on an integrated 
program with a lot of clinical specialties starting early in the curriculum. 
We didn’t even have people, department chairs in some cases, for second 
year courses, let alone clinical years. And it took us a while to recruit the 
faculty. We really needed the teaching hospital to do that.”14 
 As a testament to their intentions, Dr. Wheeler gave the very first 
lecture of the first medical school class. He explained his approach this 
way:
…in line with our thoughts about introducing clinical material early, 
I focused on a case presentation. I had a patient, a man who was 
down for a follow-up, who had had an unusual surgical procedure, 
an axillo-bifemoral graft. This is a procedure in which, because of 
blockage of the abdominal aorta and the vessels going to the legs, 
and for various reasons, an inability to repair those vessels directly, 
a graft is taken from the armpit, basically, down to the groin, just 
under the skin. So you can feel it and you can see it; you can feel the 
pulse. And it was a pretty dramatic case for the students to see, and 
to be able to examine the patient, and talk to him.15
To understand the impact of starting medical school this way—regardless 
of the traditional curriculum that followed—here is a recollection by 
Leonard Finn, M.D., a member of that first class who became a family 
practitioner:
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So our first day at medical school, Brownie Wheeler, who was the 
Chief of Surgery, brought in one of his patients, whom he’d treated 
in Boston, I think, but somebody who’d had vascular reconstruction 
of his arms and legs by Dr. Wheeler. And he brought in the patient. 
And all the faculty who had been hired so far were present, you 
know, six or ten faculty people and the sixteen of us students were 
present. And Dr. Wheeler introduced the patient to us and we 
talked with the patient, talked about his medical history and his 
social situation, his family situation, his work situation, his leisure 
activities and how his vascular problems had interfered with that, 
and how the surgery had helped improve that.  And…so that we 
had a bio-psychosocial experience with our very first day at school, 
the very first…medical school experience; the first day was not with 
cadavers.16
 Such opportunities in the first semester were not the norm for many years. 
Rather, the curriculum followed the traditional pattern of 20th century medical 
education. During most of year 1 the students focused on “the study of the normal 
structure and function of cells, tissues and organs.” In practice, this meant two 
semesters of anatomy, one semester of biochemistry followed by a semester of 
physiology. By 1972, however, the second semester of year 1 also incorporated 
a block, carved out of the combined anatomy/physiology course, devoted to “an 
interdisciplinary consideration of topics related to clinical problems.” In that 
segment, clinical and basic science faculty worked together, presenting problems 
that “correlate closely with the material being studied in physiology.”17 During 
year 2, again following tradition, the focus shifted from normal structures and 
functions to the pathological, including a year of pathology, and large curricular 
blocks for microbiology and pharmacology. A curricular pathway allowed for 
coverage of physical diagnosis, medical history-taking, plus a smaller block for 
genetics. By 1972, a new feature of the curriculum added a two-year course run 
by the psychiatry department to address “fundamental aspects of personality 
development” and human behavior. Singularly true to the founders’ original 
vision was a required course in community medicine in years 1 through 3 which, 
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as described in Chapter 6, exposed students to problems of health care delivery, 
various modes of and settings for health care delivery, and introduced them to 
epidemiology. A three-week project in communities across the state provided 
students with their first encounter with health care as it was delivered outside the 
hospital setting. As for electives, they were limited to the last month of year 1 (to 
be used for an individual project), and in years 3 and 4.18 
All in all, as Donald Abbott, M.D., a member of the first class, summed 
it up, it was “a very, very traditional medical school curriculum. It was not an 
integrated curriculum, the way some of the schools are doing now, where you 
learn more about systems and everything that goes with a system…you learned 
biochemistry; you learned physiology; you learned pathophysiology; you learned 
pathology.”19 Resources were simply too scarce; innovation would have to wait. 
As Chancellor Roger Bulger wrote in 1978, “In retrospect, the decision to develop 
a fairly standard curriculum while trying to grow with limited resources seems to 
have proven most efficient. While the State has invested a considerable amount 
of money in the Medical School, there has never been enough invested in learning 
resource centers and the usual office of education, largely because every available 
dollar had to go to salaries for new faculty. Capitation funds, too, have gone 
toward faculty support.”20
 For the first six or seven years, all of the clinical clerkships of the third 
and fourth year classes were conducted at the community hospitals of Worcester 
and, for obstetrics, at Wesson Women’s Hospital in Springfield. Before UMass’s 
hospital became fully functional, most instruction was provided by volunteer 
faculty, many of whom were “glad, even excited, to teach students, and devoted 
a fair amount of time to them.”21 One of the first volunteer faculty members, 
Paul Schwartz, M.D., a cardiologist located at Memorial Hospital, echoed this 
comment: 
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At that time the Chief of Surgery was Brownell Wheeler, and his office 
was at Saint Vincent Hospital. And the Department of Medicine [chair] 
was Roger Hickler, and his office was at the Memorial Hospital of 
Worcester, and they were the only two paid medical clinical faculty at that 
time…So all of the staff were essentially clinical staff on a volunteer basis, 
and most of us, at least those of us who were more recently trained and 
board-certified, were very excited about having the medical school here, 
and participating…in the clinical teaching of the medical students.22
Students 
 The cultural imprint of the “Shaw building” era—improvisational, 
collaborative, generous—made a deep and long lasting impression on students 
and faculty alike. UMMS students from those first three years in the Shaw 
building overwhelmingly recalled their experiences as “pioneering” or “unique.” 
The student body itself was minute: 16 students matriculated in 1970, 24 in 1971 
and 1972, 40 in 1973, and 64 in 1974.23 Only in 1975 did the number of students 
in the entering class reach the projected number for a full class of 100 students.24 
UMass Medical School Entering Class Size, 1970-201625
1970           16
1971           24
1972           24
1973           40
1974           64
1975          100
1976          100
1977          100
1978          100
2008        114
     2009       125
     2016          150 (projected)
 The first class was especially close knit. As one class member admitted, 
“With sixteen of us, we got to know each other pretty well—sometimes better 
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than we wanted to.”26 To the disappointment of some, all the students were men. 
Apparently two women had been accepted for the first class, but neither wanted 
to gamble on such a risky proposition—being a woman medical student was hard 
enough in 1970 without the additional stress of a school that might not last long 
enough for her to graduate. Nor did the class contain any non-white students, a 
matter which was immediately noticed by Boston representatives of the NAACP. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, ethnic and racial diversity proved to be a 
more challenging goal than achieving gender balance.27  
That first class did represent a good balance of students in both economic 
and geographic terms, a circumstance deliberately facilitated by the $600 
yearly tuition (raised to $900 in 1978, $4740 by 1981, and $10,262 in 1994-
1995, standing at the 75th percentile for all U.S. public medical schools). The 
sixteen represented public and private education; some came from affluence, 
others did not. Five of the original 16 students were graduates of a state 
university—the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (4) and the University 
of Massachusetts-Boston (1).  Four of the 16 original students came from central 
Massachusetts, including three from Worcester and one from Pittsfield in 
western Massachusetts; the remaining 11 students lived in the eastern counties.28
Writing of the classes entering from 1974 through 1978, Chancellor Roger 
Bulger noted that, “Many students have turned down offers from the most 
prestigious medical schools in the country. Thus far we have had an unusually 
high proportion of students who have not attended the more prestigious 
undergraduate colleges; their parents are not college graduates, but are in blue-
collar or other nonprofessional occupations.” A detailed look at the occupations 
of 63% of UMMS students’ fathers for the entering class of 1981 showed a wide 
range of activities including 21 professionals of various kinds, one “toolmaker,” 
one telephone company “lineman,” one truck driver, one grocer, one printer, one 
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fireman, five salesmen, and two mail carriers. Of 84 mothers surveyed, 30 were 
“housewives,” seven were secretaries, five were bookkeepers, two were waitresses, 
and one was a factory foreman.29 The mothers also included 18 professionals 
including one mathematician. One member of the first class was 28 years old and 
had come to medical school directly from service in the Navy. Susan Schooley, 
M.D., who graduated in 1980 and later became the chair of family medicine 
for the Henry Ford Medical Group and Medical Director for its Detroit region, 
recalled her class this way:
We were an interesting group, ranging in age from people who were 
straight out of undergraduate work and young and inexperienced, 
to some of us who had been out in either science-related careers 
or…out in the working world, coming back in. We had a fireman 
in our class. We had people coming back into the workplace after 
raising a family. (I’m talking about the women.) [There was] 
enormous diversity.30
Socioeconomic diversity continued to characterize the student body. In 
a report for fiscal year 1984, the socioeconomic profile remained fairly 
constant: 77% of students applied for financial aid and 38% of those 
students “came from families in which the combined parental income was 
below $30,000.”  
Such diversity of backgrounds was not an accident. Robin Davidson, a 
neurosurgeon, became Assistant Dean for Student Affairs from 1973 to 1975 until 
his clinical practice at the hospital required his full attention. He affirmed that 
in the admissions process, “we looked at their life experience significantly,” not 
merely at grades and MCAT scores, “so if someone had been out and had been 
to graduate school…or in the work force or…had been raising a family, or were 
trying to come back…we looked at that seriously and valued that, and it…became 
part of the entire equation.”31 This tradition was maintained. Jeffrey Bernhard, 
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M.D., chair of the Department of Dermatology and from 1989, Associate Dean 
for Admissions, was adamant that the Admissions committee took “particular 
note of whether or not someone was the first member of their family to go to 
college, so those were FGC’s, first generation 
college graduates…One other thing that we had a 
reputation for was being open to non-traditional 
students…people who…had other careers. I 
remember one who was a college biology teacher, 
who really made a very convincing case for 
wanting to be a physician…So we were not age-
biased either.”32
         Possibly the most iconic admissions story at 
UMass Med centered on James (Jim) McGuire, 
M.D., the first student to be admitted to UMMS.  Robert Schell, M.D., also a 
member of the first class, remembered McGuire as a “dynamic, bubbly, kind 
of rambunctious, eager, energetic kind of person.” Faculty members, no less 
than students from the early classes, remember the late Dr. McGuire, who 
became a rheumatologist, as a leader, an outstanding member of the class. As an 
undergraduate at UMass-Amherst, McGuire acquired an enviable reputation for 
scholarship, for sports, and for loving a good time. Nevertheless, as Sandy Marks, 
D.D.S., Ph.D., one of the earliest members of the faculty, laughingly explained, 
“Jim McGuire signed up under duress.” He’d always wanted to go to Duke. As the 
story has been recounted by his friends and by faculty members like Dr. Marks 
who became his friend, in the year before the school’s opening, Dean Soutter 
was in a bind. As Part 1 of this book has explained, successive threats to rescind 
funding for the school made recruiting difficult and planning, an act of defiance. 
Soutter realized that a fait accompli, namely, the admission of a student to the 
Jeffrey Bernhard, M.D.  (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medcial School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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medical school’s first class—a Massachusetts resident—would make de-funding 
the school much less palatable to the legislature. Michael Foley, M.D., a member 
of the class of 1976, a longtime member of the University’s Board of Trustees, and 
a friend of McGuire’s in college, told the story:   
When there was a critical vote that threatened to de-fund the 
medical school in 1969 [Dean Soutter], in his wisdom, saw the 
need to accept a student as soon as possible…He himself personally 
scoured through the pre-med records of the University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst…Dr. Soutter saw his man [James McGuire] 
and called him up and said, ‘Jim, we want you to come to UMass…” 
and Jim says, ‘Thank you. But I always wanted to go to Duke.’ And 
Dr, Soutter says, ‘We just want you to be “accepted” for a few days, 
or a week. We want someone of your caliber to bring before the 
Legislature…’33
In the end, Dean Soutter persuaded McGuire to accompany him to a hearing 
at the Boston statehouse. The next day, the Boston Globe ran a photograph 
of McGuire, describing him as the medical school’s first student, something 
he learned about only when his mother called to alert him. Outmaneuvered, 
McGuire accepted his fate, signed on, and—in the memory of classmates and 
faculty—immediately became a class leader.34
  At the outset, Lamar Soutter, Richard Saunders, M.D. (the first dean of 
students), Hugh Fulmer and Maurice Goodman, Ph.D., were all closely involved 
with admissions decisions. Robert Schell, who became a neurologist, applied to 
the school sight unseen. After his acceptance, he moved back from Seattle where 
he was working following graduation from Reed College, and took his first good 
look. He was interviewed by Dr. Saunders in the Shaw building:
…and I think at that point virtually the whole thing was just 
gutted.  And he showed me blueprints. There might have been an 
architectural model of the new building, but we basically walked 
around these work areas where there were exposed cinder blocks, 
and sheet rock. And I remember going to… a draftsman’s table 
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or work bench, and there was just this stack of blueprints, and he 
kind of pointed to things…that was my introduction to the physical 
plant…[By September] it looked more like a going concern.35
Richard Aghababian, M.D., a member of that first class and someone whose 
career in emergency medicine brought him back as a member of the faculty and 
a department chair at UMass, was initially interviewed by Dr. Soutter. Unlike 
Schell, he had not yet been accepted and drove out to Worcester from Harvard 
where he was a student to look over the place. He remembered thinking, as he 
was on his way into the Shaw building, “Well, gee, this doesn’t look like a medical 
school.”
…But then I got into [Dr. Soutter’s] office, and here was this man 
with this beaming smile and very fatherly-like demeanor about him, 
who I sat down with and immediately and just really said, ‘I can 
work with this person.’ I could just feel that. I mean, he just had…
so much excitement about him, and…the excitement had to do with 
the creating of the new medical school…he made you feel like it was 
going to succeed on the power of his will alone.36
Donald Abbott, M.D., who became a family physician in Maine and was another 
of the first class, was interviewed by Richard Saunders and by Hugh Fulmer 
(who appeared to like Abbott’s interest in socioeconomic issues and the health 
of communities). Abbott had been accepted to dental school, but chose to attend 
UMass: 
…I do have visions of what things can be, and I don’t have to go to 
something that is perfect to start with. [For] me—the medical school 
experience was more about the people, and I was very impressed 
with Dick Saunders and Hugh Fulmer, and you know, thought that 
this was a really pretty neat idea, because the school was trying 
to be very much primary care-oriented, going forward, or at least 
that’s what they kept telling us.37  
Leonard Finn, like Abbott a family practitioner, also was influenced by his 
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perception of the school’s goals, goals conveyed by his particular interviewers, 
Richard Saunders and Hugh Fulmer. He was accepted at another school with a 
“more ordinary” reputation. To him, “it was an easy choice…they weren’t using 
the word primary care, but the idea of primary care was prevalent at UMass, and 
that was attractive.”38
 The intimacy of the early set-up also appealed to Dr. Finn: “There were 
only going to be sixteen people in the class, and they were going to be collegial 
with professors in developing the school. And that was significant to me…I 
liked the idea of innovating, and developing. It was exciting to be starting a new 
school.”39 P. David Jarry, M.D., who became an internist with an emphasis on 
pulmonary medicine, echoed these impressions. So did Robert Schell: “There 
was a lot of personal attention—a close working relationship—a warm kind of 
environment,” Schell told a reporter in 1974. When one of the students, for 
example, hadn’t yet gotten housing in Worcester, Maurice (Moe) Goodman—who 
hadn’t yet moved to Worcester either—picked him up near his parents’ house in 
Newton on the way into Worcester so they could drive out together. Dr. Soutter 
and the faculty cultivated the sense of intimacy. For example, in March 1970, 
six months before the first class was due to arrive, Dean Soutter wrote them 
a letter to give them “news of progress in the development of the school.” He 
enclosed a list of the names of the 19 students invited to attend UMMS, even 
though he knew a few would choose to attend other schools. He proceeded to let 
them know the faculty’s current thinking about the curriculum, the current state 
of faculty recruitment (he was pleased to announce that the “young, able and 
very enthusiastic” Maurice Goodman had just been hired). But, he also gently 
reminded the students that “it takes time to recruit outstanding men,” and they 
should not be concerned that the task was still ongoing.40 
 Dean Soutter hired Mayre Coulter as the first registrar, foreseeing 
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correctly that she would also help the students solve the day-to-day problems of 
med student life. Knowing that housing might be a problem, Coulter met with the 
president of the Worcester chapter of the University of Massachusetts Alumni 
Association and together they set out to find suitable quarters for the students. 
Three of the first class members were married and may not have needed this kind 
of support. But for the remaining 13 students, Mayre Coulter was an enormously 
helpful presence. Remembering Coulter, Michael Foley said, “the medical 
students were kind of all her nieces and nephews, and she just knew everything 
about everyone…She had everybody figured out and she was a great read of 
character, and a great read of need, and anticipated things tremendously.”41 
 Coulter solved the housing problem for half the class by finding a large 
Victorian house in Worcester, near WPI and what was then Becker Junior 
College. The house, on Marston Way, became the headquarters for eight 
students. Dr. Schell described it as a “rambling old house, a three-story, single-
family house that could squeeze in eight medical students. One lived in the old 
dining room, one lived in probably an old servant’s room behind the kitchen…
there were four who lived on the second floor, and then there were two people 
on the third floor…I actually liked my room quite a bit, but I think it was clearly 
the room that nobody wanted…I lived in a gable.” The monthly rent was about 
$40.00 per student. A second house, known as Anderson House, became part 
of the university’s property and was within two blocks of campus on Plantation 
Street. Students would eat together at their houses and often have faculty and 
other guests over for dinner. Dr. Foley remembered that Lamar Soutter would 
“grace” them with his presence two to three times a year. Opportunities for 
recreation were limited; the Shaw building had no space for an exercise room 
or gym, but it did have a ping pong table. Of course, the students’ free time 
was limited, too. Everyone was given a membership at the Jewish Community 
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Center for swimming, exercise and, especially, squash, but pick-up games of 
lacrosse, volleyball, softball, or picnics also became part of the campus culture. 
Photos from those early “Shaw building” years 
reveal Bill Butcher and other faculty hanging 
out with students on the campus and near Lake 
Quinsigamond, playing softball, canoeing, and 
picnicking.42
 Faculty and students found other ways to 
spend time together outside of formal classes. 
Frank Chlapowski, Ph.D., then a very young 
assistant professor of anatomy, reminisced:
Sometime…we would take the whole 
group home with us and work with them in the evening to go over 
things and prepare them for the various exams and whatnot…One 
night, to my wife’s dismay, I showed up with the entire class of 
16, asked her to make lasagna, which she did… Eventually [after] 
having a little too much beer or wine, the entire class slept over at 
my house…Obviously nothing you could do now with 100 students, 
and probably something I shouldn’t have done then with 16 
students!43
The Shaw building’s lunch room was furnished only with tables, chairs, and 
Student running group-UMMS Flux, c. 1975 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Masachusetts Medical School)
Faculty and students playing 
softball, 1975-1976 (Photo courtesy 
of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of 
Massachusetts Medical School)
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vending machines, but students, faculty, and staff—including Dr. Soutter—all 
ate there and talked. The collaborative spirit was captured in the dean’s two-day 
Orientation schedule for the opening of the year. On day two, following Brownie 
Wheeler’s presentation of the first clinical case (described above), a student-
faculty picnic was scheduled by the lake. “Swimming, tennis, touch football, etc. 
will be in order,” Soutter wrote. “Unfinished discussion of the morning may be 
continued.”44  
 Parties were part of the culture, too. Dean Soutter’s punch and cookie 
parties were meant for everyone at the school. As Muriel Sawyer (Harrington), 
the Dean’s administrative assistant and another impressive problem-solver for 
students, vividly recalled, “I remember very well…everybody was invited at every 
level, and that’s one thing that I insisted upon, and Dr. Soutter insisted upon: 
that it wasn’t only the top level that went to the parties. Everyone—the janitors 
went to the parties, the maids went to the parties…Everybody came to the parties, 
because that’s when we got to know them.”45 Dianne DeBenedetto, M.D., an 
internist and gastroenterologist, one of eight women in the second graduating 
class, keenly recalled the dean’s Christmas party “rums punch” (made, in fact, 
with Irish whiskey, according to Frank Chlapowski), adding that it “took us days 
to get over it.” Chlapowski supplied additional details:
There were several Christmas parties that occurred. One was the 
Chancellor’s party, where absolutely everybody goes…[At] the initial 
ones [Lamar Soutter] insisted on making the punch and he would 
use Irish whiskey and he would serve the punch and he would stand 
there for hours until everyone was served.
The Department of Biochemistry, though, had something very 
special…We had a punch…and we called it Thunderbird. Let’s just 
say that the alcohol did not come from very far away. Nor was it 
very expensive.46
When the entire medical school community—including custodial staff—consisted 
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of only 30 to 50 people, such camaraderie was not only possible, but essential. 
As Dr. DeBenedetto explained, to the early classes, UMass Med felt like a 
“medical school without walls.” In her view, this feeling changed “when the new 
building went up.”  Dr. Chlapowski, too, had the impression that this “close knit” 
atmosphere lasted until the school got to be around 80 students, or, in other 
words, after it moved from the Shaw building in October 1973. Then it became 
hard to remember everyone’s names, although, he added, “I think it is still a 
school that is very personal to students despite the size of the class.”47
Shadowing this perceived intimacy, however, was a feeling of intense peer 
pressure—at least among the first cohort of students—the pressure to perform, 
to live up to the expectations of the people of Massachusetts, the Legislature, the 
faculty, and each other. That may have dissipated among subsequent classes, but 
the first group of 16 felt it acutely. Dean Soutter’s opening address to the first 
class calmly admonished them to remember that just by entering the building, 
“you will find that you have inherited the entire reputation of the profession 
[and] you will find that you are part of this reputation.” He also informed them 
that they would be considered not simply as students, but as “the junior colleague 
of members of the faculty.”48  Several graduates of the first class mentioned 
their feelings of responsibility to do well. They were impressed by the quality 
of the faculty and knew that, as Donald Abbott put it, “they really cared about 
making the school successful.” As a result, the first class was highly sensitive to 
any sign that they were not holding up their end of the bargain. Dr. Aghababian, 
for example, was conscious that he, “didn’t want to disappoint the State of 
Massachusetts, we didn’t want to disappoint the Worcester community, that 
had just put everything into getting this school up and running…And it just felt 
that if we made some missteps, if we didn’t cut the mustard…you know, live up 
to people’s expectations, the school wouldn’t survive and it would be all on our 
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heads…there was a real pressure to perform internally…just because the whole 
system was being scrutinized both in Worcester and in Boston.” Leonard Finn 
commented, “We were all in the boat together, and we all had to row together 
to make sure that we were all successful. So we had a special urgency to see that 
all of us succeeded in building the medical school, and graduating our class.” 
Most of their time was spent studying, either in groups or independently. The 
pressure could be intense. One of the original class members commented, “We 
supported each other really well in creating a study milieu, and we encouraged 
each other to study sufficiently hard that we looked like high achievers to each 
other and to our faculty…we let each other know that we had expectations for 
excellence.”49 Quality control took many forms, but perhaps the most memorable 
was recounted by Dr. Abbott about a student who drove in from his home near 
Boston for classes:
And he would traditionally get there about ten minutes late, and the 
only seat left was right up front. And he would get his yogurt out, 
eat his yogurt, clean off his mustache, and fall asleep. At the end of 
our second year, we all had to do projects, and make presentations 
to the entire faculty. And…when [that student] got up there, all the 
faculty…put their heads down and went to sleep…50
 Setting a tone for UMass Med that has persisted, the first class valued 
collaboration and esprit de corps. The grading system reflected these values. The 
faculty, especially those handling the basic science curriculum, intended to use 
a pass-fail-honors system. The students had other ideas. They decided among 
themselves that,
…it was going to be pass/fail. And [the faculty] really struggled with 
that, because it was…anathema to what they were used to. That is, 
they were used to…sorting out people as to better and worse, and 
we…came with the theory that we had to have a certain degree of 
knowledge to become physicians, and we either got it, or we didn’t. 
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We negotiated with them for a while, and they still—I’m pretty sure 
it was Moe Goodman who really wanted us to be pass/fail/honors, 
but we said, ‘That’s A, B, C…We just want pass/fail.’ And so they did 
acquiesce to us in the long run.51
Along with pass/fail grades, narrative comments went far toward describing a 
student’s strengths and weaknesses.52 The system’s drawbacks did not become 
meaningful until the class size was substantially increased. For example, with 
only 16 or 24 students in a class, letters of recommendation for residencies 
could adequately distinguish among students and describe their suitability for 
a particular specialty. Moreover, since the early classes received highly tailored 
counseling in regard to off-campus electives and were able to rely on the faculty’s 
well developed national contacts to win desirable residencies, honors that 
depended largely on class rank, such as being designated a member of AOA 
(Alpha Omega Alpha Honor Medical Society), made little difference to the first 
students. Indeed, they voted not to join AOA. By 1978, however, with a class size 
of 100, these distinctions began to matter. Chancellor Bulger applied to AOA to 
launch a UMMS chapter and the grading system was changed to honors-pass-fail 
or condition (tantamount to a time-limited grade of “incomplete”).53 Narrative 
comments continued to be an important part of the grading process; narratives 
might contain reports of “marginal” student performance and any student 
receiving two such ratings in a given year, or three over the four years of the 
curriculum, could be subject to dismissal.54 
 The first UMass Med graduation, held in 1974, was held in the Library, 
soon to be re-named the Lamar Soutter Library. Dean Soutter welcomed the class 
to an “honored profession” and complimented the group for their “great courage” 
and modesty. Donald Abbott was chosen by his classmates to deliver the student 
graduation speech, but, as he related, the speech “typified how we did things. 
The class got together and decided who they wanted to give the speech. And we 
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kind of concocted the speech together. It went by everybody in the class, and 
everybody had to agree. We changed it.  We took things out; we added things as 
to what they thought should be in it, and what shouldn’t be in it.  So…that’s kind 
of who we were at the time.” Abbott faithfully relayed the students’ gratitude, 
affirming that they had indeed become “junior partners in their education.”55 
In addition to the class gift of a scholarship in honor of Lamar Soutter, the class 
also decided to give a more personal gift to the dean. It needed to be something 
distinctive—something that would reflect Dr. Soutter’s personality but also 
something that would remind him of the group’s own distinctive place in UMMS 
history. Bimi Soutter always wore suspenders. Some of them were, in one 
student’s memory, “kind of flamboyant.” So the students, at a suggestion from 
Robert Schell, decided to give him a pair of suspenders as a memento of their 
Class of 1974 (Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar 
Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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class. Just to be sure, a graphic artist lithographed the portrait of each student 
on the suspenders, eight to a side. The dean was honored. Indeed, at graduation 
the next morning, the dean was wearing them, just as he did for the class’s 10th 
reunion.56  The 16 students of UMass’s first medical school class demonstrated 
the power behind the original mission for the school. Richard Aghababian 
remembered that “…there was a lot of emphasis on making good physicians, 
because one of the things the legislature wanted was more physicians…primary 
care types, to go and practice in the state in a front-line way, and I think we 
fulfilled that. And not too many of us from the first classes, you know, went on to 
be great researchers. We were more—we were cultivated to be good clinicians and 
good people, to interact with people.”57 
 Primary care gradually did become central to the culture of the school. 
Of the first class, 4 students, or 25%, became primary care physicians, two 
specialized in emergency medicine, and the remaining 10 became specialists. But, 
Dean Soutter, third from left in front row, with members of the class of 1974 at their tenth 
reunion (Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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the faculty as represented by the Admissions Committee and the Educational 
Policy Committee adopted an attitude that, “With one hundred spots, we could 
have a diverse class, diverse interests, diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, 
diverse intentions of what they wanted to be, and diverse racial groups as well.”58 
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As noted in previous chapters, this attitude reflected that of the school’s founders. 
Students, in turn, have steadily expressed their satisfaction with their education. 
In interviewing some of the members of UMMS’s first class 40 years after their 
graduation, one finds that they still express their gratitude to Dr. Soutter and the 
faculty. Dr. Schell insisted that, “In some ways I feel that I was kind of lucky… I 
have absolutely no regrets. Quote me on that.” Donald Abbott emphasized, “I will 
always be indebted to UMass.”59 
Every class, to some extent, has had its own personality and identity. But 
one major distinction separated all subsequent classes from the incoming class 
of 1970, namely, the presence of substantial numbers of women. Starting in 
1971 with the matriculation of eight women out of 24, 33.3% of the class, UMMS 
has maintained a proportion of women students above the national average. 
By comparison, the national average for graduates of 1975 was 13.4%. By 1984, 
overall enrollment of women medical students at UMass-Worcester stood at 
41.5%; the national average was 30.5%. By 1985, the entering class consisted of 
49% women. In 1992, the figure had jumped to 56%. (The national average was 
41.9%.)60 
                                                                                                  61
                                                                                                                    
Over the 30 years from 1974 to 2004, 42% of UMMS alumni have been women; 
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Admission 
Year 
  
Number of admitted 
students 
Age at 
admission  Gender 
 Race/ Ethnicity 
Total MD MDP (Average) Female Male 
American 
Indian or 
Native 
Alaskan 
Asian Black or 
African 
American 
Hispanic  Native 
Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific 
Islander 
White Unknown 
00-01 101 95 6 25.42 52 49  13 2 2  83 1 
01-02 100 98 2 25.02 52 48  9 4 1  84 2 
02-03 100 91 9 24.91 46 54  20 2 1  77  
03-04 100 95 5 24.80 59 41 2 15 2 2 1 78  
04-05 103 97 6 24.88 55 48  8 3 1  91  
05-06 104 99 5 24.57 61 43 1 19 5 3  76  
06-07 103 95 8 24.78 61 42  15 6   82  
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in 2014, the entering class comprised 60% women, 75 women and 50 men.62
 Like almost every other medical school in the 1970s, however, UMMS 
made no particular accommodation for women students. No official, or even 
semi-official, housing (such as the Marston Way house) seems to have been 
available for them and, according to one woman graduate of the class of 1975, 
they did not hang out together.63 But, for women medical students in the pivotal 
decade of the 1970s, when the percentage of women students began its steep 
rise, UMass was a good place to be. Michael Foley concluded—admittedly, from a 
man’s perspective—that for the men and women in his classes, “it was a seamless 
existence.  I mean, women were—everybody was—‘the guys.’ I mean it was just—
women did things that were inseparable from the guys. We all did everything 
together.” With classes of 24 or 40 students, most everyone could hold their own, 
establish their place in the group. Bruce Karlin, M.D., a member of that same 
class who became an internist practicing in Worcester, also recalled groups of 
men and women students getting together outside class, particularly for dinner. 
(One of them, Evelyn Love, M.D., a rheumatologist practicing in Worcester who 
was one year behind Karlin, also became his wife.)64 
 Christine Cassell, M.D., was also a member of the 
class of 1976. A pioneering geriatrician and ethicist, 
Cassell was the founding chair of the first department 
of geriatric medicine (at Mt. Sinai), the first woman 
president of the American College of Physicians and 
of the American Board of Internal Medicine, and is 
internationally known for her health care policy work 
with the Institute of Medicine. Like Foley, Dr. Cassell 
became a member of the University of Massachusetts 
Board of Trustees. In 1972, Cassell was about 25 or 
Christine Cassel, M.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Mssachusetts  
Medical School)
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26 and thus considered an “older medical student.” (Times have changed.) She 
recalled being part of a group of four women who “rented a large, old house in 
Shrewsbury, just on the line, and shared the rent and…lived together and studied 
together, etcetera.” One was a woman from the preceding class (a second year 
student). Those became “very important friendships in my life.” Dr. Cassell had 
been a philosophy major and while taking her pre-med courses after graduation 
worked as an administrator at a free clinic in Boston. It was there that she 
“learned something about…the real needs of uninsured and poor people and 
the kind of volunteer model that was very prevalent at that time. [It was an] all-
purpose free clinic for homeless people and runaway kids and…people who just 
couldn’t get care any other way.” She was attracted to UMass partly by its low 
tuition, as were many other students, but,  
the thing that really excited me was that I didn’t have a standard 
pre-med background, and I knew I was going to need some kind of 
individualized teaching. And, here was this start-up school, with 
faculty who were passionate about medical education, innovative in 
their methods, and because we were one of the early classes, a very 
small class, there were more faculty than students. You could just 
go up to anybody in the hall and say, ‘Hey, would you explain this to 
me?’65
 Michael Foley observed that the women students in his cohort, no matter 
how well treated in the medical school, seemed to have had a harder time 
than the men once they were out in the community hospitals for their clinical 
clerkships, especially with nurses, he believed.  But when he commiserated with 
one of his women peers, Deborah Hartley, she told him, he recalled, “‘Ah, this 
is the way it is.’” But, he added, “the women…gradually won them over. I mean 
really, the attitude kind of left, the more familiar the [nurses] became with the 
[women] medical students.” Dr. Cassell remembers something similar, although 
the experience was compounded by the Harvard hospitals’ general hostility 
   523
toward UMMS at the time. The UMass students often did rotations in the Boston 
hospitals in the 1970s and, just as often, they would feel like a “second-class 
citizen…I’ll tell you a story about Mass General and what some of us had to put up 
with. When I did my rotation there, I reported to duty where there was a Harvard 
resident.  And I went up and introduced myself and I said, ‘…I’m Chris Cassell, a 
student from UMass.’  And he looked at me up and down, looked at my feet—and 
said, ‘You don’t have any mud on your shoes.’”66
But at UMass itself, there seems to have been little of that sort of “House 
of God”67 arrogance or belittlement, whether on account of gender, social 
background, or anything else. Dr. Cassell’s career was in some ways propelled 
by the opportunities she received at UMass, first by a research project in 
which she collaborated with David Purtillo, Ph.D., an immunologist. With her 
assistance, Purtillo “discovered…an inherited genetic immunodeficiency disease, 
and so…tracked down the family…and mapped the family trees.” It resulted in 
a publication in The Lancet, “a very big deal.” But more telling, she also was 
exposed to a class on “the care of patients who are dying—a sort of early hospice 
model. It was very important to me.” Ruth Purtilo, Ph.D., wife of David Purtilo 
and now an internationally known bioethicist, had just received her doctorate 
from Harvard and was leading small groups in medical ethics at UMMS. Cassell 
considers both of them to have been important mentors.68 
Faculty
 For the earliest faculty members, teaching at UMMS in those years was 
also quite special—and not least because they were often called upon to improvise 
and make do. With little more than a year until the arrival of the school’s first 
class in 1970, the Commonwealth still had not appropriated the money needed 
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to hire most of the faculty. And, as noted in Chapter 5, University Hospital 
was still considered “optional” in some quarters. Thus faculty members were 
hired at what could be described euphemistically as a deliberate pace. Anyone 
necessary to teach in the first semester was brought in by the summer of 1970; 
by the end of 1970, the second semester’s teaching slots were filled, although 
some of those early faculty instructors were actually being “borrowed” from 
Harvard or UMass-Amherst until a permanent appointment could be made.69 
According to the school catalogue, by the fall of 1970, only four departments were 
represented: Anatomy, Biochemistry, Community Medicine, and Physiology. A 
year later, additional departments with one or more faculty members were in 
place, including Medicine, Microbiology, Orthopedics, Pathology, Psychiatry, 
and Surgery. Dr. Soutter told the Trustees in the spring of 1971 that the faculty 
“now numbers 51, with only 11 of this number salaried. The rest volunteer 
their services.” Over the following two years, the departments of Obstetrics-
Gynecology, Pediatrics, Pharmacology, Radiology, and a Program in Family 
Medicine were populated with at least one faculty member, usually a department 
chair or interim chair.70
 Taking the attitude that UMass Med was a 
work-in-progress, the small but excellent early basic 
science faculty did not feel strait-jacketed either by 
their close quarters or by the conservative curriculum. 
As Dr. Cassell, Dr. Foley and other former students 
made plain, the faculty took pains to interact 
individually with the students and to introduce 
innovative adjuncts to the coursework. First-year 
anatomy was an outstanding example. The department 
chair, Sam Clark, Jr., M.D., was described as “a fine, 
Sam L. Clark, Jr., M.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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southern gentleman: tall, thin, white-haired, had a Tennessee twang…” On at 
least one occasion he entered the classroom for the first anatomy session of the 
year and, “a cappella, sang at the top of his lungs, Ezekiel Saw the Wheel, as part 
of our very first lecture.” In the mind of at least one student, “that kind of set the 
tone for the relationship of that faculty to the student body, and the elevation…
of the kind of learning we were doing to something that had some spiritual 
connectedness and some meaning beyond a profession.”71 Other members of 
the early anatomy faculty also were memorable: Merrill K. (Ken) Wolf, M.D., 
came here from Harvard during the first academic year initially as a lecturer 
in anatomy, but especially for neuroanatomy, his area of specialization. Wolf, 
besides having been a precocious young man who graduated from Yale at the age 
of 14, was also a professional pianist.72 For decades, he served as the organist for 
the UMMS graduation at Mechanics Hall.
Standing about five feet tall, he had no difficulty in keeping the students’ 
attention. For example, he would fluidly draw the hemispheres of the brain, using 
left and right hands simultaneously. Sometimes, Dr. Schooley remembered, 
Wolf’s lecture “would just be turned over to a concert, and sometimes he 
 Susan Gagliardi, Ph.D. and Merrill K. (Ken) Wolf, M.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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would schedule a concert separately from class, but what I remember about his 
performance is that he demonstrated the consequences of neuroanatomic lesions 
by demonstrating gait, demonstrating thought patterns—imitating the effects 
of these lesions so that you could tangibly experience a clinical consequence of 
these things we were learning in anatomy.”73 Wolf shared the lecture duties with 
another respected and appreciated neuroanatomist, Susan Gagliardi, Ph.D., 
who arrived several years later from Harvard. Gagliardi, too, was known for her 
effective teaching. As it happened, she stood at something close to six feet tall. 
Anatomy lectures were not dull. 
 Another favorite among the basic science lecturers, Guido Majno, M.D., 
was chair of the Department of Pathology and an accomplished historian of 
medicine. As an indication of his scholarly breadth, each of Majno’s major 
books, The Healing Hand: Man and Wound in the Ancient World, and Cells, 
Tissues, and Disease: Principles of General Pathology (co-authored by Isabelle 
Joris, Ph.D.) received a major literary award. (The Healing Hand was a Book-
of-the-Month Club offering.) In addition to his more than 200 scholarly articles, 
abstracts, and books, Dr. Majno received 16 “Outstanding Medical Educator” 
awards from UMass classes every year except one, from 1987 to 2001. (He 
became professor emeritus in 2002.) A native of Milan, Majno moved to Geneva, 
Switzerland for his residency in pathology. In 1952 he came to the United States, 
first to Tufts and then to Harvard Medical School. After a year working in the lab 
of future Nobelist George Palade at the Rockefeller Institute (now, Rockefeller 
University), Dr. Majno returned to Harvard. But, he was restless there. As he 
told an interviewer, “Harvard is enormous…it’s totally stable. It’s like a rock, 
full of tradition.” Initially he returned to the University of Geneva as chair of the 
Department of Pathology. While in Geneva, he and his colleagues characterized 
myofibroblasts as well as the “wavy fibers” present in early myocardial infarction. 
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But, the opportunity to come back to Massachusetts where, as Majno put it, 
“there was nothing,” and build a new program proved too tempting. He also 
enjoyed the challenge of explaining why he was leaving Geneva for Worcester. 
Majno arrived at UMass in 1973 and stayed for the rest of his career—one of the 
most beloved of faculty members.74 
 Dr. Majno launched each year’s general 
pathology course by telling the students something 
about his background and interests and, once the 
class size became fairly large, asking them to do 
the same by writing up a brief autobiography. Dr. 
Joris, his wife, colleague at UMass and, often, his 
co-investigator in the field of vascular pathology, 
explained that, “This manner of starting the course 
let students understand that Dr. Majno cared 
about them and was eager to share his enthusiasm 
for pathology and learning.” Majno also regularly 
rewarded students for giving a correct answer in 
class by tossing chocolates to them. In at least 
one instance, he received back more than he gave. 
One student from the class of 1977 regularly sat up front, knitting. She was an 
excellent student and Dr. Majno was not concerned. As he told a visiting lecturer, 
“‘If you say anything important, she’ll write it down.’” At the end of the year, 
the future Dr. Evelyn Love completed her knitting—a vest—and gave it to Dr. 
Majno, who wore it.75 He and Dr. Joris’ philosophy of medical education was well 
epitomized by something he wrote for the student yearbook, Iatros: 
We tried not to burden you with details and tried to keep focused 
on the Big Picture. Here and there we may have failed, because 
Guido Majno, M.D. (Photo  
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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even the Big Picture is made of details. This is precisely one of the 
problems that you will have to face: remembering certain details 
can also save lives. What’s an unnecessary detail?  There may be 
no such thing…However, there is a way out. WHEN IN DOUBT, 
ASK…you will find that even experts are not necessarily right. And 
don’t forget that however hard you may try, you will never know 
it all—the best you can do is to attain your own acceptable level of 
ignorance.76
 Students recalled Dr. Majno as, “a medical historian [who] never 
lost an opportunity to bring into perspective the past…going back into the 
eons.”77 Because at the beginning UMMS had no courses in history or the 
humanities, Dr. Majno began to organize some lectures, first in history of 
medicine, and then what he called “Medicine and Society” seminars. He 
and Dr. Joris acquired a small grant for the series and asked Ruth Purtilo 
to coordinate it. They sponsored the seminars from approximately 1977-
1980. As Dr. Joris recalled, “the topics discussed were related to current 
issues discussed at that time: work-related ailments, neonatal intensive 
care, and even a mock medical trial…enacted by a Worcester physician and 
Worcester lawyers.” One speaker who returned several times to the school, 
Jamake Highwater, was an American Indian writer who spoke about 
how, in Dr. Majno’s words, “the white man puts body and soul together—
or doesn’t.” Highwater referred to the differing styles of healers, i.e. 
orthodox, Western physicians vs. Native American healers, as being “earth 
doctors” or “sky doctors.” At graduation in 1991, when Dr. Majno received 
an honorary degree, he told the students, “At the end of the day, you’ve got 
to be a ‘sky doctor.’” 78
 Sandy Marks, one of the original professors in the Department of 
Anatomy who taught the gross anatomy class for many years, organized 
the Anatomical Gifts program for the school and in 1972, instituted a 
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memorial service to honor body donors. (First year students later took 
responsibility for organizing the service in conjunction with the gross 
anatomy faculty, who eventually included Susan Gagliardi, John Cooke, 
and Anne Gilroy; it has been held every year since then.) 
Marks, like Guido Majno, left an outsize impression on students 
and faculty as a teacher and human being. He joined the faculty in 1970 
and remained here until his death in 2002. Marks’ research established 
the “hematopoietic origin of the bone-resorbing osteoclast,” and his 
grant, “Bone Matrix and Bone Resorption,” was continuously funded 
for 22 years. Marks believed in the integration, whenever possible, of 
teaching and research. As his colleague, Paul Odgren, Ph.D., wrote after 
Marks’ unexpected death, “He always tried to get medical students to 
think about patients as people, and to consider the anatomical basis for 
clinical findings.”79 The son of a missionary dentist, Marks “took teaching 
as a calling,” in the words of Chancellor Aaron Lazare. He always related 
to students as people. Early in his tenure at the medical school, he 
noticed that some students found the process of dissecting the human 
Sandy Marks, D.D.S., Ph.D. (Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter  Library,
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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body profoundly unsettling. In a few cases, students’ inability to resolve 
the anxiety provoked during dissection labs led to “prolonged leaves 
of absence.” The late 1960s and 1970s were years in which increasing 
attention was paid to the potentially dehumanizing effect of medical 
education. (The first  medical humanities department was established at 
Penn State Hershey College of Medicine in 1967; the second was founded 
at the University of Texas Medical Branch in 1973.80) Gross anatomy 
courses, in part because they represented many students’ first encounter 
with patients—dead patients—came to seem more like hazing than 
education.81 
Marks decided to respond to a demonstrable student need. In so 
doing, he put UMass Med in “the vanguard for explicitly incorporating 
emotional lessons into its learning objectives for gross anatomy.”82 As 
Marks related, “The departmental faculty chose to at least try, in its own 
limited way, to acknowledge that such feelings exist, that they are present 
in most human beings, that it is valuable to be able to recognize these 
and other human emotions, and that academic failure may be related to 
a student’s inability to deal with them.” For several years Marks and his 
departmental colleagues organized small group discussions during the 
early part of the gross anatomy course—discussions focused on articles 
about death “as a process.” But after several years they realized the need to 
focus directly on what the students themselves were feeling about “death, 
dying, and dissection.” They therefore decided to hold hour-long small 
group discussions for two weeks, followed by a tour of the dissection lab, 
discussion of the body donation program, and finally, discussion of the 
care of cadavers and basic techniques of dissection. Only then did actual 
dissection assignments begin.83
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By chance, in 1976, while Dr. Marks was developing this preamble to the 
gross anatomy lab, the hospital was establishing a Palliative Care Service under 
the direction of Dr. Melvin Krant, director of cancer programming. As part of the 
new program, Dr. Krant brought in Sandra Bertman, a former English teacher 
and social worker, and a well-known Boston consultant 
on death and dying—a thanatologist, or “death educator.” 
Bertman used literature and the arts to assist patients 
and their families in the difficult process of coming to 
terms with mortality.84 Soon Marks and Bertman began to 
collaborate on, and redesign, the multi-session seminar 
that served as a preamble to the dissection course. The 
course Bertman designed, called “Death, Dying, and 
Dissection,” was followed by other (optional) classes on 
topics such as coping with cancer, handling bad news, AIDS, and aging, as well 
as brown bag lectures open to all. She also created the book, One Breath Apart: 
Facing Dissection, largely based on the essays and drawings created by UMass 
medical students during the summer prior to their first year of medical school.85 
The increasing involvement by the students themselves in the Anatomy 
department’s Memorial Service testifies to the success of Marks’ and Bertman’s 
efforts to humanize the experience of human dissection. For example, Mary 
Ann Foti, M.D., a first-year student in 1979-1980 who became a psychiatrist and 
a Deputy Commissioner for the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, 
told a local journalist that the course, “got us thinking of some of these issues 
before we met the body…I feel a strong responsibility that I must learn as much 
as I possibly can from this body.”86 Another student, Nancy Long, M.D., UMMS 
class of 1995 and a family physician, wrote a poem as part of her assignment for 
anatomy. It was incorporated in Bertman’s One Breath Apart as well as in the 
Sandra Bertman, Ph.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, 
Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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Memorial volume created in memory of Dr. Marks. It reads:
You came to take me for a walk with you.
I was afraid at first
To meet you,
To take your hand.
I pretended you were here
To teach me the details—
Muscles, arteries, nerves—
And I held on tight.
Then I saw your face,
And I knew
You came to take me for a walk with you—
On the edge
You on one side,
Me on the other,
We are one breath apart.87
In 2002, at the memorial for Dr. Marks, a member of the class of 2005 spoke to 
what Dr. Marks (and his colleagues) had accomplished. Matthew Logalbo, M.D., 
who is now a family practitioner, wrote: 
How we relate to each other and our anatomical donors reveals 
tenets of our character that may have been obscured in any previous 
setting. And in the degree to which we are willing to acknowledge 
the conflicted emotions we encounter, we discover fundamental 
truths about who we are and what we believe. I think Dr. Marks 
saw all this and more. He shared with us his own struggles with 
questions about life and death, and how he had been changed by 
the experience of dissecting a human body…He met us where we 
were.88
The Integration of Preclinical and Clinical Education, 1978-1990
 Once the entering class reached its projected size of 100 and the Medical 
Science building and hospital were both up and running, the school’s leaders 
could address some of the unfinished business of curriculum development. As 
was often true at UMass, students involved themselves in the process. In 1978, for 
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example, 85 first-year students signed a petition, delivered to Acting Provost Moe 
Goodman, “requesting the establishment of a course in clinical medicine within 
the second-year curriculum for the coming academic year.” The Educational 
Policy Committee (EPC) had recently been reconstituted and directed to address 
such issues. Accordingly, Dr. Goodman delivered the petition to the EPC which 
designated an ad hoc committee to develop a proposal.89 
A few months later at an all-faculty curriculum retreat, EPC chair 
Sam Clark told the group that, “From the beginning it was intended that 
the curriculum should evolve as the school grew; instead, it seems to have 
rigidified… For instance, during the first two years, 35 hours per week are 
devoted to scheduled student activities—a high figure nationally.” The list of 
recommendations drawn up at this retreat nearly 40 years ago sounds uncannily 
like the problem list of most medical school curriculum committees in the early 
21st century. Among a list of objectives, they called for using the admissions 
process to select applicants who were “more humane and are committed to a 
career in primary care.” Likewise, they sought to increase the teaching of primary 
care, including “longitudinal experience in ambulatory primary care.” Perhaps 
most challenging, they called for “reinforcement of basic science in the third and 
fourth years.” The faculty also reiterated that education for primary care was just 
one of several of the school’s educational goals: “we should not fail to provide 
opportunities for students with other interests.” 90 Many of these concerns made 
their way into the school’s 1978 Self-Study for the LCME:
Some movement toward interdepartmental teaching is beginning. 
A multidisciplinary course entitled Introduction to Patient Care has 
been incorporated in the first year and provides an avenue for the 
introduction of the behavioral and social sciences along with family 
and community medicine, human sexuality, ethics, emergency 
medical training and introductory physical diagnosis. The course 
in human genetics offered in the first year is another example of 
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interdepartmental teaching.91
Slowly, additional innovations appeared in the curriculum in an effort to 
further integrate basic science and clinical education. In 1982, Paula Stillman, 
M.D., a leader in the use of standardized patients in medical education, was hired 
as Associate Dean for Curriculum. A modicum of problem-based learning was 
introduced in 1987. Once in the fall semester and once in the spring, second year 
students were divided into small groups and presented with a patient’s name, 
age, gender, and case description. They researched the case over a two-day span, 
ultimately meeting either the patient or someone with a similar diagnosis.92 
With so much preclinical coursework on the books—not to mention the faculty 
members who had been honing it for almost 20 years—curricular change moved 
slowly. 
Pressure to introduce clinical medicine and, it was thought, encourage an 
interest in primary care, continued. Given the pressures being brought to bear by 
the state legislature as well as the genuine shortage of primary care physicians in 
rural and urban underserved communities, UMMS paid attention to its students’ 
specialty choices and whether they chose to practice in Massachusetts. One 
effort to encourage UMass Med alumni to practice in Massachusetts, a “learning 
contract,” added a financial incentive to practice in the Commonwealth. In the 
state budget for fiscal year (FY) 1977, the legislature included an optional learning 
contract; in return for practicing in Massachusetts for one year, students were 
forgiven 2/3 of total tuition costs. But the bill did not specify what type of practice 
would qualify for tuition forgiveness. In 1978, the learning contract was made a 
requirement. In 1990, the state’s learning contract required service of at least two 
years and specified that such service must be “in the areas of primary care, public 
or community service, or underserved areas…” The state’s 1995 iteration of the 
learning contract required payback of this service over four years in return for 
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forgiveness of 2/3 of total tuition costs.93 
The relationship between tuition incentives and rates of primary care 
practice is not easy to track. Nationally, lower tuition costs have not been 
demonstrated to outweigh other influences such as personal interest, practice 
hours, lower rates of reimbursement for primary care and, therefore, lower 
projected lifetime earnings in a student’s choice of specialty. Over the years 
the proportion of UMass graduates practicing in primary care residencies did 
exceed the national average. From 1974 through 1978, 78% of UMMS graduates 
entered primary care residencies defined as internal medicine, pediatrics and 
family practice. From 1978 through 1984, UMMS graduates entered primary 
care residencies at a rate that averaged 72% (and was never lower than 66%), 
compared to an approximate national average of 67%.94 Indeed, UMass has 
largely outperformed other schools in its record of graduates who enter the 
traditional primary care residencies. Moreover UMMS records show that during 
the decade from 1997 to 2007, an average of 32% of UMMS alumni entering 
these primary care fields chose to stay in Massachusetts. The graph below 95, 
which records the results for recent years, indicates an overall trend of decreasing 
numbers of UMass Med graduates entering primary care disciplines:
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However, no medical school offering the full spectrum of educational 
opportunities, as UMMS has always been committed to doing, can guarantee that 
its graduates will not move into subspecialty practices during or after residency. 
Thus, by 1999, out of 2347 medical graduates from UMass, a total of 857, or 
36.5%, ultimately became primary care doctors defined as a practice in the 
following specialties: family medicine, general medicine/primary care, geriatrics, 
internal medicine, and pediatrics.96 That compares favorably to the national 
profile according to a study published by the Association of American Medical 
Colleges (AAMC). The AAMC data show that between 1980 and 2007, only 31.2% 
of physicians in active practice specialized in one of the primary care fields.97 
UMMS exceeds these national percentages, but would like to further increase its 
proportion of graduates who enter primary care practices. In 2015, the school 
established a new program in collaboration with UMass-Amherst and Baystate 
Health in Springfield to further increase the UMMS contribution to the primary 
care physician workforce. It was intended for medical students committed either 
to pursuing primary care practice in rural or urban/underserved settings, or to 
population health and integrated health management.98 
Thoroughgoing curriculum reform, 1990-2005
Nationally, the 1990s and especially the period between 1993 and 2000, 
coincided with an uncharacteristic jump in the proportion of primary care 
practitioners. Those were years of intensifying enrollment in HMOs as well as 
the attempted implementation of the Clinton administration’s proposed health 
insurance plan, potentially a mechanism that would increase demand for primary 
care. More directly relevant to UMass Medical School, these were the years 
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during which this school’s participation in the Generalist Physician Initiative 
(GPI), underwritten by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, gave 
a strong boost to curricular reforms emphasizing primary care. The campus’ GPI 
initiative was the result of more than a decade of small steps taken by the EPC, 
the Admissions Committee, and the Associate Dean of Students’ office. Slowly 
they began to break open the traditional 2 x 2 basic science/clinical medicine 
curriculum structure.  
 Medical school educational leaders generally respond more rapidly to 
external stimuli than to internal prodding. Accreditation reviews by the LCME 
or other agencies such as the New England Association of Schools and Colleges 
(NEASC), rankings by national magazines such as U.S. News and World Report, 
or a growing consensus among medical school deans about an educational 
approach—any of these stimuli might motivate a school to undertake a concerted 
effort to reform its curriculum. Student opinion as expressed in the AAMC 
graduation questionnaires may also motivate change. At UMMS, all these forces, 
plus the accession of Aaron Lazare as dean in 1990, militated toward an active 
period of curricular transformation during the 1990s and on into the first decade 
of the 21st century when they were carried forward under Dean Terry Flotte.99 
In the preceding chapter I described the challenge faced by Chancellor/
Dean Lazare, in sustaining the momentum of a reenergized research 
community on campus. To his credit, Lazare, in his capacity as the dean—i.e. 
as chief academic officer of the school—was also determined to reinvigorate 
the curriculum. An LCME site review in 1989 had recommended, that, “(1) a 
major curriculum review be undertaken dealing less with content than with 
developing a stronger emphasis on independent thinking and problem solving, 
and (2) efforts be directed toward achieving greater…consensus on educational 
philosophy.”100 Some faculty members were already trying to prepare the 
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ground for such change. In 1990, basic and clinical science faculty reached an 
agreement that, “more integration and problem solving should occur within the 
curriculum; some courses have made some changes to include these activities 
where appropriate.”101 Also in 1990, a longitudinal course supported by the dean 
and directed by Sarah Stone, M.D., “Medical Interviewing and Clinical Problem 
Solving” (described in Chapter 7, and later renamed “Physician, Patient and 
Society,” or PPS), was introduced. With Dr. Lazare in place and a limited LCME 
re-survey scheduled for 1991, significant change began to take shape. 
 The LCME surveyors in 1991 expressed concern that the EPC had become 
“disempowered” over the years. This was effectively remedied. Whereas the EPC 
was previously a standing committee of the faculty and merely advisory to the 
Faculty Council and Executive Council of deans and chairs, starting in 1991 it 
was granted the power to both plan and execute educational policy. It was also 
given the budget and personnel to carry out curriculum assessments and teaching 
faculty development under the aegis of a new Office of Medical Education. 
Additionally it was now composed of representatives from each department. The 
following year, the position of Vice Dean of Medical Education, reporting directly 
to the dean, was created to oversee and coordinate the activities of the EPC.102 
 More profoundly, in 1992 a full educational retreat was organized by Paula 
Stillman and colleagues which was attended by a sizeable number of faculty 
members. Some of the faculty still were not convinced of the need to reconfigure 
the curriculum at all. A bit of tinkering would suffice. But, as the EPC reminded 
them,
 
…there is considerable concern among the faculty regarding student 
attitudes towards basic science. A growing gap between basic 
science and clinical education leads students to see these as two 
unrelated areas. These attitudes are strongly reflected in surveys 
of our matriculating and graduating students conducted by the 
[AAMC]…[T]hey demonstrate that while our students consistently 
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rate ‘intellectual challenge’ among the most important factors in 
their choice of medicine as a career, many find that basic science 
information is overemphasized in our curriculum…103
New advances in molecular biology, molecular genetics, and neurobiology, 
the committee continued, “require a new interdepartmental approach to the 
teaching of basic science.” Moreover, changing patient demographics, new 
financial mechanisms for health care delivery, the need for more primary care 
physicians and improvement of health care access, all “compel a reassessment 
of undergraduate medical education.” A warning signal, continued the EPC 
brief to the faculty, was the declining number of UMMS graduates seeking 
careers in primary care. Because medical students’ experiences in courses and 
clerkships are among “the most important factors influencing career choices,” it 
was incumbent upon UMass Med to redesign its curriculum in a way that would 
better integrate basic and clinical science while also demonstrating the value of a 
career in primary care. (It was in consideration of these matters that the medical 
school had applied for the Generalist Physician Initiative grant.) The retreat, 
focusing on the question, “Is there a disparity between what we teach and what 
our students need to know?” would thus try to find “common ground” among 
disparate faculty stakeholders. The discussion topics summarize the dilemmas 
UMMS (and others) faced:
•	 Curriculum alternatives: basic science/clinical medicine integration
•	 The new science and the impact of molecular biology
•	 How much basic science need we teach? Where in the curriculum should 
basic science be taught?
•	 Who should teach basic science? Are whole-organ system experts a dying 
breed?
•	 Ambulatory teaching. Is there a need for an ‘ambulatory block’?
•	 Longitudinal courses and longitudinal topics: Clinical interviewing, 
behavioral medicine, preventive medicine, biomedical ethics, medical 
informatics
•	 Review of the existing curriculum…What resources are necessary?
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•	 Teaching and evaluation methods: where do we fall short?
•	 The training of generalists. What will be the impact of the Robert Wood Johnson 
‘Generalist Initiative’? 104
 About six weeks after the retreat, the EPC, chaired by Andrew Cohen, 
M.D., working in association with Paula Stillman, M.D., Associate Dean for 
Curriculum, issued a strategic plan. It opened with a clarion call (in boldface 
type) for collaboration and curricular balance: “In defining our educational 
mission,” it insisted, “we need not choose between developing an 
emphasis in primary care or continuing to support careers in 
biomedical research and academic medicine. These are not mutually 
exclusive goals but instead share similar educational needs.”105  
 The 1992 retreat resulted in many changes. The campus acknowledged 
publicly that, “Since the demands of research and clinical service and their 
revenue-generating capacity often place education at a disadvantage, the 
Medical Center’s leadership must insure the centrality of the educational mission 
and allocate resources to accomplish this.”106 In 1994, an Office of Medical 
Education was established. According to the prevailing consensus, “departmental 
sovereignty no longer dictate[d] the curriculum.” Rather, it became an 
“integrated, coordinated, school-wide effort.”107 Such coordination, in fact, was 
driven by the goals of the GPI grant which was awarded to UMMS in 1994 after a 
two-year planning grant that began in 1992. Curriculum revision thus converged 
with planning for the GPI and a concerted effort was made to enhance student 
exposure to the core elements of primary care. The main features of the new 
curriculum, which was implemented in 1996, were a sizeable increase in hours 
devoted to “active learning,” such as labs or small group sessions; an emphasis 
on problem-solving, though “problem-based learning” did not structure the 
curriculum as a whole; an effort to insure that the subject matter of the basic 
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science courses was linked meaningfully to that of the clinical problem-solving 
components of the PPS course; emphasis on ambulatory care; and the inclusion 
in regular coursework of interdisciplinary subjects such as bioethics, preventive 
medicine, and medical communication. An Office of Ethics directed by Marjorie 
Clay, Ph.D., was first started in 1992 and became a part of the Office of Medical 
Education in 1994, facilitating the inclusion of bioethics across multiple courses 
and all four years. Building on the standardized patient program already in use, 
objective structured clinical examinations, or OSCEs, were incorporated into the 
curriculum in 1993 to test clinical skills, communication skills, and diagnostic 
reasoning. In 1995, a multi-station OSCE exercise was implemented as an “End-
of-Third-Year” assessment tool.108 So-called “orphan” topics such as managed 
care, communication skills, domestic violence, human sexuality, women’s 
health, multiculturalism, professionalism and geriatrics were introduced to the 
curriculum through interstitial courses (originally known as interclerkships), as 
well as through electives.109
 One interesting innovation, designed to convey the nature of continuity 
of care, especially care of the whole family, was the development in 1995 of a 
new curricular module known as the “Standardized Family.” The hypothetical 
“McQ” family was developed by Michele Pugnaire, M.D., and colleagues to teach 
principles of ambulatory care in a non-clinical, standardized setting. Emphasizing 
clinical problem-solving, the module employed a hypothetical “genogram” 
specifying basic clinical and psychosocial elements of each member of the “McQ” 
family. A sample “genogram” looked like this:
Genogram:
Ed—died age 50, CAD, alcoholism
Esther—80, mild CHF
Mary—55 (daughter of E & E), part-time nurse’s aide, post-menopausal, 
abnormal mammogram
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Mike—55, brake press operator, smoker, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia
John—35 (son of M & M), Supervisor, alcoholism, low back pain
Jane—35, part time keyboard entry, unplanned pregnancy, Rh negative 
Karen—15, UTI, contraception
Kevin—10, Asthma
Keith—infant, breast feeding
Other aspects of the module included “specific managed care insurance plans for 
each family member; a set of office records for each member for the preceding 
five years; student interviews with standardized patients representing a family 
member; multiple ‘encounters’ with each family member; an end-of-clerkship 
OSCE with one family member.” The standardized family was one of the 
outgrowths of the GPI that had a broad impact on the curriculum. Although 
it was initiated as part of the required family medicine clerkship, after a few 
years it was also introduced into the pediatrics and general internal medicine 
clerkships.110 
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Student satisfaction was generally high. By 2005, Chancellor Lazare could 
proudly report that, “During the past 11 years, UMass Medical School has enjoyed 
an average ranking of 5th in the nation in primary care education according to 
U.S. News and World Report.”112
Medical Education since 2005: LInC, Global Health, and Learning 
Communities
 Medical school curricula are rarely static documents. Changes occur 
constantly, even if they are modest enough to be absorbed into an ongoing 
educational structure. For example, around the turn of the 21st century, 
improving the clinical competency of medical graduates and residents became 
one of the more pressing concerns of American medical educators. Reports such 
as the Institute of Medicine’s To Err is Human (2000) and Crossing the Quality 
Chasm (2001) sparked an interest in competency-based education for residents 
and medical students.113 At UMass, a new curriculum framework, approved in 
2004 and implemented over the next seven years, stressed six competencies: the 
physician as “Professional, Scientist, Communicator, Clinical Problem Solver, 
Patient and Community Advocate, and Person.”114 According to the school’s self-
study for the LCME review in 2004, “by the end of Year 4, students have received 
195 hours of instruction specifically addressing the medical consequences of 
many societal problems that students will confront as practitioners: domestic 
violence (child, partner, elder abuse); underserved populations; disability 
(mental or physical); medical ethics; child abuse; HIV/AIDS; medical economics; 
sexual violence; substance abuse; and violence.”115 
 Yet gaps in educational coverage remained. Nor had the problem of 
excessive lecture hours been resolved. A student satisfaction survey from 
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2002-2003 revealed a fair degree of frustration. With 58% of the student 
body responding, a “representative sample” described the school’s positive 
characteristics as “collegial,” “friendly,” “nurturing,” “warm.” One student wrote, 
“The faculty is so warm. A LOT of the students here are very kind, down-to-
earth people.” The quality of teaching received highly positive responses. Yet, 
when asked what required improvement (in addition to the food at the hospital 
cafeteria), one respondent summed up the students’ overall criticisms by writing, 
“Less lecture time, and more clinical correlation or integrating basic science with 
clinical situations.” Or, as another exasperated student wrote (this was only a 
fraction of the entire comment):
Spend a week at the beginning of each block teaching us the basics 
in all the areas that we’ll be covering. I guarantee it will pay off. 
Also, TEACH LESS. I know it sounds absurd, but realize that 
medical students have a finite amount that they can learn. I have 
no idea what the really important information is from any of my 
courses. Every time a physician stands up in front of the classroom 
he/she should ask, ‘What are the three things that medical students 
should know, so that when I see them on the wards next year, they 
are easy to teach, and they won’t put my patients in danger?’116
 In 2005-2006, a full restructuring of the curriculum was begun. In 
principle, the goals of the new framework resembled those of the curriculum 
implemented a decade earlier, in 1996: “a comprehensive basic and clinical 
science integration with shared course leadership representing basic and clinical 
sciences and multiple specialties.” What was ultimately called the “Learner-
centered Integrated Curriculum” (LInC), made a number of far-reaching 
changes. For one, heavy emphasis was placed on peer mentoring and teaching, 
on enhanced student responsibility for learning through “directed preparatory 
exercises,” capstone projects to promote scholarship and “lifelong learning,” 
“learning communities” to nurture communication and mentoring among the 
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different classes and between students and faculty, and, finally, community 
engagement. By “community,” it should be emphasized, UMass students and 
faculty focused their attention on underserved communities in Worcester itself; 
they also generated equally vibrant enthusiasm for global health projects.117 
 Of these many initiatives, two, the burgeoning of community and global 
health programs and the creation of “learning communities” (LCs), seem to 
exemplify the culture of UMass Med in the early 21st century. From 1996 to 2000 
UMMS piloted a multiculturalism two-year track for preclinical medical students, 
the “Global Longitudinal Pathway,” with both domestic and international 
“immersion experiences with multicultural populations.” Students who elected 
the program were assigned to a local family who spoke the language the student 
was trying to master, took a six-week language immersion program in another 
country, and in their second year, participated in a community project such as 
school-based HIV education, free clinics, flu shot programs, mentoring programs, 
soup kitchens, family mental health support, or advocacy for abused children. 
This global health track augmented the students’ understanding of the challenges 
faced by non-English speaking newcomers.118 
The Global Longitudinal Pathway evolved in surprising ways into a 
global health project undertaken initially by Michele 
Pugnaire, M.D., in 2003. Pugnaire, a family physician 
who was at that time the Vice Dean for Undergraduate 
Medical Education and is currently Senior Associate 
Dean for Educational Affairs, decided to join a 
weeklong medical mission organized through a 
church in her town of Sterling, Massachusetts. The 
Good Samaritan Hospital Mission in La Romana, 
Dominican Republic (DR) collaborated with the 
Michele Pugnaire, M.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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Haitian Baptist Church to provide Haitian migrant workers on DR sugar cane 
plantations and their families living in plantation settlements known as “bateyes” 
(pronounced “bat-ays”—the singular form is “batey”) access to medical care. 
Bateyes, in Pugnaire’s words, are “makeshift communities and villages on sugar 
plantations…and the people who live there are Haitian migrant workers [with] a 
lot of profound poverty, poor access to care, and poor health literacy.” Some of 
the bateyes are geographically isolated, exacerbating these conditions.119 
Pugnaire’s work with the bateyes in the Dominican Republic intersected 
with the interests of some UMMS medical students. Olga Valdman, M.D., 
personifies the evolution of the program. Currently a family physician working at 
the Family Health Center of Worcester and director of a global health fellowship 
there, Valdman was a first-year student in 2004. She and her family had 
emigrated from Russia when she was a teenager in 1996. While at UMass Med, 
she became deeply interested in global health. Valdman remembered that, as 
a new student, the community health clerkship, which became the population 
health clerkship and was part of year 1 (now it is in year 2), “defined my time in 
medical school.” She spent those weeks focused on refugee health, working for 
Catholic Charities to help resettle Hmong and Liberian refugees in Worcester. 
Valdman “got really connected with a family and started helping the children 
with schoolwork…” She spent the rest of her first year tutoring that one family. 
Valdman traveled to Nicaragua during the summer between her first and second 
years to learn Spanish and to learn about “providing medical services in an 
international setting.” When she returned, she and other students resurrected 
UMMS’ international health student interest group. They were trying to figure 
out where they could travel and actually “do something.”120 
At that point, Valdman attended Pugnaire’s lecture on her experiences 
in the Dominican Republic. Valdman thought this could be the right model for 
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the students. “We didn’t want to drop into the middle of nowhere. We wanted to 
be part of an organization.” Equally important, it seemed like a project that was 
managed by a local organization, “which was really important to us...because 
of sustainability and ownership on the ground.” Dr. Pugnaire invited them to 
join her group. Unfortunately the students could only travel together during 
their one-week spring break and the group from Sterling had already arranged 
for different travel dates. Valdman and her classmates then contacted the Good 
Samaritan hospital director in La Romana. He recognized the potential of having 
medical students working with his staff. With his assistance as well as help 
from UMMS faculty such as Drs. Godkin and Pugnaire, Valdman and her fellow 
students successfully raised the funds, organized the medical shipments, and 
coordinated travel plans for eight medical students (4 first-year and 4 second-
year students) and two spouses to travel to the Dominican Republic for a one-
week “immersion experience” on the bateyes. Initially they had no on-site faculty 
advisors either from UMMS or from the physicians in the Dominican Republic. 
Their ministrations were limited to dispensing vitamins, Tylenol, Advil, creams 
for skin rashes, or the significant decision to drive a patient from a batey to 
the hospital. They made a good start, did no harm, and were in fact welcomed 
back the next year. By then, the group included 25 students and several faculty 
members. As Valdman recalled, “From there on, the program kind of exploded.”121
By 2006, Pugnaire decided that the UMass contingent should travel under 
the sponsorship of the school rather than through the Baptist church mission. 
Under school sponsorship and with Pugnaire as the faculty leader, students 
from all four years may now be found participating in the Dominican Republic 
initiative.122 By 2014, they had moved away from what Pugnaire characterized as 
an:
in-and-out, rapid fire, clinic model, where we may or may not be 
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making long-term change, to adopting several of these bateyes, 
these villages, and going to the same ones time and time again, and 
doing capacity-building and community engagement. Because most 
of the problems that we address medically could be prevented with 
better social support, clean water, education, that sort of stuff.123
A second and more thoroughgoing innovation, establishing “learning 
communities” (LC) at UMMS, developed out of a desire to improve the mentoring 
available to students. By 2009, when learning communities first began at UMass, 
18 medical schools out of 124 in North America had established such a program. 
The University of Missouri-Kansas City College of Medicine was the first to do so 
in the early 1970s; in New England, Harvard was the first, in the late 1980s. The 
majority of programs, however, began after 1995. Among the schools surveyed 
in 2009, developing academic and social “support networks” for medical 
students were primary goals of the majority. And so it 
was at UMass. In 2002, Michael Ennis, M.D., a family 
physician at the medical school with a long history 
of involvement in undergraduate medical education 
and medical advising, was named Assistant Dean for 
Student Affairs/Advising. Ennis was raised in the South 
Bronx before a scholarship to boarding school propelled 
him toward higher education. A tall, rangy man with 
close-cropped hair and an indelible Bronx accent who 
often bikes to work, Ennis is renowned among students 
for a lecture to the incoming classes titled, “Worcester: Paris of the Millennium,” 
featuring restaurants, beer joints, and other, useful local lore. A respected 
colleague and teacher, he found he could use his own life experience effectively to 
help students who were struggling.124 
 Ennis discovered LCs while he was trying to improve the student advising 
Michael Ennis, M.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of 
Massachusetts)
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program at UMMS. “I learned that part of the model of learning communities 
was a very sort of robust, in-depth mentoring system. And then as I looked into it 
more, and looked into other schools that had learning communities, this seemed 
to be a recurrent feature. So I thought to myself, ‘If we’re going to get a better 
advising program, maybe getting learning communities is the way to do this.’” 
Michele Pugnaire’s office funded his attending a national “Learning Communities 
Institute” along with two students who became strong advocates of the program. 
In Ennis’s words, “they were like zealots about this, and did an amazing job 
talking about it at key committees…And this dovetailed with what was called 
the CIP, Competency Implementation Project, which was the precursor to the 
LInC…” As Ennis explained, learning communities have, “three legs. We think of 
it as a tricycle…curriculum and mentoring and student community.” 125
 Directed by Ennis and David Hatem, M.D., a general internist with 
longstanding interests in literature and medicine as a component of medical 
humanities, at UMMS the LC structure carries a lot of the weight of the 
preclinical course work through the “Doctoring and Clinical Skills” course 
(formerly known as “Physician, Patient and Society”). As Dean Terry Flotte 
stressed, “we put together a learning community program that was very robust…
there’s significant curriculum in our learning communities, appropriate and 
attuned to the things that can best be done in that setting.” The curriculum 
component of the LCs incorporates physical diagnosis, professionalism, 
communication, and ethics. In addition, as Dean Flotte noted, “it’s had a strong 
service learning [component].”126 This curriculum is taught not only by the 20 
mentors chosen to oversee the learning communities, but by other faculty who 
are brought in to teach. Each LC is assigned a librarian who works closely with 
the students. A key element of the program’s success, however, is development 
of the mentors to be effective as both teachers and mentors. While there are no 
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quotas, LC mentors tend to divide evenly between generalists and specialists. 
The LC directors share the duties of curriculum planning and training of the 
20 mentors, as well as arranging for guest speakers for the mentors’ classes, 
such as the head of the Center for Academic Achievement or of the Student 
Mental Health Service. The learning communities, in Dr. Ennis’s view, are a 
logical outgrowth of a competency-based curriculum. They provide “a setting in 
which competencies, like professionalism and the physician as person, could be 
assessed and measured by LC mentors where under the previous advising system, 
the mentors couldn’t possibly attest to a student’s competence in that way…”127 
 At UMMS, the students chose to name their learning communities 
“houses.” As Mike Ennis explained, “I think it had to do with Harry Potter, like 
they’re all of that generation, they all read Harry Potter…rather than like at a lot 
of other schools, [where] they’re called ‘colleges’ or ‘societies.’ But we’re UMass, 
so we’re less formal. They call them ‘houses’ here. And then they named them 
after local Worcester neighborhoods and landmarks, and I thought that was 
really nice. And they began to draft their own constitution.”128 The five houses, 
Blackstone, Burncoat, Kelley, Quinsigamond, and Tatnuck, are recognizable 
sections of Worcester. The houses, individually and together, undertake social 
events, career-development events, community service projects, and publish 
occasional newsletters about their doings. Inter-house competitions have 
not been uncommon. Building on the opportunity provided by the learning 
communities and by the deliberate decision to co-locate the LCs and the 
interprofessional Center for Experiential Learning and Simulation (iCELS) in 
the new Albert Sherman Center in 2013, interprofessional learning experiences 
linking medical students to nursing students, especially those in the Graduate 
Entry Pathway (to be described below) also have become a feature of the new 
curriculum.129
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From Affirmative Action to Diversity and Equal Opportunity
Underrepresented Minorities
 In spite of its public-spirited mission, UMass-Worcester made only 
halting progress toward gender, racial, and ethnic diversity in its first few years 
of existence. To put the matter in a national perspective, it is helpful to note 
that a dearth of minority medical students nationwide had been the unfortunate 
norm since the 19th century. In 1847, David J. Peck, M.D. became the first 
African American to graduate from a U.S. medical school, Rush Medical College 
in Chicago. The first African American woman medical graduate, Rebecca Lee, 
M.D., received her degree from the New England Female Medical College in 
1864. According to historian Darlene Clark Hine, by the end of the 19th century, 
909 African Americans, of whom 115 were women, had received medical degrees 
from U.S. medical colleges. By 1920, approximately 3950 African Americans were 
listed as physicians by the U.S. census, less than 1% of American physicians.130  
Despite the advent of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and the passage 
of civil rights legislation in the mid-sixties, the percentage of African American 
medical graduates in the U.S. continues to be low.
 
Underrepresented Minorities as a Percentage of U.S. Medical 
Graduates
   ’71-72  ’81-82  ’91-92  ’01-02  ’11-12
African American 2.4%  4.8%  5.3%   6.9%  6.7%
Other Underrepresented
Minorities  .3%  4.1%  5.9%   7.3%  10.6%
The largest gains were made by students of Hispanic ethnicity, who alone 
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comprised 7.4% of U.S. medical graduates in 2011-12. 131
 UMass Medical School was thus not exceptional in its low enrollment 
figures for students from demographically diverse backgrounds. As mentioned 
toward the beginning of this chapter, UMMS’ first entering class contained 
neither students of color nor women. In response to a sharp inquiry from the 
NAACP, Dean Soutter told the university Trustees that, “it had been discovered 
last year that there were no black applicants for the medical school. The Student 
AMA had been contacted and asked to provide names of possible applicants 
for admission. Only 10 students were listed for Massachusetts; all of these were 
contacted and, of these, one applied but did not meet admissions standards.” 
Soutter hoped for “improvement in the situation in the future.”132 When the 
medical school’s minority recruitment yield did not improve, the Dean received 
a rebuke from the state Secretary of Educational Affairs, Joseph Cronin. Cronin 
wrote, “My office is disappointed with the UMass Medical School record in 
recruiting and attracting minority students. I urge you to take action on a series 
of recommendations initiated in discussions with you this summer by Janice 
Reynolds, equal opportunity officer, on behalf of the Governor [Francis Sargent] 
and myself.”133 
 The University’s president finally intervened directly, recommending that 
the Trustees approve a policy that supports explicit procedures and instructional 
programs that would make possible the admission and, ultimately, the successful 
graduation, of minority or economically deprived applicants. The Trustees 
agreed on the grounds of not only current U.S. federal guidelines, but, “simple 
justice based upon an intelligent and imaginative grasp of the very real needs 
of minority and other people to have their own doctors and of young people to 
seek medicine as a natural and normal choice of a career…” They added that this 
would “enhance the professional quality and distinction” of the medical school. 
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In a progress report, Dean of Students Richard Saunders explained that although 
the school had accepted a “small number of minority students,” all had chosen 
to attend “more prestigious” schools. He noted that the pool of minority medical 
school applicants in Massachusetts was small and that the medical school’s 
lack of robust financial aid made matters even more difficult. He added that the 
faculty had affirmed their support for the Board of Trustees’ affirmative action 
policy, namely, “That the Trustees approve the admission of a group of applicants 
who, because of reasons of economic status or minority group status, have been 
educationally deprived and who, therefore, appear to be less well-qualified 
academically than some other applicants. It is presumed that most, but not 
necessarily all, of this group will be members of racial minority groups.”134  By the 
following year, 1974-1975, a faculty-run Affirmative Action committee had been 
established. By then, a total of nine minority students were enrolled (out of a total 
of 268), six in the current first-year class. Eight out of the nine were receiving 
substantial financial aid.135 
 With the formation of a medical school Committee on Academic Support 
Services in September 1975, an organized effort was begun not only to recruit 
promising minority and economically disadvantaged students but to begin 
cultivating such students while they were still in high school and college. The 
committee also provided faculty and peer tutorials for students facing academic 
difficulties in the preclinical courses. Sometimes, all that was needed was a 
change of study habits or locale, sometimes a change of living arrangements. In 
“extreme cases,” a student might be advised to decelerate his or her program to 
graduate in five or six years instead of the typical four.136 Since 1976, an Assistant 
Dean for Minority Affairs was assigned to work on recruitment of “groups under-
represented in medicine,” which by that time, according to the AAMC, no longer 
included “Asian Americans” or “Cuban Americans.” It’s also worth noting that in 
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1978 the UMass Board of Trustees amended the system’s affirmative action policy 
to include those they classified as “the handicapped.” (Non-minority women 
students, though still considered underrepresented, did not receive “any special 
consideration on scholastic grounds [because] their membership in a minority 
group has not usually produced any scholastic deficiency.”) By 1977-78, minority 
students accounted for 8% of 367 students in all four classes; by 1981, however, 
minority enrollment at the school for all four classes had dropped to 2.66%, 
well below the 6% minority population for the state, and well below the national 
average.137
 Organized mentoring of matriculated students from minority groups was 
one approach to increasing graduation rates. For example, Danna Peterson, M.D., 
who was recruited in 1978 and became the residency director for the department 
of Anesthesiology in 1979, played a leading role for many years in the Committee 
on Equal Opportunity and Diversity (CEOD) and from 1997 through 2011 served 
as Assistant Dean for Student Affairs/Diversity Support. In the latter role, Dr. 
Peterson was the faculty advisor to the Student National Medical Association, 
originated Careers in Medicine workshops, and co-chaired the Minority 
Academic Advancement Committee of the CEOD. After 2011, Peterson’s activities 
on behalf of diversity and inclusion were folded into the portfolio of the Associate 
Vice Chancellor for Diversity and Equal Opportunity, Deborah Plummer, Ph.D.138
But recruitment demanded a special focus. In 1987, the campus 
director of Affirmative Action, Rawle Garner, reported on ways that a 
newly approved, comprehensive plan would address the matter of racial 
and ethnic underrepresentation in “health and science” professions. 
Beyond programs conducted by the Office of Minority Affairs to assist 
potential applicants and matriculated students, the plan would attempt to 
enlarge and strengthen the applicant pool through a Summer Enrichment 
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Program on campus for college students and a High School Health Careers 
program that would offer summer courses in “mathematics, biology, 
chemistry and laboratory procedures, verbal skills, reading, writing, and 
test taking.” By this time, too, campuses including UMass-Worcester had 
begun to contend with issues of inclusiveness and fairness for disabled 
and for “older” employees. By 1990, James Wells, the UMMC Associate 
Vice Chancellor for Equal Opportunity, could report, “the representation 
[of minority students] at the Worcester Campus is at 9%. The black 
representation of medical students is 5%.” The problem area with respect 
to both minorities and women, he continued, is in the “upper level 
positions,” that is, faculty, staff, and administration.139 
 In an effort to focus attention on recruitment of minority students 
while maintaining current efforts to address the concerns of women and other 
underrepresented faculty (of which, more below), in 1989 UMass Medical 
Center hired Deborah Harmon Hines, Ph.D., an assistant professor of anatomy 
at Meharry Medical College, as an associate professor of cell biology and the 
Associate Dean for Minority Affairs. (In 2008, Hines was named Vice Provost for 
School Services.) Dr. Hines understood the problem to be well beyond successful 
recruitment of medical school applicants, something her predecessors also 
recognized but did not have the resources to address. As she explained, 
We only accept Massachusetts residents. African Americans [were] 
only 6% of the population. Latinos, at the time, were less than 3% 
of the population. Massachusetts boasts the highest high school 
graduation rate in the country…I tracked these data. The high 
school graduation rate for African Americans has gone between 60 
and 65%. For Latinos, it was between 50 and 55%. So if they don’t 
graduate from high school, they certainly can’t come to this medical 
school!140
Hines also recognized that relatively few economically 
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disadvantaged students of any ethnicity or race were attending UMass-
Worcester in any of its three schools. More fundamentally, opportunities 
existed to develop much greater collaboration and 
trust between the medical school and the Worcester 
community, especially with its school system. She 
established the Worcester Pipeline Collaborative 
(WPC) for the elementary schools, middle schools, 
and high schools in the north quadrant of Worcester, 
“to encourage the kids, first of all, to stay in school, 
graduate from high school, go to college, and then 
either apply to the medical school, the graduate 
school, or the nursing school, or come here to 
work.” UMass scientists go into the schools and 
do experiments and give talks about the “excitement of why they chose 
careers in science.” And often the high schools’ AP biology and chemistry 
labs are held at the medical school. “So,” in Hines’ words, “it was taking 
the institution outside of its walls, and also then bringing people in, so 
that there was a two-way street.”141 Since 1996, Hines’ Department of 
School Services has included an Office of Outreach Programs directed 
by Robert Layne, which oversees the WPC as well as the Summer 
Enrichment program and the High School Health Careers program. Of 
the 1443 students who participated in these programs between 1990 and 
2011, 317, or 22%, completed a four-year college degree.142 With respect 
to minority recruitment to the Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, 
in 1993 Hines, as co-Principal Investigator with Janet Stein, Ph.D., a 
professor of cell biology, initiated an NIH-funded Summer Undergraduate 
Research program to bring in undergraduates from underrepresented 
Deborah Harmon Hines, Ph.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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minorities and underserved communities from across the U.S. Students 
were offered a structured research experience with a scientific mentor for 
10 weeks during the summer. (More recently, Brian Lewis, Ph.D., associate 
professor of gene function and expression has co-directed the program 
with Hines.)143 
Recruitment of underrepresented minority students to UMass 
Medical School remains a challenge. In recent years, UMMS received 
about 80 applications from underrepresented groups per year. Of those, 
according to Hines, about “half have GPA and MCAT scores that merit 
reading the application…And only half of those have MCAT scores and 
GPAs that are at the mean of the students that we normally accept. So 
[we’re] going from 80, to 40, to 20.” UMMS will accept all 20 but, “We’ll 
be lucky if we get 10 of them to come here.”144 Figures in the table of 
student characteristics cited earlier in this chapter reveal that the average 
number of students of underrepresented minorities remained low between 
2001 and 2007, averaging five to six per year.145 In 2012, UMMS launched 
the BaccMD medical school prep program. Its purpose is to identify 
“talented students who are considering careers in medicine” from the 
undergraduates attending any of the four undergraduate campuses of the 
University of Massachusetts. Students apply during their sophomore year 
of college for a three-year program, including summers, to prepare them to 
“apply and succeed at UMMS.” In the process, these prospective students 
meet many members of the UMMS faculty, thus developing a support 
network for their years as med students. In 2015, the first three BaccMD 
students began medical school at UMMS.146
 With respect to minority faculty recruitment, as of March 1976, total 
faculty from underrepresented groups (including Asian Americans and women), 
   558
numbered 26 out of 131, or about 20%.  Of these, 18 were women faculty, or 14% 
of the total faculty; the remainder consisted of six Asian American faculty and 
two faculty of either Hispanic or African American origin. One professor in the 
Physiology department, the late John Fray, Ph.D., who was born in Jamaica, 
received a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1975, and 
was recruited to UMass Medical School in 
1978, remembered that, “It was not easy for a 
black man in those days to thrive at UMass.” 
He gratefully acknowledged his colleagues, 
Sandy Marks and Maurice Goodman, for 
making things “bearable.” In 1994, Professor 
Fray founded the Thoth Program for Science 
Education Training in Jamaica to promote 
education in science and technology in Jamaica, 
continuing that work after his retirement 
from UMMS in 2003.147  Since 1996, a Faculty 
Diversity Scholars Program award, administered by the Vice Provost for Faculty 
Administration, has been a part of UMMS’s efforts to promote the recruitment of 
faculty from underrepresented groups for the School of Medicine, the Graduate 
School of Biomedical Sciences and the Graduate School of Nursing. In addition, 
in 2003, Marian Wilson, Ph.D. became the first Associate Vice Chancellor for 
Equal Opportunity. She was succeeded by Deborah Plummer, Ph.D., Associate 
Vice Chancellor for Diversity and Equal Opportunity in 2009.
Gender Equity
  From 1849, when Elizabeth Blackwell became the first woman in the 
John Fray, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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Anglo-American world to receive a medical degree, women have campaigned 
for equality of opportunity in the medical profession—for the opportunity to 
attend medical school, to practice medicine, and to become members of medical 
school faculties. UMass Medical School opened just at the time that the numbers 
of women medical students in the U.S. began to rise, an increase that started 
in the late 1960s and accelerated from the 1970s through the 1990s. In 2014, 
women comprised 47% of all medical students in the United States according to 
the AAMC. The proportion of women in practice has also steadily increased, but 
does not yet approach parity with men. Currently, women comprise about 33% 
of practicing physicians, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation. In 2014, 
38% of full time faculty in academic medicine (whether physicians or otherwise) 
were women. They comprised, however, only 22% of tenured faculty. Twenty-
one percent of women faculty members were full professors. Sixteen percent of 
deans and 15% of department chairs in the U.S. in 2014 were women. The AAMC 
began to note the increasing presence of women in the mid-1970s and by 1978, 
the majority of AAMC-member schools had appointed Women’s Liaison Officers 
(WLOs) in conjunction with the AAMC’s new Women in Medicine program. By 
1993, nearly half of all medical schools in North America had created programs, 
offices, or at least a committee on women in medicine.148
  At UMass Medical School, women were to be found in the upper levels 
of the faculty early on. Helen Padykula, Ph.D. was hired as the chair of the 
Department of Anatomy as early as 1976. That same year two other women joined 
the school as the first women full professors: Ruth Bulger, Ph.D. (in Pathology) 
and Barbara Waud, M.D. (in Anesthesiology and Pharmacology). Lynn Eckhert, 
M.D. became the first chair of a clinical department, Family and Community 
Medicine, in 1984. Yet over the next decade, women faculty began to suspect 
that, generally speaking, they were moving on a slower track than their male 
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colleagues. As Isabelle Joris, Ph.D., who arrived in 1973 from Switzerland as an 
instructor in Pathology and became an associate professor, observed, “In the 
U.S., over time, I noticed that the notion that men were able to ‘go up the ladder’ 
faster than women became common and discussed more widely everywhere.” 
In response to this (justified) sense of inequitable treatment, UMMC women 
faculty in 1992 created the “Women’s Issues Committee” (WIC). The committee’s 
first co-chairs were Diana DeCosimo, M.D., associate professor of medicine, and 
Karen Reuter, M.D., associate professor of radiology and obstetrics-gynecology. 
In 1994, Linda Pape, M.D., a cardiologist and associate professor of medicine and 
Mary Costanza, M.D., an oncologist and the first woman division chief, became 
the school’s WIC chairs and worked long and hard over the next few years to 
make substantive changes in the climate for women at the medical center.149 In 
1994, too, Dr. Pape was named the first Women’s Liaison Officer to the AAMC 
Women in Medicine program.150 According to its bylaws, the committee’s 
purpose was “to serve in an advisory capacity to the Chancellor/Dean regarding 
issues and activities relevant to women and families and to have direct input 
in the following four areas: “Institutional planning…affecting hiring…; search 
committee representation; compensation; promotion and tenure; maternity, 
paternity, adoption, and family leave; and publications review.” Specifically, 
WIC subcommittees addressed salary equity, tenure and promotion, sexual 
harassment, and women’s health.151
 Dr. Joris recalled that, “One of the first topics [WIC] looked into was 
possible disparities in the pay of women faculty vs. men faculty.” In fact, several 
months after the committee’s formation—with behind-the-scenes prodding 
by senior women faculty—Provost Michael Bratt, Ph.D. sent a memo to all 
department chairs and upper level administrators. It began as follows: “As I 
mentioned at the last two Chancellor’s Advisory Council Meetings, there has been 
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an increasing rumbling below the surface about perceived gender and minority 
salary inequities.” The Lazare administration had agreed to form a “Gender and 
Minority faculty Salary Equity Task Force,” which in its initial, pilot phase was 
chaired by Lynn Eckhert.152 As gently as possible, Bratt now exhorted the medical 
center’s department heads to:
carefully reevaluate the criteria you use in establishing these 
salary levels, carefully scrutinize these data in the context of that 
reevaluation, and then make your FY94 salary recommendations 
in the context of that reevaluation…I am confident that the 
combination of these convergent processes and the good will you 
have displayed in the past will allow all concerned to have renewed 
confidence not only in the appropriateness of our processes, but 
also in the fairness of their outcomes.153
The salary survey yielded disturbing results. As Bratt reported, 
Based on its analysis of the data provided in March of 1993 the Task 
Force questioned the salaries of 49% of all women on the faculty 
as possibly low relative to those of their male colleagues. Although 
some of these were found to be appropriate, and were appropriately 
raised when the faculty member took on additional responsibilities 
or received a grant, a large fraction of salaries the Task Force 
identified as apparently low, were determined to be inappropriately 
and inequitably low, and were subsequently corrected  [emphasis in 
original].154
Almost half of the women whose salaries were flagged as potentially low received 
“Task Force Identified/Generated Equity” increases, or about 25% of all women 
then on the faculty. Just as important, measures were taken to institutionalize 
mechanisms for “continual monitoring” of salary equity for the future. By the 
time a second salary survey was completed in 1997, only 12 salary “adjustments” 
were deemed appropriate and necessary.155 
 As the most egregious issue—salary inequities—was addressed, the 
subtler and less tractable issues of the institutional climate towards women 
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(and minorities) came under closer scrutiny. A second major undertaking led 
by the Equal Opportunity Office and the WIC, a “Gender Equity Survey” that 
was begun in 1994, was intended to assess the gender climate at UMMC beyond 
the single issue of equitable compensation. Bratt observed that “…the overall 
poor representation of women in leadership roles clearly contributes to a lower 
average compensation level for women.” Thus, the Board of Trustees agreed to 
a medical school-generated proposal to revise the campus’ academic promotion 
policy to enable promotion on a non-tenure track for faculty who contribute 
significantly in teaching, clinical service, and other activities that fall outside 
the well-defined advancement pathway for researchers. (Indeed, the slower rate 
of advancement by women compared to men faculty at UMMC documented by 
the report was more pronounced among the clinical departments.) Finally, a 
“special effort” was begun to appoint more women faculty to UMMC standing 
committees and other leadership positions. Not coincidentally, in 1996 Cheryl 
Scheid, Ph.D., a professor of physiology, was designated the first Vice Chancellor 
for Faculty Administration. Over the next decade, Scheid and her office, with 
active collaboration from the WIC, developed many of the mechanisms that have 
continued to guide policy regarding the issues of promotion, tenure and, more 
generally, equitable treatment of faculty.156 
WIC also sponsored speakers to address issues of professional 
development, leadership, and the role of women in medicine, inviting, for 
example, Janet Bickel, head of the AAMC’s Women in Medicine program, in 
2001. Another of the WIC’s initiatives, establishing a robust place for education 
about women’s health in the curriculum, was spearheaded by Judith Ockene, 
Ph.D. Throughout 1995 and 1996, Ockene chaired a women’s health task force 
that worked to establish a presence in the curriculum for the study of women’s 
health, whether in the first and second year “doctoring” courses, or in electives 
   563
and interclerkships. Ultimately, one of the task force members, Julie Jonassen, 
Ph.D. of the physiology department, did establish women’s health courses as part 
of the interclerkship program described earlier in this chapter.157
 By the late 1990s, the core members of the WIC concluded that the 
committee would profit from a modest restructuring. Indeed, the progress of 
women faculty appeared to have stalled, as the following table shows:
                                         158  
                                   
In 2000, with Phyllis Pollack, M.D., a pediatric cardiologist, and Julie Jonassen 
as co-chairs, the renamed “Women’s Faculty Committee” added several programs 
to its portfolio—with support from the Office of Faculty Administration and the 
Equal Opportunity Office—such as a program for mentoring junior faculty, an 
awards luncheon, and a successful application to the Joy McCann Foundation 
to establish a Joy McCann Professorship for Women in Medicine. Funds from 
the McCann professorship support both the recipient of the two-year endowed 
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professorship, who undertakes a project in support of women faculty at UMMS, 
but also the mentoring program, something with which Judy Ockene became 
closely identified.159 (Linda Weinreb, M.D., professor of family medicine, held the 
first Joy McCann professorship.) The group also sponsors a Women’s History 
Month lecture and a Women’s Health lecture. Finally, in collaboration with 
Luanne Thorndyke, M.D., Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs, and the Women’s 
Leadership Group, the Women’s Faculty Committee developed a Faculty Scholars 
award to fund a portion of a junior faculty member’s research at a point when 
she (or he) has encountered a time-limited but conflicting responsibility due to a 
family-related illness or other urgent concern.160 
 Between 2000 and 2012, the status of women faculty at the medical school 
assumed a distinctly upward trajectory. The Medical School began supporting the 
selection of a competitively chosen cadre of women faculty to participate in the 
AAMC’s professional development workshops and the Hedwig van Ameringen 
Executive Leadership in Academic Medicine (ELAM) program run by Drexel 
University College of Medicine. Three department chairs out of 18, or 17%, were 
women, compared to a national benchmark of 
13%. Thirty-eight percent of program directors 
were women; 23 women were division chiefs. 
One of the three deans was a woman (the Deans 
of the Graduate School of Nursing thus far have 
always been women), and two-thirds of both 
the Senior Associate Deans and Vice Provosts 
were women. Cheryl Scheid, Ph.D., Vice 
Chancellor for Faculty Administration from 1996 
to 2006, was succeeded in that role by Luanne 
Thorndyke, M.D. in 2010; Judith Ockene, Ph.D. became Associate Vice Provost 
Cheryl Scheid, Ph.D. (Photo courtesy 
of the University of Massachusetts 
Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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for Faculty Affairs in 1999, served as interim Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs from 
2006 to 2010, and then resumed her earlier role under the new title of Associate 
Vice Provost for Gender and Equity. In 2012, 25% of the faculty at the rank of 
tenured full professor were women compared to the national benchmark of 20%. 
UMMS slightly exceeded the national benchmark in 2012 for full-time associate 
professors as well.161 
None of this occurred by chance. Women faculty at UMMS have benefited 
from strong leadership and mentoring from Scheid, Ockene and Thorndyke, as 
well as the indispensable strong commitment to equity by the school’s academic 
leaders. Even after Cheryl Scheid left UMMS for a position elsewhere, Judith 
Ockene and Luanne Thorndyke continued her initiatives by normalizing close 
examination of all faculty members’ readiness for promotion through mentoring 
and regular discussion of potential candidates for advancement with department 
chairs. As a result, Ockene noted, “In one year, we got 10 women promoted to 
full professor and associate professor. And some of the chairs who I worked with 
said, ‘I don’t understand how I didn’t focus on these particular individuals to be 
promoted’…So it worked very well.”162
 Nevertheless, much work remains to make the academic workplace 
attractive and equitable for young women (and young men) who are trying to 
balance their responsibilities to their families and to their profession. In 2014, 
a Diversity Engagement Survey sent to employees and students of the medical 
school by Deborah Plummer, Ph.D., Vice Chancellor for Diversity and Inclusion, 
revealed the persistence of perceived inequities. Statistically significant numbers 
of women faculty responded less favorably than their male peers to questions 
about fairness in compensation, in recognition for excellence, and in their sense 
of worth to the institution.163 In 2015, Ockene sent out an email query to members 
of the Women’s Faculty Committee, asking for their thoughts on the current and 
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future situation of women in academic medicine. One response typified several. 
Mary Costanza, M.D., professor of medicine emeritus and, previously, chief of the 
division of oncology, wrote:  
Put bluntly, it’s time for culture change and culture change now 
and the Women’s Faculty Committee needs to make this their 
priority. This is about creating a truly family friendly workplace/
community…do it for your daughters (and sons). You deserve a 
place to work where a parent can leave a child in safe day care, 
where you can nurse without searching for a private place. You 
deserve to work where leaving at 5 or 6 pm is the rule, where 
morning meetings don’t begin before school starts. You deserve a 
place to work where life starts at home, not at the lab or the office. 
And your male colleagues deserve it as well…164
As Judith Ockene observed, “Today…we must figure out how to help families be 
flexible…This is about families, and family health, however you want to configure 
it.”165
  Perhaps surprisingly, the issue of day care at the UMass-Worcester 
campus was taken up as early as 1978—and not only by women faculty. The 
first iteration of a campus day care center was established at the Irving A. 
Glavin Regional Center, a facility owned by the Massachusetts Department of 
Mental Health that was located a few minutes from the campus by car. During 
the discussions prior to Board approval of the day care center for children 
of students, medical residents, faculty, and staff, Massachusetts Secretary of 
Education Paul Parks told the Board that he favored the provision of child 
care facilities as “essential to the opening of opportunities for women in all the 
professions.” In 1991 the Center moved to larger quarters in Shrewsbury, and 
then to a house on Plantation Street that abutted the main campus. When that 
facility closed, several years passed before a group of faculty and students, men 
and women, worked successfully with the campus administration to remodel 
parts of the Shaw Building into a modern child care facility. The issue of child 
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care truly does transcend the concerns of women in the workforce; men, too, feel 
they have a stake in the issue, and they are correct.166
The Graduate School of Nursing
Founding the Graduate School of Nursing, 1965-1985
 Although a school of nursing was envisioned by the school’s founders, the 
Graduate School of Nursing was established at the University of Massachusetts-
Worcester only in 1985. The first class matriculated in September 1986. The idea 
for a nursing program was first mentioned in 1965 by UMass Medical School 
Lamar Soutter, whose vision of a multi-disciplinary health sciences campus 
included schools of nursing, dentistry, and even veterinary medicine. But in 
1965 the professional climate for nursing differed greatly from what emerged in 
the decades since then. For example, Dean Soutter anticipated only a four-year 
undergraduate program for nurses. 
 From the earliest days of professional nursing in U.S. hospitals in the late 
19th century, nursing was structured mainly to support hospital administrators’ 
and physicians’ needs, with little of the professional autonomy or diagnostic skill 
we associate with nursing today. Although the professional identity of nursing 
steadily consolidated over the course of the 20th century, even in the 1960s there 
was no national consensus among nurses about the educational requirements 
for entry into practice. But, the need to advance nursing professionalism through 
collegiate, not diploma school, education was beginning to be acknowledged, for 
example in the influential Lysaught Commission Report of 1970.167 Leaders in 
academic nursing, such as Dean Loretta Ford at the University of Rochester also 
began advocating for a new model of advanced practice nursing, specifically the 
“nurse practitioner.” Initially this meant that many—but not all—diploma-school 
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educated nurses would find it necessary (and desirable) to earn a bachelor’s 
degree in nursing. Beyond that, new master’s programs for nurses would be 
necessary to effectuate the nursing profession’s goals for advanced practice 
nursing, including nurse practitioners. Following national trends, doctoral 
programs for nurses also became available. By the time UMass opened its 
University Hospital in 1976, these educational trends had become compelling 
although, as noted in Chapter 5, Worcester itself maintained numerous hospital 
diploma schools well into the 1970s and 80s.168
 The direct impetus for a graduate school of nursing at UMass, 
however, came from within University Hospital a few years after its opening 
in 1976. Locally, Worcester State College (now, University) had a successful 
undergraduate degree program in nursing that reduced the need for such 
a program at the Medical Center. Gail Frieswick, Ed.D. (UMMC Nursing 
Administrator, later the hospital’s CEO), and Anne Bourgeois, Ed.D. (Associate 
Administrator, later the hospital’s CNO and President) realized that patient care 
would benefit from encouraging nurses in central Massachusetts, and especially 
those already working at UMass, to pursue an advanced nursing practice 
degree. As the patient census and acuity of conditions increased at the hospital, 
it required nurses who were familiar with the latest technologies and with the 
sickest of patients. As Gail Frieswick recalled, “We needed nurses that had more 
depth than what we had from diploma programs.”169 Indeed, after the UMass 
hospital opened in 1976, it made its desire for baccalaureate-level nurses very 
clear in its hiring preferences, as Chapter 5 has already noted. It was hoped, too, 
that Master’s degree-prepared nurses could bring the latest skills in community 
nursing out to regional population centers. This view was shared by the UMass-
Worcester Health Sciences Task Force, which issued a report in 1980 that cited 
graduate nursing education as a high priority for new programs on the campus.  
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 Working with consultants such as Lillian Goodman, Ed.D., founding chair 
of the Department of Nursing at Worcester State College, and nursing leaders 
from Yale, Case Western, UMass-Amherst and other institutions, Frieswick 
worked assiduously to persuade a hesitant UMMC leadership and UMass Board 
of Trustees to establish the school. Bourgeois concentrated on easing the doubts 
of the hospital’s own nurses by explaining the potential benefits of moving 
beyond a diploma-school or even a bachelor’s degree preparation. Physicians, 
too, had to be reassured that advanced practice nursing would be beneficial 
to the overall system of care. In working to reduce the animosity of the local 
diploma schools, another crucial issue, “Lillian [Goodman] was a major support,” 
according to Frieswick.170 Finally in 1983 the Board voted to establish a Master’s 
program for nurses at UMass-Worcester, and (just in time) amended their vote 
on July 16, 1986 to substitute the word “School” for “program.”171
 Two additional years passed between the 1983 vote and the actual 
commitment of funds for space, equipment, and recruitment of faculty, students, 
and staff. After a national search, in which Chancellor Robert Tranquada, 
Frieswick, Bourgeois, Goodman, and chairs of the major clinical departments 
participated, Kathleen J. Dirschel, Ph.D. was named the first Dean of the 
GSN. Dr. Dirschel, the Dean of Nursing at Seton Hall University, had recently 
completed a program in Academic Administration at Harvard. Dirschel was 
appointed Dean in June 1985, and the planning process began in earnest.172  
Growing the GSN—1985-2010
 Founding Dean Kathy Dirschel learned quickly that there are two sides to 
the coin of a brand new school. On the one hand, she found a deep reservoir of 
good will and pride that UMass would be starting a graduate school of nursing, 
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the first in the UMass system. On the other hand, “When I got to UMass, the tiny 
little space they carved out [for the GSN] was kind of like a locker room; it had 
no furniture. We had to rent furniture!” But, the opportunities seemed endless, 
in Dean Dirschel’s words, “to enhance professional practice so that it had a very 
strong scientific basis, and to strongly develop the advanced practice role…called 
the ‘nurse practitioner’ role at that time…”173 Soon the first new faculty member, 
Dr. Susan Roberts, was hired and they began 
planning the curriculum. As Roberts commented, 
“We had a blank slate—what do you want to do 
and how do you want to do it?” Fortuitously for the 
UMass GSN, Boston University had recently closed 
its highly respected school of nursing. As a result, 
Dean Dirschel could hire a number of the excellent 
faculty who were just then looking to relocate.174 
With the first faculty, including Drs. Susan 
Chase, Glenys Hamilton, Carolyn Lawless, Diane 
Skiba, and Susan Roberts, Bourgeois and Dirschel 
developed a Master’s in Nursing Science curriculum for advanced practice 
nurses. Major concentrations included Acute Care Nurse Clinical Specialist, 
Nurse Administrator (a joint MSN/MBA with Clark University), and Ambulatory 
Clinical Nurse Specialist. The school went on to introduce a track for the HIV/
AIDS nurse practitioner. Dirschel herself began to practice in the HIV clinic, 
learning how to interview for sexual histories and practices. Carol Bova, who 
later became a member of the faculty and one of the first to be an NIH-funded 
researcher at the GSN, was also at this time beginning to develop her expertise in 
advanced practice HIV/AIDS nursing.175
 In 1986, the first class of 30 students matriculated. At first, they could 
Kathleen Dirschel, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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barely find classroom space since most classrooms had been reserved long in 
advance by the medical school. The first graduation, which was held for the 13 
students in the accelerated, one-year program, took place in the Lamar Soutter 
Library in the spring of 1987. In the fall of 1987, the entering class reached its 
full complement of 10 full-time and 35 part-time students.176 One year later, the 
National League for Nursing awarded the GSN full accreditation for eight years.177
 When Dirschel took another position in 1991, Lillian Goodman, who was 
on the verge of retiring from Worcester State, was invited by Chancellor Lazare 
to become the interim dean; in 1995 she was made permanent dean of the 
school, continuing in that role until her retirement in 2000. Many new programs 
were developed during the nine years of her deanship. Professor emeritus and 
associate dean Mary K. Alexander, Ed.D. emphasized that, with a small faculty 
during  its first few years, the GSN could react quickly to changing needs; it 
could “turn on a dime!” For example, the Acute Care Clinical Specialist track was 
revised as a major in Acute Care Nurse Practitioner. Alexander remembered, “We 
created a program for acute care nurse practitioners in 3 months!” Subspecialties 
in HIV/AIDs, Cardiac Nursing, Geriatric Nursing, and Cancer Prevention were 
Lillian Goodman, Ed.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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also initiated during Lillian Goodman’s deanship. In keeping with the GSN’s 
ambitions to develop a program of nursing research, the school also launched the 
university’s first doctoral program in nursing in collaboration with the nursing 
school at UMass-Amherst. (Among its earliest students was the future dean of 
the GSN, Paulette Seymour-Route, Ph.D.) On the occasion of the school’s 20th 
anniversary in 2005, Dean Emeritus Lillian Goodman noted that, “The practice 
of nursing has changed. The advanced practice nurses, teachers and researchers 
who will guide these changes must be rigorously prepared in nursing programs of 
high academic quality…Our programs of study are designed to sharpen analytic 
skills, stimulate scientific inquiry and develop effective practice methods through 
which compassion and caring will flourish.”178
 When Dean Doreen (Dodie) Harper, Ph.D. succeeded Goodman in 2000, 
she was fortunate to find that both the master’s and doctoral programs were 
well under way at the GSN. But, additional pathways remained to be cultivated. 
Two of these, the Worcester Nursing Pipeline Consortium and the Graduate 
Entry Pathway (begun in 2004), responded to an acute 
shortage of nurses during the 1990s. The GEP accepted 
individuals with bachelor’s degrees (or higher) in a 
field other than nursing into graduate nursing degree 
programs. As Harper commented, “Anne Bourgeois 
helped me understand how we could be more in sync 
with the clinical system…at the bedside. We had to have 
a pre-licensure program…We were in a nursing shortage. 
We needed to ramp up the production of nurses [yet] we 
didn’t produce what most hospitals wanted—RNs.”179 The 
GSN also created a track for Advanced Practice Nurse 
Education. Today, she continued, programs like the Graduate Entry Pathway 
Doreen Harper, Ph.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the 
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(GEP) are the “fastest growing cohort” in the profession. A Ph.D. program 
independent of the UMass-Amherst campus was approved during her deanship. 
It began in 2005.180  
 In 2006 Seymour-Route became the Dean of the GSN after having served 
as interim dean for the previous year. Under her leadership (she retired in 
2015), the GSN again responded to changing health care needs by establishing 
a Doctorate of Nursing Practice (D.N.P.) in 2008. The school also moved far 
ahead in research activity and funding. Today, in Seymour-Route’s words, the 
GSN has “numerous faculty who are continuing the model first started well 
before us of working on the clinical side and the academic side. Out of 25 full 
time faculty, we have three who have federally 
funded grants.” Interestingly, Seymour-Route’s own 
career path recapitulated the evolution of nursing 
professionalism in Massachusetts. Many of her most 
important professional relationships were generated 
during her years as a student and, later, as a faculty 
member at the Worcester City Hospital diploma 
nursing program, learning about direct care at the 
bedside. Yet she knew that baccalaureate training was 
becoming essential for nurses, and soon began work 
on bachelor’s degree (B.S.N.)  at Worcester State. In 
1987 she received her M.S.N. from Boston College. At 
the opening of the UMass-Worcester/UMass-Amherst doctoral program in 1994, 
she pursued her Ph.D., graduating in 2001. From early in her career, she also 
held part time teaching positions at the GSN. 
Significantly, however, all the while she pursued her interests in 
academic nursing, Seymour-Route held increasingly responsible and prominent 
Paulette Seymour-Route, Ph.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
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positions in successive clinical systems, and ultimately at the UMass hospital. 
Her experience moving from bedside nursing to the Chief Nursing Officer and 
Senior Vice President at University hospital helped bring the GSN full circle. The 
original vision of Gail Frieswick and Anne Bourgeois, namely, to establish a well-
integrated clinical and academic system, thus was facilitated by Seymour-Route’s 
own career trajectory. And this in spite of the organizational separation between 
the two systems in 1998, described in Chapter 5. Dean Seymour-Route in fact 
served on the Board of Directors for UMass Memorial Health Care.181
 At the GSN, this vision has been allied to another imperative, 
interprofessional learning. In 2010 the World Health Organization published 
a “framework for interprofessional education.” At about the same time, the 
Interprofessional Education Collaborative (IPEC), a non-profit consortium 
created in 2009 issued a set of suggested competencies for interprofessional 
education. The consortium represented a variety of U.S. health professions 
educational organizations such as the American Association of Colleges of 
Nursing and the Association of American Medical Colleges.182 At UMMS and the 
GSN, those involved with curriculum design have acknowledged that health care 
professionals must work “to value, to understand, to educate and to practice in 
interprofessional teams while maintaining [their] own identity as a nurse, as a 
physician, as a pharmacist, as a social worker, but all intently focused” on the 
patient.183 As Michele Pugnaire, Senior Associate Dean for Educational Affairs, 
observed, the GEP students “came with a bachelor’s degree and they were going 
to get an advanced practice [nursing] degree, either a master’s or, now, a doctor 
of nursing practice.” Pugnaire added that the students—medical and nursing 
students—“love it. I think the reason they love it is because they, first of all, 
learn so much more from each other than they ever do from us. And secondly…
they start out early establishing [interprofessional] relationships of trust and 
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respect that, hopefully, will withstand the test of time.” Beyond maintaining 
good coordination between academic and clinical settings, this is also being 
realized through interprofessional coursework for medical and nursing students, 
especially utilizing the Simulation Center to learn clinical skills and in global 
health projects in the Dominican Republic.184 Reciprocally, GSN faculty such as 
Seymour-Route and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Janet Hale, Ph.D., 
R.N., teach in the medical school curriculum in segments of the “Doctoring and 
Clinical Skills” course. 
In recent years, the GSN made the decision to redirect its master’s-degree 
programs into a track for nurse educators and a new track in population health. 
This decision responded to the increasing need for advanced practice nurses 
who will work in practice settings that incorporate community health outreach 
into their core mission. Primarily the GSN will focus on its doctoral programs. 
Even the GEP students will enter the GSN as doctoral candidates in the D.N.P. 
program to become nurse practitioners. In October 2015, Joan M. Vitello-Cicciu, 
Ph.D., R.N., previously the associate chief nurse of cardiovascular, thoracic, and 
surgical acute care at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, was named as the new 
dean of the Worcester campus’ Graduate School of Nursing.185 
The Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences
 Graduate education is an essential component of any campus with a 
serious commitment to research. Although the Graduate School of Biomedical 
Sciences (GSBS) came to fruition during the Tranquada years, the process began 
much earlier. On April 10, 1978, approximately six months before moving to 
the University of Texas Health Science Center-Houston, Chancellor Roger J. 
Bulger, M.D. wrote an emphatic letter to UMass President Franklin Patterson, 
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urging him to support a proposal for a “Ph.D. Program in Medical Sciences” at 
the medical center in Worcester. As he noted, “This proposal has received the 
unanimous approval of the Faculty Council and Executive Council of the Medical 
School.” Bulger made sure to emphasize that the faculty came here, 
…expecting to be able to teach in a graduate program and eagerly 
await its arrival. It will not only contribute further to the intellectual 
enrichment of the campus, but this enrichment itself becomes 
an invaluable attraction in our efforts to recruit first-rate clinical 
faculty…To put it another way, it is doubtful that high quality 
faculty would be attracted to an institution which does not have 
the intellectual ferment and excitement generated by the kinds of 
scholarly activities which characterize graduate education.186
Faculty researchers were beginning to lose patience. The presence of graduate 
students for their labs, no less than in their classes, was sorely missed and 
anxiously awaited. On June 7, 1978 President Patterson and the Board of 
Trustees, gave the new program their full support.187 What was needed was a full-
fledged graduate school but until 1986, a “doctoral program” had to suffice.
 Why did UMass-Worcester have to fight so hard even to get that much? 
First, at the time, research was being downplayed as part of the central mission 
of the medical school. Nor did the University’s flagship campus, UMass-Amherst, 
welcome UMass-Worcester’s ambitions to become a Ph.D.-granting institution. 
Just as the Medical School began to plan a graduate program in the biomedical 
sciences, doctoral education in Massachusetts, and in the U.S. generally, suffered 
a serious demographic setback. In the mid-1970s, the UMass system cut back 
many of its doctoral programs in the face of population shifts and waning 
demand for new Ph.D.s in academia. As a report by the UMass Vice President 
for University Policy concluded, “At present trends, we may turn out 100,000 
to 200,000 more Ph.D.s during the rest of this decade than can be absorbed in 
academia, industry, and government…” As a result, the University administration 
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and Board of Trustees emphasized consolidation, streamlining, and avoidance 
of duplication of graduate programs during most of the 1970s.188 The Worcester 
campus was hardly in evidence during discussions over the future of graduate 
programs at the University in this period, with the focus entirely on the UMass-
Amherst and Boston campuses. The dean of the Graduate School at UMass-
Amherst, moreover, viewed the Worcester campus as a potential competitor.
 As early as 1972, members of the UMMS basic science faculty, through 
their representatives on the Scientific Council, formed a committee to begin 
planning a graduate program. In this they were fully supported by Dean Lamar 
Soutter, as they were by his successors, Acting Dean Butcher and Chancellor/
Dean Bulger. Indeed, an early accreditation visit from the LCME noted that 
UMMS was required to develop graduate programs. As an initial step, in 
December 1972, guidelines were drawn up for a “Five College Program” to 
permit a student enrolled in a graduate program at UMass-Amherst to take 
courses leading to a doctorate at either the Worcester campus, WPI, Clark, or the 
Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology (later, the Worcester Foundation 
for Biomedical Research). Similarly, in 1977 the Medical campus was invited to 
become part of a joint Ph.D. “Program in Biomedical Sciences” with Clark, WPI 
and the Worcester Foundation. The obvious drawbacks to either program was the 
inability of students to receive degrees from UMass-Worcester or to take any but 
lab courses at the Medical Center.189
 An independent program based at the medical campus, however, had 
been envisioned by the 1972 agreement with Amherst, and faculty here began 
the planning process even while participating in those precursor programs. 
Dean Soutter appointed a formal planning committee of faculty from both the 
basic and clinical sciences early in 1975, chaired by George Wright, associate 
professor of pharmacology and eventually director of the initial Doctoral Program 
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in Medical Sciences. Its members understood the political facts of life: to win 
approval for a freestanding degree program, such a program must not cost much 
(costing nothing was preferred); it must offer a course 
of study unique to the Worcester campus; it must, 
if possible, incorporate collaboration with UMass-
Amherst and local higher education entities; and 
finally, it must fill a niche in the potential job market 
for Ph.D.s. The committee worked for two years to 
devise an acceptable proposal. Wright explained, “We 
wrote [the proposal] as a program in the medical 
sciences so that it could not be easily duplicated by 
any other school in the state…”190 
 As faculty insistence on a free-standing doctoral program began to mount, 
external support arrived in the form of a Visiting Committee Report of February 
1976 and the LCME’s second accreditation visit in April 1976. Both urged the 
Medical School to establish a graduate program of its own, “without further 
delay…Any long delay…will lower the morale of the basic sciences faculty and 
decrease the quality of the basic science educational and research programs.” 
This is the climate in which Chancellor Bulger wrote his unusually blunt letter of 
support. He concluded, “It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of this 
program to our faculty, and to the overall educational milieu experienced by our 
medical students.”191 With this background, we are better able to understand 
the program that was approved by the University Board of Trustees on June 7, 
1978.192
 Regarding the original curriculum, Wright remembered, “The biggest 
problem was trying to match the particular scientific rigor that each department 
would want to offer with the political realities of the times…to prove that we were 
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not duplicating other existing programs.”193 A catalogue from 1980-1981 states 
that, 
The program of study leading to the Ph.D. in Medical Sciences 
consists of a core curriculum to be taken by all students and a 
specialization and research phase to be selected by the individual 
student…The core curriculum will provide all students with 
an integrated foundation…emphasizing coursework in at least 
four of the seven basic medical sciences at the Medical School, 
interdisciplinary courses in Molecular Biology and Cellular Biology 
and a Seminar in the Medical Sciences.194
The core curriculum was to be completed in 18, or at most, 24 months. 
Students were also required to participate in at least two lab rotations during 
their first year.195 Initially, the areas of specialization included anatomy, 
biochemistry, microbiology, pathology, pharmacology, physiology. In 
addition, an interdisciplinary course of study, possibly working with one 
of the Worcester Consortium institutions, could be arranged. By 1981, an 
interdepartmental faculty group in immunology had been added to the list 
of possible concentrations. Eventually, it was anticipated, “clinical medical 
science departments in which faculty members will teach and direct research 
of graduate students would include the Departments of Pulmonary, Renal, 
and Cardiovascular Medicine, and the Departments of Infectious Diseases, 
Hematology, Endocrinology and Immunology-Rheumatology.” Others would be 
added in the future.196 
 Only seven students were accepted for the first class, beginning in 1979, 
the numbers a reflection of the school’s newness and its financial state in 
those early years. As Maurice Goodman, recalled, “there was no money [in the 
budget] to cover stipends for first-year graduate students, so we devoted money 
[from the Scientific Council’s overhead reserve fund] for that.” Students could 
expect a stipend of $4000 during their first two years, but $4500 in grant-
   580
funded assistantships after they were accepted into an advisor’s laboratory for 
dissertation research. By 1986, the number of matriculants had grown to 20-
25, including M.D.-Ph.D. students, with an optimum total number of students 
projected at 100. Indeed, during the 1984-1985 academic year, more than 130 
applications were received for the available slots.197
 Dr. Wright was appointed Acting Associate Dean from 1978-1980. But 
from 1980, the Program was sufficiently mature for his appointment to be 
changed to Dean of Graduate Studies, a position he retained until 1984 when he 
decided to return to full-time research and teaching. Oversight of the program, 
as with the GSBS after 1987, was placed in the hands of a Graduate Council. The 
Council consisted of “one representative from each of the [basic] medical science 
departments…two representatives of the clinical science departments, and a 
representative of the graduate student body.” 198
 On April 2, 1986, nine years after the founding of a Graduate Program 
in Medical Sciences, the University Board of Trustees approved a significant 
change of status for UMass-Worcester, granting it the right to form a Graduate 
School of Biomedical Sciences (GSBS). The graduate 
program had been a “grass-roots program.”199 Just as 
the faculty drove the push for the Graduate Program, 
so they fueled the drive to become a full-fledged 
school at the Worcester campus. The force behind this 
transformation, in similar fashion to George Wright 
a decade earlier, was Thomas Miller, at the time of 
this writing a professor emeritus in the department of 
Biochemistry, Molecular Biology, and Pharmacology. 
Miller became Wright’s successor as Acting Dean of 
the Program in 1984 and founding dean of the GSBS. Miller believed that, “It was 
Thomas Miller, Ph.D. (Photo 
courtesy of the University of 
Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts 
Medical School)
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becoming a trend for Ph.D. programs that were attached to medical schools to 
seek out their own identity by becoming a school…So I started a crusade [with] 
the Graduate Council to change the Graduate Program into the Graduate School 
of Biomedical Sciences…”200 Miller saw the issue as one of identity—or the lack of 
it—in the eyes of the doctoral students themselves.  Once the Graduate School of 
Nursing had been established in 1985, a concern to be on “an equal footing” with 
the other two schools intensified. The draft proposal for the GSBS explained that: 
Another compelling reason for this change in status is to give the 
Ph.D. students themselves an independent identity…Without this 
[new] organizational structure, Ph.D. candidates tend to view 
themselves as second-class citizens vis-à-vis medical or other health 
science students on campus. In the words of our Dean for Graduate 
Studies [Miller], the ‘identity problem for graduate students in a 
Medical School, although anecdotal, is real…’201
 Perhaps more germane, the growth of research activity at the Worcester 
campus argued for the Program’s designation as a Graduate School. By 1986 
more than 130 faculty members participated in the Program; an M.D.-Ph.D. 
program had been initiated in 1983, evidence of the GSBS’ growing importance 
and the wide involvement of faculty across the basic/clinical research spectrum. 
Chancellor Tranquada was happy to encourage development of a proposal 
that cost relatively little and which heightened the profile of, and added value 
to, research and education on campus. The faculty, department chairs, and 
administration worked together to move the plan forward. 
 Certain key differences distinguished the GSBS from the Medical School 
and the Graduate School of Nursing, the result of its utilizing only full-time 
faculty with Medical School appointments. Hence, the GSBS proposal of 1986 
stated that the “status and powers of the Graduate School will differ from those of 
the two professional schools at UMass-Worcester as follows:
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--A direct reporting line to the Provost on academic matters, rather than 
the Chancellor, because of the dependence of Graduate School programs 
on the Medical School faculty and the strong interrelationships between 
these schools.
--No authority to develop an independent faculty. The Graduate 
School’s authority in academic personnel matters will be limited to the 
appointment of qualified Medical School and Graduate School of Nursing 
faculty…
--No authority to establish academic departments within the [Graduate] 
School.”202
The GSBS faculty, however, were empowered to form interdepartmental or 
interdisciplinary programs, and in fact the Immunology and Virology program, 
created in 1986, was an outgrowth of the immunology program that had been 
in existence for several years already. Such curricular decisions and most other 
matters of oversight were the responsibility of both the Graduate Dean and the 
Graduate Council.
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In typical UMass-Worcester fashion, the GSBS started on a shoestring. 
Tom Miller remembered, 
We were in a small little area down in the student wing of the 
medical school. There hadn’t actually been an office of Graduate 
Studies when I started. George Wright hadn’t had an office; he had 
run it out of his faculty office in the department of Pharmacology. 
We were allowed to start an office…By that time there were, I think, 
35-40 graduate students…By the time I left [2002], we had a couple 
of hundred, 150-200 students.203 
Miller understood that faculty wanted students in the labs and, “there weren’t 
that many to go around. Everyone in the basic sciences and a few in the clinical 
sciences wanted students in their labs. So I started an active recruitment 
program.”204 In 2011 the GSBS boasted an enrollment of nearly 450 students. 
Four years later, as federal research funding contracted, the number of new 
GSBS students was reduced accordingly. As in the 
1970s, the robustness of graduate education in 
the biomedical sciences responded to the external 
economic climate for such research. 
 In 2002 Miller retired and in 2003 was 
succeeded by Anthony Carruthers, Ph.D., the GSBS’s 
current dean. Carruthers first came to UMMS from 
King’s College, University of London, in 1982 as a 
research associate. Now a professor of biochemistry 
and molecular Pharmacology, his research focuses 
on glucose transport structure. He emphasized the 
wisdom of the GSBS’s interdisciplinary curriculum, 
saying in 2004, “Our faculty determined it’s not enough for our students just 
to do neuroscience or biochemistry or cell biology. They must have a core 
Anthony Carruthers, Ph.D. 
(Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School 
Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
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Medical School)
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understanding of the principles involved in all these areas.”205 Indeed, although a 
number of the graduate school faculty had lobbied hard to give degrees in specific 
disciplines such as immunology or microbiology, by the late 1990s many, if not 
all, had begun to see the virtue of the less specific designation of a doctorate in 
“biomedical sciences” with a concentration in a specialized area.206 As Carruthers 
explained:
…the type of research we now do is rather different. When I first 
came here, you could work on an isolated molecule and secure 
extramural support from in the NIH very easily. But now you have 
to be able to work on the isolated molecule, then work on it in a 
cell, then work on that cell in an organ, and that organ within an 
organism, and I suspect as we branch into more extensive clinical 
research, those organisms within a population. And so now in 
NIH applications, we have to be able to talk about individual 
molecules and how they do what they do, but we need to be able to 
explain their role within the context of a whole organism, and the 
advantages of the roles that they bring to the organism.207
The GSBS core curriculum—originally the product of political expediency, 
that is, the need not to be duplicative—became one of its signature features. 
Newer initiatives are reflected in the two divisions that currently structure GSBS 
coursework, “Basic and Integrative Biology” and “Clinical and Translational 
Sciences,” a structure that incorporates new specialty tracks such as the programs 
in Clinical and Population Health Research or Bioinformatics and Computational 
Biology. 
Lamar Soutter Library
 An excellent library was integral to Lamar Soutter’s vision for UMass 
Medical School. As early as 1965—months before the university’s trustees decided 
on a location for the new medical school—an editorial in the New England 
Journal of Medicine praised a proposed federal law that would provide funding 
for medical library construction or renovation. The editorial was emphatic 
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that, “New medical schools, such as that at the University of Massachusetts, 
regardless of where it will be located, must have strong working libraries.”208 
New medical schools, continued the editorial, can expect to accumulate some 
100,000 volumes and to take regularly some 1600 journals. A decade later, when 
Soutter unexpectedly resigned as Chancellor/Dean of UMass Medical School, 
Acting Dean Bill Butcher wrote to President Robert Wood, “I am aware that the 
Trustees are not enthusiastic about using the names of living persons, but this 
seems a special case. I should add that Dr. Soutter has always had a particular 
fondness and concern for the Library.” The trustees agreed. In 1975 they named 
the medical library after him: the Lamar Soutter Library (LSL).209 
 Soutter’s vision for the library was captured by one of its early librarians. 
She wrote that, based on his own experience as a medical student, Dean Soutter 
“emphasizes the importance of providing the medical students with study 
facilities other than those that may be available in the dormitory complexes. [To 
assure] the greatest possible acceptance of the Library as a study-and-reading 
adjunct of student life, the types of seating must be as varied as the needs and 
the work habits of the persons who will use them.” Michael Foley’s recollection, 
described earlier in this chapter, of a student regimen of working late into the 
night in the library, punctuated either by naps on the couches or a bit of touch 
football, seems to have reflected the dean’s designs. (Given the early interior 
decoration—vintage 1970s with bright orange carpeting and blue upholstery—it’s 
hard to imagine students ever falling asleep there. Yet they surely did.) Nor were 
food and drink forbidden in spite of the early decision to build completely open 
stacks. From the outset, the library was envisioned as a haven for students and 
faculty, a place to study, to think, to work individually or in groups.210
 Initially the library’s collections were shipped to the UMass-Amherst 
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campus, but after the Shaw Building’s purchase they were sent directly to 
Worcester. Because of the delay in opening the campus’s permanent buildings, 
the first of the library’s directors, Cynthia Philpott, worked with Soutter and 
the UMass-Amherst librarian to purchase and organize the library’s holdings. 
By 1967, these included 30,000 books. Philpott was followed by Cynthia Robin 
Brown, whose efforts alongside Soutter’s to win support for the library from the 
Worcester medical community resulted in several meetings with the officers 
and board of the Worcester District Medical Society prior to the actual opening 
of the school.211 One focus of mutual interest for the two organizations was the 
amalgamation of the rare book holdings of the WDMS’s Worcester Medical 
Library with the UMMS library’s rare book collection. In 1974 an agreement 
was made to this effect with the WDMS’s collection being intershelved with 
the volumes of rare books already acquired by Dr. Soutter from the Pittsburgh 
Academy of Medicine for the UMass rare book room.212
Following Cynthia Brown’s retirement in 1970, Donald Morton, Ph.D., 
D.L.S., became the LSL’s director for the next 25 years. Morton, a plant 
pathologist who later earned a doctorate in library sciences from Simmons, 
initially presided over modest quarters in the Shaw building. But within three 
years he was able to oversee the library’s move into its new building nestled 
between the basic and clinical science wings of the medical school and, once 
the hospital was completed, just around a corner from the first floor corridor to 
the hospital. Like so many facets of the school’s first two decades, however, the 
library’s robust “physical facilities” belied the fragility of its financial support. As 
the Physiology Department’s Visiting Committee report detailed in 1978, “it is 
unfortunate that book acquisitions and periodicals are apparently limited due to 
inadequate finances. A comparison of the University of Massachusetts medical 
library with those of other schools in the northeast …indicates that [UMMS] is the 
   587
lowest in terms of total library expenditures.” Although an LCME accreditation 
report from 1984 found that the LSL was “a valuable resource which serves 
the entire medical community effectively,” the view of more research-oriented 
outsiders, such as those assessing the Physiology Department in 1978, noted the 
library’s inability to keep up with the needs of at least some researchers. (The 
Physiology Department, it must be noted, adopted a common practice of funding 
a departmental library for the use of its own faculty and graduate students.)213 As 
long as the library kept abreast of students’ curricular needs, and as long as the 
medical center did not centralize and ramp up its research activities, the library 
was able to maintain its reputation through sympathetic staff and accessible 
resources.
By the 1990s, however, much had changed. As Chapters 8 and 9 have 
illustrated, UMass Med had emerged from a long period of legislative indifference 
or even hostility; its research activities and graduate education likewise were 
benefiting from careful and concerted attention. In addition, the medical school’s 
Educational Policy Committee and Office of Medical Education, in alliance 
with the Generalist Physician Initiative and other outside funding sources also 
were experiencing a new sense of empowerment. Yet the institution’s relevant 
infrastructure had not yet been brought up to date. This applied to the LSL, 
but the library was not alone. In 1994, a petition signed by faculty, fellows, 
and graduate students was delivered to Provost Michael Bratt. It read, “We…
strongly urge you—the members of the Administration and the Computing 
Center—of the urgent need to improve upon the piecemeal computing facilities 
currently provided to our research, teaching, and student communities.”214 The 
LSL’s situation was no better and possibly worse than the Computing Center. 
The imminent retirement of its well-liked director, Don Morton, left him in no 
position to negotiate for increased funding. His immediate successor, Annanaomi 
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Sams, had been the associate director and became interim director after 
Morton’s retirement. She was appointed his permanent successor in 1995. But, 
amid library staff dissension and a lack of resources to hire additional staff or 
equipment, she left the institution in 1997.215 
 By that time, an LCME accreditation visit had cited deficiencies in library 
resources and facilities. Even students were complaining about slowness of 
service.216 The administration was put on notice and reacted promptly. As a 
first step, Frank Chlapowski, Ph.D., assistant vice chancellor of research, was 
appointed interim director of the LSL. He, in turn, worked with an outside 
consultant and the library staff to begin the process of rebuilding the library’s 
importance to, and high regard among, the institution’s educational and 
research constituencies. As Chlapowski observed, the library has always been, 
“loved by the students and faculty, the physicians, scientists, and so forth, 
and even the public comes in to use it.”217 It was neither easy nor inexpensive 
to return the library to its previous place in the lives of 
faculty and, especially, students. As a first step, a new 
library director was hired. Elaine Martin, D.A., became 
LSL director in 1998 after having been director of the 
University of Illinois-Chicago College of Medicine library. 
She found a library in urgent need of professional staff, 
renovations (that orange carpeting had not aged well), 
and a thoroughgoing technological upgrade: “They did 
not have internet access. They did not have desktop…
computers with mice—nothing like that. They had a stand-alone CD-ROM 
MEDLINE system that you had to come in to use for searching. They still had 
the card catalogue…They didn’t have [electronic] card access [for the photocopy 
machines]. Very basic things…” But with administration support and a special 
Elaine R. Martin, D.A. 
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contribution by Mary Soutter, Lamar Soutter’s widow, library renovations were 
completed in 2003. One by one, a long check-list of other needed resources was 
completed.218 
 Perhaps the first sign that the library was assuming a new, nationally 
recognized stature, arrived with a $5 million, 5-year grant from the National 
Library of Medicine in 2001 to become a Regional Medical Library (RML) for 
the New England Region (NER). At the time of the application, the UConn 
School of Medicine was the site of the NER-RML. No one expected that UMass 
would successfully wrest the contract away from the current grant recipient. 
When the LSL succeeded (it has competed successfully for renewals of the grant 
a total of three times, and will hold the contract at least through 2021), LSL 
staff knew they had successfully emerged from the doldrums. Numerous other 
initiatives in clinical service, education, research, and archival stewardship 
reinforced this impression of a rejuvenated library. For example, recognizing 
that many clinicians at UMass Memorial hospital also held faculty appointments 
at the medical school, the LSL established a clinical librarian program in which 
librarians served as liaisons to clinical departments. Working particularly 
with the departments of Family Medicine and Community Health, Pediatrics, 
Emergency Medicine, Obstetrics-Gynecology, and Surgery, librarians attend 
morning report, grand rounds, and other activities where they participate in 
clinical problem-solving and evidence-based medicine using remote-access 
search techniques to find the best and most relevant journal articles for cases 
under discussion at that moment. At the invitation of the then chair of Pediatrics, 
Marianne Felice, M.D., the library also created a pediatrics library in the waiting 
area of the Children’s Medical Center designed for patients and their families.219
 With regard to education, the library’s role has also increased. LSL 
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librarians act as research advisors to all GSN doctoral candidates and any Ph.D. 
students from the GSBS who request their assistance. Whereas in the past, 
the LSL taught classes in a variety of research tools such as expert searching, 
reference management, or use of PowerPoint and Excel, now the librarians teach 
evidence-based research skills during clerkships. They also work as the assigned 
liaison to each of the medical student learning communities. In research, the 
situation is more complex. One of the library’s most valuable—and invisible—
services to researchers has been the access it provides to journals—at first 
mainly in print, now almost entirely online—through institutional subscriptions. 
Researchers rarely need to ever visit the library itself, sometimes even forgetting 
that the library has paid for the access they enjoy. Like medical libraries 
everywhere, rising journal subscription costs and stable or even declining library 
budgets may threaten these services.
 LSL has begun new initiatives to support wider access for UMMS 
researchers’ output, such as through the Institutional Repository, by 
supporting an open access initiative, and by developing expertise in data 
management/curation, known among librarians as “e-Science.” Under Elaine 
Martin’s initiative, the library created a new journal, the Journal of eScience 
Librarianship, with Martin as editor-in-chief. The LSL also developed “Science 
Boot Camp,” which is designed for librarians who want to learn more about the 
natural, environmental, and statistical sciences with which they need expanded 
familiarity to fulfill their growing responsibilities on research teams or as liaisons 
to graduate students. Finally, the LSL developed a fellowship for recent library 
graduates who want to become health sciences librarians. It is a two-year or, 
optionally, a three-year program that provides needed postgraduate training in 
the specialized skills of health sciences librarianship. The fellowship program also 
continually rejuvenates its host library by bringing in recent graduates. In 2006, 
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the LSL was asked by the medical school administration to create a new service 
to sustain the historical traditions, cultural heritage, and documentary record 
of UMass Medical School by starting an Office of Medical History and Archives 
(OMHA). In addition to establishing the institution’s archives, OMHA created a 
large collection of oral histories, a historical timeline, a robust online presence, 
and organized events to highlight significant historical developments in the life of 
UMass-Worcester.220 
 Global health librarianship at the LSL evolved as a result of UMass-
Worcester’s long involvement with overseas initiatives to treat and prevent 
dissemination of HIV/AIDS in Africa. A 14-year long civil war in Liberia led to 
the destruction of most of the nation’s educational and other civil infrastructure. 
UMass Medical School and others were invited to assist in the resurrection of the 
University of Liberia’s A.M. Dogliotti College of Medicine in Monrovia. Katherine 
Luzuriaga, M.D., whose work in Liberia led to her leadership of the UMass 
involvement, immediately recognized that the Liberian medical school’s library 
also was in disarray. Medical students need a library, even if, in this case, lack of 
electricity and even sometimes of running water created enormous challenges. 
Elaine Martin and James Comes, Ph.D., the retired head of public service 
librarianship at the LSL, made numerous visits to Liberia. As of this writing, even 
after the major setback of an Ebola outbreak, a modest medical library of about 
7000 donated books and other paper-based supplies have been imported to 
Liberia, catalogued, and organized for medical student and faculty use.221
 Today’s Lamar Soutter Library faces many challenges. In Elaine Martin’s 
words, these challenges begin with “peoples’ perceptions of libraries, [namely] 
‘That it’s all online. It’s on your desktop. What do you need the library for?’ 
And, ‘Why do you need all that money for these resources…isn’t it free online?’” 
Moreover, the LCME standards for medical school libraries are eroding from a 
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separate requirement for libraries, including a requirement for a physical library, 
a collection, and professional librarians, to simply a requirement “that students 
need access to information to support the curriculum.” Nevertheless, students 
seem no less inclined to gravitate to the library as their locus of study, research 
(and relaxation) than when Lamar Soutter was first planning the library’s mission 
and design. This seems unlikely to change—at least not in the near future.222
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
An Academic Health Science Center, Honoring the Past, 
Looking to the Future
  In 1978, UMass Medical Center Chancellor Roger Bulger concisely 
articulated the challenge that would face campus leaders for decades to come. 
He wrote that, “The faculty and the administration believe that the appropriate 
future of the Medical Center will be to serve as an academic health center. 
Whether that vision will be fully embraced by the university’s trustees and the 
public officials of the commonwealth is a key question for the future.”1 This 
concluding chapter, an overview of the past decade, will describe UMass Medical 
School in the years since it began its gradual reconfiguration as an academic 
health science center.
 Supporting a robust research environment while maintaining the school’s 
commitment to primary care education and service was clearly a challenge, but 
it was essential to UMMS’s identity in the 21st century. As this book has shown, 
the school’s early history was a struggle to overcome the explicitly modest 
expectations of some (though not all) of its earliest legislative supporters. From 
Lamar Soutter to Chancellor Michael Collins and Dean Terry Flotte, successive 
leaders of UMass Med sought to assure its standing as more than a “community” 
medical school. That assumption lay behind Dean Soutter’s insistence on 
building a teaching hospital. Yet, investing in both primary care education 
and world class research seemed barely possible for many years. Legislative 
challenges drained energy and attention from adopting a comprehensive strategy 
for institutional excellence. Scarce resources made such a strategy difficult even 
619
to envision. Indeed the school faced multiple threats to its very existence—first 
in 1969, then in 1975, in 1981, and in 1990. By the late 1980s, however, a newly 
determined President and Board of the University of Massachusetts, bolstered by 
an outsider’s perspective, made possible the reevaluation of the school’s potential 
for research significance, a commitment briefly begun under Chancellor Leonard 
Laster and continued under Chancellors Lazare and Collins and Dean Flotte.
  Paradoxically, the privatization of University hospital in 1998—despite 
the distress it entailed to many of the clinical faculty—freed the school to focus 
on research and its embrace of a new identity: academic health science center. 
Simultaneously, Aaron Lazare’s interest in medical education, coinciding with 
renewed national concern over a shortage of primary care providers, insured a 
parallel recommitment to educational vitality. The Generalist Physician Initiative 
focused campus educators’ attention on primary care curricular innovation at the 
same time as leaders in the basic sciences were working to insure the success of 
the campus’ research enterprise. With the divestiture of the hospital, the success 
of Commonwealth Medicine and the school’s increased prestige, state political 
leaders no longer saw the medical school as a financial liability The UMMS 
Graduate School of Nursing and Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, too, 
were developing well. After a period of stasis in the 1980s and early ’90s—with 
a 3-week furlough of state employees as the nadir, the 1990s, as the previous 
chapters have shown, became years of significant advances on all fronts.
*****
 By the turn of the 21st century, the medical school was fully invested in 
becoming a research-intensive health science center while also capitalizing on its 
growing reputation for primary care education. As UMMS Chancellor Michael 
Collins, Chancellor Lazare’s successor, wrote in 2009, “Over the course of the 
last two decades, [UMMS] experienced a period of sustained and substantial 
growth in its research enterprise. From FY’94 to FY’09, NIH funding of UMMS 
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investigators has more than tripled ($35 million to $125 million) and from 
FY’02 to FY’09, total research and development expenditures at UMMS have 
increased 53% ($134 million to $204 million).”2 Resources made available 
through Commonwealth Medicine’s consulting activities on behalf of the state of 
Massachusetts gave essential support to the school’s intensified commitment to 
research.
 Managing the tensions that arise between the domains of medical 
education and basic research, is never easy. Nor, as described in Chapter 9, was 
it always possible to erase the resentments among more successful and less 
successful basic science departments. Strains also were evident along another 
plane, between the clinical system and the medical school, an unfortunate 
reminder of the university hospital’s difficult 
privatization process, described in Chapter 
5.3 Dr. Lazare, whose interpersonal skills had 
helped lead the campus back from a period of 
intense perturbation in 1989-1990, became one 
of the longest-serving medical school heads in 
the U.S. Along with Lazare’s strong leadership, 
the creativity and intelligence of his two chief 
aids, Rick Stanton and Tom Manning, made 
possible much of the school’s growth during 
the previous 15 years, first through adroit 
negotiation with state officials and second, 
through the creation of Commonwealth Medicine. But after so many years, the 
decision-making powers accrued to the Lazare leadership team became a source 
of frustration, particularly to the chairs of powerful departments who felt that 
their own influence had thus been diminished. The fact that neither Stanton nor 
Manning was a physician or a scientist seems to have exacerbated the irritation 
of the school’s academic leaders. One retired department chair put it this way: 
“I think one of Aaron’s great skills has been to disseminate responsibility while 
centralizing authority.”4  
Aaron Lazare, M.D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University of Massachusetts Medical 
School)
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 In 2005, Chancellor Lazare prepared a self-study of his administration as 
part of a scheduled review of UMass chancellors, which in this case included the 
heads of the Worcester and the Lowell campuses.  His analysis of the currents 
of dissatisfaction then circulating around the medical school succinctly (and 
frankly) identified the main sources of tension:
Current challenges facing the Worcester campus include: problems 
related to the medical school faculty working for two employers; a 
lack of understanding/acceptance by some academic leaders over 
fiscal limitations of the medical school; dissatisfaction on the part of 
some academic leaders over their perceived lack of input regarding 
allocations of finances and space; dissatisfaction of some educators 
and clinicians over the perceived imbalance of school resources 
dedicated to the research mission; a lack of understanding and/
or commitment of many faculty over the public service mission 
of the school and the operations of Commonwealth Medicine; 
dissatisfaction of some of the chairs over the authority delegated to 
the two deputy chancellors who are not faculty.5
At the UMass Trustees’ meeting in August 2005, President Jack Wilson 
announced that Chancellor Lazare’s review showed him to be doing “an 
outstanding job.”6 But the outside reviewers also suggested that Dr. Lazare 
consider making some changes. They particularly highlighted a need for someone 
in the top leadership to represent faculty interests and, if possible, clinical faculty 
in particular. They commented that, “‘there needs to be special attention paid 
to the clinical faculty including reemphasis on the capacity of clinicians to do 
research and teaching in addition to their clinical work.’” The reviewers also 
suggested that separating the dean’s and chancellor’s positions might make this 
possible.7 
 Over the succeeding year, tensions began to build, exacerbated by 
external developments. For example, soon after his election in the fall of 2006, 
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick began discussing ways to propel the state 
forward as “a global leader in the life sciences.” Even before his formal proposal, 
a 10-year, $1 billion Life Sciences Initiative (LSI), was announced in May 2007, 
informal discussions galvanized president Jack Wilson, the Trustees, and, of 
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course, the leaders and individual researchers 
at the Worcester and Amherst campuses. 
Since 2004, President Wilson and the Board 
had been looking for ways to increase non-
state revenues, especially through science and 
technology initiatives. Even before Governor 
Patrick’s election, an ad hoc Trustees’ task 
force on Science and Technology began 
considering the role of stem cell research 
across the UMass system. Craig Mello’s award 
of a Nobel Prize in the fall of 2006 focused 
attention on the Worcester campus. With 
Governor Patrick’s declared intention on the 
table, UMass was put on notice. Solid proposals 
to attract state funding for the life sciences became an urgent priority. 
 By the time the governor’s initiative was formally announced, Chancellor/
Dean Lazare had resigned as the medical school’s dean and chancellor. The 
decision was a two-stage process. In the fall of 2005, Dr. Lazare informed the 
campus that he was undergoing surgery for renal cancer. In February 2006, as 
a result of the outside reviewers’ suggestions noted above, possibly because of 
pressure to attract research funding, and certainly as a result of the effects of 
illness, Dr. Lazare agreed to relinquish his duties as Dean but to retain his role as 
Chancellor.8 
 The appointment of Terence R. (Terry) Flotte, M.D., a pediatric 
pulmonologist, as Provost, Executive Deputy Chancellor and Dean, was 
announced on April 2, 2007. Flotte, who was previously the chair of the pediatrics 
department at the University of Florida College of Medicine and director of the 
University of Florida Genetics Institute, is an internationally known researcher in 
the field of gene therapy. In 2005 he received the E. Mead Johnson award from 
the Society for Pediatric Research, a measure of his standing.9 As both a clinician 
and scientist, the new dean was strongly encouraged to focus on “bridging 
Governor Deval Patrick (Public domain 
photo courtesy of blackpast.org)
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between the clinical and the research side of things” at UMMS. But, as he soon 
became aware, other fracture lines could 
not be ignored. And, just after Dr. Flotte’s 
appointment, Dr. Lazare also resigned as 
Chancellor, in part due to illness.10 With 
clinicians and researchers expressing a sense 
of exclusion from, or at least frustration 
with, decision-making at the medical school, 
Flotte rapidly became convinced that the 
leadership wasn’t “doing enough…to help 
people see a common vision.” From his 
perspective, the campus had entered a highly 
promising period, as the new dean told a 
campus gathering, “poised to bridge the gap 
between science and the bedside, a goal that entails not only training the right 
individuals but putting the right systems in place.”11
 Believing that the campus couldn’t “afford to wait a long time” to 
replace Dr. Lazare, on May 15, 2007 President Wilson appointed Michael F. 
Collins, M.D. to be acting chancellor of the Worcester campus and Senior Vice 
President for Health Sciences 
for the university system. The 
appointment coincided with 
Dean Flotte’s arrival on campus. 
(The Board’s official vote for 
Chancellor Collins occurred on 
June 23, 2007. He was made 
the permanent chancellor for 
UMMS in September, 2008.)  
Dr. Collins, an internist who 
had attended the College of the 
Holy Cross in Worcester as an undergraduate and Tufts University as a medical 
Terence Flotte, M.D. (Photo courtesy of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School Archives, Lamar Soutter Library, 
University  of Massachusetts Medical School)
Michael Collins, M.D. (Photo courtesy of the University 
of Massachusetts Medical School Archives, Lamar Soutter 
Library, University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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student, had been the president and CEO of the Caritas Christi Health Care 
System followed by two years as chancellor of UMass-Boston. Now, Drs. Flotte 
and Collins, with their complementary backgrounds as a clinician-researcher and 
department chair, and as a clinician-senior health care executive, undertook a 
partnership to “align education, research and public service as one synchronous 
unit.” Just as in the 1990s, the years from 2007-2015 became pivotal in the 
medical campus’ history.12
 During their first year at UMMS, the Chancellor and the Dean worked to 
understand the campus’ needs. Dr. Collins conducted a campus-wide strategic 
planning process that encompassed all constituencies and included input from 
UMass Memorial Health Care. As he had done at UMass-Boston, he also met 
at length with every department chair soon after his arrival. Additionally, Dr. 
Flotte met with John Sullivan, M.D., Vice Chancellor (later, Vice Provost) for 
Research, and with the Scientific Council. Very quickly, lack of flexible research 
space headed a list of major unmet needs, but a close second was the need to 
reconnect clinical and basic science faculty. Dr. Flotte thought this could best be 
accomplished through a focus on clinical and translational research. As he later 
emphasized, much of the important work in the basic science departments at that 
time really dealt with human diseases such as AIDS or diabetes. In other words, 
it was anything but a fantasy to envision the next step in UMMS’ evolution as 
a much larger investment in research that would ultimately move, as was often 
said, “from the bench to the bedside.” Reflecting on that first year on campus, 
Dean Flotte recalled, 
…the piece that I thought was very important was to have people 
understand the connection between clinical research and basic 
science research, and how we could align those things…The 
Chancellor committed the resources, got a lot more resources from 
the state and from donors, then we put those into creating more 
numerous and better examples of people who were superb in both 
clinical and in research—that was an important part of changing the 
mindset.13
To underscore the point, in 2006, the NIH began calling explicitly for closer links 
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between basic research and applications to human disease, launching the Clinical 
and Translational Science Award (CTSA) program.14 With UMass President 
Wilson and many campus scientists anxious to increase research activity on 
campus, with the Governor’s Life Science Initiative and the NIH’s CTSA in the 
background, the campus was ready to entertain a more deliberate commitment 
to translational research. The hospital, while no longer part of the UMass system, 
still was a highly valued clinical partner, an essential collaborator in clinical and 
translational research as well as in medical education.
 Drs. Collins and Flotte thus focused on drafting a proposal for support 
from the not-yet-formalized Life Sciences Initiative of Governor Patrick and 
the Legislature. The Life Sciences Initiative was signed into law in 2008 and 
on September 23, 2009, the medical school was awarded $90 million and 
permission to borrow another $235 million for what Dr. Collins had termed 
an “Advanced Therapeutics Cluster” (ATC) to be located in the soon-to-be-
built Albert Sherman Center. As originally envisioned, the ATC comprised the 
RNA Therapeutics Institute, a Center for Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative 
Medicine, and a Gene Therapy Center.15 Looked at from the perspective of 
UMMS’ long-gestating desire for prominence in research (in 2013 it was ranked 
36th in NIH funding among the 141 U.S. medical schools—reaching the top 
quartile for the first time),16 the ATC could be viewed as a fulfillment of intentions 
dating back at least to the mid-1980s. But, looked at from the perspective of 
the mid-2000s, especially in light of the events of 2006-2007, the ATC can and 
should also be seen as auguring a new phase in the history of research at UMass-
Worcester—an emphasis on translational and population health research that 
would elaborate on the accomplishments of world class molecular biologists but 
link that work to clinical applications.
 Such work was not new to the campus. As described in Chapter 9, 
pediatric virologist John Sullivan and his lab had been working with patients and 
pharmaceutical companies in clinical trials of Nevirapine since the 1990s. The 
work of Aldo Rossini, Mike Czech, and others on diabetes was never divorced 
from development of therapeutic applications. From 2007, Robert Finberg, M.D., 
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chair of the department of Medicine since 2000, John Sullivan, M.D., and Gary 
Stein, Ph.D., were part of the University’s Research and Technology Task Force 
working group (along with Robert Jenal, UMMS Executive Vice Chancellor for 
Administration and Finance, and research leaders from UMass Amherst) on the 
development of stem cell research.17 But, the anticipated trajectory of the campus’ 
research program from 2008 onward called for new initiatives to fully take 
advantage of the state’s investment in UMass-Worcester. In Chancellor Collins’ 
words, “We wanted to catch the wave of greater investments in translational 
research.”18
 A key component of their strategy was a successful application for a 
Clinical and Translational Science Award from NIH. Campus leaders proceeded 
along several fronts in preparation for a CTSA award. Possibly the first step was 
the re-purposing of a new building being erected next to the hospital visitors’ lot, 
turning it—in collaboration with UMass Memorial Health Care—into a site for 
specialized ambulatory care and management of clinical trials. The Ambulatory 
Care Center (ACC) opened in 2010. Second, 
additional senior faculty were recruited for their 
dual excellence in clinical and basic research, such 
as David Harlan, M.D., formerly Chief, Diabetes 
Research, National Institute of Diabetes and 
Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK), NIH, 
who was hired to lead the Diabetes Center of 
Excellence, and Robert Brown, M.D., recruited 
from Harvard to continue his work on ALS as 
chair of the department of Neurology and head 
of the Neurotherapeutics Institute. In 2015, a 
reorganized Department of Molecular, Cell, and 
Cancer Biology was created with Michael Green, 
M.D. as chair; he was also named the director of 
the Cancer Center. Catarina Kiefe, M.D., Ph.D., renowned in quantitative health 
sciences, was recruited to create the Department of Quantitative Health Sciences, 
 Catarina Kiefe, M.D., Ph.D. (Photo
 courtesy of the University of  
 Massachusetts  Medical School  
 Archives, Lamar Soutter  Library, 
 University of Massachusetts Medical 
 School)
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including divisions focused on biostatistics, population health, health services 
research, health informatics, outcomes research, and epidemiology of chronic 
diseases and vulnerable populations. Finally, of course, success in winning state 
officials’ approval for the construction of the new research building, designated 
the Albert T. Sherman Center (ASC) in honor of the campus’ longtime state 
legislative liaison, “Albie” Sherman, actualized the school’s vision for the basic 
and translational science. In 2010 the school received a 5-year CTSA grant 
(renewed in 2015). John Sullivan, the CTSA principal investigator, became 
the director of the Center for Clinical and Translational Research; Katherine 
Luzuriaga, M.D., succeeded Sullivan in that role in 2012.19
 Clinical, translational, and basic research may have occupied the center 
of attention during the new administration’s first years, but research was not its 
only concern. Curriculum reform (the LInC curriculum, described in Chapter 
10) also received close attention, emphasizing professional competencies 
and interprofessional learning. As Chancellor Collins recalled, they aimed at 
revamping the curriculum and creating a better learning environment at the 
same time. The ASC, which opened in 2012, was intended to be a genuine campus 
center. It houses a large cafeteria that can be converted to a meeting space, a café, 
The Albert Sherman Center (Photo courtesy of the Office 0f Communications, 
University of Massachusetts Medical School)
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an auditorium, a fitness center, the simulation center, and the learning centers 
and classrooms for medical and nursing students. Students in all three schools 
are always a big presence in the ASC. Responding to national trends in health 
professions education, the school began to cultivate interprofessional learning. 
Now, as Dr. Collins noted,
the nursing students actually teach the medical students how to 
put in an intravenous line, or they work on these inter-clerkship 
experiences together…
Our grad students, who study the genetic component of a disease, 
wanted to see patients with the disease, and so they are now 
interacting with the medical students.20
 Greater ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic diversity of the student body 
continues to be a pressing concern. Several programs mentioned in Chapter 10 
have brought students of diverse backgrounds to campus including the UMMS 
BaccMD program which has the additional benefit of linking the medical school 
with its sister UMass campuses.21 Additionally, a new initiative to expand the 
medical school’s class size, which reached 125 in 2009-2010, will bring 25 
additional students from outside Massachusetts, 20% of whom will be supported 
by scholarships. The total medical school entering class will reach 150 starting 
in the fall of 2016.22 To accommodate the increased number of students, two 
new affiliations have been negotiated to provide resources for clinical clerkships, 
one with Cape Cod Healthcare in Hyannis and another with Baystate Health 
in Springfield. The latter affiliation also will involve the creation of a regional 
campus in Springfield, to be called the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School-Baystate Health, or UMMS-Baystate. The UMMS-Baystate campus will 
emphasize the teaching of rural and urban primary care, population health, 
and integrated health delivery. Twenty-five incoming students will be directly 
admitted to UMMS-Baystate for the fall of 2016, although they will not be in 
residence at Springfield until their clinical years.23
 Community and global engagement have also emerged as strong interests 
of the Worcester campus, an outgrowth of longstanding work by medical and 
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nursing faculty both in Massachusetts and globally. In 2015, the Paul G. Allen 
Family Foundation provided a $7.5 million award for UMass faculty to expand 
their work combatting the Ebola epidemic in Liberia, a nation where UMMS 
has devoted significant efforts to assisting in the restoration of the health care 
delivery and medical education infrastructure.24 For that work and for work by 
medical students who for many years have volunteered at the St. Anne’s free 
clinic (as well as other sites), the Carnegie Foundation named UMMS the first 
medical school to receive its Community-Engaged Campus award. The medical 
school has also begun to collaborate with the U.S. Veterans Administration 
by creating an ambulatory care clinic for Worcester-area veterans that offers 
podiatry, optometry, and audiology services.25
***
 The history of the University of Massachusetts Medical School, from its 
legislative enactment in 1962 to 2015, is a story of remarkable expansion and 
maturation. A glance at its most recent statistical profile reveals the breadth of 
this accomplishment. In fiscal year 2014, the state appropriation to the school’s 
budget was $44.6 million, only 4.8% of UMass Med’s total funding and revenues. 
The school’s research funding from all sources totaled $215.1 million, up from 
$61 million 20 years earlier. From 1974, when its first class of 16 students 
graduated, through 2014, the medical school has graduated 3781 physicians, 1081 
graduate-level nurses, and 663 scientists.26 Envisioned by the Commonwealth’s 
leaders in the 1960s as a medical school for the state’s own students, intended to 
turn out medical practitioners for the state’s own citizens, UMMS has definitively 
reshaped and expanded its original blueprint. 
 From his first year as founding dean of UMass Medical School, Lamar 
Soutter refused the legislature’s attempts to type-cast the new school as a 
“community” medical school. For Dr. Soutter, it was unthinkable that UMMS 
would be any less excellent than the other—the Boston—medical schools. This 
meant that UMMS graduates should have the option to pursue any branch of 
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medicine they desired to follow, not just primary care. And that, in turn, required 
building an academic teaching hospital, provoking a drawn-out battle to pay for 
it after the Nixon administration reneged on its share of the funding. Indeed, 
successive Massachusetts governors, from Governor Sargent in the early 1970s to 
Governor Weld 20 years later, eventually gave way against the determination of 
the medical school (and the University). Along the way, however, the school did 
accede to the legislature’s correct insistence that primary care—family medicine, 
general internal medicine, general pediatrics—become a central pillar of its 
educational programs. UMMS has reconfigured its blueprint, but has made sure 
to retain that important original feature—a dedication to providing doctors for 
the care of Massachusetts families.
 Once the hospital reached a point of modest stability in the mid-1980s, 
however, another school constituency was ready to make a case for increased 
attention and resources, namely, the basic researchers. Some of the school’s 
prominent, early basic scientists, such as Maurice (“Moe”) Goodman, Ph.D., 
and William (“Bill”) Butcher, Ph.D., chairs of the departments of Physiology 
and Biochemistry, respectively, persuaded Lamar Soutter to set aside 50% of 
research overhead funding to subsidize research cores, individual laboratory 
needs, and the like. By the late-1980s, a considerable sum was available to help 
underwrite a realignment of research infrastructure that resulted in the creation 
of the Program in Molecular Medicine, the recruitment of a new generation of 
molecular biologists and biochemists, and, ultimately, the emergence of UMMS 
as an internationally known center for molecular medicine.
 With the turn of the 21st century, UMMS could be said to have come into 
its own. UMass Medical School’s three mission areas of education, service and 
research all were flourishing. Primary care education received renewed attention. 
Curricular initiatives such as the Generalist Physician Initiative and the LInC/
competencies curriculum emphasized clinical skills early in the educational 
cycle, weaving basic science material into clinical cases more fully than before, 
and increasingly emphasizing global and community health competency. For the 
past 20 years, the school has ranked in the top 10% for primary care education. 
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Whereas its founders defined the school’s service mission principally as clinical 
care for the people of the state, after the hospital’s privatization the school 
redefined “service” instead as public sector activities on behalf of the citizens of 
the state. Commonwealth Medicine’s consulting services and Mass Biologics’ 
not-for-profit vaccine and orphan drug manufacturing became significant 
components of the school’s profile and vital components of its financial base. Not 
unrelated, from the 1990s forward, UMass Medical School experienced startling 
success in achieving its aspiration to excel as a research institution. The award 
of a Nobel Prize, a Lasker Award, a Breakthrough Prize, the presence of many 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigators and members of the National 
Academies—described in Chapters 8 and 9—surely surpassed the expectations of 
the school’s founding generation of faculty and its original legislative sponsors. 
Finally, with the CTSA and other investments in clinical and translational 
research, the school’s accomplishments are encompassing all dimensions of its 
original mission of education, research, and service.
 UMass Medical School undeniably became an academic health science 
center. A typewritten telephone directory from 1971 lists 110 employees of the 
medical school, of whom 11 were volunteer clinical faculty. In 2013, UMass 
Medical School employed about 6800 people, a nearly sixty-fold increase.27 Yet 
it has not changed in one crucial respect. As Chancellor Collins pointed out, and 
as many of those who were interviewed for this book also insisted, despite the 
campus’ growth in ambition and size, it has not lost the collaborative culture 
so valued by its first generation of students and faculty. In Dr. Collins’ words, 
“what’s so unique about the Worcester campus is its collaborative nature…
in Boston, that wasn’t always the case. But here, there’s a collaborative gene, 
and it’s dominant and fully expressed.”28 Nevertheless, it was not easy for 
UMMS to transcend the limits of its origin story: a school to provide doctors 
for Massachusetts families. Nor is it inevitable that the school will continue to 
transcend the boundaries of that vision as it has done during the past two decades 
by acquiring a national reputation for excellence in primary care education 
and cutting edge research. Balancing these two domains has never been for the 
632
faint-hearted. But it is a worthy vision, one that twenty-first century citizens of 
Massachusetts, in the spirit of the school’s founders, have come to expect. That 
alone is testament to UMMS’s success. 
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Alexander, Mary K.
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Bartke, Andre 
Bernhard, Jeffrey
Bertman, Sandra
Bourgeois, Anne 
Bova, Carol 
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Bruner-Canhoto, Laney
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Bulger, Ruth Ellen 
Butcher, R. William
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Carruthers, Anthony 
Cassell, Christine
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Chlapowski, Francis 
Cohen, Carole 
Collins, Michael
Conte, John 
Costanza Mary
Coteleso, Karen 
Cutler, Bruce 
Czech, Michael 
Dalen, James 
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Debenedetto, Diane 
Dimitri, Dennis
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Doyle, Dan 
Drachman, David
Dukakis, Michael S. 
Eckhert, Lynn 
Ennis, Michael
Felice, Marianne
Finn, Leonard 
Flotte, Terence
Foley, Michael 
Frey, John
Frieswick, Gail
Fritsche, Coleen 
Fulmer, Hugh 
Gallagher, Donna
Goodman, Lillian 
Goodman, Maurice
Grady, George
Green, Karen 
Green, Lois
Grignard, Annette
Grignard, Patricia Loughlin 
Handley, Mary
Hanshaw, J. Barry
Harper, Doreen 
Harrington, Muriel Sawyer
      638
Hines, Deborah Harmon
Hines, Gail Loughlin 
Howe, John, III 
Hunter, Richard
Irwin, Richard
Jacobson, Allan
Kabat-Zinn, Jon
Karlin, Bruce 
Lai, Margalit 
Lasser, Daniel 
Laster, Leonard
Lawrence, Jeanne 
Lazare, Aaron 
Levine, Peter
Li, Lynne
Lian, Jane
Lochrie, Jane 
Longenecker, R. Gerald
Loughlin, Paul
Love, Evelyn 
Lucia, Alan
Luzuriaga, Katherine
Martin, Elaine 
Mason, Edward
McCracken, John 
McNeil, Ogretta Vaughn 
Miller, Thomas Bryan
Murphy, Joyce 
Ockene, Ira
Ockene, Judy 
O’Connor, Darlene
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Odgren, Paul
Pape, Linda 
Pappas, Arthur 
Paraskos, John 
Pederson, Thoru 
Pigaga, Vite 
Pockwinse, Sherwin 
Pugnaire, Michele
Quirk, Mark
Raza, Azra
Roberts, Sue 
Rogoff, Mai-lan
Rossini, Aldo
Saba, Frank
Santorelli, Saki 
Scheid, Cheryl
Schell, A. Robert
Schiavi, Susan 
Schooley, Susan
Schwartz, Paul
Seymour-Route, Paulette 
Sherman, Albert 
Singer, Joshua 
Soutter, Mary B. 
Soutter, Nicholas
Soutter, Sarah
Spillane, John 
Stanton , Richard
Starr, Susan
Stein, Gary
Stein, Janet
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Stoff, Jeffrey
Sullivan, John 
Tipper, Donald 
Tranquada, Robert
Valdman, Olga 
Walton, Richard
Weinstein, Bruce
Welsh, Raymond 
Wheeler, H. Brownell 
Wolf, Merrill Kenneth 
Wright, George
Zamore, Phillip
Zereski, Cathy
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Appendix B.
Chancellors and Deans
UMass Medical School and UMass Medical Center
•	 Lamar Soutter, M.D. – Dean: 1964-1975; Chancellor: 1974-1975
•	 R. W. Butcher, Ph.D. – Acting Dean: 1975-1976
•	 Roger J. Bulger, M.D. – Chancellor/Dean: 1976-1978
•	 H. Maurice Goodman, Ph.D. – Acting Chancellor/Dean: 1978-1979
•	 Robert E. Tranquada, M.D. – Chancellor/Dean: 1979-1986
•	 James E. Dalen, M.D. – Acting Chancellor: 1986-1987
•	 J. Barry Hanshaw, M.D. – Dean/Provost: 1986-1989; Acting Chancellor: 1987
•	 Leonard Laster, M.D. – Chancellor: 1987-1990
•	 Aaron Lazare, M.D. – Dean ad interim: 1989; Dean: 1990-2007; Chancellor ad 
interim: 1990;  Chancellor: 1991-2007
•	 Michael F. Collins, M.D., FACP – Chancellor ad interim: 2007-2008; Chancellor: 
2008-present
•	 Terence R. Flotte, M.D. – Dean: 2007-present
Graduate School of Nursing
•	 Kathleen M. Dirschel, RN, Ph.D. – Dean: 1985-1991
•	 Lillian R. Goodman, Ed.D. – Dean: 1991-1999
•	 Doreen Harper, Ph.D., CS, ANP, FAAN – Dean: 2000-2005
•	 Paulette Seymour Route, Ph.D. – Interim Dean: 2005-2006; Dean: 2006-2015
•	 Joan Vitello, Ph.D., RN – Dean: 2015-present
Program in Biomedical Sciences
•	 George E. Wright, Ph.D. – Acting Dean: 1979-1980
•	 Trudy G. Morrison, Ph.D. – Acting Dean: 1980-1981
•	 George E. Wright, Ph.D. – Dean: 1981-1984
Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences
•	 Thomas B. Miller, Jr., Ph.D. – Dean: 1984-2002
•	 Anthony Carruthers, Ph.D. – Dean: 2002-present
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